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SUMMARY 
This thesis considers the existence of, and potential causes of, continuation and 
reversal effects in stock market returns. In the first part of the research, a time- 
series approach is used to consider the profitability of momentum trading 
strategies on fourteen major stock market indices. Momentum trading strategies 
exploit continuation in returns, and evidence of significant profits to such 
strategies therefore implies the presence of continuation effects in the data 
samples. Significant losses to momentum strategies, on the other hand, are 
indicative of reversal effects in returns. This part of the research identifies 
continuation effects in stock index returns over periods of 1 trading day and 10 
through 252 trading days. 
The second part of the research explores the various behavioural and non- 
behavioural theories proposed in the literature for the existence of continuation 
and reversal effects in returns. Such effects imply that stock market trends differ 
systematically from trends in random data with the same underlying distribution of 
daily returns. An algorithm from the information technology literature is adapted 
and used to identify turning points in trends in the fourteen data sets, and the 
statistical properties of daily returns within stock market trends are analysed. 
Important patterns are observed in the steepness of trends and the volatility of 
returns within trends as they develop. These patterns enable some inferences to 
be drawn as to the most probable factors driving the continuation effects 
observed in the first part of the research, with nonsynchronous trading and 
investor loss aversion highlighted as potential causes of very short-term and 
medium-term effects respectively. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background and Structure of Thesis 
This thesis documents two main bodies of research which approach from 
different angles the question of the existence and nature of continuation and 
reversal effects in stock market returns. Continuation effects in financial market 
returns occur when periods of positive returns are followed by further positive 
returns and negative returns are followed by negative returns. Reversal effects, 
on the other hand, occur when positive returns are followed by negative returns 
and negative returns by positive returns. 
The existence of continuation and reversal effects is an important issue in 
finance. If such effects can be shown to be a feature of stock market returns, 
then this would imply that stock markets are not efficient in the manner 
suggested by Fama (1970) and that suitably constructed trading strategies will 
generate excess returns which are not accounted for by risk. Jones and Netter 
(1993) identify three perspectives from which the issue of stock market 
efficiency is important. Firstly, from an economy-wide perspective, stock market 
efficiency implies that the market is functioning effectively in channelling 
financial resources between savers and borrowers. Market inefficiency may 
therefore imply a non-optimal allocation of resources at the economy-wide 
level. At an individual level, small investors might be deterred from entering a 
market which they believe to be inefficient since inefficiency may favour large 
investors with access to extensive research resources. Stock market efficiency 
is therefore considered to be desirable since it is expected to generate the 
widest possible participation in the stock market. Finally, market efficiency has 
important implications for regulation, with a higher level of regulation typically 
considered necessary to control less efficient markets. 
If continuation and reversal effects are shown to occur in stock market returns, 
then the appropriate response on the part of policy-makers will depend on the 
factors driving such effects. A number of different explanations of continuation 
and reversal effects in stock market returns have been proposed in the 
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literature. These fall into two broad categories. Behavioural biases, reviewed in 
Chapter 2, relate to research in psychology which suggests that the way in 
which individuals approach decision-making situations can introduce bias to the 
resulting decision. Decision-making heuristics, or rules of thumb, as well as 
emotional factors affecting decision-making may lead investors to make biased 
predictions of future returns. If such biases affect investors in a systematic 
manner and their effect is not cancelled out by arbitrage activity, then 
anomalies in individual behaviour may feed through to anomalies in market 
returns. Alternative explanations, discussed in Chapter 3, concentrate on non- 
behavioural reasons for the findings of the empirical literature. The nature of 
the data used in these studies may be responsible for short-term anomalies, 
with bid-ask bounce and the effects of nonsynchronous trading on recorded 
prices driving short-term serial correlation effects. Secondly, the additive rather 
than multiplicative methods of aggregating short-term returns used in most 
studies may also introduce bias to their results. Thirdly, the models of expected 
returns typically used to calculate abnormal returns do not necessarily reflect 
the returns available to investors, and so findings of continuation and reversal 
effects in the empirical literature may not imply the availability of excess returns 
in the real world. Finally, even if such returns were shown to be available to 
real-world investors, they may simply reflect the risk inherent to the trading 
strategies required to exploit them. 
In order to reflect the existence of both behavioural and alternative 
explanations for the return anomalies reported in the empirical literature, this 
thesis uses the terms continuation and reversal effects throughout in 
preference to the terms underreaction and overreaction which are commonly 
employed in the literature. Similarly, a consistent terminology is applied 
throughout in describing the research methodologies employed by previous 
studies, although individual authors use slightly different terms'. 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed review of the findings of previous studies which 
have examined empirically the existence of continuation and reversal effects in 
stock market returns. The structure of Chapters 2 through 4 might be 
'A range of terms has been used in the literature for formation and test period, for 
example, as well as for the various models of expected returns and methods of 
cumulating returns reviewed in Chapter 3. 
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considered unorthodox in that the possible explanations proposed in the 
literature, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, for empirical findings of continuation 
and reversal are presented in advance of a review of the findings themselves. 
This structure is adopted in order that the findings of individual studies can be 
critically reviewed with reference to the potential pitfalls of the methodologies 
employed. In addition, many empirical studies have gone on to propose specific 
behavioural factors as potential explanations for their empirical findings. These 
can only be commented on in depth following the review of the behavioural 
literature provided in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 4 documents a large body of previous empirical research on the 
existence of continuation and reversal effects in financial market returns. This 
body of work is categorised for the purposes of review into three sections: 
short-term, medium-term, and long-term studies. 
Studies of short-term stock market continuation and reversal effects examine 
returns following large price changes over periods from one day to one week. 
In general, studies tend to find evidence of short-term reversal in returns with 
periods of poor returns following large short-term price increases, and high 
returns following large short-term decreases in price (see, for example, Atkins 
and Dyl, 1990, and Otchere and Chan, 2000). 
Studies of medium-term continuation and reversal effects identify stocks with 
particularly high and low returns over periods ranging from one to twelve 
months and go on to examine returns over subsequent periods of similar 
length. Overall, the empirical evidence from studies such as Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993 and 2001) and Hon and Tonks (2003) suggests that significant 
continuation effects occur in stock market returns over horizons lasting up to 
around 12 months. That is to say, stocks which perform well over periods of up 
to 12 months tend to continue to perform well over subsequent periods of 
similar length, and vice versa for stocks with poor performance. 
Studies of long-term stock market continuation and reversal effects follow the 
seminal work of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) who consider the returns of New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks between January 1926 and December 
1982 and conclude that extreme "winners" over a three/five year period show a 
consistent tendency to become "losers" over the following three/five year period 
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and vice versa. That is to say, extremely high and low return stocks tend to 
experience a "reversal of fortunes" over the long term. Whilst the focus of the 
current study is on short-term and medium-term continuation and reversal 
effects, long-term effects can be seen as a combination of shorter-term effects 
and as such, the results of previous research into long-term continuation and 
reversal in stock market returns are of relevance to the current study and are 
therefore reviewed in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 goes on to describe the data used in both parts of the research 
documented in this thesis and to provide descriptive statistics. FTSE All-World 
country index data (daily price index and total return index data) was 
downloaded from Datastream for the period January 1994 through December 
20022 for the stock markets of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the 
UK, and the USA. Chapter 5 also describes the calculation of the daily price 
returns, total returns and funded returns on which the empirical research 
documented in this thesis is based. 
Fama (1998) contends that, with an appropriate change in methodology, the 
anomalies of continuation and reversal in stock market returns identified in the 
literature and described in detail in Chapter 4 will tend to disappear. The main 
objective of the first part of the research documented in this thesis is to 
investigate whether short-term reversal and medium-term continuation effects 
persist when measured using a time series methodology and where the 
measure of abnormal returns is the profitability of momentum and contrarian 
trading strategies. These profits reflect the excess returns available to investors 
after taking into account funding costs but before transactions costs3. The 
availability of excess profits to such strategies is an important issue since, if 
found, they imply that investors are "leaving money on the table". That is to say, 
2 January 1994 being the earliest date for which total return index data is available for 
each country. 
3 Transactions costs are not explicitly considered in the research documented in this 
thesis since they may vary widely from investor to investor. Any excess profits must, 
therefore, be sufficiently large to cover transaction costs at the level relevant to the 
individual investor before investment in such strategies can be expected to yield 
positive returns. 
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anomalies have not been fully arbitraged away by the market, and investors 
may be able to achieve persistent profits from suitably specified trading 
strategies. The use of returns to investors as the appropriate measure of 
returns allows the risk inherent to such strategies, that is to say the volatility of 
returns, to be explicitly considered. In addition to the profitability of such 
strategies, therefore, this section of the research explicitly examines whether 
the risk of the strategies considered is empirically related to their returns. 
Chapter 6 discusses the research methodology employed in this part of the 
research. Trading strategies are derived which buy the relevant stock market 
index following rises in the market and sell following market declines. Such 
strategies can be expected to generate significant excess profits in markets 
that are subject to continuation effects and significant losses in markets subject 
to reversal. Eleven strategies are considered for each of the fourteen data sets 
(one for each of the countries considered) based on holding periods ranging 
from one day to one year. The excess returns to each strategy are calculated 
as the returns to a funded position in the relevant index. That is to say, the 
returns calculated reflect the returns available to real-world investors before 
transactions costs4. Returns are decomposed into the returns from long and 
short positions for each strategy, and the annual returns to each strategy are 
also considered. Sharpe Ratios, which measure the relationship between 
returns and risk, are calculated for each strategy. A non-parametric bootstrap 
approach is used to assess the impact of serial correlation in the data on the 
returns achieved. As Fama (1998) argues, positive returns may simply occur as 
a result of chance resulting in a fortuitous choice of data sample. The bootstrap 
method attempts to control for this problem by isolating the impact of the serial 
correlation properties of the data, rather than the statistical distribution of the 
data sample, on strategy returns. 
The properties of the returns to each of the 154 strategies derived in Chapter 6 
are discussed in Chapter 7. Positive excess returns are found for strategies 
based on holding periods of one trading day and 10 to 252 trading days. The 
returns to individual strategies are highly inconsistent over time, and trading 
strategy profitability is not generally significant once risk is taken into account. 
In addition, the returns are driven almost exclusively by high returns to long 
° Including capital gains and dividend income as well as funding costs. 
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positions which may be a simple result of generally rising prices over the period 
covered by the data. This finding provided the initial motivations for the second 
part of the research documented in this thesis which considers the issue of 
stock market continuation and reversal effects from a different angle - what 
features of the underlying price series would drive findings of continuation and 
reversal in returns, are these features present in the data sets considered, and 
how can such features be reconciled with the possible explanations discussed 
in Chapters 2 and 3? 
The second part of the research aims to explore the possible driving forces 
behind empirical findings of continuation and reversal effects in stock market 
index data. One limitation of the prior literature is that although it has generated 
evidence of return anomalies together with an extensive menu of possible 
causes, it is difficult to distinguish empirically between those possible causes. 
Findings of one-day reversals in returns, for example, may reflect 
methodological issues or equally may be a result of investor overreaction to 
new information entering the market. This part of the research begins with a 
discussion of the types of patterns in market prices required to drive findings of 
continuation and reversal effects, and concludes that such findings imply that 
market trends differ in a systematic way from random trends. The focus of this 
part of the research is therefore on an exploratory analysis of the properties of 
trends in the data sets used in the first part of the research with the aim of 
shedding further light on which, if any, of the behavioural and alternative 
explanations proposed in the literature may be responsible for empirical 
findings of continuation and reversal effects. 
Chapter 8 discusses the methodology used to consider the empirical properties 
of trends in each of the fourteen data sets. An algorithm from the information 
technology literature (Fink and Pratt, 2004) is used to identify trends in each 
data set and descriptive statistics are calculated for the properties of bull 
(upwards) and bear (downwards) trends for each data set. Bootstrap analysis is 
then used to assess the ways in which these properties of stock market trends 
differ systematically from random trends based on the same distribution of daily 
returns. 
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Chapter 9 presents the results of this analysis. Trends in the fourteen data sets 
do not differ systematically from random trends in terms of their duration or 
their total amplitude. Significant patterns are, however, observed in the 
steepness of trends as they develop. In particular, the final quarter of bear 
trends is particularly steep. Patterns are also observed in the volatility of prices 
through the bull-bear cycle. 
Chapter 10 brings together the results of the two main bodies of research 
documented in this thesis and describes the relationship between the two sets 
of results. The consistency of these results with the findings of previous 
research is discussed, and the consistency of the results with each of the main 
behavioural and alternative explanations described in Chapters 2 and 3 is 
explored. This leads into a summary of the main implications of the research 
documented in this thesis for the broader literature, together with a number of 
specific avenues for further research. 
Chapter 11 summarises the motivation behind the current study and the 
rationale for the methodology employed. The principal results of the study are 
presented together with their main implications for the literature. Finally, the 
limitations of the research are discussed and a framework for further research 
presented. 
1.2 Significance and Contribution of the Research 
The research documented in this thesis contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge in two main ways. The focus of the first part of the research is a 
study of momentum strategy profitability based on a time series methodology 
and a measure of excess returns which has practical applicability. This 
approach is used in order to examine the contention of Fama (1998) that with a 
suitable change of methodology, anomalies will disappear. In addition, the use 
of directly comparable data sets across 14 major stock markets offers an 
international perspective which has received only limited attention from 
previous research (Rouwenhorst, 1998 being the main exception). 
The second part of the research documented in this thesis does not directly 
build on any previous research and as such adds a new strand to the literature. 
Whilst related to previous work on the properties of the business cycle, and a 
21 
limited amount of prior research on identifying trends in financial market prices, 
this research introduces a new dating algorithm from the information 
technology literature. This algorithm, which is based on amplitude, is more 
closely suited to dating stock market trends than are the duration-based 
approaches typically used for dating the business cycles. The analysis of the 
features of stock market trends as they develop is, to the author's knowledge, 
new. 
5 Previous studies in this area, such as that of Pagan and Sossounov (2003), have 
used duration-based algorithms such as that of Bry and Boschan (1971), designed for 
use in dating the business cycle, to date stock market trends. In order to force the 
algorithms to "correctly" identify short-term market shocks (such as the market crash of 
October 1987) as trends, researchers have needed to add additional censoring rules to 
the initial algorithm. As Chapter 8 discusses, the way in which this is done can have an 
important influence on the results obtained. The amplitude-based algorithm employed 
in the current study, on the other hand, can be successfully applied to a range of 
different financial market data sets without modification. 
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Chapter 2 
Behavioural Theories of Stock Market 
Continuation and Reversal Effects 
2.1 Introduction 
Price changes in a financial market can be regarded as a product of the pricing 
and trading decisions of the individuals and entities trading within that market. 
In the simplest terms, if on aggregate investors are buyers of a commodity, its 
price will tend to increase and vice versa when investors are net sellers. 
According to Edwards and Magee (1948, reprinted 2001, p4-5), 
`The market price reflects not only the differing value opinions of 
many orthodox security appraisers, but also the hopes and fears 
and guesses and moods, rational and irrational, of hundreds of 
potential buyers and sellers, as well as their needs and their 
resources - in total, factors which defy analysis and for which no 
statistics are obtainable, but which are nevertheless all synthesized, 
weighed, and finally expressed in the one precise figure at which a 
buyer and a seller get together and make a deal... This is the only 
figure that counts" 
Research in psychology has identified a wide range of biases in the decision- 
making behaviour of individuals. These may result from the way in which 
decision problems are simplified in order to make them more manageable, or 
from emotional factors affecting decision outcomes. If these biases can be 
shown to influence decision-making within a financial markets context in such a 
way that anomalous individual behaviour feeds through to anomalous market 
behaviour and hence to anomalous market prices, empirical phenomena such 
as medium-term market continuation and very short-term and long-term market 
reversal might be at least partly explained. 
The main objective of prior research in this area has been the identification of 
those decision-making biases which are systematic among individuals within 
the context of trading and investment decisions. As Barber and Odean (1999, 
p41) observe, "although departures from rationality are sometimes random, 
they are often systematic". Whilst random departures from rationality among 
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investors might be expected to cancel out in the aggregate, systematic 
departures, in which most individuals err in the same direction, will not 
(Camerer, 1987). Three main investigative approaches have been taken. In the 
first, experimental environments are designed to enable specific biases to be 
tested for. A second body of work uses a questionnaire approach to survey 
real-world investors about the way in which they reach investment decisions. 
Finally, a number of studies have examined actual transactions data from stock 
trading accounts in an attempt to identify empirically whether the behavioural 
traits identified in the literature have any clear bearing on trading and 
investment decisions. 
Taking into account potential biases in the way in which individuals reach 
decisions may lead to a better understanding of the way in which market prices, 
which are a function of the overall price-setting and trading behaviour of 
individuals within that market, behave. The remainder of this chapter builds up 
a picture of how this may occur, from the biases displayed by individual 
investors through to the way in which these may affect the behaviour of market 
prices. Section 2.2 sets a framework for the decision-making process and 
provides a categorisation of the behavioural traits discussed in the literature 
into two groups; these are considered in detail in sections 2.3 and 2.4. Section 
2.5 discusses the possible links between behavioural biases in investor 
decision-making and the return anomalies documented in the literature. Section 
2.6 considers the circumstances in which the investor behaviour described in 
earlier sections may feed through to anomalies in market prices. Section 2.7 
concludes. 
2.2 The Decision-Making Process and Behavioural 
Biases 
Carroll and Johnson (1990, p19) define decision-making as "a process by 
which a person, group, or organization identifies a choice or judgement to be 
made, gathers and evaluates information about alternatives, and selects from 
among the alternatives". 
The concept of decision-making therefore encompasses the full range of 
mental activities from the moment we realise a decision needs to be made right 
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through until the final decision is reached and acted upon. The process may be 
almost instantaneous, or it may be spread out over a period of time. 
In a financial markets context, the recognition that a decision needs to be made 
may form part of an ongoing process of evaluating opportunities and revisiting 
current market exposures, or may be prompted by new information entering the 
market. The objectives of decision-making will typically incorporate 
considerations of expected return, risk, and diversification, whilst constraints 
might include time constraints on research and limits on market positions due 
to risk and/or funding constraints. When considering the available information, 
investors may take into account qualitative data such as market sentiment and 
the tone of reports published by financial institutions in addition to quantitative 
data such as the recent performance of the market under consideration. Biases 
can occur in any of these stages, or indeed at the point of evaluating and 
choosing between alternatives. Furthermore, biases in the interpretation of 
feedback may have an impact on future decisions. 
Researchers have used a number of different categorisations when assessing 
the empirical evidence relating to behavioural biases in investor decision- 
making. Raghubir and Das (1999), for example, separate biases in financial 
decision-making into five groups based on the stage in the decision-making 
process where they occur: perception, memory retrieval, information 
integration, judgement making, and behaviour. Their approach is similar in 
many ways to that of Carroll and Johnson (1990), discussed earlier in this 
section. Stracca (2002) separates biases into four categories centred on 
cognitive limitations, the interference of emotional states, choice bracketing, 
and a lack of pre-determined preferences. In this thesis, behavioural biases are 
considered within two broad categories: decision-making heuristics and 
emotional factors affecting decision-making. 
Traditional models in finance assume that the human brain has infinite 
computational capacity. This is clearly not the case. Research in psychology 
has identified a number of rules-of-thumb or heuristics used to simplify 
decision-making problems. By simplifying the problem, the investor is able to 
consider the alternatives and reach a decision within an acceptable time frame. 
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Importantly, research6 has shown that the use of decision-making heuristics 
can in itself introduce bias to the resulting decision. Section 2.3 describes 
decision-making heuristics in more detail. 
Emotional factors can also introduce bias into the decision-making process. 
These may involve a degree of self-deception on the part of the investor in 
order to control emotional responses. For example, financial decisions may be 
biased by investors' need to maintain their own self esteem, which results in 
overconfidence in their own abilities. Section 2.4 discusses the biases identified 
in the literature which stem from emotional factors. 
One of the fundamental problems encountered by the behavioural finance 
literature to date is that investors appear to succumb to different biases in 
different situations. One strong influence on the types of bias exhibited and 
therefore the eventual outcome of decision-making scenarios has been shown 
to be the way in which the scenario is framed. Minsky (1977, p355) describes a 
frame as "a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation like being in 
a certain-type of living room or going to a child's birthday party". Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981), for example, show that by framing an identical decision 
situation in terms of losses rather than gains, investor preferences of one 
gamble over another can be reversed. Whilst a huge range of individual 
behavioural traits has been documented, therefore, the difficulties in identifying 
which traits will be foremost in different situations means that these traits have 
not been brought together into a unified theory of investor behaviour which 
could be tested empirically. Stracca (2002, p3) notes that 
"So far, the behavioural finance literature has not reached a level of 
maturity which would allow it to provide a coherent, unified theory of 
human behaviour in market contexts in the same way expected 
utility and mainstream economics and finance have done". 
In addition, it may be very difficult to identify empirically which of the biases 
described in Sections 2.3. and 2.4 are at work in any given situation. For 
example, many of the biases described in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 lead investors 
to erroneously place too much or too little weight on different types of 
8 Barberis and Thaler (2002) provide a thorough review. 
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information when making financial decisions. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) 
describe three types of information that are relevant to statistical prediction: 
" Base rate evidence (such as the population likelihood of an event 
occurring) 
" Specific evidence relating to the individual case 
" The expected accuracy of prediction 
Within this context, the expected accuracy of prediction controls the relative 
weight to be placed on base rate and specific evidence. Both overconfidence 
and representativeness, described in detail in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, could 
cause an investor to overweight specific evidence relative to base rate 
evidence in a particular decision-making scenario. Different behavioural biases 
may be triggered as a result of very subtle differences in decision-making 
situations, and different biases can produce the same outcome in terms of 
investor behaviour, making the identification of those biases at work in any 
particular situation extremely difficult. Whilst research in psychology has 
produced a veritable shopping list of individual biases, therefore, and research 
in finance has identified a range of different anomalies in financial market 
returns, a direct causal link between individual behavioural biases and specific 
anomalies in market pricing has been difficult to prove. 
2.3 Decision-Making Heuristics 
When reaching investment decisions, the human brain does not possess 
sufficient processing power to perform many of the calculations suggested by 
traditional finance models. Even if it did, the computation costs (in terms of time 
and effort) would be excessively high for most decision situations. Research 
has shown that individuals use heuristics, or rules-of-thumb, to simplify decision 
situations and make the decision-making process more manageable. An 
investor wishing to construct a diversified portfolio might, for example, rely on 
selecting stocks from different industry sectors rather than attempting to 
analyse the covariance of individual stock returns. 
Different individuals may have slightly different sets of decision rules which 
have either been taught to them or which they have developed through 
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personal experience. This offers one explanation for the fact that investors will 
reach different decisions in response to the same situation. In general, 
however, researchers have identified a number of heuristics which are used to 
simplify analysis and aid decision-making across a wide range of scenarios. 
Whilst these heuristics are useful in helping individuals to reach decisions 
efficiently, they can often in themselves introduce bias to the results of the 
decision-making process. This section discusses mental accounting, 
representativeness, availability and anchoring. 
2.3.1 Mental Accounting 
The use of mental accounting to simplify decision-making is introduced to the 
literature by Thaler (1985). Individual portions of wealth are considered 
separately in different "mental accounts". Thus, decisions relating to saving for 
pensions are likely to be taken in complete isolation to decisions regarding the 
weekly groceries budget, for example. Thaler (1999) shows how mental 
accounting violates the concept of fungibility (that is to say, money in one 
account is no longer regarded as a perfect substitute for money in another 
account) and hence can result in irrational decision-making on the part of 
investors. 
The mental accounting used by individuals is one example of framing, 
described in Section 2.2, in which the decisions reached by individuals are 
heavily influenced by the way in which the decision scenario is presented to 
them. Statman (1999, p19) cites the example of individual investors' use of 
mental accounting to distinguish between the different aims of a portfolio: 
"Many investors still divide their money into a mental account for 
downside protection (containing cash and bonds) and a mental 
account for upside potential (containing stocks, options, and lottery 
tickets)". 
Research has demonstrated that the use of mental accounting to 
compartmentalise decisions can lead to inconsistencies such as the commonly 
quoted anomaly that a large proportion of the population buy both insurance 
policies and lottery tickets'. 
This anomaly is discussed by Friedman and Savage (1948) 
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Barberis and Huang (2001) consider how investors frame gains and losses, 
and in particular whether investors consider the gains and losses on individual 
stocks (individual stock accounting) or on their overall portfolio of stocks 
(portfolio accounting). 
Under individual stock accounting, changes in the discount rate used by 
investors to value stocks depend on the past performance of the stock. 
Following a gain, Barberis and Huang hypothesise, an investor will become 
less concerned about future performance and so will lower the discount rate at 
which he values the stock (this reflects the reduced risk subjectively associated 
with the stock). Following a loss the investor recognises the stock to be risky 
and increases the discount rate. Simulated stock values using this framework 
are found to be consistent with many of the empirically identified characteristics 
of stock returns including high mean returns, excess volatility, and high cross- 
sectional differences in returns between stocks. 
Under portfolio accounting, on the other hand, the same discount rate is used 
for all stocks and is driven by the past return of the investor's overall portfolio. 
In simulated tests, the mean returns of individual stocks are lower and less 
volatile than under individual stock accounting, and stock returns are more 
highly correlated. In addition, whilst three-year reversal effects of the type 
identified by De Bondt and Thaler (1985)8 are replicated in the simulated values 
using individual stock accounting, this is not the case under portfolio 
accounting. 
Barberis and Huang conclude that in general, individual stock accounting 
appears to be more successful than portfolio accounting in reproducing the 
empirical features of stock market returns and mental accounting on the part of 
investors may therefore play an important role in driving empirically observed 
anomalies in stock market returns. 
8 These findings are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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2.3.2 Representativeness 
Individuals commonly simplify decision situations by considering the extent to 
which a given item is similar to, or representative of, known groups of items. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) give the example of an experiment in which 
subjects were asked to predict the future stock price of a company. If shown a 
positive description of the company, subjects tended to produce a high stock 
value since the description given was highly representative of a successful 
company. If a less favourable description was shown, a low predicted stock 
value was obtained reflecting the representativeness of the description to a 
failing company. The representativeness heuristic may be used in different 
ways based on the decision scenario in question. 
Exact representativeness describes a situation which is seen to exactly 
represent a known stereotypical image. Camerer (1987) uses a simulated 
financial market (trading game) to consider the biases exhibited by participants. 
Assessed probabilities of future prices are broadly in line with the Bayesian 
prediction except where the price history exactly reflects a known scenario (this 
could be a repeated pattern of prices, for example). Exact representativeness 
may therefore play an important role in the price formation process in situations 
where the recent path of prices exactly represents a "known" feature such as a 
bull or bear trend or a commonly followed technical trading pattern. 
The tendency for investors to extrapolate past price trends (Daniel et al, 2002) 
may be related to the concept of exact representativeness. Shleifer and 
Summers (1990, p28) state that 
"one of the strongest investor tendencies documented in both 
experimental and survey evidence is the tendency to extrapolate or 
to chase the trend". 
If investors perceive that the pattern of recent prices forms a trend, future 
prices may be predicted using representativeness. That is to say, if a positive 
trend is observed in the recent price history, investors predict future prices 
based on the assumption of a continued positive trend. 
Benartzi (2001) shows that employees of firms with good past price 
performance make higher discretionary 401 K contributions to company stock 
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than do employees of companies with poor past price performance. The level 
of discretionary contributions does not predict future performance, however, 
hence it does not appear to be the case that employees make higher 
contributions to their own company's stock as a result of superior information in 
relation to the company's future prospects. Rather, employees appear to be 
predicting high future performance on the basis of good past performance. 
Similarly, investment flows into US mutual funds have been shown to be 
concentrated into those funds with the highest past performance (Sirri and 
Tufano, 1998) although as shown by Carhart (1997), a high past performance 
among mutual funds is not a significant indicator of high future performance. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) identify the concept of local representativeness 
(also commonly referred to as the law of small numbers or the gambler's 
fallacy), which leads individuals to expect that a short sequence of events will 
be representative of the characteristics of the underlying process . 
If a coin is 
tossed six times, for example, the sequence of outcomes "HTHTHT" is 
generally considered to be much more likely than the sequence I TTTT i '. In 
the context of financial markets, local representativeness might lead investors 
to believe that if a market has risen for four days in a row, it is highly likely to 
fall on the fifth day. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1974, reprinted 1982, 
p7) 
"Chance is commonly viewed as a self-correcting process in which 
a deviation in one direction induces a deviation in the opposite 
direction to restore the equilibrium". 
Investors often overlook the importance of sample size, taking small samples to 
be as informative as large samples9. In the short-term, local representativeness 
may lead investors to expect reversals in market prices, with recent runs of 
price increases expected to be followed by a fall and vice versa following 
periods of declining market prices. 
The phenomenon known as regression towards the mean also has its roots in 
the representativeness heuristic. Investors commonly expect extreme market 
movements to be followed by equally large price changes (positive or negative) 
9 See, for example, Tversky and Kahneman (1971) and Rabin (2000). 
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in the following period. Based on the normative laws of probability, however, if 
we take any particularly extreme observation it is highly probable that the next 
observation will be less extreme. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) argue that the 
reason regression is a difficult concept is due to the influence of 
representativeness. Investors expect inputs to be representative of outcomes. 
Given a large market move on one day, therefore, they expect the move on the 
following day to be just as extreme. A lack of understanding of regression 
towards the mean may help to explain the observed phenomenon of volatility 
clustering in financial markets10. Investors expect large market movements to 
be followed by similarly large movements, and small market movements to be 
followed by similarly small movements. 
When assessing the representativeness of a situation, individuals have been 
shown to place too little emphasis on the quality and relevance of the 
information used. In Kahneman and Tversky (1973), subjects were asked to 
assess the probability of individuals within a sample group being engineers or 
lawyers. If no description of the individual was provided, the subjects assessed 
the probability correctly based on the number of engineers and lawyers in the 
sample group. If a description was given, however, the subjects appeared to 
assess the probabilities using representativeness, regardless of the relevance 
of the information provided. The information provided, including worthless 
information such as an individual's marital status and number of children, was 
compared to the subjects' stereotypes pertaining to each occupation in order to 
gauge the probability of the individual in question being an engineer. The 
representativeness heuristic may therefore result in reliance being placed on 
largely irrelevant information when assessing the prospects for future market 
prices. If investors can be shown to react systematically in this way, biased 
predictions based on irrelevant information may be a driving force behind 
anomalous patterns in financial market returns. 
Representativeness may lead to price continuation if investors extrapolate past 
trends, or indeed to price reversal if they are subject to local 
representativeness. Different tendencies may be more common in certain types 
of investor. De Bondt (1998), for example, finds that whilst strategists tend to 
suffer from gambler's fallacy (expecting reversals), individual investors are 
10 The literature on volatility clustering is reviewed in Jacobsen and Dannenburg (2003) 
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more susceptible to extrapolating trends. In addition, different tendencies may 
be prevalent in different situations. The degree to which the data is 
representative of a given situation (for example, a bull market) may have an 
important influence, with exact representativeness becoming dominant where a 
close match is found between the underlying data and the stereotypical 
scenario to which it is compared. It is also important to consider the different 
types of information which may be used by investors in this regard. Whilst it 
would be reasonable to expect financial information and past price performance 
to play a role, the findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1973), among others, 
tend to suggest that investor expectation may also be influenced to a large 
extent by `soft' information such as media coverage. 
2.3.3 Availability 
Under the Availability Heuristic, decision-makers assess the probability of an 
outcome based on the ease with which similar instances can be brought to 
mind. 
A class of outcomes which is easier to recall will generally be allocated a higher 
probability of occurrence than an equally likely class of outcomes which is less 
easy to recall. More salient events are typically easier to recall (extreme price 
movements are easier to recall than small price movements, for example), as 
are more recent events (price movements last week are easier to recall than 
price movements last year). 
Under the Availability Heuristic, investors can therefore be expected to 
overestimate the probability of market movements which are extreme, recent, 
or on some other way memorable, and to correspondingly underestimate the 
probability of small or "ordinary" market movements. This can lead to biases in 
decision-making. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973, reprinted 1982) describe a number of 
experimental situations in which subjects are shown to make decisions based 
on availability. In one, subjects are shown a six by six grid of noughts and 
crosses, reproduced in Figure 2.1, and asked to estimate the number of paths 
containing six Xs and no Os, five Xs and one 0, and so on. A path is defined 
for this purpose as any descending line (not necessarily a straight line) starting 
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at the top row, ending at the bottom row, and passing through exactly one 
symbol in each row. 
Figure 2.1 Grid from Tversky and Kahneman (1973) 
X X O X X X 
X X X X O X 
X O X X X X 
X X X O X X 
X X X X X O 
0 X X X X X 
In this situation, subjects are seen to estimate the frequency of occurrence of 
each type of path by the ease with which they can be seen in the grid. Since 
there are far more Xs than Os at each stage, it is much easier to construct 
paths of six Xs than five Xs and one 0, even though these are in fact more 
numerous. Subjects erroneously infer that there must be more paths of six Xs 
and no Os than five Xs and one 0. 
Tversky and Kahneman go on to repeat the experiment framing the problem in 
a different way. Subjects are given a description of a card game with six 
players. Each player draws one card blindly in each round of the game. Five 
sixths of the cards are marked X and one sixth are marked 0. Subjects are 
asked to estimate, after many rounds of the game have been played, the 
percentage of rounds in which six players receive X and no player receives 0, 
5 players receive X and one player receives 0, and so on. Although this is the 
same problem as the one involving the grid, the first experiment places 
emphasis on the grid whilst the second places emphasis on the population 
parameter. In the second experiment, subjects are seen to make judgements 
using representativeness rather than availability. 
This experiment highlights the importance of framing, introduced in Section 2.2, 
in determining the way in which individuals respond to decision-making 
scenarios. In general, Tversky and Kahneman note (p174), "... the frequency of 
a class is likely to be judged by availability if the individual instances are 
emphasized and by representativeness if generic features are made salient". 
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The use of the availability heuristic leads investors to place too much weight on 
recent and salient information. In the case of recent information, this will 
reinforce the tendency to chase trends, as described in Section 2.3.2. 
2.3.4 Anchoring 
The anchoring heuristic affects individuals' ability to make accurate numerical 
predictions. Rather than starting "from scratch", predictions are typically made 
by taking a known initial value (the "anchor") and adjusting it upwards or 
downwards to reach a predicted value. 
Empirical research suggests that, in general, the adjustments made to the 
anchor to reach a predicted value are insufficient (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1971). Different starting points result in different predictions, all biased towards 
the choice of the initial anchor. In one commonly cited experiment, individuals 
were asked whether the percentage of African countries in the United Nations 
was higher or lower than a given level before being asked for their estimate of 
the true percentage. Those given a level of 10 produced subsequent estimates 
of 25, whilst those given a level of 60 produced estimates of 45. In each case, 
anchoring on the level suggested by the task biases the estimate towards the 
anchor. 
The use of different anchors will result in different predicted values. When 
assessing the importance of anchoring in financial decision-making, therefore, 
a key goal is the identification of those scenarios in which investors will 
systematically choose anchors in the same way 
The current market price may be used as an anchor. In empirical experiments 
involving problems similar to this, subjects generally produce predicted market 
levels which are too close to the current level (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
If asked to assess the probability of the market exceeding a particular level (the 
"target level") over the next week, on the other hand, investors have been 
shown to be much more likely to anchor on the target market level, or possibly 
on a point halfway between the current level and the target level. Given the 
higher level of the anchor, they are likely to produce a correspondingly high 
probability of the target level being reached. This conclusion is supported by 
empirical research involving questions of a similar nature - in general subjects 
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overestimate the probability of the market exceeding the given level than is 
actually the case (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This may lead investors to 
overestimate the probability of large market movements. 
De Bondt (1998, p834) notes that past returns are generally used as an anchor 
when forming short-term expectations, whereas past price levels are an 
important anchor for longer-term expectations: 
"It is as if investors predict the near future with an eye towards 
recent price changes but that past price levels anchor their longer- 
term forecasts.... Investors who think long-term tend to subscribe to 
regressive expectations and those who think short-term have static 
expectations" 
Investors' overestimation of the likelihood of low probability events, and 
corresponding underestimation of the likelihood of high probability events, 
results in a tendency to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events (such 
as tossing a coin six times and obtaining a head on each throw) and 
underestimate the probability of disjunctive events (such as obtaining a head at 
least once from six throws). In each case, the subjective probability of success 
in one stage is used as an anchor for subsequent stages. Given insufficient 
adjustment, decision-makers may therefore underestimate the likelihood of high 
probability compound events, such as a run of small price changes, and 
overestimate the likelihood of low probability compound events such as a run of 
large price changes. 
Conservatism has its roots in the anchoring heuristic. When forming 
predictions, individuals may use the base rate frequency of outcomes as an 
anchor. Insufficient adjustment means that the specific evidence relating to the 
decision to be made is underweighted relative to the base rate evidence. If 
investors form predictions based on conservatism, overweighting base rate 
information relative to specific information relating to the current situation, then 
prices may not initially fully adjust to new information entering the market. 
Instead, prices may adjust only slowly. Conservatism, based on the anchoring 
heuristic, has therefore been identified in the literature as one of the possible 
factors behind continuation effects in stock market returns. Ritter (2003) notes 
that conservatism can be seen as being at war with representativeness. If a 
decision scenario is closely representative of a known scenario, then 
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individuals will form predictions based on exact representativeness, leading to 
an overweighting of specific evidence relative to the base-rate information. In 
other scenarios, conservatism may prevail. 
2.4 Emotional Factors affecting Decision-Making 
Emotional factors can also result in biases in investor decision-making. A 
simple example is provided by the ultimatum game described by Thaler (2000). 
The ultimatum game is a controlled experiment involving two individuals. Player 
One is given a sum of money (10 US dollars, say) and must offer a share of the 
total to Player Two who can accept, in which case he receives the amount 
offered, or reject, in which case neither player receives anything. Experimental 
evidence shows that although it is clearly rational for Player Two to accept any 
amount offered, low offers of less that 20 percent of the total available are 
commonly rejected. In such cases, Player Two's non-rational behaviour is 
driven by emotional factors (and in particular a sense of indignation) if they are 
offered what they see as a derisory share of the overall financial gain. Similar 
experimental situations have been widely used to highlight other areas in which 
financial decision-making may deviate from rationality as a result of emotional 
factors affecting decision-making. This section discusses overconfidence, 
aversion to loss, and aversion to ambiguity in further detail. 
2.4.1 Overconfidence 
Investors are typically overconfident in relation to their own ability. In the 
Canoles et al (1998) study of commodity speculators in Alabama, for example, 
approximately half of the speculators surveyed considered themselves to be 
successful, despite only around 10 percent having made a net profit over the 
time they had been trading. 
Barber and Odean (2000) conclude that overconfidence on the part of investors 
can explain both high levels of trading activity and poor performance. In their 
study of 66,465 households in the United States over a six year period ending 
in January 1997, the average household was seen to turn over 75 percent of its 
portfolio annually. This is attributed to excess confidence among investors, the 
results of which can be extremely costly. The average gross returns achieved 
were comparable to the return on a value-weighted market index. When the 
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impact of the bid-ask spread and commissions are taken into account, 
however, households significantly underperform the market, achieving a 1.1 
percent underperformance compared to the value-weighted market index, or 
3.7 percent after the tendency among households to skew their portfolios 
towards smaller-cap, higher-risk stocks is accounted for. Men trade on average 
45 percent more often than women, and earn 1.4 percent less. Overconfidence 
results in high levels of trading activity, with the associated trading costs 
presenting a significant drag on profitability. 
De Bondt (1998) studies the forecasting behaviour of 45 investors in 
Wisconsin. Between October 1994 and March 1995, each investor made 
weekly two- and four-week forecasts and interval estimates (levels beyond 
which they thought the market had only a one in ten chance of ending the two 
or four week period). Each investor made forecasts of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average in addition to a single stock of their choice from among their main 
equity holdings. The investors were seen to make overly optimistic predictions 
relating to their own holdings but not relating to the Dow Jones index. The 
predictions of the performance of the Dow Jones index were statistically 
indistinguishable from the actual performance of the index. On average, 
however, the predicted outperformance of the individual stocks over the Dow 
Jones index was 0.86 percent compared to an actual outperformance of only 
0.28 percent. The confidence interval estimates were too narrow in all cases 
(forecast values were too close to the values at the time the predictions were 
made), with this problem being greater for longer forecasting horizons. In 
addition, the confidence intervals were asymmetric. High predicted returns 
were combined with negatively skewed confidence intervals and vice versa, 
implying that the confidence intervals were formed using the initial value as an 
anchor. 
Research indicates that subjects are generally more confident in their 
predictions the greater the degree of representativeness (the greater the 
degree with which the input to the decision process fits the stereotypical image 
relating to the prediction). This occurs regardless of the quality or accuracy of 
the information on which the prediction is made, resulting in often unwarranted 
confidence known as the "illusion of validity". Overconfidence may interact with 
representativeness in the formation of market bubbles. 
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According to Shiller (2001, p3), 
"The essence of a speculative bubble is a sort of feedback, from 
price increases, to increased investor enthusiasm, to increased 
demand, and hence further price increases. The high demand for 
the asset is generated by the public memory of high past returns, 
and the optimism those high returns generate for the future. The 
feedback can amplify positive forces affecting the market, making 
the market reach higher levels than it would if it were responding 
only directly to these positive forces. " 
In addition, confidence in predictions increases where all of the input 
information is consistent. For example, if each piece of information provided on 
a company is mediocre, subjects will be much more confident in predicting an 
unchanged share price than if the information provided is a mixture of good and 
bad signals. Adding redundant but consistent information, such as different 
measures of sales growth, can therefore increase predictive confidence. The 
typically high degree of correlation between redundant data, however, actually 
reduces accuracy relative to that obtained from the same number of 
independent pieces of information. Providing decision-makers with large 
quantities of redundant data therefore results in increased confidence 
combined with decreased accuracy. This may be relevant to the prediction of 
future stock prices, where the correlation between individual stocks and stock 
markets may not be taken into account by investors. Rising prices across a 
number of stocks or markets may therefore be interpreted as stronger evidence 
for future price rises than is warranted in reality. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) note that under normative principles of 
prediction, expected accuracy controls the relative weights to be placed on 
prior (base-rate) information and specific evidence concerning the case in 
question. When predictive accuracy is low, predictions should be weighted 
towards the base-case evidence alone. In such a scenario, an appropriate 
prediction of a future market price would be the current price. When predictive 
accuracy is high, relatively more weight should be placed on specific evidence 
relating to the case in question. Overconfident investors overestimate the 
accuracy of their own predictions, and as a result place too much emphasis on 
specific rather than base-rate information. In a financial markets context, 
overconfidence therefore leads individuals to exaggerate the expected size of 
future returns. 
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2.4.2 Aversion to Loss 
Survey evidence supports the theory that significant loss aversion exists among 
financial market participants 
Canoles et al (1998) survey the motivations of 114 retail commodity futures 
speculators in Alabama and find that whether a gain or loss was made on a 
particular trade is more important to the individual speculator than the size of 
the gain or loss. The investors considered won more often than they lost (51 
percent of trades were profitable), however 90 percent of them were net losers 
in dollar terms. In spite of recurring losses, the typical investor had never made 
any fundamental changes to his/her trading style. Investors were more 
concerned about missing out on a profit by not having a market position than 
they were about losing money by being on the wrong side of a market move. 
This encouraged continual position-taking rather than selective taking of a 
market position based on perceived opportunity for gain". 
The Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) has loss aversion 
among investors as one of its main components. Under prospect theory, values 
are multiplied by decision weights to arrive at decisions in much the same way 
as described by normative theories of decision-making. In prospect theory, 
values are assigned to gains and losses relative to a fixed reference point 
(current wealth) rather than to measures of final wealth, however, reflecting the 
concept that individuals obtain utility from gains and losses in wealth rather 
than absolute levels of wealth. In addition, the value function is generally 
concave for gains and convex for losses, with investors experiencing a 
reducing marginal pleasure from higher gains and an increasing marginal 
discomfort to higher losses. The steepest part of the value curve is close to the 
reference point (implying that investors are most sensitive to small gains and 
losses from their current wealth) and the value curve is non-linear through the 
origin. A fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is obtained: risk averse for high- 
probability gains and low probability losses, and risk-seeking for high probability 
losses and low probability gains. 
" Loss aversion may therefore contribute to the excessive trading volume attributed to 
overconfidence in some studies (see, for example, Barber and Odean, 2000). 
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The value function is specified as 
v (x) = x° if x >= 0, or 
-A (-x)ß ifx<0 
The degree of loss aversion is reflected in the parameter A and diminishing 
sensitivity to gains and losses via the parameters a and ß respectively. 
Experimental work by Tversky and Kahneman suggests values of a, ß, and A of 
0.88,0.88, and 2.25 respectively. Panel A of Figure 2.2 shows the value 
function obtained using the parameter values suggested by Kahneman and 
Tversky, and also demonstrates the impact of a change in each of the three 
individual parameters on this value function. 
The parameter a controls the degree of curvature of the value function in the 
region of gains, with a reduction in a resulting in an increased sensitivity to 
small gains relative to large gains, as illustrated in Panel B. Similarly, the 
parameter ß controls the degree of curvature of the value function in the region 
of losses. Panel C shows the impact of reducing ß in terms of an increased 
sensitivity to small losses. Finally, the parameter A controls the relative value of 
gains and losses, with a reduction in A reducing the degree to which losses are 
assigned higher value than gains. Panel D shows the effect of a reduction in A. 
The decision weights used in conjunction with the value curve reflect biases in 
probability assessment by individuals. These probabilities are generally lower 
than normative probabilities in all situations except for very small probabilities, 
where decision weights may be higher than the associated normative 
probability. That is to say, individuals overestimate the probability of extreme 
events and correspondingly underestimate the probability of non-extreme 
events. Kahneman and Tversky note that this may occur as a result of 
anchoring, described in Section 2.3.4. Whilst normative theories of decision- 
making assume that individuals make decisions using the correct probability 
distribution of returns, therefore, prospect theory suggests that this may not be 
the case and that the decision weights used by individuals may deviate 
systematically from actual probabilities. Figure 2.3 shows hypothetical prospect 
theory decision weights. 
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Figure 2.2 Prospect Theory: Value Function 
A. Value Function with a=0.88, ß=0.88, and k=2.25 
B. Value Function with a=0.50 (ß = 0.88, and A=2.25) 
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C. Value Function with ß=0.65 (a = 0.88, and A=2.25) 
D. Value Function with A=1.00 (a = 0.88, and ß=0.88) 
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Figure 2.3 Prospect Theory: Decision Weights 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) place aversion to realising losses into a wider 
theoretical framework, describing a "disposition effect' whereby investors 
display a general disposition to sell winners too early and hold losers too long12. 
Odean (1998) studies 163,000 accounts at a discount brokerage house in the 
USA, and compares the fractions of all capital gains and capital losses realised 
each day. From January through November, gains are realised 1.68 times 
more often than losses except in December when losses are 1.02 times more 
likely to be realised than gains, which Odean attributes to a tax effect. In 
general, small losses tend to be realised whereas large losses are held, 
generating poor subsequent returns. 
In their study of 10,000 randomly-selected accounts from a US discount 
brokerage, Barber and Odean (1999) find evidence to support the disposition 
12 Related tendencies have been identified in other decision-making scenarios. 
Drummond (2003, p39), for example, describes the phenomenon of escalation in 
business decision-making whereby managers may "make matters worse by persisting 
with failing ventures and end up throwing good money after bad". London's Millennium 
Dome project is cited as an example. 
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effect of Shefrin and Statman (1985), with holdings of stocks that show an 
unrealised profit 50 percent more likely to be sold on any given day than stocks 
showing an unrealised loss. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) use Finnish Central Securities Depository 
(FCSD) data from 27 December 1994 through 10 January 1997 on stock 
transactions in the Finnish market to investigate the propensity to sell or hold 
equity investments13. Logit regression is used to analyse influences on the daily 
sell versus hold decision for stock investors. Positive market-adjusted returns 
during the previous month are found to be significantly correlated with the 
decision to sell. Generally speaking, the more recent the positive returns, the 
more likely the investor is to sell. Strongly negative market-adjusted returns up 
to a week in the past moderately reduce the tendency to sell, whereas the more 
distant returns history of the stock has little impact on the sell versus hold 
decision. Large capital losses of over 30 percent significantly reduce the 
probability of a sale, by 32 percent. Smaller capital losses have a somewhat 
reduced, although still significant, effect on the propensity to sell, reducing the 
chance of a sale by 21 percent on average. Loss aversion among investors, as 
described by prospect theory and the disposition effect, may therefore have 
important implications for investor behaviour and hence also for stock market 
prices. 
In addition to simply being averse to realising losses, investor behaviour may 
also be influenced by gains and losses realised in the past. The house money 
effect of Thaler and Johnson (1990) describes the phenomenon that when 
faced with sequential gambles people risk more if they won on previous 
gambles than they do if they lost. In other words, individuals are risk taking 
following gains and risk averse following losses. Stock market investment is not 
a single-period scenario, and it is reasonable to expect that the degree of loss 
aversion experienced by investors may be related to the level of returns 
experienced in the recent past, with risk aversion therefore negatively 
correlated with recent market performance. For example, if an investor buys a 
share and sells it six months later at a profit of 10 percent, he is likely to have a 
13 This data set is unique in that it includes details of the shareholdings and 
transactions of almost all Finnish investors, both retail and institutional, during this 
period. 
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greater tolerance for risk when selecting a second stock in which to invest than 
he would be if he had lost 10 percent on the first investment. The house money 
effect may therefore be related to overconfidence, with past gains increasing 
the level of overconfidence and therefore resulting in exaggerated expectations 
of future returns. 
Barberis et al (2001, p2) describe a model which incorporates elements of both 
prospect theory and the house money effect. Investors are loss averse to a 
lesser extent following prior gains than following prior losses: 
"After a run-up in stock prices, our agent is less risk averse 
because those gains will cushion any subsequent loss. After a fall 
in stock prices, he becomes more wary of further losses and hence 
more risk averse". 
The model is seen to predict phenomena seen in historical stock market data, 
namely high average returns, excess volatility, and time series predictability14. 
The regularity with which investors review performance may also have an 
impact on the degree of loss aversion they experience. Myopic loss aversion, 
introduced to the literature by Benartzi and Thaler (1995), describes the 
tendency for loss-averse investors to be less willing to accept risk if outcomes 
are evaluated more frequently. The asymmetric valuation of losses and gains 
described in prospect theory means that whilst losses may be valued over 
gains over a single investment period, gains may be valued more highly than 
losses over multiple periods. Investments which are attractive over a long 
horizon can therefore appear unattractive over short horizons. This is reflected 
in the empirical observation that individuals display reduced loss aversion when 
faced with gambles which are repeated over time. Samuelson (1963) describes 
his experience that one of his colleagues rejected the chance to enter into a bet 
with a 50 percent chance of winning US$ 200 and a 50 percent chance of 
losing US$ 100, even though the expected outcome was positive. He was, 
however, prepared to enter into a series of 100 such bets. 
14 Specifically, reversals in returns over three year periods of the type identified 
empirically by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
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Langer and Weber (2003) show that myopic loss aversion can also work in the 
opposite direction. A series of junk bond investments with a low probability of 
default but high losses in the event of default, for example, may become more 
attractive in the short-term as a result of myopic loss aversion. Willingness to 
invest may not therefore be strictly negatively related to the degree of myopia 
as had been suggested in some previous studies. 
Haigh and List (2002) study myopic loss aversion in professional traders on the 
Chicago Board of Trade and undergraduate students at the University of 
Maryland. In an experimental environment, both groups display evidence of 
myopic loss aversion, with the degree of myopic loss aversion of professional 
traders actually greater than that of undergraduate students exposed to the 
same test. 
Fielding & Stracca (2003) model expected returns under aversion to loss and to 
regret and suggest that a combination of myopic loss aversion over very short 
investment horizons and disappointment aversion over longer horizons may 
provide an attractive explanation of the equity premium puzzle15. Their results 
suggest that unrealistically short investment horizon of less than three years is 
required for the historical equity premium to be explained by loss aversion 
alone. Disappointment aversion on the other hand can explain the historical 
equity premium for much longer investment horizons of up to ten years. 
Aversion to loss describes the phenomenon whereby investors value losses 
more highly than gains. This may lead to the rejection of opportunities which 
traditional Net Present Value (NPV) analysis would lead one to believe would 
be accepted. The degree of loss aversion displayed by investors may be 
related to the extent of previously realised losses and gains or the frequency 
with which future losses and gains are to be evaluated. 
15 Aversion to disappointment and regret is discussed by, for example, Loomes and 
Sugden (1987) and Inman et al (1997). Investors not only derive utility from realised 
outcomes (investments they hold), but also from investment opportunities they chose to 
forego. 
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2.4.3 Aversion to Ambiguity 
Empirical evidence suggests that individuals are averse to ambiguity. In other 
words, they prefer choices where the probabilities of outcomes are known 
rather than unknown. Camerer and Weber (1992, p326) state that "ambiguity 
about probability creates a kind of risk... - the risk of having the wrong belief'. 
Aversion to ambiguity is raised in the literature by Ellsberg (1961). In an 
experimental setting, Ellsberg shows, via a series of tests, that individuals 
prefer bets with a known probability of winning to equivalent bets where the 
probability of winning is unknown. In one test, the subject has to bet on the 
outcome of a single draw from an urn containing 30 red balls and 60 black and 
yellow balls in an unknown combination. Participants show a clear preference 
for betting on red over betting on black, and prefer betting on "yellow or black" 
to betting on "yellow or red". In each case, the bet with a known probability of 
success is preferred, and the examples can be constructed in such a way that 
participants' choices violate axiomatic theories of choice under uncertainty. 
Other sources of ambiguity may be based on the perceived credibility of 
information sources such as analysts' reports, or the "weight of evidence", 
which Camerer and Weber (1992, p331) define as the "amount of available 
information relative to the amount of conceivable information". 
Heath and Tversky (1991) note that aversion to ambiguity is inversely linked to 
overconfidence. If an individual is made to feel less confident about his 
predictive ability, he becomes more averse to ambiguity. 
Aversion to ambiguity may also be linked to a preference for the familiar. 
Benartzi (2001), for example, notes that about a third of 401(k) account assets 
in the USA are invested in the stock of the employing company, as are about a 
quarter of discretionary contributions. This clearly implies insufficient 
diversification and may be a result of investor preference for the familiar. 
Viscusi and Magat (1992, p373) consider that "ambiguity creates an aversion to 
incurring a loss and decreases the attractiveness of potentially winning a prize". 
Aversion to ambiguity can therefore be seen as exaggerating the effects of 
aversion to loss described in the previous section. 
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Sections 2.3 and 2.4 discuss research in psychology which has identified a 
broad range of biases in investor behaviour, any one or more of which may be 
relevant in individual decision-making situations. The following section goes on 
to consider how such biases may relate to empirically observed patterns in 
stock market returns. 
2.5 Behavioural Biases and Continuation and Reversal 
Effects in Stock Market Returns 
Table 2.1 provides a broad categorisation of the sources of behavioural bias 
described in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 according to their relevance to the empirical 
phenomena of very short-term reversal and medium-term continuation which 
are the focus of this study. 
Findings of reversal in stock market returns over the very short-term may be 
driven by local representativeness, with investors expecting a large market 
move in one direction to be followed by a "balancing" move in the opposite 
direction. Alternatively, if investors anchor on recent market prices rather than 
returns, they may equally expect a reversal following a large price change. 
A broad range of behavioural biases can be identified as being potential driving 
forces behind medium-term continuation effects in stock market returns. Exact 
representativeness, and the related tendency to extrapolate past trends, may 
lead investors to expect recent high or low returns to persist in the future. 
Similarly, recent high or low returns may be expected to persist as a result of 
the availability heuristic, or as a result of anchoring if investors anchor on past 
returns rather than past prices. Conservatism, whereby investors place too 
much weight on base case evidence rather than the individual case, may result 
in a slow adjustment of prices in response to new information entering the 
market. 
Behavioural influences may also help to explain some of the statistical 
properties of financial time series16. If investors overestimate the probability of 
16 These properties are reviewed by Cont (1999). 
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Table 2.1 Behavioural Biases and Continuation and Reversal 
Effects in Stock Market Returns 
Empirically Potentially Contributing Behavioural Factors 
Observed 
Phenomenon 
Very Short- local representativeness following a large one-day movement, 
Term Reversal investors expect a movement in the opposite direction 
anchoring investors anchor on recent market prices 
exact representativeness if investors identify a trend in recent prices, 
extrapolation of past trends representativeness leads them to expect the trend to continue 
Medium-Term availability if the recent trend in prices is positive, 
Continuation positive price changes will be more easily 
brought to mind, and investors will expect 
future price changes to reflect this 
anchoring investors anchor on recent market returns 
conservatism investors overweight base-case information, 
and therefore adapt expectations slowly to 
new information 
Leptokurtotic 
Distribution of availability investors overestimate the probability of very 
Returns large (salient) price movements 
overconfidence investors exaggerate the expected 
magnitude of future returns 
Volatility regression towards the mean investors expect large price changes to be 
Clustering followed by large price changes and small 
price changes to be followed by small price 
changes, causing volatility to persist 
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very large price movements, as a result of availability or overconfidence for 
example, then this may result in the typical "fat-tailed" distributions of financial 
time series. Similarly, a lack of understanding of regression towards the mean 
may help to explain why volatility clustering occurs. 
A number of models of investor behaviour have been proposed in the literature. 
These typically combine one or two known biases in models which seek to 
replicate the empirical phenomena of medium-term continuation and long-term 
reversals in returns. 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) present a model in which investors see 
the market as subject to two competing regimes. When the market is in regime 
1, earnings are mean-reverting, whereas when the market is subject to regime 
2, earnings trend. 
Investors within the Barberis et al model are subject to both conservatism and 
the representativeness heuristic. Investors are slow to update their 
expectations in the light of new information. As information arrives in the form 
of new prices, investors revise their subjective probabilities of being in each 
regime. For example, if the market does particularly well over a short period, 
investors will increase the probability of their being in regime 2. If, on the other 
hand, positive and negative returns are more mixed over a subsection of the 
data then the probability of being in regime 1 will be increased. That is to say, 
investors subjectively assess the probability of being in regime 1 or regime 2 
base on representativeness, with probabilities updated slowly as a result of 
conservatism. 
Barberis et al show that their model of investor sentiment generates prices 
which are consistent with the medium-term continuation and long-term reversal 
effects documented in the literature. 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) present an alternative model of 
investor behaviour in which investors are seen to suffer from both 
overconfidence and biased self-attribution. The overconfident investor 
overestimates his own ability to generate market information and thus 
underestimates his own forecast errors. Biased self-attribution concerns the 
investor's reactions to the results from his investment decisions. If a trade is 
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profitable, the investor's self confidence increases further. If a trade is loss- 
making, it is largely discounted. Successes are seen as a result of the 
investor's superior foresight whereas losses are put down to chance. 
Overconfidence and biased self-attribution lead to short-term momentum in 
prices as investors overweight private information relative to public information. 
Over the longer term, however, public information prevails and prices are 
drawn back towards the value implied by fundamentals (reversal). 
The model of Hong and Stein (1999) uses the interaction between 
heterogeneous groups of investors to generate patterns in market returns. The 
Hong and Stein world is populated by two types of investor, "news watchers" 
and "momentum traders". Each is rational in a bounded sense, in that they use 
only part of the universe of available information when making investment 
decisions. 
News watchers make decisions based solely on information concerning market 
fundamentals; they take no notice of current and past price levels. When new 
information enters the market, it diffuses slowly across the population of news 
watchers. If no momentum traders are active in the market, prices gradually 
adjust to reflect the new information, and the market displays evidence of 
continuation in returns. 
Momentum traders are simple trend chasers in the Hong and Stein model. As 
new information enters the market, it begins to disperse among the news 
watchers and the price slowly starts to adjust. At a given point, momentum 
traders will enter the market in an attempt to profit from the slow price 
adjustment process caused by the news watchers. Their transactions 
accelerate the price change, causing more momentum traders to enter the 
market. The price is pushed beyond the full information price and a reversal in 
returns occurs. 
The three behavioural models outlined above predict slightly different financial 
market behaviour. In the Barberis et. al. model, investors' perceptions as to the 
state of the market (regime 1 or regime 2) result in short-term continuation or 
reversal depending which regime is favoured at the time. In the Daniel et. al. 
and Hong and Stein models, short-term continuation in returns is accompanied 
by long-term reversal. One limitation of such models is that observed patterns 
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in returns could be explained by any number of combinations of individual 
behavioural biases; causality between individual biases and patterns in market 
prices is difficult to identify. 
If behavioural biases result in biased decision-making on the part of investors 
then anomalies in market prices, and hence market inefficiency, may result. 
The implications of behavioural biases for market efficiency depend, however, 
on the ability of arbitrage to cancel out the effect of behavioural biases and 
force prices to fundamental (unbiased) levels. The following section discusses 
the conditions in which behavioural biases may drive market prices. 
2.6 Behavioural Finance, Arbitrage, and Market Prices 
It is important to recognise that the behavioural biases in the decision-making 
of individual investors that have been identified in the literature and discussed 
in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 do not in themselves result in biases in market pricing. 
Irrational decision-making on the part of the individual investor may result in 
irrational market prices in some, but not all, circumstances. 
Shefrin and Statman (2000) note that behavioural finance rests on two pillars: 
psychology and the limits of arbitrage. Markets may be irrational if four key 
points hold: 
0 Investors are irrational 
" Biases in investor decision-making are systematic, that is to say they do 
not cancel out 
" Irrational investors survive 
" Biases are not arbitraged away. The actions of irrational investors can 
therefore cause mispricing without rational investors trading to exploit, 
and therefore eradicate, this mispricing 
This section reviews these issues in detail. Section 2.6.1 considers the issues 
of investor irrationality and systematic bias. Section 2.6.2 addresses the 
question of whether irrational investors can be expected to survive in the 
marketplace. Finally, Section 2.6.3 examines whether arbitrage can be 
expected to cancel out the potential impact of such biases on market prices. 
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2.6.1 Investor Irrationality 
Barberis and Thaler (2002) define rational investors as those who: 
" Update beliefs in accordance with Bayes' Theorem" when new 
information is received 
" Make choices consistent with Subjective Expected Utility18 (Savage, 
1954) 
" Make forecasts using the correct probability distribution of returns 
For investors to be strictly rational, all three criteria must be met. Bounded 
rationality, on the other hand, assumes only that the first two criteria are met. 
The empirical evidence presented in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 makes a compelling 
case for investor irrationality among some if not all investors. Investors who are 
subject to conservatism may not update beliefs quickly on receipt of new 
information, for example, whilst the availability heuristic may lead investors to 
make decisions based on an incorrect probability distribution of returns. Whilst 
it is reasonable to assume a continuum of rationality, with some investors 
acting more rationally than others, research suggests that there are a number 
of biases which are common to all investors to some extent, such as the use of 
decision-making heuristics. 
Clearly, the rationality of investors has implications for the rationality of the 
market as a whole. Rubinstein (2000) defines three levels of rational market. A 
maximally rational market is defined as one in which all investors are rational. A 
rational market is one in which prices are set as though all investors were 
rational. Finally, a minimally rational market is one in which prices are not set 
as though all investors were rational, but there are no abnormal profits 
available to those who are. Any evidence to support the existence of excess 
17 Bayes' theorem relates prior, conditional, and posterior probabilities of outcomes. 
The updating of beliefs in accordance with Bayes' theorem ensures that subjective 
probabilities are mathematically consistent. 
18 Under Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), subjective probabilities are multiplied by 
outcomes in terms of utility to calculate the subjective expected utility for a given 
decision scenario. 
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profits to momentum and contrarian trading strategies would therefore be 
sufficient to imply market irrationality within Rubinstein's framework. 
In summary, irrational investors clearly do exist, and some investors are more 
irrational than others. Section 2.6.2 goes on to consider whether irrational 
investors are able to survive within a financial market over prolonged periods of 
time. 
2.6.2 Survival of Irrational Investors 
Critics of behavioural finance cite two main reasons why irrational investors 
may not survive in financial markets over long periods of time, and will not 
therefore have any prolonged impact on market pricing. Firstly, irrational 
investors will become bankrupt very quickly when transacting in a rational 
market, and secondly, any irrational investors who are not bankrupted will learn 
from their mistakes and become more rational. 
Friedman (1953) argues that irrational investors will consistently lose money, 
and will not therefore survive. As a result, irrational investors will not influence 
long-term asset prices. If rational traders control most of the wealth they will 
control prices. Fama (1965) argues that rational investors will trade against 
irrational investors and force prices to levels that reflect fundamental values. 
The arguments of both Friedman and Fama can, in a certain sense, be 
regarded as circular. If markets are rational, that is to say market prices are 
rational, then irrational traders will lose money and prices will remain rational. If, 
on the other hand, markets are irrational, then there is no reason to expect that 
irrational investors will necessary lose money or that prices will be forced 
towards rational values. On the contrary, rational investors may consistently 
lose money and be forced out of the market and prices forced to irrational 
levels19. 
19 In such circumstances, the concept of rationality becomes somewhat muddled. In an 
irrational market, it might be considered rational for an investor to trade irrationally. 
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De Long et al (1990) argue that irrational traders may choose investments with 
higher expected returns and hence higher risk as a result of overconfidence, 
and may therefore even displace rational traders. 
Kogan et al (2003) point out that survival and influence on prices are two 
separate issues. Irrational traders can have an impact on prices even with very 
low wealth. 
There is no clear evidence, therefore, to suggest that irrational investors will in 
fact be wiped out by the actions of rational investors. The impact of irrational 
traders on financial market prices is driven by the extent to which the marginal 
investor is irrational rather than simply by the presence of irrational investors in 
the marketplace. 
Critics of behavioural finance have argued that since irrationality does not 
necessarily imply a lack of basic intelligence, it would be reasonable to expect 
that irrational investors will learn over time and therefore become more 
rational20. Brailsford (1992, p226) says 
"It is difficult to understand how this type of myopic investor 
behaviour, formalised in the overreaction hypothesis, can persist 
over time. It implies continued irrational behaviour of share market 
participants". 
Three key arguments emerge in the literature and are addressed in turn below: 
" Individuals learn through repetition 
" Experts can be expected to make fewer errors than the average 
investor, and it is reasonable to expect the marginal trader in financial 
markets to be a professional investor 
" With incentives, learning is accelerated, and biases will disappear 
Empirical evidence suggests that in reality, people learn much more slowly than 
economic models predict. Thaler (2000, p135) notes that "The problem with 
many economic models of learning is that they seem to apply to a very static 
environment". In reality, the same situation rarely occurs twice in exactly the 
same way, making learning more difficult. 
20 Camerer and Hogarth (1999) provide a comprehensive review. 
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Thaler goes on to give an example (p136): 
"This means that models of saving for retirement (a hard problem 
with few opportunities for learning) should be very different from 
models of frequency of milk purchases (easier, with many learning 
chances)". 
Learning in a financial environment may therefore be made difficult by the fact 
that situations do not reoccur in exactly the same way, and that some decisions 
do not offer the opportunity for repetition. 
Whilst experts, who have much greater opportunity to make repeated financial 
decisions, might reasonably be expected to learn more quickly than amateur 
investors, empirical evidence suggests that this is not necessarily the case. 
Heisler (1994), for example, studies the disposition effect among treasury bond 
off-floor traders on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), finding that traders do 
in fact hold initial losses longer than initial gains regardless of the fact that they 
are supposed experts. Similarly, group decision-making might be expected to 
display the benefits of learning to a greater extent than individual decision- 
making, whereas in fact, group decision-making has been shown empirically to 
be no more rational than individual decision-making (Carroll & Johnson, 1990, 
p 28). 
Critics of the empirical evidence on learning argue that the experimental 
scenarios used in many studies do not offer incentives for subjects to learn. In 
real-life financial decision-making scenarios, investors do have incentives and 
therefore will learn more quickly. Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) find 
evidence to counter this argument. Recognising that the incentives offered to 
students to participate in experiments are generally low, Kachelmeier and 
Shehata recruited a group of Masters students at Beijing University in addition 
to a group at a Canadian university. The incentives offered were large from the 
point of view of the Chinese students, reflecting three times average monthly 
income in one experiment. 
The experiment involved a simple bet scenario, where students were told the 
payoff of the bet and the associated probabilities and were asked to give a 
value for the bet. The main finding of the research is a tendency towards 
massive risk seeking for low probability bets (around 3 times the expected 
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value of the bet in some cases). There was no evidence to suggest that 
incentives improved performance. These results hold for Chinese students both 
with high and low incentives and for Canadian students with low incentives 
(high incentives were not available to the Canadian students). Kachelmeier and 
Shehata conclude that whilst incentives may improve attention and reduce 
carelessness, they do not remove irrational behavioural traits. 
To summarise, there is no clear evidence to suggest that irrational investors will 
necessarily be bankrupted by the actions of rational investors. Similarly, 
irrational investors need not learn the be more rational over time. The impact of 
irrational investors on market prices is not strictly dependent on the level of 
wealth controlled by irrational investors, and irrational investors can influence 
prices even at very low levels of wealth. Without an effective arbitrage 
mechanism, therefore, the actions of irrational investors may have a significant 
impact on market prices. 
2.6.3 Arbitrage 
Mispricing in financial markets may result in an asset being wrongly priced 
relative to its fundamental value or relative to the prices of other assets. Whilst 
testing for mispricing relative to fundamentals is difficult21, investors are in a 
position to identify mispricing between different assets (or indeed between the 
same asset in different markets). Arbitrage is the simultaneous purchase and 
sale of two assets which are mispriced relative to one another in order to profit 
from the price discrepancy. The act of buying the underpriced asset and selling 
the overpriced asset will tend to eradicate the initial mispricing. Even where 
behavioural factors are systematic, therefore, arbitrage may prevent such 
factors from influencing market prices. 
Arguments that arbitrage does not eradicate market mispricing are commonly 
made by counterexample. Shiller (2000, p176), for example, discusses the 
example of eToys, and points out that the market valuation following its IPO in 
21 A dual hypothesis problem arises for most assets where the model of fundamental 
value to be used is tested in conjunction with the relevant research hypothesis. 
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1999 was clearly absurd relative to the valuations of other toy retailers such as 
Toys"R"Us22. 
Lamont and Thaler (2001) describe the clear. mispricing of Palm stock 
compared to that of its parent company 3Com following the spin-off of Palm in 
2000. At the time of the spin-off, 3Com retained 95 percent of the shares in 
Palm but expressed their intention to spin off the remainder later that year 
following regulatory approval. Shareholders in 3Com would receive 1.5 Palm 
shares for each 3Com share held. Since each 3Com share offered a claim on 
1.5 Palm shares, the share price of 3Com should have been at least 1.5 times 
the share price of Palm, even if the other holdings of 3Com were assigned zero 
value. At the end of the first day's trading, March 2"d 2000, Palm shares closed 
at $95.06 whilst 3Com shares closed at $81.81, reflecting a valuation of 
3Com's remaining assets of minus 22 billion dollars. As Lamont and Thaler 
point out, this was not a simple case of enthusiasm on the first day of trading; 
rather, the mispricing took months to be eradicated despite receiving significant 
press attention. 
Shefrin (2002) provides the similar example of Royal Dutch and Shell, whose 
cash flows are split by charter such that Royal Dutch receives 1.5 times the 
cash flow received by Shell. Neverthless, the share prices of the two 
companies frequently diverge from this 1.5 times ratio. 
Lamont and Thaler (2001) point out that one reason why arbitrage may not 
occur is that the cost of shorting stocks can be excessive. Whilst this explains 
why arbitrage may not quickly eradicate mispricing betwen undervalued and 
overvalued stocks, it does not explain why investors would buy the overpriced 
security. In the case of Palm and 3Com, Lamont and Thaler say (p8-9), 
`The demand for certain shares by irrational investors was too large 
relative to the ability of the market to supply these shares via short 
sales, creating a price that was too high" 
22 At the time, Toys"R"Us had sales of $11.2 billion and profits of $376 million (together 
with an ideal starting position for entry into the intemet retailing sector), whilst eToys 
had much smaller sales of $30 million and losses of $28.6 million. Remarkably, eToys 
had a market value of $8 billion compared to that of Toys"R"Us at $6 billion. 
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Barberis & Thaler (2002) discuss a number of reasons why arbitrage may not 
prove effective in eradicating market mispricing. As stated above, arbitrage 
involves the purchase and sale of correlated assets in order to take advantage 
of mispricing. Such a strategy is not, however, without risk. Arbitrage strategies 
are subject to fundamental risk, such as new information entering the market 
relating to only one of the supposedly correlated assets. In addition, noise 
trader risk may mean that the mispricing between assets actually increases in 
the short-term in which case an arbitrage strategy may have to be cut out at a 
loss before the mispricing is eradicated. In general, this type of arbitrage can be 
extremely risky. Shefrin (2002, p42) says 
"The departure of price from fundamental value does not 
automatically lead to risk-free profit opportunities. In fact, the 'smart 
money' may avoid some trades, even though they have identified 
mispricing. Why? Because of nonfundamental risk, meaning risk 
associated with unpredictable sentiment". 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that arbitrage requires the use of capital and 
also involves risk. These two factors are likely to constrain arbitrage activity. In 
addition, most arbitrageurs are professionals who manage the funds of other 
investors. Given the documented tendency for investors to follow past 
performance when selecting funds, fund managers are likely to be hesitant to 
take on high risk arbitrage strategies, particularly in markets where fundamental 
values are opaque such as stock markets, or where the manager's track record 
is short. There may also be a tendency, given the need to be able to "explain" 
performance to investors, to wait until a pricing anomaly is well known before 
seeking to exploit it. This in itself may explain why some of the anomalies 
identified in the empirical literature have appeared to be remarkably persistent 
over time. 
Of course, the identification of profitable investment strategies in past data 
does not necessarily mean that financial markets do not function effectively in 
eventually arbitraging away anomalies. Lo and MacKinlay (2001, p16) note that 
their variance ratio results from the 1980s were exploited by investors to make 
profits, and these profits are now disappearing. Similar effects have been noted 
with some day-of-the-week anomalies, where investor attention subsequent to 
their identification has caused them to be all but removed. 
60 
Fama (1970) notes that the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is consistent with 
abnormal profits as long as such profits are not available over long periods of 
time. In financial markets, mispricing may occur from time to time and it may 
take some time before opportunities are spotted by market participants. Even at 
this stage, considerations of risk may not make it rational to arbitrage them 
away. 
Daniel et al (2002, p150) consider the changing nature of stock market 
anomalies over time: 
"Existing models of psychology and the stock market would have 
permanent descriptive power if, in the long run, patterns of stock 
return predictability were to stabilize permanently. However, we 
suspect this is unlikely to occur. Individual learning about profitable 
trading strategies, and arbitrage activity can over time attenuate or 
reverse a given mispricing effect, or even... strengthen it. We 
therefore suggest that a key challenge for future asset pricing 
models is to capture the process by which investors adopt new 
theories about market pricing". 
Arbitrage may therefore act to cancel out the effects of behavioural biases on 
market prices given certain conditions. Although clear examples of extreme 
market mispricing are commonly cited in the literature, there is some evidence 
to suggest that anomalies do tend to disappear once they have been identified 
and widely publicised. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter considers the behavioural explanations proposed in the literature 
for continuation and reversal effects in financial market returns. These are 
considered within two broad categories; decision-making heuristics, and 
emotional factors affecting decision-making. The possible impact of these 
biases on market prices is considered, as are the conditions required for 
behavioural factors to exert the predicted influence on prices. Chapter 3 goes 
on to discuss the non-behavioural alternative explanations proposed in the 
literature for continuation and reversal effects in financial market returns. 
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Chapter 3 
Alternative Theories of Stock Market Continuation 
and Reversal Effects 
3.1 Introduction 
A broad range of explanations has been proposed to explain empirical findings 
of continuation and reversal effects in financial market returns23. Whilst Chapter 
2 discussed behavioural theories of financial market continuation and reversal 
effects, this chapter goes on to consider the non-behavioural alternative 
arguments put forward in the literature. 
Criticisms of the empirical research conducted in this field typically argue that 
the momentum and contrarian profits identified by many studies are not 
achievable by investors under real-world conditions and/or merely reflect 
compensation to investors for increased levels of risk24. The principal 
arguments fall into three main categories. Firstly, profits may be driven by 
errors in the measurement of the prices used in empirical work due to market 
microstructure issues such as bid-ask bounce and nonsynchronous trading. 
Secondly, even if the underlying price data used in studies is correctly 
specified, methodological issues such as the choice of model of expected 
returns and the methodology used to cumulate returns may lead to spurious 
results. Finally, notwithstanding market microstructure and methodological 
issues which may be responsible for the results of previous empirical work in 
this field, the excess profits identified by previous research may simply reflect 
cross-sectional dispersion in the risk and expected returns of individual stocks 
and/or time-varying risk properties of financial market returns. 
These alternative theories are discussed in this chapter. Section 3.2 explores 
market microstructure issues which may influence the recorded prices on which 
23 These empirical findings were briefly introduced in Chapter 1 and are considered in 
detail in Chapter 4. 
24 Momentum trading strategies seek to exploit continuation effects in financial market 
returns, whilst contrarian trading strategies exploit reversals in returns. Momentum and 
contrarian trading strategies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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empirical work is based. Section 3.3 goes on to consider methodological issues 
which may bias the results of cross-sectional studies of stock market 
continuation and reversal effects. Section 3.4 discusses ways in which the 
cross-sectional and time-varying properties of the risk and expected returns of 
individual stocks may be responsible for the findings of prior research in this 
field. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Market Microstructure Issues 
Market microstructure issues such as bid-ask bounce and nonsynchronous 
trading may have an impact on the recorded daily closing prices which form the 
source data for the majority of studies in this field of finance. Bid-ask bounce 
can be expected to result in negative short term autocorrelation in returns, with 
nonsynchronous trading generating spurious negative short-term 
autocorrelation in returns for single stocks and positive short-term 
autocorrelation in returns for stock market indices. Section 3.2.1 discusses bid- 
ask bounce, whilst Section 3.2.2 considers the issue of nonsynchronous 
trading. 
3.2.1 Bid-Ask Bounce 
The impact of bid-ask spread on the short-term serial correlation of stock 
market returns is introduced to the literature by Roll (1984), who develops a 
model of bid-ask spread which predicts negative serial correlation in returns 
measured over adjacent intervals. 
This effect is easily explained in the context of daily closing stock prices. The 
closing price recorded for any given day will be on either the bid side or the 
offer side of the market25. Following a sharp market fall, it is likely that the last 
recorded price will be a bid price (the lower of the two prices). Conversely, 
following a market rise, the recorded price is likely to be an offer price (the 
higher of the two prices). This has the effect of introducing an upward bias to 
25 A bid price is the price at which a market maker buys, whilst the offer price is the 
price at which the market maker is prepared to sell the same asset. The ask price is by 
definition higher than the bid price, with the difference between the two prices (the bid- 
ask spread) reflecting the spread earned by the market maker. 
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the recorded size of market movements. On the following business day, in the 
absence of further movement in prices, this bias will be, on average, corrected. 
Bid-ask bounce can therefore be expected to induce negative serial correlation 
in returns over very short horizons. 
Although negative serial correlation over short horizons has been identified by 
a number of studies26, many researchers find that controlling for bid-ask 
bounce using skip-day returns (that is, missing a day between formation and 
test periods in order to remove the effect of the 'bounce') does not reduce the 
profits available to contrarian strategies. Jegadeesh (1990), for example, finds 
positive profits from a strategy set up to exploit negative serial correlation in 
monthly stock returns, whilst Lehmann (1990) obtains similar results for weekly 
returns. 
Although the impact of bid-ask bounce may continue beyond one trading day, it 
can reasonably be expected to remain limited to the very short term. Evidence 
to suggest the presence of bid-ask bounce is likely to be negative serial 
correlation in short-term returns which largely dissipates over a further period of 
one or two trading days. The data used in this study is taken from broad stock 
market indices covering approximately 90 per cent of the total market 
capitalisation in each of the countries considered. As a result, the impact of bid- 
ask bounce is likely to be reduced by diversification although bid-ask bounce 
may still have an impact on index values following large price changes affecting 
a high proportion of the largest stocks (general economic or political news 
items, for example). 
3.2.2 Nonsynchronous Trading 
Nonsynchronous trading may introduce spurious short-term serial correlation 
effects into the closing stock prices used in empirical studies of stock market 
continuation and reversal effects. 
The reported closing price for a stock is typically based on the last trade price 
which, for some less liquid stocks, may have occurred several hours prior to the 
close. Alternatively, some exchanges may report the average of the quoted 
26 see, for example, Gaunt and Gray (2003) 
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indicative bid and ask prices at the close. For some stocks, these prices may 
not have been updated for several hours, or even for a number of days. 
Stock prices typically respond in the same direction to new information affecting 
the market as a whole (macroeconomic data releases, for example). Stocks 
whose closing prices are not up-to-date will see their prices "catch up" when 
they are next traded or market quotations are updated. This effect may cause 
the short-term positive serial correlation in index returns observed empirically 
by some studies'. 
Cohen et al (1986) consider how nonsynchronous trading can produce 
spurious autocorrelations and cross correlations in the empirically observed 
return structures of individual stocks and stock market indices. Their models 
suggest that the first-order autocorrelations for single stocks will be slightly 
negative with cross-correlations between stocks generally positive28. Stock 
index returns will have positive first-order autocorrelation with the degree of 
autocorrelation positively related to the influence of thinly traded stocks in the 
index. 
Atchison et al (1987) compare the theoretical size of stock index total return 
autocorrelations due to nonsynchronous trading with that observed empirically. 
For a sample of 280 randomly selected NYSE firms over the period January 
1978 through December 1981, data on the distribution of total returns and the 
frequency of transactions for each stock are used to model the theoretical 
autocorrelation of returns due to nonsynchronous trading. The theoretical levels 
of autocorrelation estimated from the model are significantly lower than those 
observed empirically. For a value-weighted portfolio, for example, the 
. 
theoretical autocorrelation of 0.0172 is much smaller than the empirical 
autocorrelation of 0.1286. The equally-weighted autocorrelations are higher 
than the value-weighted autocorrelations, consistent with the predictions of the 
Cohen et al model, but the theoretical value of 0.0408 remains small compared 
to the empirical autocorrelation of 0.2586. These findings imply that only a 
27 see, for example, Säfvenblad (1997) 
28 Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) similarly model stock returns under nonsynchronous 
trading and demonstrate negative one-lag serial correlation for single stocks, positive 
one-lag cross-correlation between stocks, and positive one-lag serial correlation for 
portfolios of stocks. 
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small portion of the empirically-observed autocorrelation in stock returns can be 
explained by nonsynchronous trading. 
Boudoukh et al (1994), on the other hand, show that the impact of 
nonsynchronous trading on autocorrelation in stock index returns may have 
been understated. Using the patterns of nontrading over different days of the 
week estimated empirically by Keim (1989), Boudoukh et al show that the 
theoretical impact of nontrading on autocorrelation can be 2 to 3 times higher 
than that estimated by prior research on the basis of a uniform distribution of 
nontrading. Spurious autocorrelation is driven principally by the degree of 
mismatch between severe nontrading in some stocks and frequent trading in 
others. Where high-beta stocks are those which are subject to nontrading, the 
effect on autocorrelation is magnified further. Nevertheless, the theoretical 
autocorrelations obtained by Boudoukh et al are still not high enough to explain 
all of the autocorrelation observed empirically. 
Ahn et al (2002) consider the short-term autocorrelation structures of 24 major 
stock market indices and their associated futures contracts. Since the price of a 
stock index and its futures contract are linked by no-arbitrage assumptions, the 
autocorrelation structures of the two should be very similar. Any major 
differences between the two would imply some kind of market microstructure 
bias affecting the price series. Positive one-day autocorrelations are found for 
23 of the 24 stock market indices considered. Autocorrelations are generally 
greater for indices with less liquid stocks (such as the Russell 2000 in the USA 
and the FTSE 250 in the UK) than for indices of the most liquid stocks (such as 
the S&P 500 index in the USA). In addition, the autocorrelations of the stock 
market indices are in all cases greater than the autocorrelations of the 
corresponding futures market prices. The difference between the spot and 
futures market autocorrelations are both economically and statistically 
significant, pointing to market microstructure biases such as nonsynchronous 
trading as the most likely drivers of positive short-term autocorrelations in 
empirical studies of stock market returns. 
The impact of nonsynchronous trading on historical stock price data is again 
likely to remain limited to the very short term. Evidence to suggest that 
nonsynchronous trading may have an impact on results would include negative 
serial correlation in short-term stock returns combined with positive serial 
66 
correlation in short-term index returns, in each case largely dissipating over a 
period of one or two trading days. The results of Ahn et al (2002) in particular 
suggest that nonsynchronous trading may prove a more serious issue for the 
broad stock market index data used in the current study than for more well- 
known stock market indices comprising exclusively liquid stocks (such as the 
FTSE 100 index in the UK or the CAC 40 index in France). 
3.3 Methodological Issues 
Problems inherent to the methodologies used by previous cross-sectional 
studies of continuation and reversal effects in financial market returns may be 
at least partly responsible for the results of these studies. Fama (1998) argues 
that the lack of consistency in the results of previous empirical studies indicates 
that the anomalies found may simply be chance results. Importantly, Fama 
adds that most such anomalies "tend to disappear with reasonable changes in 
technique" (p283). Section 3.3.1 reviews the basic methodologies used by 
studies of continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns. 
The majority of cross-sectional studies of stock market continuation and 
reversal effects have used the market-adjusted model of expected returns to 
calculate abnormal returns to individual stocks within the data samples29. 
Section 3.3.2 discusses the market-adjusted model together with the alternative 
models of expected returns used by some studies, and discusses how the use 
of such models may be responsible for seemingly anomalous results which 
nevertheless may not be replicable under real-world conditions. 
Section 3.3.3 goes on to consider how the methods commonly used to 
cumulate single-period returns may produce spurious results. Finally, Section 
3.3.4 describes how direct comparisons between formation and test period 
returns can in themselves prove misleading. 
3.3.1 Research Methodologies 
Much of the empirical literature on continuation and reversal effects in financial 
market returns follows the methodology used in De Bondt and Thaler (1985). 
29 The specific methodologies used by each study are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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De Bondt and Thaler study the returns of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
stocks between January 1926 and December 1982 and conclude that extreme 
"winners" over a three/five year period show a consistent tendency to become 
"losers" over the following three/five year period and vice versa. That is to say, 
extremely high and low return stocks tend to experience a "reversal of fortunes" 
over the long term. 
Figure 3.1 shows the standard cross-sectional approach introduced by De 
Bondt and Thaler in the form of a time line. 
The first step in this methodology is to calculate the abnormal return of each 
stock in the data sample relative to a benchmark (the "expected return") over 
an initial period (the "formation period"). In De Bondt and Thaler's study, non- 
overlapping formation periods of three and five years are considered, and the 
expected return is the market return (with the unweighted average return on the 
stocks included in the study taken as a proxy for the market). The abnormal 
return for each stock is then simply the excess of the actual (realised) return 
over the expected return, which has already been calculated. An estimation 
period may be required prior to the formation period where the model of 
expected returns chosen has parameters which must be estimated in 
advance30. 
Individual stocks are then ranked according to their abnormal return over the 
formation period. `Winner" and "loser" portfolios are formed, in De Bondt and 
Thaler's case from the top- and bottom-performing decile of stocks 
respectively. The abnormal return of each portfolio over the formation period 
can then be calculated and is simply the mean abnormal return of the stocks in 
that portfolio. 
30 For example, if expected returns are to be calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), then the ß coefficient for each stock would be calculated over a prior 
estimation period, with this parameter then be used to calculate expected returns over 
the required formation period. 
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Figure 3.1 Standard Cross-Sectional Methodology 
t=o t=x t=2x 
Estimation Period Formation Period Test Period 
" estimation of 
parameters of model 
of expected returns 
" length of estimation 
period generally 
independent of the 
length of formation 
and test periods 
" calculation of 
formation period 
abnormal returns for 
all stocks 
" formation of winner 
and loser portfolios 
" calculation of 
formation period 
abnormal returns of 
winner and loser 
portfolios 
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period abnormal 
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loser portfolios 
The abnormal return of each portfolio is then calculated over a subsequent 
period (the "test period") in the same way. In De Bondt and Thaler's study, the 
test period has the same length as the formation period (i. e. a three year test 
period is used in conjunction with a three year formation period, and a five year 
test period with a five year formation period). 
The abnormal returns of the winner and loser portfolios across the formation 
and test periods are then compared. If winners continue to perform well over 
the test period and losers perform badly, then this is taken as evidence of 
continuation in returns. Conversely, if winners perform poorly over the test 
period and losers perform well, this provides evidence of reversal. In 
determining "good" and "bad" performance for the purposes of this analysis, 
studies may consider whether test period performance is positive or negative, 
or may consider whether test period performance is better than or worse than 
formation period performance. The performance of the winner portfolio minus 
that of the loser portfolio over the test period is also reported in many studies. 
This represents the return to a strategy of buying past winners and selling past 
losers. 
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A small number of studies (see, for example, Cox and Peterson, 1994) have 
used regression analysis to examine short-term continuation and reversal 
effects. In this approach, abnormal test period returns for individual stocks are 
regressed on formation period returns to estimate the relationship between 
formation and test period returns for a given subsection of stocks (in Cox and 
Peterson's case, those which had experienced one-day formation period 
declines in price of 10 percent or more). 
In addition, some studies have estimated directly the serial correlation 
properties (Poterba and Summers, 1998, for example) or variance ratios 
(Jegadeesh, 1990, for example) of stock returns and used their results to infer 
continuation and/or reversal effects in returns. 
The following sections discuss ways in which the standard cross-sectional 
methodology described in this section may in itself be responsible for many of 
the empirical results reported in the research literature. 
3.3.2 Models of Expected Returns 
Previous research has tended to use an event study approach, comparing the 
abnormal returns to a portfolio of stocks (winner and/or loser) during an initial 
event window (the formation period) to the abnormal performance of the same 
portfolio during a subsequent post-event window (the test period). In this 
context, the abnormal performance of a stock is simply the realised return 
minus the expected return, where the expected return is typically calculated 
using one or more of the mean-adjusted model, market model, market-adjusted 
model, capital asset pricing model (CAPM), or Fama-French three-factor 
model. 
The choice of model of expected returns will have an impact on the abnormal 
returns obtained and may therefore bias the results of empirical studies of this 
type. Authors such as Fama (1998) have noted that this issue is most serious 
for studies of long-term market continuation and reversal effects. Over very 
short time horizons, expected returns will be small and the difference between 
the expected returns obtained using different models is likely to be insignificant. 
Over long time periods, on the other hand, where expected returns may be 
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large, the choice of model of expected returns may have a significant impact on 
the results of empirical studies. 
This section provides a brief review of the models of expected returns 
commonly used in the empirical literature; these models are referred to in 
Chapter 4 where the methodologies and results of previous studies are 
discussed in detail. 
In the Mean-Adjusted Model, the expected daily return is a constant calculated 
by averaging the actual daily returns on the stock over a specified estimation 
period prior to the formation period. Using an estimation period of k days, for 
example, 
1 n=t-1 
ER. =-X ER; r + su k n=f-k 
where 
ER; 
1 
is the expected return for security i on day t 
Ru is the observed return for security i on day t 
E; t is an error term with expected value zero 
(i. e. white noise) 
Brown and Warner (1985) find that, although simple, the mean-adjusted 
method produces results that are very similar to those obtained using more 
complex models. 
The Market Model31 specifies a linear relationship between the performance of 
a given stock and the performance of the market over the same period. 
ER, = a, + ß, Rmt + 61, 
where 
Ru is the observed market return on day t 
Regression analysis is used over an estimation period calculate the intercept 
and slope coefficients of this relationship (a; and ß; ). The expected return of the 
31 also known as Sharpe's Single Index Market Model (Sharpe, 1963) 
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stock over the formation period can then be calculated as a function of the 
actual market performance over the same period. A broad market index is 
commonly used as a proxy for the market when implementing the Market 
Model. 
The Market-Adjusted Model is the model of expected returns most commonly 
employed in studies of stock market continuation and reversal effects. In the 
market-adjusted model, the expected return for all stocks is simply the market 
return over the same period. 
ERu=R, 
a+E;: 
The main advantage of the market-adjusted model is that no parameters need 
to be estimated in order to implement it. A major drawback of the model, 
however, is that no allowance is made for differential risk, and hence differential 
expected returns, across stocks. 
The market-adjusted model is clearly equivalent to the market model with a; =0 
and ß, = 1, whilst the mean-adjusted model can be seen to be equivalent to the 
market model with ß, = 0. 
In the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965), the expected daily return is calculated as the risk-free return plus a 
proportion of the excess market return over this risk-free return. 
ERR, =rf +ßß(R, -rft)+E,, 
where 
rR is the risk-free return on day t 
The beta of the stock (the proportion of excess market returns which the stock 
returns) is generally estimated using regression analysis over an estimation 
period prior to the formation period. 
The Fama-French Three Factor Model (Fama and French, 1992) has also 
been used in the empirical literature on continuation and reversal effects in 
financial market returns. This model aims to take into account the empirical 
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observation that small stocks and stocks with high book to market ratios 
typically enjoy higher returns than larger stocks or stocks with lower book to 
market ratios. 
ERir = r+ ß1(R, - rý) + ß2iSBt + ß3, HL, + ft 
where 
SBt is the difference in returns between the smallest and biggest stocks at 
time t (the size premium) 
HL, is the difference in returns between the highest book to value and 
lowest book to value stocks at time t (the value premium) 
Again, the parameters of the return model are typically calculated over an 
estimation period prior to the formation period. 
One of the main issues surrounding the choice of model of expected returns in 
the empirical literature is the presence of a dual hypothesis issue. When testing 
for continuation effects using abnormal returns calculated using the market- 
adjusted model, for example, the results are subject to two distinct hypotheses. 
The first is the hypothesis that the market-adjusted model correctly specifies 
the returns generating process, and the second is that the hypothesised 
continuation and reversal effects are present in the data. 
A second issue relates to the implications of empirical findings of continuation 
and reversal effects based on measures of abnormal returns which may not be 
easily replicable by investors. If strong evidence of continuation and/or reversal 
effects is found using abnormal returns calculated using the market-adjusted 
model, then this has clear implications for market efficiency. The abnormal 
returns to a stock calculated using the market-adjusted model are easily 
replicated by investors (by buying the relevant stock and short-selling the 
market), hence investors could easily devise strategies to profit from 
continuation and reversal effects in stock returns measured using the market- 
adjusted model. If these effects persist, this therefore implies that investors are 
"leaving money on the table", and the market's failure to arbitrage away such 
opportunities provides a clear argument against market efficiency. 
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If evidence of continuation and/or reversal effects is found using abnormal 
returns calculated using more complex models such as the Fama-French Three 
Factor model, on the other hand, then this must be weighed against the 
difficulty facing investors in exploiting such effects (this would require a much 
more complex strategy transacting not only in the stock in question and the 
market but also in portfolios of large-sized, small-sized, high book-to-value and 
low book-to value stocks). The complexity of such a strategy, the additional 
risks it may entail, potential liquidity issues, as well as high transactions costs 
may explain any apparent failure on the part of the market to arbitrage away 
the apparent excess returns available from such strategies. 
3.3.3 Calculation of Cumulative Returns 
Cumulative return calculations involve the calculation of multi-period returns 
using the returns already available for shorter time periods, for example the 
calculation of a twelve month return using monthly returns data. 
A number of different specifications of cumulative returns have been used in 
the literature. Within these, some studies use discrete returns whilst others use 
logarithmic returns. Gray and McAllister (2001) show that the choice of discrete 
or logarithmic (continuously compounded) returns can have a significant impact 
on the findings of empirical studies in this field. As some studies, such as De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) use discrete returns and others, such as Brailsford 
(1992) use logarithmic returns, the results of these studies can prove difficult to 
compare32. 
3.3.3.1 Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) 
The Cumulative Average Return (CAR) approach sums separately the realised 
return and the expected return to the relevant portfolio of stocks for each sub- 
period. The total expected return is then subtracted from the total actual return 
to give the portfolio abnormal return. 
32 As discussed in Chapter 5, the current study uses discrete returns throughout since 
these correspond to the returns which would be achieved by a real-world investor. 
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The CAR method is given by 
R CAR =II-I 
Iu 
r=o 1N t=o 1N 
where 
N is the total number of stocks in the portfolio 
T is the total number of time periods (e. g. months) 
R« is the return on security i in time period t 
ER1r is the expected return on security i in time period t 
The CAR method has the advantage of computational speed, although 
Dissanaike (1994) notes that the returns obtained bear little relation to those 
actually available to investors. One implication of the CAR method is that 
portfolios are rebalanced each time period. A 12 month return cumulated from 
daily returns would, for example, imply daily portfolio rebalancing. Although a 
CAR return could theoretically be replicated by investors, the costs of doing so 
may be prohibitively high. Dissanaike also shows that the differences between 
returns calculated using the CAR approach and those actually achieved by 
investors will be exacerbated in the case of high price-volatility markets. 
Nevertheless, the CAR approach is used in a wide range of studies of stock 
market continuation and reversal effects, including De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
and Alonso and Rubio (1990). 
3.3.3.2 Periodically Rebalanced Returns (PRRs) 
The Periodically Rebalanced Returns (PRR) approach cumulates the actual 
return and the expected return to the relevant portfolio of stocks before 
subtracting one from the other in the same way as the CAR approach. Rather 
than adding the sub-period returns, however, the PRR approach takes the 
product of sub-period returns. This again assumes that the portfolio is 
rebalanced to equal weights at the beginning of each time period, but the use 
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of a product rather than a summation more closely reflects the returns available 
to investors33. 
The PRR method is given by 
RPRR_ 
L (t&+iJ_n(Et 
+ 
t=0 f t=0 f 
where 
N is the total number of stocks in the portfolio 
T is the total number of time periods (e. g. months) 
R1, is the return on security i in time period t 
ERu is the expected return on security i in time period t 
Whilst the PRR method has the advantage of being more closely related than 
the CAR approach to the real-world returns available to investors, rebalancing 
does in itself imply transactions costs. These costs may outweigh any evidence 
of significant profits arising from continuation and reversal effects in financial 
market returns from studies based on Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) or 
Periodically Rebalanced Returns (PRRs). 
3.3.3.3 Holding Period Returns (HPRs) 
The use of Holding Period Returns (HPRs), commonly referred to in the 
literature as buy-and-hold returns, assumes equal initial investment in each 
stock with no subsequent rebalancing. 
33 The PRR approach takes a product of single-period returns, implying that profits (or 
losses) are reinvested each time the portfolio is rebalanced. The CAR approach, in 
contrast, takes the arithmetic mean of single-period returns. This not only assumes that 
the portfolio is rebalanced each period, but also that the portfolio value is reinstated to 
its original level each time. The CAR approach therefore does not reflect the 
experience of most investors, who do not extract profits and make good losses on a 
regular basis. 
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The HPR method is given by: 
RHPR =1Z fl(R,, +1)-fl(ER, +1) 
i r=o r=o 
Whilst the holding period return approach provides a measure of returns which 
reflects the experience of investors without incurring excessive transactions 
costs, one argument against the use of holding period returns in cross-sectional 
studies of stock market continuation and reversal effects is that portfolios can 
become very unbalanced in the event that there is a large variation in 
performance between stocks (Dissanaike, 1994). 
It should be noted that the HPR method described above produces returns 
which are equivalent to calculating returns over a single (longer) period as 
advocated by some researchers (see, for example, Conrad and Kaul, 1993). 
In order to illustrate the implications of the three different methods of calculating 
multi-period returns, an example is considered below. Table 3.1 shows prices 
taken at monthly intervals for three different stocks together with the return to 
each stock over the 2 monthly periods. For example, the return shown for stock 
A in the first month is calculated using the prices shown at t=0 and t=1 as 
(55/50 - 1)%, or 10.0%. For simplicity, it is assumed that the expected return 
on each stock is zero and that there are no dividends reinvested. 
Table 3.1 Impact of Cumulation Method on Measured Returns 
Stock 
Price A B C 
t=0 50.0 20.0 30.0 
t=1 55.0 60.0 27.0 
t=2 60.5 15.0 35.1 
Stock 
% Return ABC 
1 10.0% 200.0% -10.0% 
2 10.0% -75.0% 30.0% 
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The portfolio returns calculated using the three methods are: 
CAR: (10%+200%-10%)/3 + (10%-75%+30%)/3 = 55.00% 
PRR: [(10%+200%-10%)/3+1]x[(10%-75%+30%)/3+1]-1=47.22% 
HPR: [(1+10%) x (1+10%)]/3 + [(1+200%) x (1-75%)J/3 +[(1-10%) x 
(1 +30%)]/3 = 4.33% 
The three methods of calculating portfolio returns produce very different results. 
Both the CAR and PRR method imply rebalancing of the portfolio each period. 
After the first month, therefore, both methods imply a reduction in the holding of 
Stock B to rebalance the portfolio. This results in a substantially higher return to 
the CAR and PRR approaches than the HPR approach. Clearly, examples can 
be constructed where the CAR and PRR methods substantially underperform 
the HPR method. In addition, the transactions costs associated with 
rebalancing in the CAR and PRR methods are difficult to determine explicitly. 
As the above example demonstrates, the choice of method used to cumulate 
returns may have a significant impact on the results of previous empirical 
studies. The following section discusses arguments against the use of 
cumulative returns in general. 
3.3.3.4 Arguments against the Use of Cumulative Returns 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) show that any noise in prices due to factors such as 
bid-ask bounce and nonsynchronous trading can be statistically shown to 
introduce an upward bias to single-period returnsM. This bias is not dependent 
on the length of the period over which returns are calculated, and so the 
cumulation of many single-period returns using, for example, the CAR or PRR 
method, can greatly exaggerate the bias. 
34 Jakobsen and Voetmann (2000) show how returns are upwardly biased as a result of 
the compounding effect. This bias is driven by the volatility of returns and occurs even 
where the distribution of single-period returns is normal. These results can be related 
back to the argument of Conrad and Kaul. Noise in short-term returns (daily or hourly, 
for example) introduces an upwards bias to returns over longer periods. 
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This upward bias in calculated returns may also be responsible for the 
empirical findings of anomalies between the performance of winners and losers 
noted in some studies using the market model. If losers have generally lower 
prices than the average and winners higher prices than the average, noise 
items such as bid-ask spread will have a proportionally greater impact on losers 
than the market, and a greater impact on the market than on winners. The 
upward bias is therefore greater for losers than for the market, exaggerating 
reversals for losers, and greater for the market than winners, thus reducing any 
reversals in the winner portfolio. 
Conrad and Kaul use both CARs and holding period returns35 to investigate the 
evidence of return reversals in NYSE stocks over non-overlapping three-year 
formation and test periods from 1929 to 1988. The CAR method is used to form 
the winner and loser portfolios, but then the subsequent performance of the 
portfolios is evaluated using both methods. The results using the CAR method 
are consistent with those of De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Using the buy-and- 
hold method reduces formation period returns in all instances, however, 
eliminating all non-January returns to the contrarian strategy of buying past 
losers and selling past winners. Conrad and Kaul conclude that the results of 
previous studies suggesting long-run reversal in stock market returns could 
therefore be due to a combination of cumulated measurement errors and the 
January effect, with findings of reversal consistent with those of De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) absent in their data set when buy-and-hold returns are used and 
the January effect is controlled for. 
Dissanaike (1994) considers the impact of using the CAR and PRR methods on 
the results of previous empirical studies using data from the London Share 
Price Database from January 1981 to January 1990 and a typical cross- 
sectional methodology based on 3 year formation and test periods. Whilst the 
two methods yield very different results both in terms of performance and the 
composition of the winner and loser portfolios, the author notes that the 
direction of the overall bias is difficult to specify. 
35 Conrad and Kaul calculate their holding period returns directly over three year 
periods rather than cumulating from shorter-term returns. As discussed in Section 
3.3.3.3, however, the same results would be obtained using the HPR method described 
in that section. 
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3.3.4 Comparison of Formation and Test Period Returns 
Studies of continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns typically 
form winner and loser portfolios based on stock performance during a given 
formation period using a choice of model of expected returns and method for 
cumulating returns, as described above. They then use the same methodology 
to track the performance of the winner and loser portfolios over a subsequent 
test period. This methodology may result in unintended biases in the results of 
empirical studies. 
Dissanaike (1996) notes that using test period returns to measure the strength 
of continuation and reversal effects is unreliable. Symmetric price reversals do 
not imply symmetric return reversals. Dissanaike gives the example of two 
stocks each with a price of 100 at the start of the formation period. The winner 
stock increases in value to 150 over the formation period before falling to 125 
by the end of the test period. The loser stock falls to 50 by the end of the 
formation period before rising to 75 at the end of the test period. The formation 
and test period price reversals are symmetric, whilst the return reversals are 
not. For the winner stock, a 50% return in the formation period is followed by a 
16.6% fall in the test period. For the loser stock, a 50% fall in the formation 
period is followed by a 50% test period gain. In typical studies of stock market 
continuation and reversal effects, such a pattern would be interpreted as an 
asymmetry between winners and losers. Dissanaike proposes a new measure, 
the reversal coefficient, to correct for this bias in cross-sectional stock market 
studies3s 
Dissanaike (1998) uses monthly returns data from the London Share Price 
Database from 1st January 1981 to 1 st January 1988 inclusive and considers 
the returns to winner and loser portfolios using 48 month formation and test 
periods using the FTSE 500 return index as a proxy for the market in 
calculating expected returns using the market-adjusted model. The average 
test period abnormal return is 67% for the loser portfolio and -58.3% for the 
winner portfolio, seemingly confirming findings of winner-loser asymmetry in 
36 The reversal coefficient, which compares the magnitude of price changes rather than 
returns over the formation and test periods, has not, to the author's knowledge, been 
used in empirical work in this field other than by Dissanaike, and it is therefore difficult 
to assess the impact its use would have on the results of the existing literature. 
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earlier studies using US data. The effect is not as strong as found in previous 
studies, however, and the reversal for losers exceeds that for winners in only 4 
of the 8 test periods considered. Use of the reversal coefficient proposed by 
Dissanaike (1996), however, shows that the reversals for winners are stronger 
than for losers in all test periods with winners falling 33% on average and 
losers gaining 8.5%. 
3.4 Risk and Expected Returns 
Even if the price series used in previous studies of continuation and reversal 
effects in financial market returns are not affected by issues such as bid-ask 
bounce and nonsynchronous trading, and methodological issues cannot be 
shown to be responsible for the significant profits to momentum and contrarian 
trading strategies identified by previous research, these profits may simply 
reflect a fair reward to investors for the risks inherent to such strategies. 
The existing literature suffers from an important joint hypothesis problem, in 
that the measure of expected returns used to calculate the abnormal returns on 
which the analysis is based may be invalid. The market-adjusted model in 
particular does not take into account differences in risk across stocks. A 
number of researchers have considered ways in which the risk and return 
characteristics of different stocks may be responsible for the findings of the 
empirical literature. These include differences in the risk and expected return of 
stocks in the cross-section, discussed in Section 3.4.1, and the time-varying 
properties of risk and expected returns, covered in Section 3.4.2. 
3.4.1 Cross-Sectional Dispersion In Risk and Expected Returns 
Cross-sectional dispersion in the risk and expected returns of individual stocks 
may be responsible for the medium-term momentum effects documented by 
studies such as that of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Profits to momentum 
strategies may therefore simply reflect the risk borne by such strategies. 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) argue that momentum strategies should prove 
profitable where there is cross-sectional dispersion between the mean returns 
of stocks, even where the price formation process is a random walk. 
Momentum strategies involve buying past winners and selling past losers. On 
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average, past winners are stocks with high mean returns, whereas past losers 
are stocks with low mean returns. Momentum profits can therefore be 
consistent with efficient markets where the dispersion of expected returns is 
large relative to the variance in unexpected returns. That is to say, if the 
difference between returns achieved by the highest return stocks and lowest 
return stocks is large and the volatility of these returns is relatively small, then 
our high-return stocks will remain high-return and our low-return stocks will 
remain low-return. Momentum strategies will generate positive profits over time, 
but these profits reflect cross-sectional differences in the risk and expected 
returns of stocks and may not necessarily be inconsistent with market 
efficiency37. 
In their study, Conrad and Kaul carry out a decomposition of the returns to 
momentum strategies in the US stock market to examine to what extent returns 
are driven by the time series properties of returns and to what extent by cross- 
sectional variations in the mean returns of individual stocks. Weights are 
assigned to each stock depending on its performance relative to the market 
performance (where the market performance is an average of all the stocks 
under consideration). Stocks which outperformed the market are bought, and 
stocks which underperformed are sold. The strategies therefore hold a position 
in each stock, and by construction each strategy is a zero-cost investment 313 
The momentum strategies use holding periods of 1 week, 3 months, 6 months, 
9 months, 12 months, 24 months and 36 months, and consider the 
performance of each stock over a preceding period of the same length as the 
holding period to be used (so 3 month returns are used to form portfolios which 
are held for 3 months, 6 month returns for 6 month holding periods, and so on). 
The data used is the entire sample of NYSE/AMEX stocks over the period 
1926-1989, with 5 subsets considered. 
Of the 36 profitable strategies discovered, 18 are momentum strategies and 18 
contrarian. Statistically significant returns are achieved by 21 of the 36 
37 If the dispersion of stock returns is smaller and/or the volatility of individual stock 
returns higher, on the other hand, then momentum strategies may not generate 
significant excess profits over time. 
38 This trading strategy specification is that proposed by Lo and MacKinlay (1990b). 
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profitable strategies. Of these, 11 are contrarian strategies and 10 are 
momentum strategies. Momentum strategies with 3 to 12 month holding 
periods are profitable across all periods excluding 1927-1947, which is 
consistent with the results of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and similar studies. 
Contrarian strategies are only successful in the 1927-1947 period. 
The profits to the successful momentum studies are decomposed into profits 
accruing from the time series predictability of returns and those accruing from 
cross-sectional dispersion in returns. Of the 18 profitable momentum strategies, 
only 2 benefit significantly from price continuation effects. In the others, the 
returns are almost entirely driven by cross-sectional variation in mean stock 
returns. Conrad and Kaul conclude that momentum profits may therefore 
simply be a result of holding high return, high risk stocks and selling low return, 
low risk stocks. 
Connolly and Stivers (1998) find that the degree of autocorrelation in equity 
index returns in the US, UK, and Japan is related to unexpected changes in the 
dispersion of the previous week's firm-level returns. When the previous week's 
returns show abnormally high dispersion, continuation eff ects are observed 
whilst reversal follows abnormally low dispersion in firm-level returns. These 
results are consistent with the arguments of Conrad and Kaul. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2002), on the other hand, find that very little of the 
observed return to momentum strategies is explained by cross-sectional 
differences in expected returns, and attribute Conrad and Kaul's results to 
small sample biases in their empirical tests as a result of the use of non- 
overlapping periods. Using a momentum strategy specification identical to that 
of Conrad and Kaul for six month holding periods and a data sample of all 
NYSE and AMEX stocks over the period 1965 to 1997, Jegadeesh and Titman 
show that the zero-cost momentum strategy does produce significantly positive 
profits and that cross-sectional differences in expected returns contribute little 
to explaining these profits. 
The effect of risk on the cross-section of stock returns may be asymmetric. Ang 
et al (2001) note that stocks with high downside risk, that is to say stocks which 
are highly correlated with the market during market downturns, generate 
relatively high expected returns. This is illustrated using data on all 
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NYSE/AMEX stocks over the period 1964 through 1999 and NASDAQ firms 
over the period 1972 through 1999. After controlling for market beta, size, and 
book-to-market effects, the portfolio of stocks with highest downside risk was 
found to outperform the portfolio with the lowest downside risk by 6.55 percent 
per annum39. Momentum strategies involve buying past winners and selling 
past losers. Past winners will tend to be stocks with high expected returns, high 
betas, and thus high downside risk in the event of a fall in the market. Part of 
the profitability of momentum strategies may therefore reflect compensation for 
taking on this additional risk. 
3.4.2 Time-Varying Risk and Expected Returns 
In addition to cross-sectional dispersion in the risk and return characteristics of 
individual stocks, a number of authors have noted that the risk and expected 
returns of individual stocks also vary over time. 
Chan (1988) argues that the use of past data to calculate expected returns is 
inappropriate. The risks associated with winner and loser stocks are not 
constant over time. Other things equal, the risk of loser stocks can be expected 
to increase as their prices fall and hence their leverage increases. The 
converse is true for winner stocks, whose risk can be expected to fall following 
a price rise. Measures of expected returns based on past data will therefore be 
biased, upwards in the case of winners and downwards for losers. This will 
tend to exaggerate any evidence of return reversals. In order to avoid such 
biases, separate estimation periods should be used to generate the betas to be 
used in calculating formation and test period returns. Although this assumes 
that beta is constant over each of these periods, this is considered preferable to 
estimating a single beta over a long horizon such as the 60 months used in De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985). Chan illustrates the point by testing the returns to the 
contrarian strategy of selling past winners and buying past losers based on the 
CRSP data set used by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and expected returns 
calculated using the CAPM. The returns to the contrarian strategy once market 
betas are allowed to vary over time are small, producing an average return of 
0.133 percent per month compared to 0.586 percent per month in the De Bondt 
39 Stocks are allocated to six portfolios based on their downside correlation. Portfolio 
returns are value-weighted. 
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and Thaler study. The excess return available from contrarian strategies may 
therefore simply reflect suitable compensation for the risk involved in such a 
strategy. 
Ball and Kothari (1989) present evidence that negative long-term serial 
correlation in firm-level returns may be due to expected returns which vary over 
time as a result of changes in risk. Serial correlation in realised and expected 
returns is calculated using data on all stocks on the CRSP tape from 1930 
through 1981. At the start of each calendar year, 20 portfolios are formed on 
the basis of realised returns over the previous 5 years and also on the basis of 
firm size. The returns realised by each portfolio over the years t-4 through t+5 
are then calculated for each portfolio, with holding period returns used 
throughout. Regression analysis is used to estimate the parameters of the 
market model for each combination of event year (t-4 through t+5) and portfolio 
(1 through 20). These parameters are then used to calculate abnormal returns 
for each portfolio and year. Whilst there is evidence of negative serial 
correlation in realised returns, Ball and Kothari also find significant changes in 
risk over time, and the negative serial correlation effect is greatly reduced once 
these changes are accounted for by considering abnormal rather than realised 
returns. 
Berk et al (1999) demonstrate how the expected returns to a stock and its 
systematic risk vary dynamically as the profile of the firm's assets and growth 
options changes over time. Shocks to firm value occur as a result of the 
adoption or abandonment of projects with, other things equal, positive shocks 
caused by the adoption of low risk projects or the abandonment of high-risk 
projects and conversely, negative shocks caused by the adoption of high risk 
projects or the abandonment of low risk projects. Such shocks to firm value 
impact on the firm's systematic risk and hence its expected future return. Berk 
et al find that expected future returns are positively correlated with past 
expected returns (since a firm's asset mix is persistent over time) but negatively 
correlated with past realised returns. 
The evidence of short-term contrarian strategy profits and medium-term 
momentum profits documented by previous research may therefore be a result 
of ignoring the time-varying properties of expected returns. In the very short- 
term, for example, a large positive price change (a positive shock to firm value) 
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will be accompanied by a reduction in systematic risk and therefore expected 
returns are lower since less compensation for risk is required. Berk et al note 
that failing to take into account this drop in expected returns will result in an 
understating of subsequent abnormal returns thus driving findings of reversal. 
Over the longer-term, a single shock to firm value becomes less important in 
determining returns over the period and momentum effects begin to appear. 
Berk et al show by simulation that this model is capable of explaining much of 
the empirically-observed variation in cross-sectional stock market returns as 
well as stock market return anomalies documented in the literature including 
those of short-term return reversals and medium-term continuation. Contrarian 
strategies produce profits up to horizons of 9 months, after which momentum 
strategies are profitable out to 5 year horizons. Although these time periods are 
somewhat longer than those identified in the empirical literature, the magnitude 
of profits are broadly consistent with those of studies such as Conrad and Kaul 
(1998). 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) similarly find evidence to suggest that 
momentum profits may reflect time-varying risk and expected returns. Chordia 
and Shivakumar demonstrate that momentum profits can be explained by a set 
of lagged macroeconomic variables: the 3 month T Bill yield as a proxy for 
expectations of future economic activity, dividend yield as a proxy for time 
variation in unobservable risk premia (since a high dividend yield for a given 
stock price indicates that dividends are being discounted at a higher rate), 
default spreads to capture the effect of default premia and term spread (which 
has been shown to be closely related to the short-term business cycle). 
The data set is identical to that of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and business 
cycle dates for the US economy are taken from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER). Overall, Chordia and Shivakumar find that 
momentum returns are only significantly positive during economic expansions. 
During economic contractions, momentum profits are negative although not 
significantly so. This indicates that the source of momentum profits is linked in 
some way to the business cycle. The authors note that a common cause of 
momentum profits is suggestive of rational risk-based explanations rather than 
behavioural biases. 
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Ahn et al (2003) use a different approach to consider the extent to which 
medium-term momentum profits can be explained by risk. A stochastic discount 
factor is constructed from industry portfolios as basis assets and used to 
assess the significance of risk-adjusted momentum profits40. If momentum 
strategies produce significant risk-adjusted returns, then they will enhance the 
investor's opportunity set, that is to say the returns to strategies will not be 
'priced' by a combination of the basis assets. The momentum strategies are 
formulated as per Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) using decile portfolios and 
formation and test periods of 3,6,9, and 21 months. The data used for the 
momentum strategies is NYSE and AMEX stock prices over the period 31 
January 1965 through 31 December 1997, and the basis assets are twenty 
equally-weighted industry portfolios of NYSE and AMEX stocks. 
As in Jegadeesh and Titman's study, the returns to the momentum strategies 
vary widely but are generally increasing with the length of the formation period. 
The returns are not adequately explained by either the CAPM or Fama and 
French Three Factor Model. Using an unconditional performance measure 
based on the 20 industry portfolios reduces the abnormal performance of the 
momentum strategies to around half the level originally measured, although the 
residual profits remain statistically significant at the 5% level for 8 of the 16 
strategies considered. Ahn et al conclude that up to a half of momentum 
strategy profits may be attributable to risk inherent in the strategies. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter discusses the non-behavioural explanations proposed in the 
literature for empirical findings of continuation and reversal effects in financial 
market returns. Market microstructure biases such as bid-ask bounce and 
nonsynchronous trading have a clear potential impact on the short-term 
autocorrelation structure of returns. The impact of methodological issues such 
as the choice of model of expected returns and the use of cumulative returns is 
not immediately clear. In general, however, it should be noted that the market- 
40 The Stochastic Discount Frontier (SDF) approach is used to assess the returns to an 
investment strategy with respect to the universe of alternative investments available to 
the investor rather than a single benchmark return such as the return on a stock index. 
Farnsworth et al (2002) provide an explanation of this approach. 
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adjusted method of calculating abnormal returns, used in the majority of studies 
of continuation and reversal effects, does not take into account differential risk 
in the cross-section of stocks. In addition, the time-varying nature of risk and 
expected returns may not be adequately captured in some studies. 
Chapter 2 described the behavioural explanations put forward in the literature 
for continuation and reversal effects in financial market returns. This chapter 
has examined a range of non-behavioural alternative explanations based on 
the data and methodologies used in empirical studies. Chapter 4 goes on to 
consider, in the light of these behavioural and alternative explanations, the 
methodologies and results of individual empirical studies of continuation and 
reversal effects in stock market returns. 
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Evidence of Stock Market Continuation 
and Reversal Effects 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the empirical evidence of continuation and reversal 
effects in stock market returns. Whilst the broad pattern of empirical results can 
be summarised as reflecting very short-term reversal, medium-term 
continuation and long-term reversal, the results of individual studies are often 
inconsistent and the different methodologies employed can make these 
differences difficult to reconcile. Some observers have gone so far as to 
suggest that findings of continuation and reversal may simply be a result of 
excessive data-mining on the part of researchers. Fama (1998, p287), for 
example, says 
"I doubt that the literature presents a random sample of events. 
Splashy results get more attention, and this creates an incentive to 
find them. ... The same authors, viewing 
different events, are often 
content with overreaction or underreaction, and are willing to infer 
that both warrant rejecting market efficiency" 
This chapter reviews in turn the evidence of predictability in returns over the 
short-term, medium-term, and long-term. Section 4.2 examines studies 
focusing on short-term effects over periods ranging from one day to a week. 
Section 4.3 goes on to consider medium-term effects over periods up to two 
years41. A review of the literature on long-term effects is provided in Section 
4.4. 
Whilst the research documented in this thesis concentrates on short-term and 
medium-term effects, it is possible that the long-term effects identified in the 
literature may be driven by short-term and medium-term phenomena. Nagel 
(2002), for example, postulates that medium-term continuation in returns may 
be a direct consequence of short-term reversals. In a similar fashion, the 
41 Studies are categorised in this thesis as being short-term or medium-term based on 
the length of the formation period considered. 
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results of long-term studies in this field may have implications for returns in the 
short- and medium-term. 
4.2 Short-Term Studies 
A number of studies have considered stock market returns following large price 
changes over periods ranging from one day to one week. 
Howe (1986) considers CRSP stocks with one-week price changes of 50 
percent or more over the period 1963 through 1981 and finds that winners 
underperform the market by 30 percent over the 12 month period following the 
price event, with this underperformance consistent and statistically significant 
across all time frames up to 12 months. Losers, however, appear to rebound in 
the first 5 weeks following the price event, with much of this reversal occurring 
in the first week. After 40 weeks, cumulative returns relative to the market once 
again turn negative for losers. Howe notes that the price event appears to have 
little impact on the market betas of the stocks under consideration, and the 
results are not explained by the January effect. 
Atkins and Dyl (1990) use data on the three largest percentage winners and 
losers among NYSE stocks each day over the period January 1975 through 
December 1984. These are published daily in the Wall Street Journal. From 
this data set, 300 trading days are chosen at random, and the average 
performance of the winners (14.94 percent) and losers (-10.28 percent) 
calculated. The performance of these stocks is then examined using both the 
mean-adjusted and market-adjusted models to calculate abnormal returns over 
test periods of between 1 and 10 days. Losers appear to produce significantly 
positive returns over days 1 and 2 following the initial price event, and 
cumulative returns are positive out to 8 days. Interestingly, losers also generate 
significantly positive returns on average over the four days prior to the price 
event, a phenomenon which had not been specifically addressed in the 
literature. Winners experience slightly negative returns on average over 1 
through 7 days following the price event, although these are not significantly 
different from zero. The results are similar using the mean-adjusted and 
market-adjusted models. Atkins and Dyl conclude that their study shows 
evidence of strong reversals following a negative price event, combined with 
slight reversals following a positive price event. 
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Bremer and Sweeney (1991) examine returns following one-day abnormal price 
declines of 10 percent or more in Fortune 500 stocks listed on the CRSP tape 
between 1962 and 1986. They find significant positive abnormal returns, with 
average cumulative returns of 1.773 percent after 1 day, 2.215 percent after 2 
days and 2.641 percent after 3 days. Whereas 55.28 percent of stocks show a 
positive performance on day 1, this figure reduces to 46.05 percent over day 2 
and 41.19 percent over day 3, suggesting that most stocks have completed 
their price adjustment after day 1 but that some stocks continue to rise in value 
over a longer period. This is inconsistent with the notion that market prices 
quickly change to reflect relevant information. The results are robust to the 
January eff ect and day of the week effects. 
Cox and Peterson (1994) similarly study price changes in US stocks following 
one-day declines of 10 percent or more. Data from January 1963 through June 
1991 is taken for all 2776 NYSE, 2287 AMEX, and 1436 NMS firms that are 
included in the CRSP data files. Regression analysis is used to examine the 
relationship between test period abnormal returns over 1 to 20 days and the 
initial one-day abnormal drop in price, firm size, and the market on which the 
stock is traded. 
The study finds significant reversals for all markets over 1 to 3 days following 
the initial one-day decline, although for NYSE and AMEX firms, short term 
reversals gradually diminish over time and no reversals are found after October 
1987. For NMS firms, reversals continue, but after controlling for the bid-ask 
spread no reversals are found after October 1987. The lack of reversals for all 
markets after 1987 is consistent with the hypothesis that market liquidity and 
bid-ask bounce are the driving factors behind the initial short-term reversals, 
with increases in market liquidity over time resulting in smaller price reversals. 
Additionally, if behavioural factors were the cause of reversal following one-day 
declines, one would expect larger declines to result in larger subsequent 
reversals, a hypothesis for which Cox and Peterson find no empirical evidence. 
Continuation is observed over a period between 4 and 20 days following the 
large one-day drop for all time periods and markets. 
Overall, therefore, Cox and Peterson find evidence of price reversals among 
losers over a1 to 3 day period following a large one-day decline in stock price, 
followed by evidence of continued poor performance over longer test periods 
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up to 20 days. There is evidence to suggest that the short-term reversals may 
be due to liquidity effects rather than behavioural factors. 
Akhigbe et al (1998) consider the greatest percentage loser and winner 
announced in the Wall Street Journal for each trading day during 1992. Returns 
data from the CRSP database and average closing bid-ask spread data from 
the ISSM tape are used for the sample of 203 losers and 210 winners. Losers 
exhibit strong reversals over 1 and 2 days following the price event, whilst 
winners show continuation behaviour over the first day following the price event 
before undergoing a reversal over days 2 through 4. Whilst the cumulative 
reversal for losers over the first two days following the price event greatly 
exceeds the average bid-ask spread, the average return from a strategy of 
buying extreme losers at the offer price following the price event and selling at 
the bid price one or two days later is negative. Even though the market appears 
to experience a reversal following a large price event, Akhigbe et al conclude, 
this is not inconsistent with weak-form market efficiency. 
Ratner and Leal (1999) examine returns following large one-day movements in 
the major stock market indices of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, the USA, and Japan as 
well as the Morgan Stanley World Index. The data covers the period January 
1982 through March 1995, with the month of October excluded to avoid the 
volatility surrounding the crash of 1987. Expected returns are calculated using 
the mean-adjusted and market models over 105 through 6 trading days prior to 
the large one-day movement and 21 through 121 days afterwards. A large one- 
day movement is defined as one which exceeds three standard deviations from 
the mean daily return. 
Evidence of significant reversal following a large one-day decline is found for 
only Japan (day 2), Malaysia (days 4-20) and the USA (days 1-3), whilst 
evidence of significant continuation is found only for India (day 1) and the 
Philippines (day 3)42. No significant continuation or reversal effects are found 
following large one-day increases in the indices considered. 
42 all at the 5 percent significance level. 
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Otchere and Chan (2000) consider the evidence from short-term returns to 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) stocks over the periods 25 March 1996 to 
31 July 1997 and from 1 August 1997 to 30 June 1998 (the period of the Asian 
Financial Crisis). The earlier sample consists of data on 432 stocks and the 
later sample contains data on 474 stocks. 
On each trading day, a winner and loser stock is chosen, these being the 
stocks with the highest and lowest abnormal return over that trading day 
respectively, and the subsequent abnormal return over test periods of 1 to 7 
trading days is calculated. Over the earlier period, evidence of reversal in 
returns is found over 2 to 4 trading days following the designation of stocks as 
a winner and 3 days following designation as a loser, with the size of the 
reversals more pronounced for winners than for losers. After accounting for 
transactions costs, however, profits from a trading strategy designed to exploit 
these reversals are generally insignificant. This is consistent with the results of 
Akhigbe et al. Over the period of the Asian Financial Crisis, the results are 
mixed. Otchere and Chan note that their results appear robust to factors such 
as bid-ask bounce, size effects, and day-of-the-week effects. 
Schnusenberg and Madura (2001) use a time-series approach to investigate 
the short term returns behaviour of six US stock market indices: the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (1st October 1928 to 31 st December 1997), the S&P 500 (1st 
January 1928 to 31st December 1997), the Nasdaq Composite (5th February 
1971 to 31 s' December 1997), the NYSE Composite (1st January 1966 to 318t 
December 1997), the Russell 3000 (2"d January 1979 to 31st December 1997), 
and the Wilshire 5000 (1 st December 1979 to 31 st December 1997). 
Portfolios of winning and losing days are formed based on the abnormal index 
performance on that day. Both a mean-adjusted return model, in which 
expected returns are based on the average actual return over the previous 60 
days, and an ARIMA model are used in the calculation of abnormal returns. In 
the case of the ARIMA model, the model is fitted using the first 100 days of 
data to obtain the necessary model coefficients, and is re-estimated for each 
decade of data in the sample. 
The winner and loser portfolios are formed from the top and bottom deciles of 
daily returns, with each portfolio therefore containing a list of trading days 
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rather than of individual stocks. Cumulative abnormal test period returns are 
computed for 1,2,3,5,10 , 30, and 60 
days following the trading days in the 
winner and loser portfolios, and a mean return calculated for each winner and 
loser portfolio. Schnusenberg and Madura thus consider combinations of a 
one-day formation period with test periods of length from 1 to 60 days. 
Using the mean-adjusted model, the returns on the day following the market 
event show strong evidence of continuation for both winners and losers. For 
example for winners, an average Dow increase of 1.93 percent is followed by 
an increase of 0.21 percent (t=5.73) on the following trading day whilst for 
losers, an average Dow decrease of 1.91 percent is followed by a further 
decrease of 0.12 percent on the following trading day. This short-term 
continuation is statistically significant for both winners and losers across all six 
indices. 
For longer periods, abnormal returns to winners are consistently positive and 
increasing with time period. For losers, however, once we go beyond a one-day 
test period, the subsequent abnormal return is significantly negative only for the 
NYSE out to 5 days and the Nasdaq out to 30 days. For test periods of 60 
days, the abnormal returns to the loser portfolio become significantly positive 
for all indices other than the Russell 3000 and Wilshire 5000, indicating 
reversal among losers over the medium term. 
For the one-day test period, the results from the ARIMA model are different to 
those using the mean-adjusted model, with no significant abnormal test-period 
returns for either winners (with the exception of the S&P 500 and Nasdaq) or 
losers. The results obtained for longer periods are similar to those using the 
mean-adjusted model. 
Overall, Schnusenberg and Madura's study provides mixed-evidence of market 
behaviour on the day following a large one-day movement. Over periods from 2 
to 30 days following such a move, evidence of market continuation is observed. 
Over a 60 day period following a large one-day market movement, asymmetry 
is seen between winners and losers, with reversal among winners and 
continuation among losers. 
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Lasfer et al (2003) examine the price behaviour of 40 stock market indices over 
1 to 10 days following large one-day price changes. The data covers the period 
1989 through 1997 and is grouped into developed and emerging markets 
indices based on the Financial Times and Morgan Stanley classifications. 
Large price changes are defined as those exceeding two standard deviations 
from the mean daily return, where both the mean and standard deviation are 
calculated over a 50 day window ending 10 days before the price event. This 
mean return is similarly used in the calculation of abnormal returns in the post- 
event period. 
For developed markets, the abnormal test period returns display continuation 
over 1,3,5, and 10 days following both positive and negative initial shocks, 
with the results significant at the 1 percent level throughout. Following positive 
shocks, abnormal returns increase monotonically from 0.29 percent over 1 day 
to 0.916 percent over 10 days. Following negative shocks, abnormal returns 
follow the opposite path, declining monotonically from -0.12 percent over one 
day to -0.872 percent over 10 days. 
The results are similar for emerging markets, with statistically significant 
positive returns of 0.651 percent over one day rising to 1.951 percent over 10 
days following initial positive shocks. Following negative shocks, returns are 
negative and statistically significant over 1 day (-0.31 percent), 5 days (-0.398 
percent) and 10 days (-0.872 percent). 
To summarise, Bremer and Sweeney (1991) and Cox and Peterson (1994) 
each study the returns to losers following one-day price declines of 10 percent 
or more. Both studies find evidence of reversal in returns over periods of 1 to 3 
days, with similar results reported by Atkins and Dyl (1990) and Akhigbe et al 
(1998) for US stocks and Otchere and Chan (2000) for Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange stocks. Cox and Peterson note that the size of their reversals 
declines markedly through the data samples. This is taken to be an indicator 
that bid-ask bounce may be responsible for findings of short-term reversal, with 
increased market liquidity in recent years reducing the magnitude of the effect. 
Howe (1986) finds evidence of return reversals continuing out to 12 months for 
winners and 5 weeks for losers. 
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Table 4.1 summarises the research methodology and results of each of the 
studies reviewed in this section. It is worth noting that slightly different results 
are obtained by studies which consider the short-term return characteristics of 
stock market indices rather than individual stocks. Ratner and Leal (1999) find 
mixed evidence of continuation (2 indices) and reversal (2 indices) for losers 
among the 12 indices considered in their study, with no evidence of either 
continuation or reversal effects found for winners. Both Schnusenberg and 
Madura (2001) and Lasfer et al (2003) find evidence of continuation for winners 
over test periods lasting up to 10 days (Lasfer et al) and 60 days 
(Schnusenberg and Madura). For losers, Schnusenberg and Madura find 
continuation over 1 day using mean-adjusted but not ARIMA expected returns, 
whilst Lasfer et al find evidence of return reversals out to 10 days. 
For single stocks, therefore, the empirical evidence supports strong reversal 
among losers with mixed evidence for winners. There is some evidence to 
support bid-ask bounce as a possible driver of these effects. For stock market 
indices, the evidence is more mixed. 
4.3 Medium-Term Studies 
Poterba and Summers (1988) use a variance ratio test to examine the serial 
correlation properties of the stock market indices of 18 countries43 . Monthly 
returns data is considered for Canada (1919 - 1986), the UK (1939 - 1986), 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, India, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA 
(1957 - 1986), Columbia (1959 - 1983), and Spain (1961 - 1986). The NYSE, 
TSE, and FTSE indices are used for the USA, Canada and the UK respectively, 
with indices published by the IMF used in all other cases. 
43 If stock market returns follow a random walk, then the variance of returns will be 
proportional to the return horizon. That is to say, the variance of 6 month returns will be 
half that of 12 month returns, which will be one third that of three year returns, and so 
on. The variance ratio statistic relates the variance of returns at different horizons to the 
variance of 12 month returns. 
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Evidence of positive serial correlation in returns over a one-month horizon is 
found in all but one country (Columbia), with negative serial correlation over 
longer periods. Although the short data samples and associated high standard 
errors make it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of zero serial correlation, 
Poterba and Summers report, the consistency of the results is persuasive. 
Jegadeesh (1990) finds evidence of significant serial correlation in CRSP 
stocks, with negative serial correlation over one month and positive serial 
correlation over 2 to 36 months but most notably over a 12 month horizon. A 
trading strategy is devised which uses one month serial correlations estimated 
using prior data to rank stocks in terms of expected performance over the 
following month. The strategy then buys the decile of stocks with the highest 
expected performance and sells that with the lowest expected performance. 
This strategy realises an average abnormal return of 1.99 percent per month 
over the period 1934 to 1987. A similar strategy using the 12 month serial 
correlation estimate realises an average 0.93 percent per month over the same 
period, whilst one which uses all of the estimated serial correlations from 1 to 
36 months realises 2.49 percent per month. 
Jegadeesh reports that the pattern of returns is different in January, but this 
does not explain the overall findings. Similarly, possible explanations such as 
size-based risk, time-varying risk and the effects of the bid-ask spread and 
nonsynchronous trading are unable to fully explain the observed empirical 
results. 
Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) consider the evidence of continuation and 
reversal behaviour among Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) stocks between 
1950 and 1988 using formation and test periods of equal length ranging from 
12 and 24 months up to 10 years. Evidence is found of significant price 
continuation up to 24 months. Over longer periods, small reversals in returns 
are observed although these are not statistically significant. Their results are 
robust to the January effect and size effect. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that momentum strategies which buy US 
stocks with strong past performance and sell stocks with poor past 
performance generate significant positive abnormal returns over 3 to 12 month 
holding periods but negative abnormal returns over the subsequent two year 
99 
period. These results are consistent with medium-term market continuation but 
longer-term market reversal. For example, a strategy based on a six month 
formation period generates average returns of 9.5 percent over a 12 month test 
period but loses over half of this return over the following 24 months. These 
later losses indicate that the strategies are not simply selecting stocks with high 
unconditional expected returns, rather that price changes during the holding 
period are at least partially temporary. 
Data from 1965 to 1989 is used for AMEX and NYSE stocks with formation 
periods and test periods of between 1 and 4 quarters. Strategies are 
considered where the test period follows on immediately from the formation 
period and where a one week gap exists between formation and test periods, 
giving 32 strategies in all. Stocks are ranked at the beginning of each month on 
the basis of their return during the formation period, and portfolios formed 
based on the top and bottom deciles. The strategies examined involve buying 
the winner portfolio and selling the loser portfolio each month, and also carry 
forward positions from the previous K-1 months where K is the length of the 
holding period. Thus, each strategy makes use of overlapping holding periods 
based on previous months' winner and loser portfolios. 
The returns from all the strategies considered by Jegadeesh and Titman are 
positive and statistically significant except for that of the 3 month/3 month 
strategy that does not skip a week, where returns are positive but not 
statistically significant. Importantly, both the buy and sell sides of the strategy 
generate a positive contribution to returns in all cases. The most successful 
strategy uses a 12 month formation period and 3 month holding period. 
The 6 month formation /6 month holding period strategy is analysed in further 
detail. Over the 1965 to 1989 period, the strategy realises a compound excess 
return of 12.01 percent per annum on average. Average losses of about 7 
percent occur in each January but positive abnormal returns averaging 1.66 
percent per month are found in all other months. The magnitude of the January 
losses is found to be inversely related to firm size. Seasonal effects occur 
outside January, with fairly low returns in August and particularly high returns in 
April, November and December. 
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Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) respond to criticisms that their earlier results 
may have been a result of data snooping bias by retesting the 6 month 
formation /6 month holding period strategy used in the 1993 study using data 
from 1990 to 1998. The results of this out-of-sample analysis indicate that 
momentum strategies continue to be profitable throughout the 1990-1998 
period and that past winners outperform past losers by a similar amount to that 
found in the earlier study. The authors conclude that momentum profits arise 
due to time-series variations in stock returns caused by behavioural factors. 
Chang et al (1995) use one month formation periods and test periods of 
between one and six months to examine the profitability of contrarian strategies 
using data on Tokyo Stock Exchange-listed firms between 1975 and 1991. The 
short term contrarian strategy produces significant profits for holding periods of 
up to four months, although returns are negative over five and six month 
holding periods. The results are not affected by adjusting for firm size, 
systematic risk, or the January effect. Additionally, a strong symmetry in returns 
is observed between the winner and loser portfolios. 
Rouwenhorst (1998) considers the profitability of Deutschmark-based 
momentum strategies in twelve European countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK) over the period 1980 to 1995. The methodology is that 
of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and the results are similar. Significant 
continuation effects are observed in all twelve countries and last for about a 
year, with a portfolio of internationally diversified winners outperforming the 
loser portfolio by approximately 1 percent per month, on average, after 
controlling for risk. Irrespective of the length of the formation period, returns 
tend to reduce as the holding period is increased. Country-neutral and size- 
neutral momentum strategies are also found to be profitable in all cases. Whilst 
continuation is negatively correlated with firm size, it is not limited to small 
firms. International returns are found to be correlated (with a positive correlation 
of 43 percent) with those of the USA, suggesting that the profitability of 
momentum strategies in different countries is driven by a common factor. 
Chan et at (1999) consider the profitability of a simple strategy of buying past 
six-month winners and selling past six-month losers using data on all NYSE, 
Amex and Nasdaq stocks between January 1973 and December 1993. Their 
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results suggest that the arbitrage portfolio is profitable, earning an average 8.8 
percent over six month holding periods and 15.4 percent over 12 month holding 
periods. Returns over 2 and 3 years are similar for the winner and loser 
portfolios, with the portfolio of buying past winners and selling past losers 
producing insignificant returns. These results are broadly in line with those of 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) using a very similar data sample. Whilst the 
earlier study found that momentum profits were eroded over longer time 
horizons, however, Chan et al find no evidence of any such longer-term price 
reversals. 
Schiereck et al (1999) use data on all companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange between January 1961 and December 1991 to consider the issue of 
momentum and contrarian strategy profitability in the German stock market. To 
test the profitability of momentum strategies, winner and loser portfolios are 
formed from the best and worst 10,20, or 40 performing stocks respectively 
over formation periods of 1,3,6, and 12 months, and the performance of these 
portfolios are tracked over the following 12 months. 
The momentum strategies considered are generally profitable. With a formation 
period of one month and portfolios formed from the top and bottom 20 stocks, 
for example, the mean monthly return is a small but statistically significant 1.49 
percent. The authors note that the profitability of the momentum strategies 
considered increases over time through the three decades covered by the data. 
The five year contrarian strategies based on portfolios of 20 stocks earn 
positive returns in 15 of the 22 samples considered. Controlling for beta, risk, 
and firm size does not account for the findings of the study. 
Pan and Hsueh (2001) argue that the significant momentum profits found by 
studies such as Rouwenhorst (1998) may be empirical illusions caused by the 
use of overlapping data. Trading strategies are constructed using a data set 
comprising the stock market indices of twelve European countries and the 
USA. The strategy generates a zero-cost portfolio comprising long and short 
investments in each index where the portfolio weights assigned to each index 
are based on the excess of that index's performance over a prior period relative 
to the average performance of the indices. Indices which outperform the 
average over the prior period are therefore assigned positive weights, and vice 
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versa for indices which underperform the average47. The data sample covers 
the period from January 6th 1988 to December 29th 1999. 
The momentum strategy is implemented for five different time horizons: one 
week, two weeks, four weeks, twelve weeks, and 26 weeks, with average 
profits of -0.00096 cents, 0.032 cents, 0.099 cents, 0.358 cents, and 0.824 
cents respectively. The profits appear to increase with longer formation and test 
periods, and are significant at the 1 percent level across all horizons except 
one week. These results suggest the existence of international momentum 
effects in stock market indices similar to those reported by Rouwenhorst using 
data on single stocks. Repeating the test using non-overlapping data however 
generates profit estimates, none of which are significantly different from zero, 
whilst a variance ratio test shows little evidence of serial correlation in any of 
the thirteen indices. Much of the evidence for momentum profitability may 
therefore be attributable to biases introduced by the use of overlapping time 
periods. 
Wilson and Pinfold (2001) find evidence in favour of the profitability of both 
momentum and contrarian strategies using data on the New Zealand stock 
market from June 1989 to June 2000 and a standard methodology using buy- 
and-hold returns and the market model. Contrarian strategies with formation 
periods of 12 and 26 weeks and a test period of 52 weeks generate statistically 
significant excess returns of 13.5 percent and 15.6 percent respectively, whilst 
a momentum strategy with a formation period of one week and a test period of 
four weeks generates a significant excess return of 2.3 percent. The two 
profitable contrarian strategies are no better than chance, however, at picking 
test period winners; rather, profits are generated by a small number of 
formation period losers which produce particularly high test period returns. 
Hameed and Kusnadi (2002) investigate the profitability of momentum 
strategies in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand over the period 1981 through 1994. The methodology employed is 
similar to that of Rouwenhorst (1998) with sixteen combinations of 3,6,9, and 
12 month formation and test periods. Whilst the returns achieved by these 
47 This methodology is introduced by Lo and MacKinlay (1990b) and is also used by 
Conrad and Kaul (1993). 
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strategies are generally positive, they are small (the most profitable strategy, 
using a9 month formation and 12 month test period, generates an average 
annual return of 9.48 percent) and none of the results are statistically 
significant. 
Hon and Tonks (2003) use the methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
to investigate the profitability of short term momentum strategies in the UK 
stock market based on data from the London Business School London Share 
Price Database (LSPD) tape. Using formation periods and test periods ranging 
from 3 to 24 months in 3 month intervals (i. e. a total of 64 combinations of 
formation and test period), positive mean returns are found to most strategies 
over the period January 1955 to December 1996 with 24 of the 64 strategies 
generating significantly positive returns at the 90 percent confidence level. 
In terms of formation period, returns tend to increase with the length of the 
formation period up to 12 months, subsequently decreasing towards zero. 
None of the strategies using a 24 month formation period generate significantly 
positive returns, and a number of the average returns are in fact negative. In 
terms of test period, strategies with 6 to 9 month test periods generate the 
highest returns, with returns again subsequently tailing off towards zero. The 
highest overall return is produced by the 12 x6 (12 month formation period, 6 
month test period) strategy with an annualised return of 16.2 percent. These 
results are consistent with those of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
Hon and Tonks go on to report that splitting the data set into two subsamples 
from January 1955 to December 1976 and January 1977 to December 1996 
generates very different results, with the returns generally positive but 
insignificant over the period 1955 to 1976. Over the period 1977 to 1996, 
returns increase with the length of the formation period up to 9 months before 
decreasing with longer formation periods, but are generally positive and 
significant throughout. Most of the profits generated from the whole sample are 
therefore concentrated in the second half of the data, and the authors conclude 
that momentum was not a general feature of the UK stock market during the 
period as a whole. 
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Forner and Marhuenda (2003) consider the returns to 6 month and 12 month 
momentum strategies in the Spanish stock market48. Significant positive returns 
are found only for the 12 month strategy, and these returns remain after 
adjusting for risk. 
Table 4.2 summarises the methodology and findings of the empirical studies of 
medium-term continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns 
reviewed in this section. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that 
significant continuation effects are present in stock market returns over 
horizons lasting up to around 12 months. Within this, returns appear to increase 
with the length of the formation period as noted by Hon and Tonks (2003), 
among others. The majority of studies consider the profitability of momentum 
strategies based on buying a portfolio of past winners and simultaneously 
selling a portfolio of past losers. Whilst some studies, such as Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), note that both winner and losers contribute to momentum 
strategy returns, further information on the relative performance of the winner 
and loser investments may help to shed light on the potential driving forces 
behind the momentum effect. Similarly, whilst some studies, such as 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993,2001) consider the returns to strategies over 
different subsets of the total available data, further research into the time- 
varying nature of momentum strategy returns may indicate the extent to which 
these are persistent over time. Whilst Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) obtain 
returns which are broadly consistent with those of their 1993 study, for 
example, Hon and Tonks (2003) find that the momentum profits identified in 
their study are concentrated almost exclusively in the second half of the period 
covered by their data. 
48 3 and 5 year contrarian strategies are also considered using the same methodology; 
the results for these strategies are reviewed in Section 4.4. 
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4.4 Long-Term Studies 
Using data on NYSE stocks between January 1926 and December 1982, De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) find evidence of significant reversals in returns over 
formation and test periods of 3 and 5 years. They report that over 3 years, a 
contrarian strategy which buys past losers and sells past winners earns an 
average return of 24.6 percent, for example, whilst the equivalent 5 year 
strategy earns an average return of 31.9 percent. Subsequent studies have 
tended to use a similar methodology with broadly consistent results. 
Alonso and Rubio (1990) examine the evidence of price reversals in the 
Spanish stock market between 1967 and 1984. Formation periods of 36 
months are used with holding periods of between 1 month and 36 months. For 
each choice of holding period, losers outperform winners with cumulative 
returns to the contrarian strategy of buying past losers and selling past winners 
increasing over time. With a holding period of 10 months, for example, losers 
outperform winners by a cumulative 31.2 percent. The authors note that the 
results are symmetrical for losers and winners and that the January effect does 
not appear to be significant in this sample. 
Brailsford (1992) also uses a 36 month formation period and test periods of 1 to 
36 months, in this case to consider the evidence from Australian stock prices 
from 1958 to 1987 inclusive. The market-adjusted model and cumulative 
average returns (CARS) are used to calculate abnormal returns for each stock 
over a 36 month formation period and winner and loser portfolios formed based 
on the top-performing and bottom-performing decile of stocks respectively. 
Over a 36 month test period, winners undergo a significant price reversal with 
an average return of -69.6 percent whilst losers continue to perform poorly with 
an average return of -52.6 percent. The difference between the returns of 
winners and losers during the test period is not statistically significant, and no 
single calendar month produces any consistent significant return behaviour for 
either winners or losers. The results are robust to the size effect, and do not 
appear to be influenced by the industrial classification of stocks. Results using 
5 year formation and test periods are consistent with those of the three year 
periods described above. 
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Chopra et al (1992) find significant profits to the 5 year contrarian strategy 
using CRSP tape data from 1926 to 1986. Using 5 year formation and test 
periods together with buy and hold returns, losers appear to outperform 
winners by 6.5 percent per annum on average. Adjusting for risk using 
empirically estimated betas does not explain these excess returns. Return 
reversals are strongest among small firms, with only very weak effects 
observed among the largest firms. 
Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) consider formation and test periods of 36,60, 
96, and 120 months in addition to the shorter periods described in Section 4.3. 
No significant evidence of reversal is found over these longer periods for the 
Toronto Stock Exchange Stocks which are the focus of their study. 
Allen and Prince (1995) consider the evidence from Australian stock prices 
between 1974 and 1991 using 36 month formation and test periods and 
additionally controlling for time-varying risk using the approach proposed by 
Chan (1988). The winner and loser portfolios are constructed from the best- 
performing and worst-performing 35 stocks respectively with data taken from 
the Centre for Research in Finance (CRIF) database. The initial results, using 
cumulative abnormal returns and the market model, are broadly consistent with 
those of Brailsford (1992). Cumulative formation period returns of 166.10 
percent for winners are followed by 39.97 percent falls over the test period, 
whilst losers fall 192.90 percent on average over the formation period and fall a 
further 57.95 percent over the test period. The picture is somewhat different 
once time-varying betas are taken into account. Winners show evidence of 
strong continuation effects in contrast to the previous findings, whilst losers 
continue to perform poorly. 
Clare and Thomas (1995) use monthly data on UK stock returns from 1955 to 
1990 to examine the evidence of long-term reversal effects in UK stock prices. 
The data is taken from the London Business School LSPD tapes and consists 
of the month-end dividend-adjusted returns of all stocks quoted on the London 
Stock Exchange over the period. In each analysis, up to 1000 stocks are 
chosen at random from the data sample, and winner and loser portfolios are 
formed on the basis of this subsample only. Stocks are required to survive for 
the formation and test period to be analysed but need not be present 
throughout the entire data sample. 
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Non-overlapping one, two and three-year formation periods together with CAR 
returns calculated using the market-adjusted model are used to form winner 
and loser portfolios comprising the top- and bottom-performing quintile of 
stocks respectively. The performance of these portfolios is then tracked over a 
test period of the same length as the original formation period. Using one-year 
formation and test periods therefore generates a total of 18 non-overlapping 
observations, two year periods give 9 non-overlapping observations, and three 
year periods provide 6 non-overlapping observations. 
Using one year formation and test periods, the difference between the 
performance of winners and losers over the test period is not significantly 
different from zero. Winners produce an abnormal return of 0.36 percent per 
month and losers 0.328 percent per month, equivalent to an annualised 
difference of 0.37 percent. 
Clare and Thomas report evidence of reversals for formation and test periods 
of 2 and 3 years, however, with losers seen to outperform past winners by a 
statistically significant 1.68 percent per annum over 2 years (based on average 
monthly returns of 0.11 percent for losers and -0.03 percent for winners) and 
1.56 percent per annum over 3 years (based on average monthly returns of 
1.29 percent for losers and 1.15 percent for winners). Controlling for size using 
the approach proposed by Zarowin (1990), however, reveals a size effect over 
2 and 3 years which may be the cause of the observed price reversals. 
Chen and Sauer (1997) re-examine the findings of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
and Chopra et al (1992) using data from the CRSP tape from 1926 through 
1992. Five-year formation periods and buy-and-hold returns are used to form 
winner and loser portfolios consisting of the top and bottom 5 percent of stocks 
respectively. The loser portfolio generates an average annual test period return 
of 23.74 percent whilst the winner portfolio yields an average annual return of 
12.43 percent. Test period returns are seen to fall gradually as one moves from 
the extreme loser portfolio through to the extreme winner portfolio. The returns 
to the contrarian strategy of buying past losers and selling past winners are not 
stationary through time, however, with periods of very high returns (such as the 
late 1930s and early 1940s), periods when the strategy earns negative returns 
(the mid to late 1930s for example), and periods where returns are negligible 
(from the mid 1940s to the mid 1950s for example). 
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Considering the standard deviation of test period returns produces aU shaped 
relationship. Extreme winners and losers do not always become extreme losers 
and winners respectively. Lower standard deviations for the mid-rank portfolios 
imply that these are more likely to remain mid-rank portfolios over time. Plotting 
arbitrage portfolio returns against the market risk premium reveals a close 
positive relationship. Contrarian profits may therefore be a simple result of 
economic cycles. During downturns, losers fall faster than winners (resulting in 
negative profits to the contrarian strategy), whilst during economic upturns, 
losers rise faster than winners (producing positive profits to the contrarian 
strategy). During periods of economic stability, there is little difference in the 
performance of winners and losers. 
Dissanaike (1997) examines long-term reversal effects in the UK stock market 
using monthly returns data from the London Share Price Database for 925 
constituent companies of the FTSE 500 index during the period from list 
January 1975 to 1st January 1991 inclusive. Aggregate abnormal returns over 
48 month formation and test periods are calculated using the market-adjusted 
model with the FTSE 500 index as a proxy for the market, and using buy-and- 
hold returns as well as periodically rebalanced returns49. Ten overlapping 
formation periods spaced 12 months apart are considered. On average, 
extreme winners (the top-performing decile of stocks over the formation period) 
fall 69.1 percent over the test period whilst extreme losers (the worst- 
performing decile of stocks over the formation period) gain 25.5 percent using 
buy-and-hold returns. Using monthly rebalancing returns, extreme winners 
suffer a fall of 57.9 percent whilst extreme losers gain 14.63 percent. The 
results appear robust to the arguments of differential risk for winners and losers 
proposed by Chan (1988). 
Baytas and Cakici (1999) use Conrad and Kaul (1 993)'s methodology to test for 
long term reversal effects in the stock markets of seven industrialised countries 
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA). Data from 
1982 to 1991 is used from the Worldscope Disclosure Database and winner 
and loser portfolios formed over five year formation periods using holding 
period returns and the market-adjusted model. Moving on one year, another 
(overlapping) formation period is considered, and so on. Test periods of one, 
49 The calculation of these returns is discussed in Section 3.3.3. 
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two, and three years are considered. In all countries except the USA and 
Canada, losers consistently outperform winners over all three test periods. 
The three year return to the contrarian strategy (buying losers and selling 
winners) is positive and statistically significant for all countries except the USA, 
with average returns over the three-year period of 94.5 percent in Japan, 62.9 
percent in France, 58.5 percent in the UK, 50.5 percent in Germany, 21.6 
percent in Italy, and 12.4 percent in Canada. 
Strong asymmetries are found in some markets, for example Japan where the 
reversal is much stronger for winners than for losers. In the UK, Germany, and 
France, the reaction is less pronounced and the magnitude of the reversal for 
losers is only slightly less than that for winners. 
Whilst the results seem to indicate the presence of return reversals in the 
markets studied, Baytas and Cakici note that this may be due to the influence 
of factors such as price and firm size on performance. Across all countries, 
winners have higher average prices and market values than losers. Using 
pooled regressions of holding period returns on both price and size (approach 
as per Fama and MacBeth, 1973) in the USA, Canada and Japan, the price 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant whilst the market value 
coefficient is insignificant. Returns increase as price declines, and reversal 
effects in stock market returns may be a low price phenomenon. 
In Europe the results are more mixed. In Italy, France and Germany the price 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant for losers. In Italy the market 
size coefficient is positive and significant for winners. In Germany both price 
and market size coefficients are significant for winners. In the UK, the market 
value coefficient is significant in some regressions. 
Baytas and Cakici also consider their results in the context of the profitability of 
contrarian trading strategies in the relevant markets. Given the results of the 
regression analysis, the strategy of buying the lowest price stocks and selling 
the highest price stocks (regardless of past performance) is considered and 
outperforms the market across all time periods and markets except Italy. In all 
markets except Germany, the returns from this strategy are greater than for 
strategies based on past performance (buy losers and sell winners) or market 
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value. In all countries except Italy, the market value strategy also outperforms 
the past performance strategy. 
Baytas and Cakici conclude that although returns to long term contrarian 
strategies are generally significant, returns to arbitrage portfolios based on 
price are higher than those based on size, and those based on size do still 
generally outperform the winner / loser arbitrage portfolio. Perceived reversal 
effects in stock markets may therefore be a result of relationships between 
price and/or market value and the performance of individual stock prices. 
Forner and Marhuenda (2000) use the methodology of De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) to consider the evidence of long term return reversals in the Spanish 
equity market using 36 month formation and test periods. Whilst formation 
period winners do produce negative test period returns and formation period 
losers positive test period returns, these effects disappear when adjusting for 
risk as per the methodology proposed by Chan (1988). 
Ahmad and Hussain (2001) consider the empirical evidence of reversal effects 
in returns among Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) stocks using three 
year formation and test periods. Daily price data on 166 companies from 1986 
to 1996 inclusive is used. Of these companies, 66 were constituents of the 
KLSE Composite Index in 1996, representing approximately 50 percent of the 
value of the main board at that date, and every sector in the board is included 
in the sample. There is a potential issue of survivorship bias, since companies 
for whom data was not available throughout the period under consideration are 
omitted from the study. 
Three year formation periods are considered starting in January each year from 
1986 to 1991 inclusive (6 non-overlapping formation periods in total), followed 
in each case by a three year test period. Expected returns are calculated using 
the market-adjusted model with the KLSE Composite Index used as a proxy for 
the market, and the winner and loser portfolios are based on the top- and 
bottom-performing decile of stocks during the formation period. 
Ahmad and Hussain find that the performance of winners worsens significantly 
from the formation period to the test period whilst the performance of losers 
improves, with the choice of returns measure having no significant impact on 
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the results obtained. The results display some asymmetry - the 
underperformance of winners in the test period is not as dramatic as the 
outperformance of losers. Also, the return to the loser portfolio is generally 
greater than that of the winner portfolio indicating the availability of contrarian 
profits from selling winners and buying losers, although these results are not all 
significant. Any potential profits may therefore not be worth exploiting once 
transaction costs are taken into account. 
Forner and Marhuenda (2003) consider the returns to 3 and 5 year contrarian 
strategies in the Spanish stock market in addition to the 6 and 12 month 
momentum strategies discussed in Section 4.3. Significant contrarian profits 
are found for the 5 year strategy but not for the 3 year strategy. The 
differences in results between this study and that of Alonso and Rubio (1990) 
appear to be due to differences in the methodologies used to calculate 
abnormal returns. Whilst Forner and Marhuenda calculate betas individually for 
the formation period and the test period and use these, together with the 
market model, to generate expected returns, Alonso and Rubio calculate betas 
on a rolling month-by month basis using the previous 60 months' returns. 
Table 4.3 summarises the methodologies used by the empirical studies of long- 
term continuation and reversal effects reviewed in this section, together with 
their main findings. Studies have tended to find evidence of significant profits to 
the contrarian strategy of buying past losers and selling past winners. Whilst 
some studies, such as Alonso and Rubio (1990) argue that size does not 
explain these returns, others, such as Clare and Thomas (1995), argue that 
size does have an important role to play. Similarly, studies such as that of 
Dissanaike (1997) note that contrarian profits are not explained by 
considerations of risk, whilst the study of Forner and Marhuenda (2000) finds 
that profits disappear after controlling for risk. 
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4.5 Summary 
This chapter reviews the empirical evidence of continuation and reversal effects 
in stock market returns. In the short-term, empirical evidence of reversal effects 
has been reported for single stocks and in particular following large one-day 
price declines. The evidence of short-term continuation and reversal effects for 
stock indices, rather than single stocks, is mixed. In the medium-term, 
momentum strategies which buy past winners and sell past losers appear to be 
profitable for single stocks, whilst in the long-term, contrarian strategies 
generate significant profits in many studies. Very few studies have considered 
medium-term and long-term continuation and reversal effects in stock market 
indices. The two exceptions reviewed in this chapter are Poterba and Summers 
(1998), who find continuation effects over periods lasting only up to one month, 
and Pan and Hsueh (2001), who find no significant excess profits to a portfolio 
of stock indices weighted by past performance. 
The current study considers whether short-term and medium-term continuation 
and reversal effects occur in international stock indices. The time-series 
approach used builds on Schnusenberg and Madura (2001) who consider the 
abnormal returns to market indices over 1 to 20 days following a large price 
movement. The current study extends this approach to consider formation and 
test periods ranging from 1 to 252 trading days, with returns measured as the 
excess return to an investor from a fully funded market position50. 
This chapter has reviewed the empirical evidence of continuation and reversal 
effects in stock market returns. Chapter 5 introduces the data used in the 
current study before Chapter 6 describes the methodology used to identify 
continuation and reversal effects in the data. 
6o This is similar to the approach taken by Conrad and Kaul (1998) and is described in 
detail in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
Data 
5.1 Introduction 
The research documented in this thesis is in two main parts. The first part 
considers the profitability of short- and medium-term momentum trading 
strategies whilst the second examines the statistical properties of stock market 
trends. Each part of the research is carried out in the context of an international 
study of fourteen major stock markets. 
The stock market data used in each study is taken from the country indices of 
the FTSE All-World Index Series for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the USA. The fourteen markets chosen are all those 
in the developed markets category of the FESE All-World Index Series for 
which daily data is available (price return, total return and interest rate data) 
over the required period for each study. 
The methodologies employed in each part of the research are discussed in 
detail in subsequent chapters. This chapter considers the choice of data and 
provides descriptive statistics. Section 5.2 discusses the choice of data 
samples. Section 5.3 describes the background to, and construction of, the 
FTSE All-World Index Series. Section 5.4 discusses the sources of the data. 
Section 5.5 considers the calculation of daily returns for each trading day in the 
data samples. Section 5.6 presents descriptive statistics, whilst Sections 5.7 
and 5.8 go on to consider the correlations between data series and the 
autocorrelation structure of returns for each individual data series. Section 5.9 
concludes. 
5.2 Choice of Data Samples 
This study uses stock market data in preference to data from other financial 
markets such as the markets for foreign exchange or commodities. The main 
reason for this is that previous empirical studies of continuation and reversal 
effects in financial market returns concentrate on stock market data. One major 
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limitation of the literature to date has been a lack of consistency in results. The 
application of a revised methodology across 14 international stock markets may 
enable such differences to be at least partly reconciled. 
Stock index data together with a time-series approach is chosen in preference 
to individual stock data and a cross-sectional approach. One main benefit of 
the use of stock market indices is that an international comparison of the way in 
which different national stock markets behave becomes possible without the 
need to consider, and control for, the individual characteristics of many 
thousands of individual stocks. 
The use of index data raises issues in terms of the potential impact of bid-ask 
bounce and nonsynchronous trading on the daily closing levels of the stock 
market indices employed in the current study and therefore on the empirical 
results. As discussed in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 respectively, bid-ask bounce 
might be expected to induce spurious negative short-term correlation in returns, 
with nonsynchronous trading conversely inducing positive short-term 
autocorrelation in returns. 
A number of possible choices of stock market index exist for each of the 
fourteen countries considered in this study. The country indices of the FTSE 
All-World Index Series were chosen in preference to well-known national 
indices (such as the S&P 500 index in the USA, the FTSE 100 index in the UK, 
and the Nikkei 225 index in Japan) since the FTSE indices are broad market 
indices which are comparable in their scope and calculation methodology 
across countries. 
The well-known national stock market indices are in general not directly 
comparable. They cover different proportions of the investible stock market 
universe in each country. For example, only 40 stocks are included in France's 
CAC 40 index whereas 500 are included in the USA's S&P 500 index. In 
addition, calculation methods may differ between indices. The calculation of 
performance indices such as the German DAX, for example, includes 
reinvested dividends; most other well-known indices are price indices, which 
exclude dividends. In addition, indices may incorporate only stocks of a 
particular type (sector indices) which may have different characteristics to those 
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of the stock market as a whole. One example would be the Nasdaq 100 index 
of technology stocks in the USA. 
The FTSE All-World country indices consider the entire universe of stocks in 
each country which meet minimum standards of size and liquidity, thus offering 
a much broader base than the alternatives, which generally only consider those 
stocks with the highest market capitalisation in each country. They offer a 
consistent methodology across all markets, enabling like-for-like comparison of 
results. The FTSE indices are preferred over the (similar) country indices 
calculated by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) due to the 
availability of total return data over a longer period for each country. 
One argument in favour of using well-known national indices is that the indices 
can generally be traded in their own right through liquid futures contracts. 
Although one of the main stated aims of the FTSE indices is that they are 
replicable by investors, the costs of replication may be difficult to determine and 
will almost certainly differ markedly across investors. For the purposes of this 
study, however, it is considered that the benefits of using broad market indices 
in terms of consistency across national stock markets more than offset any 
costs in terms of the difficulty of explicitly taking into account transactions costs. 
The fourteen stock markets considered are taken exclusively from the 
developed market category of the FTSE All-World Index Series. One reason for 
this is that the required total return and interest rate data is generally not 
available for developing markets. In addition, market microstructure effects and 
liquidity issues are likely to be more pronounced in emerging market data and 
this may contaminate results. 
5.3 The FTSE All-World Index Series 
The FTSE All-World Index SeriesTM was launched in 1987 and is owned by 
FTSE International Ltd. The objective of the Index is to 
"... create and maintain a series of high quality indices of the 
international equity markets for use as a benchmark by the global 
investment community" (FTSE, 2004, p4) 
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The index series comprises 49 country indices divided into 3 categories: 
developed, advanced emerging, and emerging. Stocks are classified by their 
country of incorporation in principle, unless the individual case warrants 
alternative consideration. 
The FTSE All-World country indices are broad market indices, the aim being to 
capture 90 percent of the investible universe (total market capitalisation) in 
each country after the application of three investibility screens designed to 
ensure that each index is easily replicable by investors without excessive cost. 
Liquidity and size screens exclude very small and/or illiquid stocks. Similarly, 
screens based on free float / cross-holdings and foreign ownership limits 
ensure that investors have access to all stocks included in the index. In 
practice, a range of 85 percent - 95 percent of the investible universe in any 
given country is considered acceptable (FTSE, 2001). The constituents of each 
index are regularly reviewed, as is the industry distribution, the aim being to 
ensure that the industry distribution of each index closely reflects that of the 
investible universe of the country in question. As a general rule, unnecessary 
turnover of stocks is avoided to minimise cost of replication. FTSE (2001) 
describes these procedures in detail. 
The construction of the FTSE All-World Index Series follows a chained 
Paasche methodology, which is defined by Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2000) as 
follows: 
P,, x q, t 
I(t) =`1 -x B 
ýP; 
oxg1r 
Where 
I(t) = index value at time t 
p= market price for stock i at time t 
q= weighting of stock i at time t 
0= base date of the index 
B= base value of the index 
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Each country index of the FTSE All-World Index Series has a base value of 100 
as at 31st December 1986. Index values are calculated once daily using actual 
closing mid-market or last trade prices. 
A review by the Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2000) notes that different index 
construction methodologies are used by well-known stock market indices. The 
Dow Jones Industrial Average, for example, is calculated as an unweighted 
arithmetic mean, the Dax and Eurostoxx indices are Laspeyres indices, whilst 
the S&P 500 index is a value index. Indices also differ in the way in which 
stocks are weighted, with some indices weighted by price and others on the 
basis of market capitalisation. The review concludes that the choice of index 
methodology does not generally have a significant impact on reported index 
values and returns. It is possible that the index calculation methodology used in 
the construction of the FTSE All-World Indices may have an influence on the 
time series behaviour of the resulting data sets, although this issue is not 
explored further in the current study. 
One advantage of the chained Paasche methodology is that the index 
calculation only requires the current weights and prices for each stock in the 
index. All required adjustments to the index, for example following capital 
changes, are handled by adjusting the weights of the stock(s) in question. 
FTSE (2002) provides full details of the calculation methodologies for the price 
and total return indices as well as adjustments to the indices to take account of 
free float percentage for individual stocks, capital changes, mergers, and other 
corporate events. The details are not reproduced in this thesis for reasons of 
brevity. 
The total return index series for each country similarly has a base value of 100 
as at 31st December 1986, but incorporates dividends reinvested as at their 
effective date. These are grossed up to reflect the position of an international 
investor with benefit of double taxation agreements, if any. It is therefore 
necessary to bear in mind that any excess returns to investment strategies 
considered based on this data may be subject to taxation implications based on 
circumstances of individual investors in addition to transactions costs. The 
methodology used to adjust the price index series for dividends may introduce 
a further source of bias to the time series behaviour of the total return indices 
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used in the current study, although this issue is not explored further within this 
thesis. 
The research documented in this thesis uses all of the country indices in the 
developed category for which daily price return, total return and short-term 
interest rate data is available over the period 31st December 1993 to 31st 
December 2002 inclusive. The local currency series are used throughout, and 
all returns calculated are therefore local currency returns. 
5.4 Data Sources 
The calculation of the daily returns used in the two parts of the research 
requires daily price index and total return index values for each of the stock 
markets considered, together with short-term interest rates in the domestic 
currency of each stock market. 
This data was downloaded from Datastream for the period 31st December 
1993 to 31st December 2002 inclusive, this being the maximum period for 
which total return index as well as price index data was available for each of 
the separate country indices. 
Where available, the short-term interest rate data consists of the overnight 
deposit rate in the relevant currency. For some countries, where overnight rates 
were not available, call rates were used. In all cases, the interest rates used 
are mid-market prices. Appendix A gives the Datastream codes for the data 
employed in this study. 
The conversion to the Euro for those countries participating in the first round of 
European Monetary Union (EMU) does not have a direct impact on the stock 
index levels provided by Datastream. Although some data series (such as 
individual stock prices) prior to 1st January 1999 are recalculated by 
Datastream using fixed conversion rates for those currencies to the Euro, this 
does not impact on the values of the FTSE All-World Index Series. 
Appendix B provides charts of the price index and total return index data for 
each of the 14 stock markets considered in this study. 
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5.5 Calculation of Daily Returns 
Discrete returns are used in preference to logarithmic (continuously 
compounded) returns throughout this study. Logarithmic returns are commonly 
used in studies of stock market continuation and reversal effects due to the 
simplicity of calculating multi-period returns from single-period returns. A further 
benefit of using logarithmic returns is that if single period returns are assumed 
to be normally distributed then multi-period returns will also be normally 
distributed (Savage, 2003). Empirical evidence suggests, however, that the 
return distributions of financial time series are not normal (they have `fat tails', 
for example)51, and since the methodology used in this study is "model-free", 
logarithmic returns do not offer significant advantages over discrete returns. 
The use of discrete returns ensures that the returns from the momentum study 
are replicable and reflect the actual returns to a real-world investor, which may 
not be the case for logarithmic returns52. 
Daily returns are calculated for each trading day in each of the fourteen data 
series. In all cases, returns are measured at the published closing price, that is 
to say the return over trading day t is measured from the closing price on the 
previous trading day t-1 to the closing price on trading day t. Price returns, total 
returns, and funded returns are calculated for each trading day in each of the 
14 data samples using the daily price index, total return index, and short-term 
interest rate data as described below. 
Daily price returns measure the capital gain to an investor from holding a given 
index for one day. For a single unit of currency invested in the index at the 
close on trading day t-1, the daily price return for index i on trading day t is 
calculated as: 
PR- = 
Pl. 
t, 1- 
Pl,, 
1-1 -1 9,1 PI i, t-1 
51 Cont (1999) provides a review of the statistical properties of financial time series. 
52 Whilst logarithmic returns are good approximations of discrete returns in the region of 
zero, the errors are not symmetric and can become large for extreme values, for 
example. 
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where 
PRg 
r= price return 
for index i on trading day t 
Pl; 
t= price 
index for index i on trading day t 
Daily total returns measure the returns to an investor from dividend income as 
well as capital gains. Since dividends are, by definition, positive, the total return 
will always be greater than the price return for any given trading day in the data 
samples. For a single unit of currency invested in the index at the close on 
trading day t-1, the daily total return for index i on trading day t is calculated as: 
TR`. - 
PI 
r+ 
Dj, 
r - 
PI j,, j -1= PR`. + PI,, 
t-1 
'` PI ,, t-1 
where 
TR, 
r= total return 
for index i on trading day t 
D;, 
f = effective 
dividend for index i on trading day t 
Alternatively, the total return can be calculated directly from the total return 
index series downloaded from Datastream (as in this study), in which case 
TR. = 
RI1,1- RIj, t-j 
`'r RI. 
_ 
where 
RI,, = total return index for index i on trading day t 
Total return index data is used in preference to dividend yield data in the 
current study for the calculation of total returns. Dividends are highly seasonal 
in most countries (see Deutsches Aktieninstitut, 2000, for examples). The total 
return index enables the effective dividend relating to each individual trading 
day in the data samples to be isolated. An equivalent degree of accuracy would 
not be possible using annualised dividend yield data. 
The total returns described above are not employed directly in the remainder of 
this thesis, but are used in the calculation of funded returns. Descriptive 
statistics are, however, presented in this chapter for total returns since this 
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enables an insight to be drawn into the different properties of the three 
measures of returns. 
Daily funded returns measure the return to an investor from holding the index 
on a fully funded basis, that is to say borrowing the necessary funds to finance 
the purchase of the index which then pays a return in the form of dividends and 
capital gains. For a single unit of currency invested in the index at the close on 
trading day t-1, the funded return for trading day t is calculated as: 
calendardays;,, _,, t FR;, =TRtt - r,, ý_, x basis; 
where 
FR 
1= 
funded return for index i on trading day t 
r, ý_, = closing overnight 
domestic currency interest rate for 
index i on trading day t-1 
calendardays,.,, = number of calendar days from trading day t-1 to 
trading day t for index i 
basis; = interest rate basis for money market rates in the 
domestic currency of index i 
The difference between the calculation of total return and funded return for any 
particular trading day lies in the calculation of the funding cost of holding a 
position in the index. In order to fund a single unit of currency invested in the 
index at the close on trading day t-1, the investor must borrow 1 unit of 
currency at the then-prevailing short term interest rate rt_,. The number of days 
over which interest must be paid is based on the number of calendar days 
between trading day t-1 and trading day t, as per market convention. The basis 
on which interest is calculated is also taken from market convention. For US 
Dollars, interest is calculated on an Actual/360 basis, so 3 calendar days' 
interest at 5 percent equates to a cost of 5 percent x 3/360 or 0.041667 
percent, or example. For Sterling, the calculation is on an Actual/365 day basis, 
so 3 calendar days' interest at 5 percent equates to a cost of 5 percent x 3/365 
or 0.041096 percent, for example. 
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An investor who is long the index on any trading day receives the returns 
(price, total, or funded) described above. Similarly, an investor who is short the 
market on any trading day pays these returns, that is to say the return accruing 
to the investor who is short the index is the negative of the return accruing to 
the investor who is long the index. 
The methodology employed in the current study to investigate the existence of 
continuation and reversal effects in the 14 data samples is model-free in that 
the return metric used is the return to an investor taking into account dividends 
and funding costs as well as capital gains. As such, it should be recognised 
that the returns to the trading strategies considered in Chapters 6 and 7 will be 
excess returns. This is in contrast to many prior studies in this field, which have 
considered abnormal returns calculated using one of the models of expected 
returns discussed in Section 3.3.2. 
This analysis does not take into account bid-ask spreads or other transactions 
costs and also assumes that it is possible for investors to short stocks without 
excessive cost or other penalty. Where results rely on returns from short 
positions in stock market indices, these are explicitly highlighted and the 
potential impact of any restrictions on short selling is considered. 
5.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 5.1,5.2, and 5.3 present basic descriptive statistics for the daily price 
returns, total returns, and funded returns calculated for each index, whilst 
Appendix B reproduces the funded returns for each index in chart form. 
The number of daily observations for the 14 stock market indices ranges from 
2222 (Japan) to 2296 (Hong Kong and the Netherlands), with the differences in 
the number of observations accounted for by the different numbers of public 
holidays in each country. 
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The mean daily price return and funded return is positive for all countries with 
the exception of Hong Kong and Japan. This reflects the strong performance of 
most of the stock markets considered in this study during the first 5 years of the 
data sample. Similarly, the mean total return, which includes dividends but 
does not deduct funding costs, is positive for all markets except Japan. 
The maximum and minimum daily returns are very similar for price, total, and 
funded returns. Maximum daily returns fall in the region of 5 percent to 8 
percent with the exception of Hong Kong. Minimum daily funded returns fall in 
the region -5 percent to -8.5 percent, again with the exception of Hong Kong. 
For Hong Kong, Italy, and Japan, slightly less than 50 percent of the observed 
daily price and funded returns are positive; for the other 11 countries, just over 
50 percent are positive. All countries have positive total returns on over 50 
percent of the observations in the data, with the sole exception of Japan. For 
Italy, less than 50 percent of observations are positive yet the mean price 
return and funded return are positive, suggesting positive skewness in the data. 
The percentage of negative funded returns is not reproduced since, to two 
decimal places, this simply equates to 100 percent minus the percentage of 
positive funded returns (the data contains very few zero return observations). 
Not surprisingly given the statistics described above, the median daily price 
return is positive for all countries except Hong Kong and Japan. The median 
daily total return is positive with the exception of Japan, and the median daily 
funded return is positive with the exception of Hong Kong, Italy, and Japan. For 
these countries, the median return is lower (more negative) than the mean 
return. 
Tables 5.1 through 5.3 also show annualised (252 trading day) standard 
deviations of daily returns together with the coefficients of skewness and 
kurtosis and values of the Jarque-Bera (1980) test for normality. 
A comparison of the mean levels of price returns, total returns, and funded 
returns in each data sample reveals that almost all of the daily variation in 
returns is driven by price changes rather than changes in dividends or interest 
rates. For this reason, the standard deviations, coefficients of skewness and 
kurtosis, and Jarque-Bera statistics calculated for price returns, total returns, 
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and funded returns are very similar. The remainder of this section discusses 
the values obtained for funded returns; the same conclusions can be drawn for 
price returns and total returns. 
The annualised (252 trading day) standard deviations of daily returns shown in 
tables 5.1 through 5.3 are calculated as: 
(Ri 
-R') 
StDevi _ `-' (x 252 (Ni 
-1) 
where 
StDev; = 252 trading day standard deviation of daily returns over the 
data sample for index i 
Ni = total number of daily observations for index i 
R;. 1 = daily return (price 
/ total / funded, as appropriate) for index i on 
trading day t 
R; = the average daily return (price / total / funded, as appropriate) 
over the data sample for index i 
For funded returns, the values obtained range from 13.53 percent (Australia) to 
28.56 percent (Hong Kong), with most values falling in the range from 17 
percent to 24 percent. 
The use of the square root of time to scale the standard deviations reported in 
this section may be questioned on the basis that the underlying distributions of 
daily returns are not normal. Since the distributions of these returns are not 
known, the appropriate scaling rule is also unknown, and the square root of 
time is therefore used as an approximation in order to calculate an intuitively 
tractable metric across the 14 data sets. The limitations of this approach are 
acknowledged. 
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The coefficients of skewness are calculated as follows: 
(Ri't 
- Rj) 
Skew. 
` (Ni -1)x Stdev; 
3 
where 
Skew; = the skewness of daily returns over the data sample for index i 
Normally-distributed data has skewness of zero. The coefficients obtained are 
negative in most cases, with positive skewness in daily returns obtained for 
only four countries (Belgium, Hong Kong, Italy and Japan). 
The coefficients of kurtosis are calculated as follows: 
T (R,, 
-R4 
Kurt. _ `-' (Ni 
-1)x Stdev; 4 
where 
Kurt; = the kurtosis of daily returns over the data sample for index i 
Normally distributed data has kurtosis of 3.00. The coefficients of kurtosis 
obtained fall in the region 4.65 to 7.75 for all countries except Hong Kong, 
which has kurtosis of 11.98. All countries in the sample therefore display 
leptokurtosis (a `fat-tailed' distribution) in daily returns. 
The Jarque-Bera statistic follows a chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of 
freedom. A comparison of the value obtained for each index with the critical 
value from the chi-square distribution results in a clear rejection of the null 
hypothesis of normality for all fourteen time serieso. The values obtained fall in 
the range between 258.9 (Italy) and 7767.4 (Hong Kong). Five countries 
53 The test statistic is based on two independent variables (skewness and kurtosis), 
both of which are squared. The square of a normal variable is distributed as chi-square 
with one degree of freedom, giving a total of two degrees of freedom for the Jarque- 
Bera statistic. The critical values of the chi-square distribution for a2 tailed test with 2 
degrees of freedom are 5.991 at the 5% significance level and 9.210 at the 1% 
significance level. 
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(Denmark, France, Japan, Spain, and the UK) have values in the region 490 to 
700. The remaining seven values range from 1069.4 (USA) to 2206.8 
(Canada). 
5.7 Correlations 
Table 5.4 shows the pairwise correlations between the 14 data samples based 
on daily funded returns. The correlations obtained from price returns and total 
returns are extremely similar to those for funded returns and hence are not 
reproduced. 
In order to calculate these correlations, the data sets were cleaned in a 
pairwise fashion, that is to say the correlation between Italy and Spain is based 
on returns on those trading days where both the Spanish and Italian markets 
were open, the Spain/Germany correlation is based on days where data is 
available for both Spain and Germany, and so on. 
It is apparent from the correlation coefficients in Table 5.4 that the fourteen 
data samples can be split into 3 natural groups, with each country having 
higher correlations with members of its own group than with other countries. 
The first group, consisting of the continental European countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland) 
plus the UK has relatively high correlations between daily stock market returns, 
ranging from 49.1% (Denmark/Italy) to 83.4% (France/Netherlands). Australia, 
Hong Kong, and Japan have higher correlations with each other than with any 
other countries, ranging from 36.8% (Hong Kong/Japan) to 47.5% 
(Australia/Japan). Similarly, Canada and the USA have a higher correlation 
with each other (70.1 %) than with other countries. 
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5.8 Autocorrelations 
Table 5.5 shows the autocorrelation coefficients of daily funded returns for lags 
of 1,2,3,4,5,10,21,42,63,126, and 252 trading days, scaled to fall in the 
range -100 to +100. 
The h-lag autocorrelation for each index i is calculated as: 
`FR;., - FR; 
XFR, 
+h - 
FR; I 
Autocorrelation;, h = `-' NZx 100 
where 
Autocorrelation, 
h= the autocorrelation coefficient calculated 
for 
index i based on a lag of h trading days 
Table 5.5 Autocorrelations of Daily Funded Returns 
Lag Length (trading days) 
12345 10 21 42 63 126 252 
Australia 0.92 -3.65 2.38 -4.52 -3.48 -1.97 -0.97 0.89 -1.51 1.73 -1.52 
Belgium 16.74 0.34 -6.66 0.18 -5.89 0.02 -1.06 -2.21 1.37 0.59 0.90 
Canada 6.77 -3.75 1.27 -5.86 -0.16 0.93 -3.89 -7.68 -0.08 -0.25 0.28 
Denmark 5.36 -2.33 -2.78 3.38 -1.24 0.08 -4.00 -2.93 0.70 -1.54 0.16 
France 3.15 -2.81 -5.74 1.43 -4.62 -2.13 0.39 0.58 2.35 0.93 4.57 
Germany -0.87 -3.33 -1.13 3.91 -2.03 -3.25 -0.98 -1.69 0.18 -0.29 3.21 
Hong Kong 5.04 -4.30 7.64 -3.04 -3.23 1.84 0.28 1.23 1.21 1.48 -0.85 
Italy 1.59 1.19 -0.54 5.11 -4.06 2.68 -0.60 -1.26 3.62 -1.76 4.60 
Japan 3.45 -6.04 -0.59 -6.39 -3.58 1.12 -2.15 0.70 -0.62 0.34 -1.36 
Netherlands 0.49 -4.19 -6.53 2.84 -4.75 -0.38 0.53 -0.31 6.98 0.45 0.04 
Spain 4.22 -5.55 -2.99 1.32 -2.48 -0.47 0.07 1.36 1.88 -2.81 -1.81 
Switzerland 4.86 -1.26 -1.73 1.43 -6.53 0.58 0.88 0.16 -0.46 0.89 2.77 
UK 2.36 -6.15 -7.61 1.34 -3.00 -4.80 -3.59 -1.45 1.64 -0.03 1.44 
USA 0.73 -3.46 -3.27 0.12 -4.03 2.39 -2.89 -2.99 2.01 -0.16 -1.89 
All figures are percentage values. 0.92 = 0.92% and so on 
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The autocorrelation coefficients calculated are generally small. With a time lag 
of one trading day, the coefficients range from -0.87 (Germany) to 16.74 (Hong 
Kong). Excluding these two countries, all values are positive and lie in the 
region of 0.49 to 6.77. 
For a lag of two trading days, 12 of the 14 autocorrelation coefficients are 
negative, as are 11 coefficients for a lag of 3 trading days, 4 coefficients for a 
lag of 4 trading days, and all 14 coefficients for a lag of 5 trading days. Over 
longer horizons, no clear pattern emerges in the autocorrelation coefficients 
and the coefficients themselves are small. 
5.9 Summary 
This chapter explains the choice of the FTSE All-World Index Series as the 
basis for the research described in this thesis. The composition and calculation 
of the Index Series is explained, as is the methodology used to calculate daily 
returns for each country based on daily data downloaded from Datastream. 
Descriptive statistics are presented for each index together with the correlations 
between data samples, and the autocorrelation structure of data samples is 
also considered. 
The information presented in this chapter is fundamental to the analysis 
conducted in the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 6 describes how the daily 
funded returns described in this chapter are used to consider the existence of 
momentum effects in the fourteen data samples. Similarly, Chapter 8 explains 
how daily price returns are used to examine the properties of stock market 
trends. 
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Chapter 6 
Momentum Study Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology employed in this study to identify 
continuation and reversal effects in the fourteen data sets described in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
The medium-term continuation effects identified in the literature by studies such 
as that of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) attribute their results to investors' 
underreaction to new information entering the market. Underreaction, as 
described in the behavioural finance literature, is very much a time series 
phenomenon. Investors place too little weight on new information entering the 
market in relation to a particular asset. As a result, prices adjust slowly towards 
the "full information" price, and continuation effects occur. In the model of Hong 
and Stein (1999), for example, new information entering the market diffuses 
slowly across the population of news watchers and prices gradually adjust to 
reflect the new information. As the price adjusts, momentum traders enter the 
market, pushing the price beyond the full information price. This produces the 
patterns of continuation and reversal in returns which are commonly referred to 
in the literature as underreaction and overreaction. 
Previous studies of continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns 
typically perform a cross-sectional analysis of the returns to individual stocks. 
Cross-sectional studies are effectively selecting stocks in different phases of 
the underreaction / overreaction cycle. If the best-performing decile of stocks 
over a given period is taken to form a winner portfolio, for example, some of 
these stocks may be in the phase of underreacting to new positive information, 
whilst others may be in the stage of correcting an overreaction to previous 
negative information. There is likely to be an aggregation effect in results which 
may make true patterns of underreaction and overreaction difficult to isolate, 
and may therefore be at least partially responsible for the inconsistency in the 
results of previous research. 
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The time series methodology employed in this study allows patterns in market 
returns through time to be more easily identified, and may therefore shed more 
light on behavioural theories than a cross-sectional approach. In order to test 
this, suitably-specified momentum strategies are defined which will generate a 
buy signal following a rise in the market and a sell signal following a fall. The 
returns to these strategies are then tracked to assess the extent to which 
significant excess profits or losses are produced. This approach ensures that 
the results of the current study reflect the returns which would be available to a 
real-world investor, before considering the impact of transaction costs. 
A further benefit of the time series methodology employed in the current study 
is that it avoids a number of important potential modelling problems. Previous 
research into continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns using a 
cross-sectional methodology may suffer from a dual hypothesis problem in that 
the measures of expected returns used (the market model, for example), may 
not reflect the true returns-generating process. In the current study, excess 
returns are used to measure any significant continuation and reversal effects 
identified in the data, and provide a measure of the actual return an investor 
would achieve, taking into account the returns from dividends and capital gains 
as well as funding costs. In addition, the trading rule profitability measure used 
in this study makes full use of each data sample whilst avoiding the 
methodological issues associated with overlapping returns in cross-sectional 
studies54. 
The methodology described in the remainder of this chapter is applied 
consistently to each of the fourteen stock markets considered. Only a small 
number of previous studies have applied a consistent methodology in an 
international study of stock market continuation and reversal effects55, and the 
consistency of results across countries is in itself of value in assessing the most 
probable sources of any such effects discovered. 
64 Richardson and Smith (1991) discuss in detail the advantages and limitations of the 
use of overlapping return observations in empirical studies. 
55 See, for example, Rouwenhorst (1998). 
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6.2 Momentum and Contrarian Trading Strategies 
This study considers the profitability of momentum strategies on the fourteen 
stock market indices described in Chapter 5. Momentum strategies involve 
buying assets which have performed well in the past and selling those which 
have performed badly. If continuation is a fundamental feature of financial time 
series, appropriately constructed momentum trading strategies can be 
expected to generate positive returns over time. 
Contrarian trading strategies, on the other hand, involve buying assets which 
have performed poorly in the past and selling those which have performed well. 
If reversal is a fundamental feature of financial time series, then appropriately 
constructed contrarian strategies can be expected to generate positive returns 
over time. 
A contrarian strategy is the opposite of a momentum strategy. For any specific 
momentum trading strategy, there exists a contrarian strategy which generates 
exactly opposite signals. It is therefore not necessary to consider both 
momentum and contrarian strategies in order to assess the evidence of 
continuation and reversal effects in financial market returns. Whilst significantly 
positive momentum profits indicate continuation, significantly negative 
momentum profits are in themselves sufficient to indicate reversal. 
This section describes the construction of the momentum strategies 
implemented for each of the fourteen stock market indices. In the context of a 
time series analysis, a momentum strategy will buy following a period of good 
performance and sell following a period of poor performance. The key features 
of a strategy that must be defined include: 
1. the measure of returns used to judge 'good' and 'poor' performance 
2. the time period over which the strategy judges 'good' and 'poor' 
performance 
3. the level of returns that constitutes 'good' and 'poor' performance 
4. the transaction that will be executed on receipt of a buy or sell signal 
These features are discussed in the following subsections. 
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6.2.1 Measure of Returns used to Generate Signals 
Chapter 5 describes the calculation of price returns, total returns, and funded 
returns for each of the data sets. Any of these three measures could be used 
as the appropriate measure of past returns on which to base trading signals56 
The choice of price returns, total returns, or funded returns as the measure of 
past returns used to generate trading signals within a strategy depends largely 
on the nature of the process which is assumed to drive continuation and 
reversal effects in stock market returns. 
For example, if continuation effects are considered to be driven by 
extrapolation of past price trends by investors (a symptom of 
representativeness), then signals based on price returns can be expected to 
generate the most successful results since they most closely reflect the returns 
generating process. Similarly, if investors extrapolate based on total returns or 
on the excess performance of a market over the cost of funding, then total 
returns or funded returns respectively may be considered the most appropriate 
measure on which to base signals. The process driving continuation and 
reversal effects in stock market returns is not known, and funded returns are 
therefore used both to generate trading signals and to calculate the returns to 
each of the momentum strategies considered in this part of the research57. 
To summarise, in this study, funded returns are used to generate signals in 
momentum strategies. Each strategy considers the cumulative funded return 
over a given past period, buying the market index if that return is high and 
selling the market index if it is low. 
56 Funded returns are clearly the appropriate measure to use when calculating and 
comparing the profitability of momentum strategies, however. 
57 The analysis described in this chapter and in Chapter 7 was repeated using price 
returns and total returns, rather than funded returns, as the measure of past returns on 
which signals are based. The results, which are consistent with those based on funded 
returns, are reproduced in Appendix D (price returns) and Appendix E (total returns). 
Chapter 7 discusses in detail the results obtained using signals based on funded 
returns. 
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6.2.2 Length of Price History used to Generate Signals 
In this study, a range of momentum strategies is considered for each stock 
market index. Strategies are differentiated based on the period over which 
market positions are held. Eleven holding periods are considered ranging from 
1 to 252 trading days, as follows: 
1 trading day 
2 trading days 
3 trading days 
4 trading days 
5 trading days (analogous to 1 week) 
10 trading days (analogous to 2 weeks) 
21 trading days (analogous to 1 month) 
42 trading days (analogous to 2 months) 
63 trading days (analogous to 3 months) 
126 trading days (analogous to 6 months) 
252 trading days (analogous to 12 months) 
A total of eleven strategies is therefore considered for each of the 14 stock 
markets which are the focus of this study. 
In each case, the length of prior price history used to generate trading signals is 
the same as the holding period of the strategy. A strategy with a holding period 
of 5 trading days, for example, generates signals based on the funded return 
over the previous 5 trading days. Once transactions are entered into, they are 
held for the specified horizon regardless of actual price movements in the 
interim. That is to say, no stop-loss mechanism is incorporated into the simple 
strategies considered. 
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6.2.3 Level of Returns required to Generate Signals 
Previous studies using cross-sectional data samples have tended to form 
'winner' portfolios based on the top-performing decile of stocks and 'loser' 
portfolios based on the worst-performing decile of stocks. 
In a time series scenario, this might translate to the strategy generating a buy 
signal on 10 percent of decision days within the data sample and a sell signal 
on a further 10 percent of decision days. Given that each strategy is only 
permitted to generate signals based on the available information at the time, it 
will not be known whether, on any decision day, the previous market move is 
sufficiently large to place it in the top or bottom 10 percent. A hurdle rate must 
therefore be set against which prior returns are evaluated. 
Some previous studies into returns following large short-term price changes 
have used hurdle rates. Howe (1986) considers CRSP stocks with one-week 
price changes of 50 percent or more, for example, whilst Bremer and Sweeney 
(1991) consider returns following one-day abnormal price declines of 10 
percent or more in Fortune 500 stocks. Fixed hurdle rates do not provide a 
"level playing field" on which to compare the results from markets with 
potentially different volatility, however. In volatile markets, prices might 
reasonably be expected to move further in percentage terms before a 
transaction is initiated than would be the case in less volatile markets. In 
addition, market volatility changes over time, hence the effective level of any 
fixed hurdle rate will also fluctuate over time through each data sample. 
The current study therefore defines a hurdle rate based on the standard 
deviation of the underlying price series. For consistency with previous research 
using cross-sectional data, an appropriate frequency of signals is taken to be 
10 percent of decision days. If daily price changes were normally distributed 
then a hurdle rate of approximately 1.28 times the standard deviation of the 
underlying return series should generate buy/sell signals 10 percent of the time 
respectively58 
58 This is somewhat simplistic given that the null hypothesis of normality in daily returns 
was rejected using the Jarque-Bera skewness-kurtosis test (see Chapter 5 for details). 
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For the purposes of calculation, the strategy estimates the standard deviation 
of the underlying funded returns using the previous twelve months' data. This is 
then scaled to the appropriate number of business days (multiplied by square 
root of number of days) and multiplied by 1.28 to find the appropriate 
percentage hurdle rate to apply. The purpose of the hurdle rate is to ensure 
that a small subset of periods are chosen from each data sample representing 
periods of particularly high and particularly low excess returns. The rejection of 
the null hypothesis of normality in funded returns for each data sample, 
described in Chapter 5, is acknowledged as a potential issue in the use of the 
square root of time to scale standard deviations. 
The actual funded return over the appropriate time period is then calculated. If 
this is greater than the hurdle, a buy signal is generated. If it is lower than the 
negative of the hurdle, a sell signal is generated. 
For example, if the standard deviation of daily funded returns over the previous 
12 months is 0.65 percent, the investor will buy under the 5 day strategy if the 
total funded return over the previous 5 trading days exceeds 1.86 percent (0.65 
percent x "15 x 1.28) and sell if the total funded return over the previous 5 
trading days is lower than -1.86%. 
6.2.4 Transactions Executed based on Signals 
All transactions entered into by each of the 154 momentum trading strategies 
considered in this study (11 strategies for each of the 14 stock markets) are 
deemed to occur at the market close on the day the signal is generated. This is 
by definition the case since the data used in the construction of each strategy is 
closing price data. All transactions occur at the closing price obtained from 
Datastream, and no bid-ask spread or other transactions costs are taken into 
account. 
There are three main ways in which a strategy could be set up to take 
advantage of the buy and sell signals generated on the basis of past 
performance as described in the preceding sections: 
1. a strategy could buy or sell a fixed number of units of the index in each 
transaction. This is akin to a strategy which trades a single stock buying 
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or selling 1000 shares in each transaction, for example. The main 
disadvantage of this approach is that transactions are larger in 
monetary terms when prices are high than when prices are low. The 
level of risk undertaken by the strategy at any point in time becomes 
dependent on the level of the index, which may in itself influence the 
results obtained. 
2. a strategy could start with a fixed monetary value and reinvest the 
proceeds of each transaction into the next. For example, a strategy with 
a starting capital of £100 would buy or sell units of the index with a 
value of £100 for the first transaction. If a loss of £10 is made on the 
first transaction, the second transaction would be for a value of £90, and 
so on. The disadvantage of this approach is that cumulative returns 
over the data sample as a whole are highly influenced by returns to the 
first few transactions. If the first few transactions are loss-making, for 
example, remaining transactions will be small and will have only a 
limited impact on overall cumulative returns even if they prove highly 
profitable in percentage terms. 
3. a strategy could buy or sell units in the index with a fixed currency value 
for each transaction. This is the approach used in this study. Each 
transaction is the same size in monetary value rather than in terms of 
units of the index as in the first alternative. The main advantage of this 
approach is that a given percentage return generates the same 
monetary gain or loss regardless of the actual level of the relevant stock 
market index. 
Once transactions have been initiated, they are held for the appropriate length 
of time (1,2,3,4,5,10,21,42,63,126, or 252 trading days) based on the 
specification of the strategy, regardless of the performance of the market over 
this period. That is to say, no new signals are generated by the strategies whilst 
another position is being held. Similarly, transactions are not rebalanced during 
the holding period. 
Consider the example of a5 trading-day strategy with a monetary value of £1 
million per transaction for which a buy signal is generated on trading day t. The 
strategy buys the index at the closing price of 5000 on trading day t, thus 
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buying 200 units of the index. If the market falls substantially over the period (t, 
t+5), the strategy will not generate a sell signal whilst it is holding a position in 
the market (although a sell signal may be likely on trading day t+5 when the 
current position expires). The monetary value of the 200 units of the index held 
will fluctuate over the 5 days for which the position is held since no rebalancing 
takes place59. 
6.3 Calculation of Returns 
The calculation of the return for each transaction entered into for the 154 
strategies considered in the current study is carried out on the basis of the daily 
funded returns described in Chapter 560. These daily returns must be 
cumulated to produce returns over longer periods (2,3,4,5,10,21,42,63, 
126, or 252 trading days, depending on the strategy considered), taking into 
account that no rebalancing takes place during the holding period. 
Returns are calculated in two ways. The first enables the total return to each 
transaction to be easily calculated. In the second, returns are calculated daily 
for each strategy, thus providing an analogous measure to the mark-to-market 
profit accruing to an investor each day. These two measures produce the 
same total profit or loss for each transaction and for each data sample as a 
whole; the daily profit figures are calculated for ease of compiling annual profit 
figures for each strategy, as described later in this Chapter. 
6.3.1 Transaction Profit and Loss 
Recalling from Chapter 5 that the funded return on each trading day in the data 
sample is calculated as: 
69 This is in contrast to some cross-sectional methodologies which imply daily or 
monthly rebalancing. 
60 Appendices D and E reproduce the results of the current analysis using price returns 
and total returns as the measure of past returns used to generate trading signals. This 
does not affect the use of funded returns in calculating the performance of these 
strategies, and the description provided in this section of the calculation of returns is 
directly applicable to the strategies discussed in the appendices. 
147 
FR. - 
RI` - RIt_1 
-1- r. X 
calendardays;, r_,, 1 
`'` RI1_1 `, 1_1 basis, 
where 
FR,, = funded return for index i on trading day t 
RI; = total return index for index i on trading day t 
rt, t_, = closing overnight 
domestic currency interest rate for 
index i on trading day t-1 
calendardays<t_1, = number of calendar days from trading day t-1 to 
trading day t for index i 
basis, = interest rate basis for money market rates in the 
domestic currency of index i 
The transaction profit for each unit of transaction size for index i strategy j 
based on an x-trading day strategy entered into at the closing price on trading 
day t is then 
M=X 
TP J r, r+x = 
(1 + FR1+,, ) -1 
n=l 
The transaction profit for a5 trading day strategy initiated on day t, for example, 
is a function of the funded return on trading days t+1 (which is based on the 
return from the close on trading day t to the close on trading day t+1), t+2, t+3, 
t+4, and t+5. Note that since the profit is calculated per unit of transaction size, 
this is equivalent to a percentage return. 
A key assumption of this method of calculating holding period returns is that 
investors do not fund the entire transaction at initiation of the position, but fund 
on a rolling basis each trading day. 
The cumulative profit for each strategy is simply the sum of the profit or loss for 
each individual transaction entered into by that strategy. In practice, interest 
would be earned on positive returns to transactions, and further funding costs 
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would become due on negative returns. These returns to realised profits during 
the period covered by the data are not taken into account in the current study61. 
6.3.2 Daily Profit and Loss 
For the purposes of the analysis described in the remainder of this chapter, the 
returns to each strategy are also calculated for each trading day in the data 
samples. This enables the returns to "incomplete" transactions to be included in 
the analysis. In this way, the results reported for strategies with different 
holding periods cover the same amount of data. In addition, reporting profits 
daily enables the profitability of trading strategies over each calendar year in 
the data samples to be calculated, allowing an examination of the consistency 
of momentum strategy profitability over time. 
The reported profit per currency unit of transaction size on each trading day in 
the data sample is zero for all trading days on which a strategy does not hold a 
market position. For the first day on which any market position is held, the daily 
profit is simply the funded return already calculated for that day. For all other 
days, the reported profit is calculated based on the transaction profit to date for 
the current transaction and the transaction profit to date at the close on the 
previous day62. 
The daily profit on the kth trading day of a position entered into at the closing 
price on day t and maturing at the close on day t+x is then 
DP,, J, k,:, r+x = 
TP,., j,,, S+k - 
TP,, J, I, t+k-I 
and 
x 
TP J, I, f+x =I 
DP. 1. k. 1.1+x 
n=l 
s' The reason for this is the difficulty of including such funding costs in the calculation of 
returns based on the 4999 bootstrap time series for each strategy. 
62 Within the context of this study, a loss is simply a negative profit and the text 
therefore refers to profits throughout. 
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For example, the daily profit on the second day of a transaction initiated on day 
t for the 5 trading day strategy, is calculated by subtracting the profit over the 
first day of the transaction from that calculated over the first two days. 
Summing the daily profits reported for each trading day covered by a given 
transaction simply gives the total transaction profit described in the previous 
section. The daily profits can be considered as analogous to a simple mark-to- 
market return for each trading day in the data sample. 
For example, consider a5 trading day transaction with funded returns 
calculated for days t+1 through t+5 of 1.00 percent, 0.73 percent, -0.50 percent, 
-0.80 percent, and 1.22 percent. 
The transaction profit is (1.0100 x 1.0073 x 0.9950 x 0.9920 x 1.0122) -1 or 
0.0164 per currency unit of transaction size (rounded to 4 decimal places). 
Transaction profits to date for the first 2,3, and 4 trading days of the strategy 
can be calculated in the same way. These are reproduced in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Calculation of Transaction Profit and Daily Profit 
Trading Day Funded Return Transaction Profit to Daily Profit 
Date 
t+1 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 
t+2 0.73% 1.74% 0.74% 
(=1.0100 x 1.0073 - 1) (=1.74% - 1.00%) 
t+3 -0.50% 1.23% -0.51% 
(=1.0100 x 1.0073 x (=1.23%. 1.00% - 0.9950-1) 0.74%) 
t+4 -0.80% 0.42% -0.81% 
(=1.0100 x 1.0073 x (=1.23% - 1.00% - 0.9950 x 0.9920 - 1) 0.74% + 0.51%) 
t+5 1.22% 1.64% 1.23% 
(=1.0100 x 1.0073 x (=1.23% - 1.00% - 0.9950 x 0.9920 x 0.74% +0.61% + 
1.0122- 1) 0.81%) 
Overall Transaction Total Daily Profit: 
Profit: 
1.64% 1.64% 
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For trading day t+1, the reported daily profit is 1.00 percent, the same as the 
funded return. For trading day t+2, the funded return on trading day t+1 has 
already been reported. The transaction profit produced so far by the strategy is 
1.74 percent, hence the daily profit remaining to be reported on trading day t+2 
is 0.74 percent. For day t+3, the transaction profit to date is 1.23 percent, or 
which 1.74 percent has already been reported, hence the reported daily profit 
for day t+3 is -0.51 percent, and so on. 
All strategies transact over the period 1st January 1995 through 3181 December 
2002. Data from 1994 is used to calculate the past returns on which to 
generate signals during 1995 and to calculate initial values for the standard 
deviation of returns over the past 12 months. Transactions need not be 
completed by the end of the data sample. If the 252 trading day strategy, for 
example, obtains a buy signal on 1st September 2002, then only the first four 
months' of returns for the final transaction will be included in the cumulative 
profit over the data sample. 
The following example summarises using the example of the 5 trading-day 
strategy. Similar examples can easily be constructed for the other ten 
strategies considered for each stock market index. 
On the first available trading day in the data set (the first trading day in 1995), 
the strategy considers the funded return over the previous 5 trading days. The 
trigger level for initiating a position is calculated as 1.28 times the standard 
deviation of daily funded returns over the previous 12 months. A position is 
initiated only if the absolute value of the funded return over the past 5 days 
exceeds the trigger level. If it does not, no trade is initiated and the same 
calculation is performed on the following trading day and each subsequent 
trading day until a signal is received. 
Once a signal is received (that is to say the absolute value of the funded return 
over the previous 5 trading days exceeds the trigger level), the strategy enters 
into a market position. If the funded return is positive, the strategy goes long 
the market in a notional amount of one unit of currency. If the return is negative, 
the strategy goes short the market in the same notional amount. The strategy is 
therefore simply following the recent market trend. 
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Once initiated, the position will be held for 5 days regardless of market 
movements in the interim, and no additional positions will be entered into 
during these 5 days. On each trading day within the data samples, the daily 
profit to the position is calculated with reference to the price change, dividend 
return and cost of funding the position for that day. Positions are not 
rebalanced over the 5 day holding period. 
6.4 Performance Measures 
As discussed in Section 6.1, significant positive momentum strategy profitability 
is indicative of continuation effects within the data sample. Similarly, findings of 
significant negative profits to momentum strategies indicate price reversal. 
If any one of the alternative explanations discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, or 
indeed a combination of these explanations, drives systematic continuation and 
reversal effects in stock market returns, then it is reasonable to expect that the 
performance of any particular momentum strategy (the 2 trading day strategy 
for example) will be broadly consistent across markets and across time. A 
substantial lack of consistency in the results would be supportive of chance, or 
another as yet unidentified factor, as the most probable driving force behind 
patterns in stock market returns. 
Perhaps the most important indicator of the performance of any momentum 
strategy is its profitability. For each strategy, cumulative returns across the data 
sample are calculated covering the eight year period from January 1995 
through December 2002 by summing the daily profits generated by the strategy 
over the data sample63. In addition, cumulative returns are calculated by 
calendar year. Mean transaction profits are also reported and reflect the 
average profitability of each individual transaction entered into by a particular 
strategy. The cumulative return by year enables the consistency of each 
strategy's performance to be assessed". The mean transaction profit across 
63 These daily profits are calculated per unit of currency invested and are therefore 
analogous to percentage returns. 
64 This is important since many professional investors are assessed on annual returns. 
Within this context, annual returns should ideally be consistently positive, with no large 
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the data sample enables an assessment of whether a strategy is likely to be 
worthwhile after allowing for transaction costs. 
The profitability measures described above are also reported separately for buy 
and sell transactions. Some types of investor may be precluded from taking 
short stock market positions, for example pension funds in the UK, whilst 
others, such as individual investors, may not be in a position to short-sell stocks 
on a cost-effective basis. For these investors, only buy-side returns may be 
relevant. Additionally, the relative contribution of long and short positions to 
total profitability may be important in assessing the potential driving forces 
behind any significant findings. 
Some observers have argued that significant momentum strategy profitability 
may simply compensate investors for the increased risk inherent to such 
strategies. Whilst the cumulative returns to each strategy by year provide some 
indication of the consistency of a strategy's performance, more formal 
measures are also reported in the form of the standard deviation of daily 
strategy returns and the Sharpe ratio of each strategy over the data sample. 
The Sharpe ratio, developed in the literature by Sharpe (1966 and 1975), is a 
performance measure for hedge funds based on the ratio of profitability (mean 
return) to risk (variance of returns). The Sharpe ratio is calculated as 
S.. - 252x 
D" 
(YDP, i, 1 
where 
Sr. 
j = the 
Annualised Sharpe ratio for index i, strategy 
DP,, i = the mean daily profit for index i strategy j, calculated as 
drawdowns reported. In this study, annual returns are calculated based on the calendar 
year. As Birniyi (1993, p27) says, 
"Fact is that most seasonal tendencies are only 'statistically significant' - 
meaning you can write a dissertation on the subject, but don't try to make 
money on it ... 
Institutions, unlike most of you, close their books at the end 
of the year and tally up their gains and losses so they can prepare their 
report cards". 
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ýj DP. 
1.1.1.1+1 
DP.. 
Ni 
Ni = the number of daily funded returns in the data sample for index i 
aDP,;, j = the standard deviation of daily profits for index i strategy j, calculated 
as 
N2 (DP, 
j,,,,, i+, - 
DP1, j 
QDPi, 
j- 
N; -1 
Profitable strategies will have positive Sharpe ratios and vice versa for 
unprofitable strategies (although these reflect positive Sharpe ratios to the 
equivalent contrarian strategy). A higher Sharpe ratio indicates a higher return 
per unit of risk. 
6.5 Statistical Inference 
The trading strategy methodology used in this study enables some insight to be 
drawn as to the availability of excess profits to momentum strategies, and 
therefore the existence of continuation and reversal effects in the markets and 
over the time periods considered. 
Appropriate statistical tests are required to assess the significance of any 
momentum profits identified. Traditional parametric methods of statistical 
inference require a knowledge of the distribution of the test statistic, which is 
not available for many of the performance measures described in Section 6.5 
such as the cumulative returns to, and Sharpe ratios of, momentum trading 
strategies. The Central Limit Theorem provides that the distribution of a sample 
mean is normal so long as the sample size is large or the underlying variable is 
normally distributed, and the mean and standard distribution of the sample 
provide unbiased point estimates of the population mean and standard 
deviation. These conditions are not typically met for the test statistics calculated 
in this part of the research. 
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A non-parametric bootstrap approach is therefore used to assess the 
significance of the performance measures described in the previous section. 
The bootstrap methodology employed in this study not only permits the 
calculation of reliable significance levels for momentum strategy returns but 
may also provide an insight into the potential sources of such returns. Section 
6.5.1 provides a background to bootstrap methodologies, whilst Section 6.5.2 
describes the specific approach used in this study. 
6.5.1 Bootstrap Methodologies 
Traditional parametric approaches to statistical inference assume that the 
sampling distribution of the statistic in which the researcher is interested is 
known. The sampling distribution of a statistic is simply the distribution of the 
values of that statistic obtained by drawing an infinite number of samples of a 
given size from the population. 
For a parametric approach to provide accurate results, both the shape and 
location of the sampling distribution must be specified. These variables are 
known for a number of the most commonly employed statistics such as 
ordinary least squares regression coefficients. Other statistics in which 
researchers may be interested, such as the difference in median between two 
samples, have sampling distributions which are not known, and the 
assumptions of the parametric approach are thus violated. This is the case for 
many of the trading rule profitability statistics which form the basis of this study. 
The implications of using parametric statistics in situations where the 
assumptions of the parametric approach are violated are that the accuracy of 
any rejection or non-rejection of the null hypothesis may be compromised. In 
addition, the probability of making Type I errors (rejection of a true hypothesis) 
and Type II errors (failure to reject a false hypothesis) will be unknown in 
advance. Non-parametric methods are often preferred in such situations. 
The bootstrap methodology is a non-parametric approach to statistical 
inference based on the analogy between a sample and the population from 
which it is drawn. Where the sampling distribution of the statistic under 
consideration is unknown, it may be preferable to base statistical analysis on 
the information contained in the known data sample rather than making 
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potentially incorrect assumptions about the possible shape and location of the 
sampling distribution. 
The bootstrap methodology involves resampling the available data, with 
replacement, many times to generate an empirical estimate of the sampling 
distribution of the statistic in which the researcher is interested. This empirical 
sampling distribution can be used for the construction of confidence intervals 
and for hypothesis testing in much the same way as for parametric methods. 
Whereas the relevant cut-off points for parametric methods are typically taken 
from tables based on the assumed sampling distribution, however, the 
bootstrap methodology bases confidence levels on the empirical sampling 
distribution. 
The theoretical justification for the bootstrap methodology rests on two key 
results. As the sample size approaches the population size, the empirical 
sampling distribution converges to the population sampling distribution (Bickel 
and Freedman, 1981). Similarly, so long as the sample size is large enough to 
permit this, as the number of resamples increases the empirical sampling 
distribution converges to the population sampling distribution (Babu and Singh, 
1983). The success of the bootstrap methodology therefore rests on ensuring 
that the sample size and number of resamples are sufficiently large to ensure 
convergence. Mooney and Duval (1993) suggest a sample size of 30-50 and 
1000 resamples as being adequate in most cases65 
The most obvious potential difficulty arising from the use of the bootstrap 
methodology occurs where the data sample is not representative of the 
population from which It is drawn. In such cases, the empirical sampling 
distribution obtained from the bootstrap will not converge to the population 
sampling distribution regardless of the number of resamples. In financial 
markets research, this could occur where the original data covers a short 
period of extreme market behaviour. This study employs a consistent 
methodology across data covering nine years and fourteen major stock 
markets in an attempt to control for the "bad sample" problem. Although stock 
markets have been shown to be positively correlated in the short term, as the 
65 In this study, 4999 resamples are taken for each strategy based on sample sizes of 
between 2222 and 2296 observations. 
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descriptive statistics in Chapter 5 and charts in Appendix B suggest, the actual 
paths taken by the various markets over the period of the data samples have 
been quite varied. Any specific circumstances which may contribute to a bad 
sample problem are unlikely to affect all markets, hence consistency in results 
will tend to indicate that no `bad data sample' problem has occurred. 
6.5.2 Methodology used in this Study 
In this part of the research, trading rules are devised to profit from any 
continuation and reversal patterns present in the returns of 14 major stock 
market indices. 
Simple bootstrap methodologies, such as that used in this study, do not 
preserve the serial correlation structure of the underlying returns data. This has 
proved problematic for some applications of bootstrap methodologies to time 
series data, leading to the more recent development of new bootstrap 
approaches which aim to preserve serial correlation in the data, such as the 
sieve bootstrap (see, for example, Bühlmann, 1997) and block bootstrap (see, 
for example, Gorener et al, 2001). 
The simple bootstrap approach employed in the current study destroys serial 
correlation in the data whilst retaining the distributional properties of the original 
data sample. Continuation effects may be observed empirically as a simple 
result of skewness in the distribution of daily returns within a data sample. In a 
sample characterised by predominantly rising prices, for example, momentum 
profits will occur as a simple result of the nature of the data (positive returns will 
tend to be followed by further positive returns). The bootstrap, which shares the 
same distribution of funded returns as the original data, will show a similar 
degree of momentum profits. Where returns are generated by serial correlation 
in the data rather than the distribution of the underlying data sample, on the 
other hand, then differences will occur between the two values since the serial 
correlation properties of the data sample are destroyed by the bootstrap 
process. Any significant difference between the profits calculated using the 
original data and the bootstrapped value can therefore be interpreted as 
indicating a significant contribution of serial correlation in driving the observed 
returns. 
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If no significant serial correlation effects are present in the original data which 
have an important impact on momentum strategy profitability (for example, if 
momentum profits in the original data occur purely by chance), therefore, then 
there will be no reason to expect that the bootstrap test statistics will be 
significantly different from the statistics based on the original data and the profit 
measures from the original data will not prove statistically significant based on 
the bootstrap test. Where serial correlation in returns does drive momentum 
strategy profitability, these profits can be expected to disappear when the same 
strategy is applied to the bootstrap data and the bootstrap test indicates that 
the results from the original data are statistically significant. 
The approach employed in this study creates 4999 bootstrap runs for each data 
sample by sampling with replacement from the daily funded returns in the 
original data. Any individual bootstrap run may contain a given point in the 
original data once, more than once, or not at all. The descriptive statistics for 
any single bootstrap run may therefore be different to those for the original 
data, although the mean value over a large number of bootstrap runs 
converges to the parameters of the original data and the empirical sampling 
distribution therefore preserves the characteristics of returns presented in 
Tables 5.1 through 5.3 and described in Section 5.6. 
Each of the 4999 bootstrap runs for each strategy is used to calculate 
performance measures in exactly the same way as for the original data. This 
gives, for each of the 154 combinations of index and momentum strategy, 4999 
sets of performance measures. 
Mackinnon (2002) suggests that the number of bootstrap simulations B be 
chosen such that a (B+1) is an integer for all levels of a considered. The value 
of Mackinnon's approach to choosing the number of bootstrap simulations is 
that critical values from the empirical distribution correspond exactly with 
individual observations from the empirical sampling distribution, removing the 
need for interpolation. For each performance measure, the 4999 bootstrap 
values form an empirical sampling distribution to which the corresponding value 
from the original data is compared. Using the percentile method of deriving 
confidence intervals from empirical sampling distributions, the 99 percent 
confidence interval of a statistic is its value at the 99.5th and 0.5th percentiles 
of the sampling distribution. In this study, two-tailed tests are used at the 5 
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percent and 1 percent significance levels, giving a levels of 0.005,0.025, 
0.975, and 0.995. With B of 4999, this gives values of a (B+1) of 25,125,4875, 
and 4975. These values can be easily looked up from the 4999 bootstrap 
runs and used to test the hypothesis that the value from the original data is 
taken from the empirical sampling distribution. That is to say, serial correlation 
in returns does not contribute significantly to momentum strategy profitability. If 
the profitability of a strategy is significantly different from the mean profitability 
from the bootstrap, we conclude that serial correlation is an important driving 
force behind momentum strategy profits. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter describes the methodology employed in this study to consider the 
existence of continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns. The 
returns to 11 different strategies are considered for each of the 14 stock market 
indices described in Chapter 5, and a range of performance measures 
calculated for each. A non-parametric bootstrap approach is used to assess the 
significance of the test statistics calculated for each strategy. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the analysis described in this chapter. 
66 This contrasts with a choice of 5000 bootstrap runs, for example, where the required 
test values fall between observations in the empirical sampling distribution and must be 
estimated by interpolation. 
159 
Chapter 7 
Momentum Study Results 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis described in Chapter 6 of the 
profitability of momentum strategies in the 14 stock market data sets introduced 
in Chapter 5. 
The principal aim of this part of the research is to identify any significant 
continuation and reversal patterns in the time series of 14 major stock market 
indices. The second part of the research, described in Chapters 8 and 9, then 
goes on to examine the potential sources of such effects by conducting an 
analysis of the statistical properties of trends within the data. 
Section 7.2 describes the cumulative returns to each of the 154 strategies over 
each data sample. Section 7.3 considers the pattern of returns across calendar 
years. Section 7.4 examines the contribution of long and short positions, both in 
terms of their contribution to the cumulative profits introduced in Section 7.2 
and in terms of their consistency throughout the data samples. Section 7.5 
moves on to consider the mean transaction profit achieved by each strategy. 
Sections 7.6 and 7.7 discuss the standard deviation of daily profits and the 
Sharpe ratios for each strategy. Section 7.8 concludes. 
7.2 Cumulative Returns 
Table 7.1 presents the cumulative returns across the 8 years of data of the 11 
momentum trading strategies on each of the 14 stock market data sets. A total 
of 154 cumulative return values are therefore reported. It is recognised that in 
reporting 154 values for each test statistic, a multiple comparison issue may 
occur in that the significance level of individual statistical tests may understate 
the overall experimental error rate. 
The returns shown are from strategies which generate trading signals based on 
daily funded returns and are in the form of a percentage of the monetary value 
of each transaction. For example, the one trading day momentum strategy in 
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the Australian market implemented with a transaction size of AUD 10 million 
would produce a cumulative profit of 11.03% or AUD 1.103 million over the 8 
year period from January 1995 through December 2002. 
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, momentum trading strategies may use funded 
returns, price returns, or total returns as the appropriate measure of past 
returns on which to base trading signals. In the current study, the same broad 
pattern of returns is obtained for all three measures. As a result, this chapter 
describes in detail the results for the 154 strategies which generate signals 
based on funded returns (11 strategies for each of the 14 data sets); the 
equivalent results using price returns and total returns can be obtained from 
Appendices C and D respectively and the conclusions drawn in this chapter 
and subsequent chapters remain valid for each. 
The second figure provided for each strategy is the mean cumulative return 
generated by the 4999 bootstrap runs. The calculation methodology is exactly 
the same as that employed for the original data, but the strategy is run over 
4999 new data series constructed by resampling with replacement the daily 
funded returns from the original data. This procedure is described in Section 
6.5. 
The one trading day strategy generates positive cumulative returns for all 
countries with the exception of Germany, where a negative cumulative return of 
-11.42% is recorded. Positive returns range from 11.03% (Australia) to 
128.36% (Belgium). These returns reflect the excess returns over and above 
the cost of funding. The bootstrap cumulative returns are small in all cases, 
ranging from -1.74% (Switzerland) through 1.83% (the Netherlands) and are 
statistically significant in only four cases for the one day trading strategy (at the 
1% level for Belgium and Canada, and at the 5% level for Hong Kong and 
Switzerland), reflecting the wide dispersion of the bootstrap returns. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the bootstrap values shown in the tables in this 
chapter are the mean values of the relevant statistic across 4999 time series 
generated by sampling with replacement from the daily funded returns 
calculated for the original data. 
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The cumulative returns for the 2 trading day strategies differ markedly from 
those of the 1 trading day strategies. The cumulative return is positive for only 6 
of the 14 countries considered, ranging from -74.61 % (the Netherlands) to 
80.72% (Belgium). Only the return for Belgium is significantly different from the 
bootstrap, at the 1% significance level. This pattern of returns continues over 
the 3 day, 4 day, and 5 day strategies where only 4,4, and 5 of the 14 data 
sets generate positive cumulative returns respectively and very few results are 
statistically significant. The lack of significant excess returns to these strategies 
suggests that the positive excess returns observed to the 1 trading day 
strategies may be due to nonsynchronous trading, which can introduce a 
spurious positive bias to the very short-term serial correlation behaviour of 
stock market indices as discussed in Section 3.2.2. 
For the 10 through 252 trading day strategies, 61 of the 84 strategies produce 
positive cumulative returns, with 6 of the 23 negative cumulative returns 
contributed by the Australian data alone. Six strategies produce cumulative 
returns that are significantly different to the bootstrap at the 1% level, and a 
further 9 strategies at the 5% level. 
Overall, 21 of the 154 strategies considered produce statistically significant 
cumulative returns based on the two-tailed bootstrap test. All of these returns 
are significantly larger than the bootstrap returns. There are no strategies which 
produce cumulative returns which are significantly lower than the bootstrap 
values. No clear pattern is observed in these significant positive excess returns, 
however, either in terms of a significant profitability of specific strategy 
specifications or strategies implemented in specific stock markets. 
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Table 7.1 Cumulative Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 11.03% -21.50% -21.76% -43.44% -29.17% -48.47% 
-0.51% 0.13% -0.67% -5.69% -6.16% -3.75% 
Belgium 128.36% 80.72% 27.23% 21.44% -20.33% 8.59% 
-0.71% 0.50% -0.16% -1.17% 5.03% 10.98% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 76.86% 21.03% 14.42% -13.82% 9.37% 46.90% 
-0.32% -0.38% 0.79% 0.73% 2.11% 1.83% 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 35.99% 4.00% 3.42% 40.11% 49.71% 33.37% 
0.46% -0.08% -1.29% -2.44% -0.71% 0.82% 
France 21.37% -68.61% -52.64% -56.92% -84.45% -10.61% 
-1.04% 1.26% 0.95% -0.67% 2.08% 2.85% 
Germany -11.42% -51.41% -53.47% -3.96% 16.92% -17.41% 
-1.67% -1.86% -1.53% 1.05% 0.21% 1.11% 
Hong Kong 71.06% 66.85% 41.46% 15.02% 9.45% 36.91% 
0.64% 0.63% 3.38% -0.48% -0.16% -4.04% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 14.06% -34.07% -20.96% 52.75% -4.09% 104.49% 
-0.06% 1.26% 17.52% 9.02% 9.71% 19.24% 
SIG 5% S101% 
Japan 23.29% 6.89% -51.99% -126.43% -109.94% -19.60% 
-0.17', 0 0.30% -0.17% 0.45% 4.46% 0.18% 
Netherlands 21.81% -74.61% -72.75% -92.90% -58.92% 70.55% 
1.83% -11.65% -0.12% 1.60% 1.22% 5.16% 
Spain 32.37% -42.43% -31.67% -18.49% 16.41% 73.65% 
-1.74% -0.89% -0.58% 1.23% -1.21% -1.83% 
Switzerland 46.53% 3.58% -41.02% -15.84% -36.97% 72.75% 
1.14% 3.29% 1.38% 1.45% 1.30% 4.48% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK 38.92% -51.69% -65-61% -63.12% -79.69% 3.46% 
0.10% -0.58% 0.76% -1.07% -0.95% -0.49% 
USA 23.54% -38.05% -65.34% -51.98% -79.05% -12.07% 
-1.03% 0.44% 1.69% 2.72% 2.46% 3.87% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table 7.1 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -36.79% -34.86% -44.06% -12.53% -3.69% 
1.50% 2.82% 4.23% 5.25% 5.14% 
Belgium -1.18% 71.35% 25.55% 62.82% 71.39% 
21.25% 24.73% 4.05% 4.80% 7.24% 
SIG 1% 
Canada 11.80% 71.41% 8.22% 3.74% 54.18% 
3.28% 5.09% 5.53% 9.77% 13.12% 
SIG 5% 
Denmark -2.41% 32.44% 74.23% 108.87% 76.22% 
0.51% -5.88% -1.22% -2.85% 5.38% 
SIG1% SIG1% 
France 35.95% 75.10% 70.73% -23.76% 91.55% 
1.03% 2.72% 3.58% 5.67% 9.83% 
SIG 5% 
Germany 20.79% 58.91% 80.66% -4.75% 90.98% 
-2.80% -0.32% 2.50% 2.42% 2.45% 
Hong Kong 78.21% 37.00% -26.17% 14.49% -94.22% 
-4.69% 19.82% 5.91% 4.28% 6.35% 
Italy -2.08% 0.97% 51.82% 51.24% 64.97% 
24.11% -12.82% 3.19% -13.07% -14.09% 
Japan -21.83% 26.76% 32.23% 1.97% -14.44% 
-2.28% 1.42% 2.27% 2.97% 2.34% 
Netherlands 13.04% 112.07% 106.03% 19.19% 124.28% 
3.10% 2.96% 6.44% 11.30% 17.17% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Spain 82.60% 59.69% 60.31% 81.55% 127.62% 
4.29% 7.43% 17.70% 11.75% 14.96% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Switzerland 18.15% 19.65% 101.03% 35.69% 88.46% 
7.19% 7.43% 10.91% 11.16% 17.66% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
UK -48.07% -17.28% 30.97% -31.67% 36.24% 
0.13% 2.38% 0.39% -1.02% -2.14% 
USA 6.74% -15.71% 11.37% 52.76% 109.07% 
1.62% 4.71% 6.55% 8.12% 10.51% 
SIG 1% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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7.3 Returns by Calendar Year 
The overall cumulative returns described in the previous section provide only 
very limited evidence of momentum strategy profitability. Positive excess 
returns to 1 trading day strategies may be due to nonsynchronous trading 
affecting the index time series. For the longer strategies, no clear pattern is 
observed in the significant positive returns obtained. 
For investors, the consistency of returns is as important, if not more important, 
than the absolute magnitude of returns. Given that the returns considered in 
this chapter are all excess returns over and above the cost of funding, investors 
can employ leverage to increase the magnitude of small but consistent returns. 
Inconsistent returns, on the other hand, cannot be financially engineered into 
consistent excess returns. 
This section considers how the cumulative profitability reported in Table 7.1 
relates to the returns of each strategy in the calendar years 1995 to 2002 
inclusive. Table 7.3 shows, for each strategy, the number of years in the data 
sample (from a maximum of 8) over which the strategy produces a positive 
return, the maximum annual return achieved, and the minimum annual return 
generated. 
As can be seen from the Table 7.2, very few strategies produce returns of a 
consistent sign (positive or negative) across all 8 calendar years. Those which 
do produce positive returns across all 8 years are the 1 trading day strategy 
(Belgium), and the 63 trading day strategy (Switzerland). These strategies also 
generate significant positive cumulative returns across the entire data sample, 
as shown in Table 7.1. Those strategies which produce a consistently negative 
return (indicating consistent positive returns to the equivalent contrarian 
strategy) are the 5 trading day strategy (USA) and the 10 trading day strategy 
(Australia). The cumulative returns across the entire data sample are not 
significant at the 5% level for either strategy, however, indicating that although 
annual returns are negative for these two strategies throughout, they tend to be 
small. No clear patterns are identified in the minimum and maximum annual 
returns achieved by the 154 strategies considered in this part of the research. 
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Table 7.2 Consistency of Cumulative Returns 
PANEL A. 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 4 3 3 2 1 0 
9.61% 4.05% 5.94% 0.40% 7.45% -0.57% 
-5.28% -20.40% -14.36% -15.81% -14.65% -12.05% 
Belgium 8 6 6 5 4 4 
32.00% 23.15% 18.60% 19.47% 20.43% 22.98% 
6.14% -3.92% -14.60% -13.15% -30.99% -25.01% 
Canada 7 6 5 4 5 6 
16.24% 13.81% 23.51% 23.32% 10.88% 14.47% 
-0.20% -14.49% -19.44% -49.16% -11.49% -12.83% 
Denmark 7 5 5 6 6 5 
14.67% 15.76% 15.88% 32.49% 26.63% 17.51% 
-17.71% -20.85% -18.67% -21.35% -13.68% -12.41% 
France 6 3 3 3 2 5 
16.72% 9.54% 8.14% 12.17% 8.81% 14.47% 
-6.07% -25.07% -20.43% -37.01% -46.88% -23.19% 
Germany 3 3 2 4 4 4 
10.91% 13.76% 4.65% 14.36% 20.13% 23.43% 
-16.51% -22.02% -20.35% -30.37% -18.23% -32.56% 
Hong Kong 5 6 4 5 5 4 
28.84% 32.31% 45.95% 24.23% 10.44% 38.83% 
-9.04% -9.81% -10.06% -25.29% -10.46% -19.66% 
Italy 5 4 6 4 3 7 
12.37% 17.33% 19.52% 24.99% 20.72% 23.83% 
-12.67% -25.59% -60.81% -6.73% -14.48% -11.38% 
Japan 6 4 3 2 2 3 
14.10% 13.15% 4.48% 11.54% 3.41% 10.30% 
-13.07% -15.61% -30.02% -38.93% -33.75% -26.52% 
Netherlands 4 3 3 3 3 6 
23.19% 5.19% 13.29% 10.00% 17.19% 41.11% 
-10.51% -31.13% -34.07% -47.66% -29.52% -13.97% 
Spain 7 4 4 4 4 6 
10.60% 8.17% 13.11% 12.94% 23.35% 33.65% 
-16.58% -20.74% -23.10% -27.13% -11.40% -7.93% 
Switzerland 6 5 3 4 2 6 
25.78% 18.49% 6.68% 12.74% 12.45% 36.07% 
-3.50% -16.55% -26.02% -23.23% -17.61% -6.90% 
UK 6 4 1 1 1 4 
19.53% 4.78% 11.21% 0.56% 5.98% 9.04% 
-5.98% -27.18% -31.77% -20.49% -17.75% -12.27% 
USA 6 1 2 3 0 4 
13.73% 20.05% 5.61% 8.31% -0.86% 9.68% 
-2.11% -24.73% -21.52% -23.98% -25.34% -29.45% 
Table shows the number of calendar years over the period 1995 to 2002 Inclusive over which each strategy 
produced a return greater than or equal to zero, together with the maximum and minimum annual return 
achieved. 
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Table 7.2 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia 1 2 1 4 5 
2.84% 4.43% 4.82% 8.73% 6.71% 
-8.99% -15.54% -14.93% -9.56% -14.24% 
Belgium 5 5 4 4 4 
39.06% 42.25% 27.43% 45.80% 50.42% 
-40.36% -18.04% -15.32% -21.76% -14.69% 
Canada 3 6 5 6 6 
16.62% 28.99% 15.28% 16.89% 25.11% 
-4.95% -14.92% -13.45% -30.95% -32.54% 
Denmark 4 5 7 7 6 
10.20% 27.18% 39.16% 41.27% 43.80% 
-15.30% -13.78% -9.72% -16.86% -24.02% 
France 4 5 7 4 7 
29.97% 44.69% 27.05% 23.42% 46.49% 
-14.42% -12.69% -7.94% -38.19% -32.71% 
Germany 4 5 7 4 6 
22.44% 37.88% 30.95% 25.00% 37.76% 
-18.62% -16.81% -4.05% -36.07% -2.38% 
Hong Kong 4 5 4 5 3 
42.65% 27.52% 9.23% 34.04% 20.43% 
-13.21% -24.53% -46.34% -37.45% -40.56% 
Italy 3 5 6 4 7 
33.90% 38.83% 18.38% 35.86% 43.01% 
-17.29% -38.43% -13.23% -21.31% -53.50% 
Japan 3 5 5 4 3 
22.04% 29.78% 23.6% 26.24% 12.73% 
-25.06% -16.42% -10.45% -27.65% -17.54% 
Netherlands 3 7 7 6 6 
20.76% 33.22% 33.92% 40.84% 48.31% 
-11.98% -7.21% -1.28% -33.86% -33.97% 
Spain 6 5 5 5 5 
24.82% 47.59% 27.62% 35.14% 40.31% 
-6.00% -42.00% -10.37% -4.75% -12.99% 
Switzerland 4 4 8 4 7 
22.85% 34.41% 21.08% 51.31% 52.92% 
-12.93% -24.78% 0.24% -27.58% -29.30% 
UK 2 4 6 5 6 
4.26% 9.61% 14.90% 18.29% 22.48% 
-26.97% -24.78% -7.28% -32.98% -21.08% 
USA 3 4 4 6 6 
17.68% 21.64% 20.30% 18.27% 25.35% 
-12.91% -23.30% -15.85% -8.97% -0.36% 
Table shows the number of calendar years over the period 1995 to 2002 inclusive over which each strategy 
produced a return greater than or equal to zero, together with the maximum and minimum annual return 
achieved. 
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Appendix C charts the annual cumulative returns to the eleven momentum 
strategies considered for each stock market over the calendar years 1995 to 
2002 inclusive, in addition to identifying years in which the returns achieved 
were significantly different to the mean annual bootstrap return for that strategy. 
In general, the returns achieved by individual strategies vary quite considerably 
from year to year. For the short-term (1 to 10 trading day) strategies in 
particular, there are years where all strategies perform well in a particular 
market (Hong Kong in 1997, for example) and corresponding years where each 
of the short-term strategies tends to perform poorly (the Netherlands in 2000, 
for example). A tendency for good and poor returns to alternate from one year 
to the next can be observed in the charts, particularly for the short-term 
strategies. 
7.4 Long-Only and Short-Only Returns 
The cumulative returns presented in Section 7.2 and the returns by calendar 
year discussed in Section 7.3 indicate that the returns to individual momentum 
strategies are not consistent over time. The returns presented in the previous 
sections are based on both long and short market positions, with each strategy 
buying the market index following periods of high returns and selling the market 
index following periods of low returns. 
As discussed in Section 6.4, some investors may not have full or cost-effective 
access to short positions in stock markets. As a result, some researchers have 
noted that empirically observed anomalies in returns may persist due to the 
difficulties associated with undertaking arbitrage which requires a short market 
position to be initiated (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). That is to say, persistent 
profit opportunities which can be exploited by taking long market positions will 
be arbitraged away, but it may not be cost-effective or practicable for market 
participants to undertake arbitrage activity where this requires a short market 
position to be initiated67. If this is the case, one would expect positive returns to 
individual momentum strategies to be driven largely by returns to short 
positions. As this section explains, no evidence is found to support this theory. 
67 This hypothesis is supported by Finn et at (1999), for example, who find that large- 
cap short sale candidates in the US stock market tend to be overpriced by up to four 
times the amount that purchase candidates are underpriced. 
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Table 7.3 shows the cumulative returns to long-only strategies. For the 1 
trading day long-only strategy, the cumulative return is positive for all 14 
markets, and is significantly different to the bootstrap average (based on a two- 
tailed test) at the 1% level for 5 countries and at the 5% level for a further 3 
countries. As discussed in Section 7.1, however, significant excess returns to 
the 1 trading day strategies may simply be due to nonsynchronous trading. For 
the 2 through 5 trading day long-only strategies, positive returns are generated 
for between 6 and 9 of the 14 countries in each case, although each strategy 
specification generates significant excess returns for a maximum of only 3 of 
the 14 countries considered. For the 10 through 63 trading day long-only 
strategies, positive returns are generated for all but one of the countries 
considered, whilst the 126 and 252 trading day strategies produce positive 
returns for 10 and 12 countries respectively. Each of the 10 through 252 trading 
day strategies produces excess returns which are statistically significant for 
between 4 and 8 of the 14 data sets. The returns to long-only momentum 
strategies presented in Table 7.3 therefore appear to generate positive returns 
across the entire range of strategy specifications, in contrast to the returns of 
the long/short strategies described in Section 7.2. 
Table 7.4 repeats the analysis presented in Table 7.2 for the long-only 
strategies, showing the number of calendar years in the data samples over 
which each strategy generates a positive return, together with the maximum 
and minimum annual returns achieved. The long-only strategies tend to 
produce positive annual returns over a greater number of calendar years in the 
data than do the long/short strategies. For example, whilst the long/short 
strategies produce positive returns on average in 3.00 years for the 5 trading 
day strategy, the equivalent long-only strategies produce an average of 4.64 
years of positive returns. Again, no clear patterns emerge in the maximum and 
minimum annual profits achieved by individual strategies. 
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Table 7.3 Cumulative Long-Only Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 21.06% 12.67% -4.89% -18.70% -8.11% 1.51% 
2.38% 4.30% 4.42% 2.42% 3.16% 3.07% 
SIG 5% 
Belgium 72.06% 40.38% 36.52% 42.06% 24.59% 21.83% 
2.26% 4.05% 4.73% 4.87% 13.82% 26.14% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Canada 45.62% 28.62% 21.77% 9.83% 27.31% 40.41% 
3.06% 5.04% 6.70% 6.97% 9.07% 8.94% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Denmark 33.54% 20.18% 38.74% 58.07% 68.82% 30.84% 
2.78% 4.40% 4.53% 4.22% 6.71% 8.55% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 810 1% 
France 19.85% -22.77% -0.81% -5.80% -19.41% 17.09% 
2.58% 5.38% 5.40% 5.91% 7.82% 10.32% 
Germany 5.50% -14.37% -13.69% -15.08% 20.05% -8.40% 
1.03% 1.77% 1.57% 3.44% 2.80% 4.59% 
Hong Kong 56.17% 41.65% 12.76% 0.17% 26.43% 34.92% 
-2.47% -3.91% -1.27% -4.90% -6.73% -9.69% 
SIG 1% 
Italy 2.33% -6.68% 14.06% 59.37% 35.10% 80.05% 
2.99% 5.88% 13.10% 5.40% 3.01% 2.43% 
S1G 1% SIG 1% 
Japan 6.74% 27.87% 4.87% -35.47% -17.01% 2.62% 
-1.75% -2.38% -2.55% -0.28% -4.71% -4.24% 
Netherlands 34.97% -28.97% -23.72% -55.24% -9.82% 57.43% 
0.05% -0.84% 7.72% 9.50% 10.06% 14.99% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 20.88% -25.36% -11.90% 13.45% 52.72% 61.12% 
3.50% 6.54% 7.53% 9.64% 9.72% 10.11% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Switzerland 28.38% 25.97% -13.92% 8.43% 6.42% 59.90% 
4.65% 8.69% 8.72% 9.60% 10.77% 15.03% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
UK 16.88% -19.58% -17.58% -9.65% -23.40% 23.30% 
0.29% 0.55% -0.45% 0.16% 0.93% 0.23% 
USA 39.72% -0.25% -5.43% 11.62% 10.55% 41.13% 
3.25% 6.09% 7.66% 9.20% 8.63% 10.39% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table 7.3 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia 5.30% -1.29% 5.12% -5.08% 12.87% 
7.79% 8.91% 9.38% 10.58% 10.57% 
Belgium 29.09% 66.71% 40.65% 88.17% 87.11% 
21.79% 27.59% 11.78% 13.04% 14.01% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 53.56% 71.36% 36.25% 10.94% 40.33% 
12.63% 14.96% 15.75% 18.11% 19.97% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Denmark 7.49% 39.57% 79.00% 89.96% 51.12% 
7.88% 9.14% 4.97% 12.57% 13.03% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
France 25.77% 56.90% 88.65% 27.36% 66.34% 
10.16% 11.83% 14.23% 15.06% 18.19% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Germany 18.72% 58.45% 77.72% -3.80% 88.49% 
3.83% 4.35% 6.74% 5.77% 6.54% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 95.05% 15.31% -2.17% -24.24% -6.48% 
-11.27% -3.52% -7.01 % -7.08% -7.10% 
SIG 1% 
Italy 22.24% 7.65% 58.50% 46.90% 51.82% 
9.30% -8.93% -0.32% 3.33% -10.48% 
SIG 5% 
Japan 13.81% 8.36% 0.01% 14.71% -9.88% 
-6.34% -5.97% -5.27% -6.06% -5.96% 
Netherlands 18.68% 72.56% 101.75% 47.76% 100.90% 
16.22% 17.09% 18.20% 21.45% 25.46% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 93.40% 86.15% 87.32% 75.64% 12.94% 
7.40% 12.62% 21.03% 22.39% 26.02% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% S101% 
Switzerland 18.35% 25.12% 103.14% 63.49% 101.02% 
17.47% 19.52% 21.34% 23.21% 27.39% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
UK -24.39% 9.74% 15.55% -10.32% 33.89% 
0.21% 1.57% 1.06% -5.81% 0.24% 
USA 17.98% 27.48% 40.66% 35.57% 104.77% 
11.28% 13.03% 14.47% 16.05% 18.21% 
SIG 1% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 11% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table 7.4 Consistency of Long-Only Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 6 6 4 2 4 4 
6.87% 7.35% 8.50% 4.03% 4.25% 3.07% 
-0.37% -3.87% -8.14% -10.05% -6.73% -2.09% 
Belgium 7 6 5 6 4 4 
21.03% 15.11% 23.92% 14.01% 20.02% 24.11% 
-4.13% -16.34% -7.37% -12.03% -8.25% -17.80% 
Canada 7 6 5 6 7 6 
10.81% 10.46% 12.43% 11.05% 9.42% 12.68% 
-1.76% -5.97% -7.66% -24.97% -1.45% -4.47% 
Denmark 5 5 6 6 7 6 
20.44% 15.81% 16.84% 30.63% 28.17% 16.11% 
-19.45% -14.25% -5.08% -4.36% -2.17% -14.76% 
France 6 3 5 5 5 6 
13.14% 9.34% 10.91% 11.59% 9.06% 15.04% 
-9.19% -18.88% -15.57% -18.02% -33.42% -12.94% 
Germany 4 4 5 6 6 5 
9.71% 8.27% 5.86% 8.96% 6.51% 11.71% 
-8.60% -16.10% -27.44% -33.13% -9.53% -22.70% 
Hong Kong 7 7 5 4 5 4 
14.39% 13.85% 9.24% 11.89% 14.11% 32.88% 
-1.88% -2.12% -3.78% -10.25% -11.69% -14.43% 
Italy 3 5 6 6 4 7 
13.05% 13.90% 14.94% 29.72% 22.66% 28.35% 
-9.35% -23.86% -23.82% -9.41% -6.16% -2.36% 
Japan 5 6 5 3 2 3 
12.87% 9.18% 11.89% 12.98% 10.52% 10.67% 
-11.45% -6.66% -9.42% -21.10% -9.33% -9.73% 
Netherlands 7 4 4 2 3 5 
17.02% 14.69% 13.00% 13.37% 12.46% 32.46% 
-1.58% -21.85% -17.38% -36.10% -11.77% -4.74% 
Spain 6 4 4 5 5 6 
13.10% 14.74% 11.00% 15.56% 20.06% 30.91% 
-16.20% -26.37% -17.38% -26.92% -4.49% -19.78% 
Switzerland 6 6 4 4 4 7 
12.85% 12.67% 8.10% 11.42% 12.19% 31.79% 
-2.48% -4.71% -15.70% -15.48% -10.60% -10.09% 
UK 5 5 4 4 3 7 
13.33% 5.54% 10.24% 3.73% 4.42% 11.97% 
-7.42% -18.92% -20.50% -9.72% -16.25% -1.15% 
USA 6 4 4 4 6 6 
12.17% 10.58% 13.02% 11.19% 9.18% 14.72% 
-3.57% -6.09% -11.01% -10.19% -11.57% -4.61% 
Table shows the number of calendar years over the period 1995 to 2002 inclusive over which each strategy 
produced a return greater than or equal to zero, together with the maximum and minimum annual return 
achieved. 
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Table 7.4 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21.252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia 5 4 5 4 6 
5.24% 7.20% 7.25% 8.73% 6.71% 
-4.84% -9.76% -6.89% -9.02% -2.36% 
Belgium 5 5 4 5 6 
31.42% 41.30% 31.58% 45.80% 50.42% 
-13.11% -14.43% -14.96% -4.60% -5.40% 
Canada 7 7 8 6 6 
18.12% 18.80% 16.52% 16.89% 23.30% 
-9.46% -2.25% 1.05% -32.34% -21.27% 
Denmark 5 4 7 8 5 
17.12% 27.8% 39.16% 41.27% 43.80% 
-15.37% -16.38% -1.18% 0.00% -24.02% 
France 5 4 6 7 7 
20.22% 37.03% 27.05% 23.67% 46.49% 
-16.06% -11.61% -2.52% -35.15 -24.04% 
Germany 5 5 7 4 7 
13.40% 37.88% 34.37% 2500% 37.76% 
-11.20% -9.52% -0.36% -37.42% -1.14% 
Hong Kong 7 5 3 4 6 
33.91% 17.08% 9.23% 34.04% 24.54% 
-2.02% -23.38% -14.01% -37.45% -33.79% 
Italy 4 4 7 6 7 
23.03% 37.93% 35.57% 35.86% 43.01% 
-10.17% -21.84% -10.67% -23.86% -36.37% 
Japan 4 4 5 6 5 
26.81% 29.78% 17.62% 26.24% 11.67% 
-9.42% -10.94% -15.27% -21.37% -8.13% 
Netherlands 4 5 7 6 6 
17.60% 33.22% 43.25% 40.84% 48.31% 
-18.94% -8.22% -1.28% -33.54% -25.88% 
Spain 8 4 6 5 7 
26.13% 48.97% 38.30% 51.31% 40.31% 
0.10% -12.33% -4.03% -26.61% -4.05% 
Switzerland 4 4 8 5 8 
22.47% 34.41% 38.45% 51.31% 52.92% 
-12.33% -11.44% 0.24% -26.61% 0.00% 
UK 3 5 6 5 7 
4.31% 13.97% 6.83% 18.29% 16.25% 
-10.82% -12.07% -7.28% -29.30% -9.10% 
USA 6 4 5 6 7 
10.88% 21.64% 20.30% 18.27% 25.35% 
-9.72% -11.49% -8.49% -8.97% -0.36% 
Table shows the number of calendar years over the period 1995 to 2002 Inclusive over which each strategy 
produced a return greater than or equal to zero, together with the maximum and minimum annual return 
achieved. 
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Table 7.5 shows the cumulative returns to short-only momentum strategies 
over the 8 year period from January 1995 through December 2002, whilst 
Table 7.6 shows the number of years in the sample over which each strategy 
produces a positive return together with the maximum and minimum annual 
return achieved. 
The returns to the short-only strategies are simply the difference between the 
returns to the corresponding long-short strategies and long-only strategies68. 
The returns to the short-only strategies are generally lower than those to the 
long/short and long-only strategies, and returns are only significant based on 
the bootstrap test for one of the 154 strategies considered (the one trading day 
strategy for Belgium). 
The long/short returns discussed in Section 7.2 show positive returns to the 1 
trading day strategy, mixed results for the 2 to 5 trading day strategies, and 
generally positive returns for the 10 through 252 trading day strategies. This 
section decomposes these returns into the contribution from long and from 
short positions. The pattern of returns to long positions generally reflects that of 
the overall returns, although the positive returns over 10 through 252 trading 
days are typically higher for the long-only strategies than for the long/short 
strategies, reflecting a negative contribution from short positions over these 
periods. Over 1 through 5 trading days, the returns to long positions are mixed 
with some positive and some negative returns although all significant returns 
based on the bootstrap test are positive. Short positions, however, contribute 
almost exclusively negative returns to the 2 through 5 trading day strategies. 
68 The results described in this section therefore reflect the contribution of long and 
short positions to overall profitability. Alternatively, long-only and short-only strategies 
could be run in isolation on each data sample; this would be expected to generate a 
greater number of signals to each individual strategy compared to the long-short 
strategies which are the basis of this study, the reason being that in the long-short 
strategies, no new signals are accepted whilst a position is being held. 
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Table 7.5 Cumulative Short-Only Returns 
PANEL A. - 
1 -10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia -10.03% -34.17% -16.86% -24.74% -21.06% -49.99% 
-2.89% -4.17% -5.09% -8.11% -9.31% -6.82% 
Belgium 56.31% 40.33% -9.28% -20.62% -44.92% -13.24% 
-2.97% -3.54% -4.89% -6.04% -8.79% -15.16% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 31.24% -7.59% -7.35% -23.66% -17.94% 6.49% 
-3.38% -5.42% -5.91% -6.24% -6.96% -7.12% 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 2.45% -16.18% -35.32% -17.96% -19.11% 2.52% 
-2.33% -4.48% -5.82% -6.66% -7.42% -7.73% 
France 1.52% -45.84% -51.83% -51.12% -65.05% -27.70% 
-3.61% -4.12% -4.46% -6.58% -5.74% -7.47% 
Germany -16.93% -37.04% -39.79% 11.12% -3.13% -9.01% 
-2.70% -3.63% -3.09% -2.39% -2.59% -3.48% 
Hong Kong 14.88% 25.21% 28.71% 14.84% -16.98% 1.98% 
3.11% 4.55% 4.65% 4.42% 6.56% 5.65% 
Italy 11.73% -27.40% -35.01% -6.62% -39.40% 24.44% 
-3.05% -4.63% 4.43% 3.62% 6.70% 16.81% 
Japan 16.54% -20.98% -56.86% -90.96% -92.93% -22.22% 
1.58% 2.67% 2.37% 0.74% 0.25% 4.42% 
Netherlands -13.16% -45.64% -49.03% -36.96% -49.10% 13.12% 
1.78% -10.81% -7.84% -7.90% -8.84% -9.83% 
Spain 11.49% -17.17% -19.78% -31.94% -36.30% 12.53% 
-5.24% -7.44% -8.12% -8.41% -10.93% -11.94% 
Switzerland 18.15% -22.39% -27.10% -24.26% -43.39% 12.96% 
-3.51% -5.40% -7.34% -8.15% -9.47% -10.55% 
UK 22.04% -32.10% -48.03% -53.48% -56.29% -19.84% 
-0.19% -1.13% 1.21% -1.23% -1.88% -0.72% 
USA -16.18% -37.80% -59.92% -63.30% -89.60% -53.20% 
-4.28% -5.66% -5.96% -6.48% -6.17% -6.52% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG I% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table 7.5 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -42.09% -33.57% -49.18% -7.45% -16.56% 
-6.29% -6.09% -5.15% -5.33% -5.43% 
Belgium -30.26% 4.63% -15.10% -25.35% -15.72% 
-0.55% -2.85% -7.73% -8.24% -6.77% 
Canada -41.76% 0.05% -28.03% -7.20% 13.85% 
-9.36% -9.87% -10.21% -8.34% -6.85% 
Denmark -9.90% -7.13% -4.77% 18.91% 25.10% 
-7.37% -15.01% -6.19% -15.42% -7.65% 
France 10.18% 18.20% -17.92% -51.12% 25.21% 
-9.13% -9.11% -10.65% -9.39% -8.35% 
Germany 2.06% 0.46% 2.94% -0.95% 2.49% 
-6.63% -4.67% -4.24% -3.35% -4.09% 
Hong Kong -16.84% 21.68% -24.00% 38.73% -87.74% 
6.58% 23.34% 12.91% 11.36% 13.46% 
Italy -24.32% -6.68% -6.68% 4.34% 13.15% 
14.81% -3.89% 3.51% -16.40% -3.61% 
Japan -35.65% 18.39% 32.22% -12.74% -4.56% 
4.06% 7.38% 7.54% 9.04% 8.29% 
Netherlands -5.64% 39.51% 4.28% -28.57% 23.38% 
-13.12% -14.13% -11.75% -10.15% -8.30% 
Spain -10.81% -26.56% -27.01% 5.91% 1.67% 
-3.11% -5.19% -3.33% -10.64% -11.06% 
Switzerland -0.20% -5.47% -2.11% -27.80% -12.55% 
-10.29% -12.09% -10.43% -12.05% -9.73% 
UK -23.68% -27.01% 15.43% -21.35% 2.35% 
-0.08% 0.81% -0.67"/ 4.79% -2.38% 
USA -11.24% -43.19% -29.29% 17.19% 4.30% 
-9.66% -8.32% -7.92% -7.93% -Z71% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG I% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table 7.6 Consistency of Short-Only Returns 
PANEL A. 
1.10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 3 1 3 2 2 1 
7.75% 0.83% 5.98% 3.88% 3.19% 1.06% 
-7.37% -16.53% -14.50% -13.61% -7.93% -12.75% 
Belgium 6 7 2 3 3 2 
20.99% 12.42% 15.13% 12.86% 3.01% 5.72% 
-0.62% -1.84% -10.70% -12.46% -23.40% -8.26% 
Canada 7 4 4 3 3 3 
14.33% 3.49% 15.69% 19.46% 11.52% 14.52% 
-3.26% -13.92% -14.21% -24.19% -14.29% -8.35% 
Denmark 4 2 3 4 3 4 
8.76% 15.15% 9.39% 7.39% 2.40% 9.44% 
-9.43% -17.92% -23.44% -25.61% -15.52% -8.08% 
France 3 2 1 3 2 1 
15.85% 8.18% 2.01% 0.84% 9.09% 6.49% 
-13.07% -20.33% -14.87% -18.99% -18.42% -13.44% 
Germany 3 3 2 4 2 4 
12.94% 5.67% 7.09% 12.15% 13.62% 11.72% 
-13.66% -15.98% -15.28% -5.51% -8.70% -14.95% 
Hong Kong 5 6 3 5 3 4 
20.05% 18.46% 42.25% 32.21% 22.13% 10.54% 
-10.53% -7.68% -12.31% -17.25% -23.31% -10.32% 
Italy 4 4 3 2 2 4 
16.99% 5.00% 15.80% 21.05% 17.74% 19.40% 
-5.45% -12.12% -37.00% -10.36% -21.03% -9.01% 
Japan 5 3 2 2 2 3 
8.93% 4.26% 10.24% 8.10% 3.60% 8.51% 
-2.42% -8.95% -20.60% -27.95% -29.00% -16.79% 
Netherlands 3 2 3 1 1 4 
20.46% 6.82% 4.90% 11.88% 19.42% 12.23% 
-14.18% -13.77% -22.64% -12.42% -23.93% -11.21% 
Spain 3 3 3 2 2 4 
18.57% 4.97% 3.74% 1.45% 7.95% 13.07% 
-5.66% -16.25% -10.91% -9.73% -13.81% -7.38% 
Switzerland 4 3 3 3 2 4 
14.96% 9.12% 5.46% 7.65% 3.60% 9.27% 
-5.73% -12.52% -13.93% -12.14% -16.32% -4.73% 
UK 6 0 1 1 1 3 
13.30% -0.54% 0.97% 1.33% 1.56% 8.57% 
-1.50% -9.51% -11.27% -13.29% -13.67% -14.79% 
USA 3 1 1 1 0 1 
1.88% 9.47% 4.75% 3.36% -4.88% 3.64% 
-6.35% -18.65% -19.08% -15.67% -25.47% -26.83% 
Table shows the number of calendar years over the period 1995 to 2002 Inclusive over which each strategy 
produced a return greater than or equal to zero, together with the maximum and minimum annual return 
achieved. 
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Table 7.6 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia 1 2 2 6 6 
1.09% 0.00% 4.14% 5.42% 0.00% 
-12.69% -11.09% -12.66% -12.32% -14.24% 
Belgium 4 4 4 5 5 
13.94% 20.09% 11.36% 12.25% 16.45% 
-32.42% -11.80% -8.50% -19.48% -14.69% 
Canada 2 4 4 5 7 
4.84% 17.70% 7.00% 12.04% 25.11% 
-14.29% -18.34% -19.36% -7.82% -11.27% 
Denmark 4 5 4 7 7 
9.22% 3.29% 16.71% 12.57% 25.80% 
-20.61% -7.38% -8.54% -17.11% -0.94% 
France 5 5 3 3 6 
16.45% 25.96% 17.01% 0.00% 36.88% 
-15.61% -7.79% -15.42% -29.72% -8.67% 
Germany 4 5 5 7 7 
14.44% 21.03% 30.14% 20.53% 4.87% 
-12.81% -13.09% -16.31% -25.58% -2.38% 
Hong Kong 3 4 6 8 4 
28.67% 23.35% 9.07% 31.54% 16.86% 
-16.61% -8.09% -32.33% 0.00% -40.56% 
Italy 4 6 5 6 7 
10.86% 11.78% 11.06% 13.66% 30.28% 
-25.63% -16.59% -19.89% -6.61% -17.13% 
Japan 2 6 5 4 6 
2.07% 22.98% 19.85% 4.12% 12.73% 
-17.41% -8.22% -10.45% -6.28% -17.54% 
Netherlands 4 8 6 7 7 
19.72% 23.49% 19.22% 2.71% 31.47% 
-21.35% 0.00% -13.30% -33.32% -8.09% 
Spain 3 5 5 7 5 
7.67% 20.19% 3.83% 10.65% 30.22% 
-12.95% -40.66% -15.59% -4.75% -12.99% 
Switzerland 5 6 6 4 7 
17.67% 7.32% 14.95% 0.00% 12.09% 
-16.62% -13.55% -17.38% -22.70% -29.30% 
UK 4 3 8 5 6 
4.47% 1.27% 13.98% 1.53% 22.48% 
-22.28% -6.76% 0.00% -14.18% -21.080 
USA 4 3 5 8 7 
13.07% 0.00% 8.49% 10.60% 4.59% 
-14.29% -17.32% -20.82% 0.00% -0.29% 
Table shows the number of calendar years over the period 1995 to 2002 Inclusive over which each strategy 
produced a return greater than or equal to zero, together with the maximum and minimum annual return 
achieved. 
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The results discussed in this section indicate positive returns to long positions 
over a period of 1 day (indicating continuation among winners) and mixed 
returns to short positions (losers). Over 2 through 5 trading days, the overall 
returns and returns to long positions are mixed, with some limited evidence of 
negative returns to short positions (indicating reversal among losers) although 
few results are statistically significant. Over 10 through 252 trading days, the 
returns to long positions are generally positive, indicating continuation, although 
no clear pattern is observed in the significant results. 
These results are not strongly consistent with the results of previous short-term 
studies reported in Section 4.2. Whilst a number of studies69 find evidence of 
one-day continuation for winners, Bremer and Sweeney (1991) find evidence of 
reversal over the same period. This may reflect the lack of a clear pattern in the 
contribution of long and short positions to 1 trading day strategies. In some 
data sets, these returns are driven largely by long-only returns, whilst in others 
the returns to short positions dominate. The prior empirical evidence over test 
periods from 2 to 10 days is mixed, with some studies reporting continuation 
and others reversal for winners70. Again, the returns reported in this study are 
mixed, and no clear pattern of significant results is reported. Over longer 
periods of up to 252 trading days, previous research tends to find evidence of 
continuation for both winners and losers". This contrasts with the results of the 
current study, which indicate limited evidence of continuation for winners over 
periods from 10 through 252 trading days. 
Medium-term continuation in returns may be driven by any number of factors 
described in Chapters 2 and 3. One of the main aims of this thesis is to assess 
the possible causes of these effects through an examination of the properties of 
stock market trends. This analysis is described in Chapters 8 and 9. 
69 Akhigbe et al (1998) and Laster of al (2003), for example. 
70 Lasfer et al (2003), for example, report continuation over test periods of up to 10 
days. Otchere and Chan (2000), on the other hand, report reversal for winners over test 
periods of 2 to 4 days. It is important to note that each of these studies uses a 
formation period of one day, whereas the results reported in this chapter are analogous 
to formation and test periods of equal length. 
71 See, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993,2001) and Rouwenhorst (1998). 
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7.5 Mean Transaction Profits 
This section considers the mean transaction profits to the 154 momentum 
strategies considered in this part of the research. These provide a measure of 
the returns to strategies over those days where investors hold a position, and 
therefore enables an intuitive analysis of whether the positive returns to some 
strategies are likely to exceed transaction costs for the majority of investors. 
Table 7.7 presents the mean transaction profits for the 154 strategies 
considered. The mean profit of 0.8363% for the 10 day strategy for Switzerland, 
for example, reflects a mean return of 0.8363% for each transaction entered 
into by the strategy over the eight years of the data sample, or 0.08363% per 
day on which the strategy held a market position. 
The maximum transaction profits are generated by the longest strategies. The 
252 trading day strategy produces a mean transaction profit of 21.2695% for 
Spain, for example, and 15.5815% for the USA. These figures are based on 
funded returns, that is to say they take into account dividend income received 
and also the cost of funding. One would expect that returns of this magnitude 
would be more than sufficient to cover transactions costs for the majority of 
investors. Nevertheless, very few values are statistically significant based on 
the bootstrap test. 
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Table 7.7 Mean Transaction Profits 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Day Strategies 
Australia 0.0318% -0.0827% -0.1077% -0.2454% -0.2040% -0.5571% 
-0.0014% 0.0004% -0.0031% -0.0328% -0.0411% -0.0416% 
Belgium 0.3056% 0.2461% 0.1121% 0.1031% -0.1136% 0.0851% 
-0.0023% 0.0021% -0.0008% -0.0072% 0.0352% 0.1592% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 0.2135% 0.0678% 0.0609% -0.0702% 0.0568% 0.4643% 
-0.0012% -0.0019% 0.0040% 0.0043% 0.015756 0.0213% 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 0.0825% 0.0130% 0.0139% 0.2057% 0.3088% 0.3550% 
0.0013% -0.0004% -0.0061% -0.0145% -0.0053% 0.0091% 
France 0.0505% -0.2144% -0.2122% -0.2860% -0.4910% -0.1179% 
-0.0030% 0.0051% 0.0045% -0.0045% 0.0139% 0.0341% 
Germany -0.0275% -0.1749% -0.2219% -0.0206% 0.1025% -0.1872% 
-0.0055% -0.0080% -0.0083% 0.0059% 0.0015% 0.0122% 
Hong Kong 0.2108% 0.2591% 0.2094% 0.0878% 0.0626% 0.4101% 
0.0028% 0.0033% 0.0181% -0.0032% 0.0001% -0.0505% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 0.0377% -0.1253% -0.1017% 0.3014% -0.0264% 1.1610% 
-0.0001% 0.0046% 0.0816% 0.0520% 0.0680% 0.2162% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Japan 0.0614% 0.0246% -0.2280% -0.6619% -0.6745% -0.2227% 
-0.0005% 0.0008% -0.0008% 0.0018% -0.0312% -0.0007% 
Netherlands 0.0498% -0.2376% -0.3149% -0.4728% -0.3593% 0.8017% 
0.0058% -0.0494% -0.0011% 0.0096% 0.0082% 0.0585% 
Spain 0.0754% -0.1390% -0.1377% -0.1005% 0.0989% 0.7515% 
-0.0053% -0.0034% -0.0028% 0.0073% -0.0081% -0.0199% 
Switzerland 0.1193% 0.0129% -0.1873% -0.0856% -0.2311% 0.8363% 
0.0041% 0.0142% 0.0072% 0.0089% 0.0097% 0.0529% 
SIG 5% 
UK 0.0918% -0.1641% -0.2804% -0.3358% -0.4980% 0.0403% 
0.0003% -0.0033% 0.0038% -0.0064% -0.0063% -0.0042% 
USA 0.0569% -0.1247% -0.2700% -0.2561% -0.4734% -0.1298% 
-0.0031% 0.0014% 0.0080% 0.0162% 0.0174% 0.0436% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table 7.7 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -0.8175% -1.4523% -2.3188% -1.2528% -0.7379% 
0.0338% 0.0338% 0.2367% 0.5515% 0.9708% 
Belgium -0.0210% 2.3782% 1.1612% 4.4871% 10.1990% 
0.4427% 0.9690% 0.2114% 0.4679% 1.4194% 
SIG 1% 
Canada 0.2134% 2.4623% 0.4111% 0.3119% 9.0301% 
0.0685% 0.1863% 0.2958% 1.0095% 2.5249% 
Denmark -0.0423% 1.0464% 3.5346% 9.0727% 10.8884% 
0.0111% -0.2202% -0.1283% -0.2876% 0.9319% 
SIG 1% S105% 
France 0.7190% 2.8885% 3.2152% -1.8280% 13.0786% 
0.0237% 0.1118% 0.1751% 0.6062% 1.8034% 
Germany 0.4157% 2.1040% 4.4813% -0.4319% 18.1966% 
-0.0616% -0.0276% 0.1339% 0.2386% 0.4196% 
Hong Kong 1.5642% 1.4798% -1.4538% 1.3169% -15.7036% 
-0.0998% 0.7692% 0.3314% 0.4090% 1.2225% 
SIG 5% 
Italy -0.0378% 0.0359% 3.2388% 4.6578% 12.9944% 
0.4481% -0.4812% 0.0977% -1.4087% -2.6336% 
Japan -0.4645% 1.0291% 2.0143% 0.2193% -3.6099% 
-0.0576% 0.0523% 0.1263% 0.3307% 0.5307% 
Netherlands 0.2557% 4.4826% 5.5806% 1.4759% 17.7541% 
0.0629% 0.1170% 0.3467% 1.1728% 3.2653% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Spain 1.6519% 2.1316% 3.0157% 7.4134% 21.2695% 
0.0863% 0.2729% 0.9822% 1.1798% 2.7575% 
Switzerland 0.3424% 0.7277% 5.3175% 2.7453% 14.7441% 
0.1500% 0.2786% 0.5957% 1.1456% 3.2567% 
SIG 5% 
UK -1.0681% -0.6644% 1.8220% -3.1671% 6.0399% 
0.0035% 0.0912% 0.0338% -0.0128% -0.5498% 
USA 0.1349% -0.5610% 0.5683% 5.2758% 15.5815% 
0.0284% 0.1927% 0.3645% 0.8367% 1.9556% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table 7.8 shows the mean profit across all 14 data sets per transaction and per 
day where a position is held for each strategy from 1 to 252 trading days. 
Interestingly, the strategy lengths which produced mixed results across data 
sets in terms of cumulative returns correspond to those strategy lengths shown 
in Table 7.8 where the mean transaction and daily profits are negative. These 
also reflect the autocorrelation structure of the underlying data sets, shown in 
Table 5.5. 
Table 7.8 Mean Transaction and Daily Profit by Strategy Length 
Strategy Length (Trading Days) Mean Transaction Profit Mean Daily Profit 
1 0.0971% 0.0971% 
2 -0.0457% -0.0228% 
3 -0.1190% -0.0397% 
4 -0.1312% -0.0328% 
5 -0.1744% -0.0349% 
10 0.2636% 0.0264% 
21 0.2026% 0.0096% 
42 1.2920% 0.0308% 
63 2.1849% 0.0347% 
126 2.1640% 0.0172% 
252 9.2661% 0.0368% 
Table shows the mean transaction profit across all 14 data sets for each strategy length together with the 
mean daily profit for days on which each strategy holds a market position. 
An examination of the mean daily returns shown in Table 7.8 reveals that these 
are typically small. Mean daily returns on days where strategies hold a position 
(that is to say excluding the zero returns on days where no position is held) are 
below 0.0750% for 135 of the 154 strategies considered and below 0.0500% 
for 111 strategies. For short-term strategies, these returns are unlikely to 
exceed transaction costs for any but the largest investors. 
The returns to the momentum strategies considered in this chapter therefore 
tend to indicate that although positive returns are generally found over 1 trading 
day and over periods ranging from 10 to 252 trading days, very few strategies 
generate statistically significant excess returns, and only the returns to the 
longest strategies are likely to generate sufficiently large returns to exceed the 
cost of trading for most investors. The attractiveness of these strategies may be 
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at least partially offset by the lack of consistency in annual returns highlighted 
in Section 7.3. Sections 7.6 and 7.7 go on to consider more formally the risk 
inherent to the strategies considered in this part of the research. 
7.6 Standard Deviation of Daily Returns 
Table 7.9 shows the standard deviation of daily returns to each of the 154 
momentum trading strategies considered in this part of the research. Daily 
returns in this context are simply the daily percentage profit or loss as 
calculated in Section 6.3.2 and include the returns to all days in the data 
sample, regardless of whether or not the strategy in question held a position on 
that day. The standard deviations reported therefore reflect the overall 
distribution of returns to an investor following the strategy in question. Each 
standard deviation is annualised by multiplying by the square root of 25272. 
The main feature of the standard deviations of momentum strategy returns 
shown in Table 7.9 is that these are significantly higher than the bootstrap 
values in almost all cases. This reflects a higher variance of daily returns to an 
investor following the momentum strategies than to an investor following a 
passive investment strategy. In other words, the momentum strategies 
considered carry greater risk than do passive investment strategies on the 
same stock market indices. The 2 through 5 trading day strategies similarly 
carry more risk than a passive investment in the index, although they do not 
provide consistently positive excess returns for the data samples considered. 
Whilst the 1 trading day and 10 to 252 trading day strategies show some 
tendency to generate positive excess returns, these returns may be attributable 
to nonsynchronous trading in the case of the 1 trading day strategy. For the 
longer strategies, not only are many excess returns not statistically significant 
at the 5% level, but there is no clear pattern to the significant returns obtained 
and the standard deviation of returns is generally significantly higher than the 
bootstrap value. This calls into question whether the momentum strategies 
considered are able to generate significant risk-adjusted excess returns. 
72 This is based on an average of 252 daily observations per year. The potential issue 
associated with using the square root of time to annualise standard deviations when 
the daily returns are not in fact normal is discussed in Section 5.6. 
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Table 7.9 Standard Deviation of Daily Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 6.63% 7.84% 8.37% 8.77% 8.77% 9.69% 
5.62% 6.90% 7.54% 7.94% 8.20% 8.94% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Belgium 10.38% 12.25% 12.71% 12.95% 13.88% 14.55% 
6.53% 8.11% 8.91% 9.48% 9.84% 10.89% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 8.47% 10.97% 12.06% 12.68% 11.99% 13.13% 
6.60% 8.22% 9.12% 9.70% 10.09% 11.15% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Denmark 10.27% 11.71% 12.04% 12.26% 12.45% 13.23% 
6.92% 8.49% 9.42% 9.90% 10.25% 11.19% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
France 11.58% 14.95% 15.04% 15.64% 16.38% 16.54% 
8.59% 10.64% 11.72% 12.40% 12.89% 14.18% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Germany 13.11% 16.33% 16.83% 17.47% 18.29% 19.23% 
9.24% 11.49% 12.73% 13.52% 14.11% 15.51% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 14.78% 16.79% 18.17% 18.40% 19.43% 21.22% 
11.05% 13.45% 14.76% 15.60% 16.26% 17.99% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Italy 12.84% 16.15% 16.38% 16.74% 17.73% 18.23% 
10.25% 12.50% 13.82% 14.30% 14.77% 16.39% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Japan 10.29% 13.10% 13.86% 14.25% 14.69% 15.75% 
8.35% 10.16% 11.17% 11.82% 12.21% 13.41% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Netherlands 13.01% 15.74% 16.17% 17.05% 17.86% 17.74% 
8.02% 10.42% 11.70% 12.46% 13.02% 14.43% 
S101% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 12.69% 15.60% 15.99% 16.16% 17.24% 18.07% 
9.36% 11.52% 12.67% 13.42% 13.93% 15-24% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 11.63% 13.34% 14.28% 15.55% 15.23% 15.70% 
7.43% 9.30% 10.28% 10.90% 11.37% 12.59% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% S101% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
UK 9.41% 11.31% 12.25% 12.44% 12.31% 13.33% 
6.88% 8.32% 9.41% 9.99% 10.37% 11.37% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
USA 10.01% 12.15% 12.56% 13.42% 13.24% 13.63% 
7.48% 8.94% 9.83% 10.36% 10.76% 11.85% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG I% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table 7.9 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia 9.84% 9.92% 10.73% 10.54% 10.55% 
9.47% 9.84% 9.97% 10.26% 10.50% 
Belgium 15.22% 15.57% 15.60% 16.16% 17.15% 
11.72% 12.36% 12.44% 12.79% 13.17% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 14.25% 13.56% 14.37% 15.99% 17.15% 
11.97% - 12.49% 12.78% 13.13% 13.46% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Denmark 14.23% 14.54% 14.58% 15.71% 16.24% 
11.93% 12.28% 12.67% 13.06% 13.25% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
France 17.74% 17.49% 19.55% 20.87% 21.48% 
15.18% 15.73% 15.95% 16.27% 16.69% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Germany 19.52% 20.29% 19.85% 21.34% 20.09% 
16.59% 17.23% 17.40% 17.84% 17.90% 
SIG1% SIG1% 
Hong Kong 22.58% 21.23% 22.73% 19.49% 25.59% 
19.45% 20.61% 20.68% 20.88% 20.84% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 19.78% 20.05% 19.42% 20.79% 22.81% 
17.99% 19.08% 18.98% 19.32% 19.79% 
SIG 5% 
Japan 15.57% 15.60% 15.65% 15.91% 14.42% 
14.23% 14.62% 14.81% 15.00% 14.93% 
Netherlands 18.92% 18.22% 20.02% 21.14% 20.41% 
15.53% 16.21% 16.47% 17.04% 17.54% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% S1G 5% 
Spain 18.99% 19.61% 19.51% 21.10% 21.50% 
16.02% 16.74% 16.99% 17.73% 18.24% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 16.39% 16.25% 15.64% 18.32% 17.61% 
13.54% 14.21% 14.44% 15.10% 15.59% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
UK 14.01% 14.39% 14.19% 14.41% 14.44% 
12.09% 12.53% 12.74% 13.30% 13.09% 
S1G 1% SIG 5% 
USA 14.86% 14.45% 15.33% 14.77% 17.56% 
12.70% 13.22% 13.49% 13.89% 14.30% 
SIG 1% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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7.7 Sharpe Ratios 
The Sharpe ratio, described in Section 6.4, is a measure of the relationship 
between the return and risk of an investment strategy. Table 7.10 shows the 
Sharpe ratios calculated for each of the 154 momentum strategies considered 
in this part of the research. 
Each ratio gives the return to the strategy per unit of risk. Strategies with higher 
Sharpe ratios therefore dominate those with lower ratios. Strategies which 
produce negative cumulative returns have negative Sharpe ratios, whilst those 
with positive cumulative returns have positive Sharpe ratios. The Sharpe ratios 
from the bootstrap are all small compared to those calculated for the original 
data samples. 
Very few of the 154 strategies considered produce statistically significant 
Sharpe ratios. For the 1 trading day strategies, both Belgium and Canada 
produce significantly high ratios, as does Belgium over 2 trading days. Three 
strategies (Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands) produce significant results 
over 42 trading days, as do Denmark and Switzerland over 63 trading days, 
Denmark over 126 trading days, and the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and 
the USA over 252 trading days. There is no clear pattern however in the 
significant results. 
In general, therefore, the Sharpe ratios calculated for the 154 momentum 
strategies considered are not significantly large. Positive excess returns to 
momentum strategies may therefore simply provide compensation for the 
additional risk inherent to such strategies. In addition, the analysis of returns by 
calendar year presented in Section 7.3 indicates that the returns to those 
strategies with significantly high Sharpe ratios is not consistent throughout the 
data samples. That is to say, strategies which appear to generate particularly 
attractive returns relative to the standard deviation of those returns cannot be 
expected to do so consistently over time. There remains, therefore, significant 
risk to returns over common performance evaluation horizons even for those 
strategies with the highest Sharpe ratios. 
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Table 7.10 Sharpe Ratios 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 0.18 -0.30 -0.29 -0.55 -0.37 -0.55 
-0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 
Belgium 1.37 0.73 0.24 0.18 -0.16 0.07 
-0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.12 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 1.01 0.21 0.13 -0.12 0.09 0.40 
-0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 0.39 0.04 0.03 0.36 0.44 0.28 
0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 
France 0.21 -0.51 -0.39 -0.41 -0.57 -0.07 
-0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
Germany -0.10 -0.35 -0.35 -0.03 0.10 -0.10 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Hong Kong 0.53 0.44 0.25 0.09 0.05 0.19 
0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
Italy 0.12 -0.23 -0.14 0.35 -0.03 0.63 
0.00 0.01 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.13 
SIG 1% 
Japan 0.26 0.06 -0.43 -1.01 -0.85 -0.14 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 
Netherlands 0.18 -0.52 -0.49 -0.59 -0.36 0.44 
0.02 -0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 
Spain 0.28 -0.30 -0.22 -0.13 0.11 0.45 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Switzerland 0.45 0.03 -0.32 -0.11 -0.27 0.52 
0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 
UK 0.46 -0.51 -0.59 -0.56 -0.72 0.03 
0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
USA 0.26 -0.35 -0.58 -0.43 -0.66 -0.10 
-0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table 7.10 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -0.41 -0.39 -0.45 -0.13 -0.04 
0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Belgium -0.01 0.51 0.18 0.43 0.46 
0.20 0.22 0.03 0.04 0.05 
SIG 1% 
Canada 0.09 0.59 0.06 0.03 0.35 
0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 
SIG 5% 
Denmark -0.02 0.25 0.56 0.77 0.52 
0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 
SIG1% SIG1% 
France 0.23 0.48 0.40 -0.13 0.48 
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 
Germany 0.12 0.32 0.45 -0.02 0.50 
-0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Hong Kong 0.38 0.19 -0.13 0.08 -0.40 
-0.03 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Italy -0.01 0.01 0.29 0.27 0.31 
0.15 -0.08 0.01 -0.08 -0.08 
Japan -0.16 0.19 0.23 0.01 -0.11 
-0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Netherlands 0.08 0.67 0.58 0.10 0.67 
0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Spain 0.48 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.66 
0.03 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.07 
SIG 5% 
Switzerland 0.12 0.13 0.72 0.22 0.56 
0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.11 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK -0.38 -0.13 0.24 -0.24 0.28 
0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
USA 0.05 -0.12 0.08 0.40 0.69 
0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 
SIG 5% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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7.8 Summary 
The main aim of this part of the research is to assess the evidence of 
significant continuation and reversal effects in financial market returns using a 
methodology which closely reflects the experience of real-world investors. A 
time-series methodology is implemented based on the profitability of 
momentum trading strategies which buy the stock market index following a 
market rise and sell following a market fall. 
There is some evidence of a tendency towards positive excess returns to 
momentum strategies for the 1 trading day strategies although this may be due 
to spurious positive serial correlation in the index values in the very short term 
as a result of nonsynchronous trading. Similarly, there is a tendency towards 
positive excess returns for strategies based on holding periods of between 10 
and 252 trading days, although there are few significant results and no clear 
pattern is observed in these results. The returns to strategies based on holding 
periods of 2 through 5 trading days are mixed. The cumulative profits to long 
positions are high for the 1 day and 10 through 252 trading day strategies, with 
mixed returns to the 2 through 5 trading day strategies. For short positions, 
mixed results are obtained for the 1 trading day strategies, with generally 
negative returns thereafter. 
These results are interpreted as very limited evidence of continuation effects in 
the medium-term (10 to 252 trading days) for winners. 
An analysis of the profitability of each strategy by calendar year reveals a high 
degree of inconsistency in returns over time, indicating that risk may be an 
important consideration for investors embarking on any such strategy. The 
standard deviation of daily returns is significantly high for almost all of the 
strategies considered. The Sharpe ratios, which measure strategy returns per 
unit of risk, are generally insignificant based on the bootstrap test, indicating 
that strategy profitability is not significantly high once risk is taken into account. 
The second part of the research examines the features of stock market trends 
with the objective of reconciling the results of this part of the research with the 
behavioural and alternative theories of continuation and reversal effects in 
financial market returns discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Chapter 8 
Trend Analysis Methodology 
8.1 Introduction 
The results of the analysis described in Chapters 6 and 7 show very limited 
evidence of excess profits to momentum trading strategies with holding periods 
of one trading day and 10 through 252 trading days driven largely by the 
returns to long positions. Once risk is taken into account, however, the excess 
profits achieved by the strategies considered are not statistically significant. 
The aim of the research documented in this thesis is to examine short- and 
medium-term continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns and to 
consider the extent to which these may be caused by the behavioural and 
alternative explanations proposed in the literature and discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3. The second part of the research, documented in this chapter and the 
following chapter, considers the issue of continuation effects in stock market 
returns from a different angle. If such effects are indeed present in stock market 
returns, what are the implications for the time series properties of stock market 
returns and in particular for trends in market prices? 
Three causes can be identified for empirical findings of continuation effects in 
stock market returns: 
9 Continuation effects in the data samples used by previous studies such 
as those of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 and 2001) may occur as a 
result of chance (Fama, 1998). Chance alone is sufficient to ensure that 
periods of time will exist in which the returns to any given financial 
market will exhibit continuation effects. Data-snooping bias may 
therefore explain some of the findings of previous research. 
" The distribution of daily stock market returns may in itself generate 
findings of continuation effects. The distribution of daily returns may be 
biased as a result of behavioural biases such as a tendency to react 
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more strongly to bad news than good, for example. If the distribution of 
returns is heavily skewed to the right, empirical studies are likely to find 
evidence of positive momentum profits, particularly from long 
positions73. The data samples used in this study exhibit positive mean 
and median returns. Positive returns are therefore likely to be followed 
by further positive returns. Even if the overall descriptive statistics for a 
data sample appear normal, periods of highly biased returns may be 
present within the sample. 
" Even if the distribution of daily stock market returns is not in itself 
biased, patterns in the order in which returns occur in the data sample 
may generate continuation effects. If, for example, positive returns tend 
to cluster together, a continuation effect will result. This could occur as a 
result of market microstructure issues such as nonsynchronous trading 
or behavioural biases such as representativeness, for example. Once 
investors see a pattern forming in returns, the expectation that the trend 
will continue may result in a greater probability of a confirming rather 
than a conflicting return on the following trading day. 
The focus of this second part of the research is on assessing the extent to 
which biases in the distribution of stock market returns and patterns in the order 
of returns might generate continuation effects. This in turn may shed some light 
on the results of the first part of the research, discussed in Chapter 7. 
Continuation effects imply trending in stock market prices. By examining the 
properties of stock market trends and considering the factors which might drive 
such trends, this part of the research considers whether stock market trend 
behaviour is consistent with medium-term continuation effects driven by the 
behavioural and alternative theories described in Chapters 2 and 3. 
This chapter introduces the analytical framework within which this part of the 
research is carried out, and describes in detail the methodology employed in an 
analysis of the statistical properties of stock market trends. Chapter 9 presents 
the results of this analysis. 
73 This is the broad pattern of returns to momentum strategies identified by the current 
study and described in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Within this chapter, Section 8.2 discusses the issue of trends in financial 
market prices in more detail. Section 8.3 provides a brief review of statistical 
methods used to extract turning points from time series data, whilst Section 8.4 
extends this to describe the algorithm used in this study. Section 8.5 discusses 
the analysis to be performed once the trends in the data have been identified 
using the algorithm, Section 8.6 reviews the use of the bootstrap methodology 
to assess significance levels, and Section 8.7 concludes. 
8.2 Market Trends 
Market trends have traditionally been defined by market commentators as 
periods of generally increasing and/or decreasing prices, with periods of rising 
prices typically referred to as bull markets and periods of falling prices as bear 
markets74. More recently, a cumulative market move of a specific size appears 
to be required for a phase to be termed a bull of bear market. Davis (2003, 
p178), for example, defines a bear market as 
"a prolonged period of falling equity prices, usually by 20 percent or 
more over several years" 
At the same time, market practitioners commonly differentiate between short- 
term and long-term market trends75. Short-term trends relate to trends 
occurring over periods of days and weeks rather than the months and years 
associated with long-term trends. A long-term trend, therefore, can be thought 
of as a combination of shorter-term trends. Figure 8.1 illustrates this by 
showing both medium-term and short-term trends in the US stock market data 
employed in this study. 
74 For this reason, the analysis described in this chapter focuses on trends in the price 
series of each of the 14 stock markets considered, rather than trends in the total return 
series or in funded returns. 
75 The definition of short-term and long-term used in this context is somewhat arbitrary. 
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Figure 8.1 Medium-Term and Short-Term Stock Market Trends 
Medium-Term Trends 
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I 
-Price Series -Trend 
Short Term Trends 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
- Price Index -Trend 
NOTE: Trends are depicted as straight lines joining their start and end points. The 
medium-term trends were generated using the price index series for the USA and the 
Fink and Pratt algorithm with R=2/3. The short-term trends were generated using the 
same data and algorithm with R=0.25. The identification of trends using the Fink and 
Pratt algorithm is discussed later in this chapter. 
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The concept of trends of differing magnitudes is not new. In a 1902 Wall Street 
Journal editorial (quoted in Nelson, 1903 and reproduced in Galbi, 2001, p8), 
Charles Dow says, for example, 
"Nothing is more certain than that the market has three well defined 
movements which fit into each other. The first is the daily variation 
due to local causes and the balance of buying or selling at that 
particular time. The secondary movement covers a period ranging 
from ten to sixty days, averaging probably between ten and forty 
days. The third swing is the great move covering from four to six 
years" 
Subsequent authors have questioned the length of Dow's trends. Hamilton 
(1922, reprinted 1998, p24) notes that according to his analysis, the primary 
trend is 
"rarely three years and oftener less than two" 
The aim of this part of the research is not only to empirically examine the 
duration and amplitude of trends in the fourteen stock market data sets 
described in Chapter 5, but by examining their statistical properties to draw 
some conclusions as to the likely relevance of the behavioural and alternative 
theories introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 in driving the findings of medium-term 
continuation effects in stock market returns reported by previous studies and 
the continuation and reversal effects identified in the first part of the current 
study and described in Chapters 6 and 7. 
In simple terms, trends occur when, in a subsection of a data series, either 
" the proportion of positive price changes exceeds the proportion of 
negative price changes for a bull trend (and vice versa for a bear trend), 
and/or 
the absolute size of positive price changes exceeds that of negative 
price changes, for a bull trend (and vice versa for a bear trend) 
If, in any given subsection of the data, for example, there are more positive 
daily price changes than negative changes, and the average absolute size of 
the positive price changes is larger than that of the negative price changes, 
then clearly the market price level will tend to increase over that subsection of 
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data. This upward trend in prices represents a bull trend. Similarly, a downward 
pattern in prices would be identified as a bear trend. 
Many market observers seem to believe that financial market trends are 
"different' in some way from random patterns of price fluctuation. Experiments 
using both normally distributed and uniformly distributed daily price returns, 
however, produce price index charts which are intuitively indistinguishable from 
charts of real-world financial market prices76. 
Most importantly, however, whilst random data and financial market prices both 
display trend behaviour, random data will not generate systematic continuation 
effects. At any point, assuming a symmetric distribution of returns, a positive 
increment is as likely as a negative increment, and momentum strategies will 
on average produce zero returns. The existence of medium-term momentum 
profits of the kind identified by studies such as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
presupposes predictability in financial time series data. That is to say, trends 
must persist such that at any given point, a trend is more likely to continue than 
to reverse". The analysis of stock market trends contained in this thesis 
centres therefore on how the behaviour of stock market trends deviates from 
that of random trends. 
Continuation effects could be produced by extreme stock market trending 
behaviour in a number of different ways: 
" Trends might become longer, either in terms of duration or total 
amplitude, than random trends based on the same distribution of daily 
returns. The distribution of daily returns in terms of the proportion of 
positive and negative daily returns in the trend and the relative size of 
each may not differ from random trends, but clustering of positive and 
negative returns within the data sample may result in trends which 
simply continue for longer before reversing. This could occur, for 
example, if stock market investors were susceptible to underreaction. 
76 Sample charts are not reproduced in this thesis in the interests of brevity and to 
avoid potential biases in the selection of a small number of charts for reproduction. 
77 Aaberge (2002) discusses the definitions of, and approaches to the measurement of, 
duration dependence in economic data. 
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Excessively long financial market trends would induce predictability in 
financial market returns in that, at any point in time, a trend would be 
more likely to continue than to reverse. 
Alternatively, trends may have the same average duration and total 
amplitude as random trends but patterns in the steepness of trends may 
introduce predictability to returns. If trends end more steeply than they 
begin, for example, this implies that although the probability of 
continuation may not be significantly greater than the probability of 
reversal at any point in time, the potential rewards from continuation 
may exceed the potential losses from reversal. This might in itself be 
sufficient to drive findings of significant excess returns to momentum 
trading strategies. Patterns in the steepness of trends can be generated 
in two main ways, as discussed above. Either 
o the proportion of positive versus negative daily returns differs 
systematically from that of random trends, or 
o the relative absolute magnitude of positive versus negative daily 
returns differs systematically from that of random trends. 
If financial market trend behaviour can be shown to be systematically different 
from the behaviour of random trends based on the same distribution of daily 
returns, then this may provide evidence to support the notion of continuation 
effects in stock market returns, and may enable some conclusions to be drawn 
regarding the sources of such effects. From the above analysis, three main 
potential sources of such differences can be identified and are examined 
empirically in this part of the research. These are 
1. The average duration and amplitude of trends 
2. The proportion of positive and negative daily returns within trends 
3. The relative magnitude of positive and negative daily returns within 
trends 
This part of the research examines the statistical properties of stock market 
price trends, beginning with the three key features listed above. A bootstrap 
approach is used to generate random price series with the same empirical 
distribution of daily price returns as the original data. An analysis of the 
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properties of trends present in the bootstrap data enables inferences to be 
made regarding the nature of systematic deviations from randomness in the 
trend behaviour of the 14 original time series. 
8.3 Identifying Trends in Time Series Data 
The initial objective of this part of the research is the identification of bull and 
bear trends in the price series of fourteen stock market indices78. The 
approach used is similar to that proposed in the literature on dating the 
business cycle, with turning points in trends (local maxima and minima) 
identified directly from the data using a suitably-specified algorithm. 
Section 8.3.1 reviews the use of algorithms in the context of dating the 
business cycle. Section 8.3.2 discusses previous research using algorithms 
based on business cycle dating techniques to date financial market cycles. 
Section 8.3.3 discusses related research in financial markets using Markov 
switching models to identify turning points. Section 8.4 then goes on to 
introduce the approach used in this study, which is based on an algorithm 
proposed in the information technology literature by Fink and Pratt (2004). 
8.3.1 Dating the Business Cycle 
The main area in which turning point detection algorithms have been used in 
finance and economics is in dating the business cycle, that is, identifying peaks 
and troughs in the business cycle from quarterly or monthly historical levels of 
GDP or other macroeconomic variables such as unemployment. 
The business cycle dating methods developed and used by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) on the basis of early work by 
researchers such as Burns and Mitchell (1946) have gained semi-official status 
for the US economy, and form the basis of the non-parametric algorithm 
proposed by Bry & Boschan (1971). This algorithm, and slight variations of it, 
are used widely in business cycle research. Artis (2002), for example, uses the 
78 These are the same data samples as those used in the first part of the research and 
are described in detail in Chapter 5. 
198 
Bry and Boschan algorithm to date the UK business cycle between January 
1974 and February 2002. 
The Bry and Boschan algorithm identifies turning points in the business cycle 
based on the duration of expansion and contraction phases. The first step is to 
identify points in monthly data which are the maximum / minimum in a window 
six months either side of the month in question. The alternation of maxima and 
minima is then enforced by selecting the highest of multiple peaks and the 
lowest of multiple troughs (in some studies this rule is amended slightly and the 
latest-occurring of any multiple peaks or troughs is taken). This gives a series 
of alternating peaks and troughs, each of which is a local maximum/minimum in 
a six month window either side. 
Further censoring operations are then undertaken to ensure that the peaks and 
troughs identified comply with generally accepted principles in terms of the 
characteristics of the business cycle. Cycles (combinations of one expansion 
and one contraction phase) lasting less than fifteen months are eliminated, as 
are any phases (individual expansions or contractions) with a duration of less 
than six months. 
Research into dating the business cycle is further complicated in that it 
commonly uses smoothed data in order to remove outliers. Data may also be 
detrended using either a low-order polynomial or a filter (Harding and Pagan, 
2003). The methodologies employed are not described in detail in this thesis as 
they are not relevant to the dating of financial market trends. Whilst there may 
be a desire to remove outliers when working with macroeconomic data, 
extreme values of stock market prices are of particular interest. 
One issue with Bry and Boschan-type algorithms is that the way in which they 
are set up determines the turning points that are found. Academic studies on 
dating the business cycle have tended to use very similar parameters (6 month 
window, 6 month minimum phase length, 15 month minimum cycle) and so 
have identified similar turning points. Changing these parameters will result in 
the identification of different turning points. Harding and Pagan (2002), for 
example, encounter difficulties when dating the UK business cycle using a Bry 
and Boschan approach, finding it necessary to reduce their initial minimum 
phase duration from 5 months to 4 for the UK data in order not to miss what 
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they consider to be an important turning point in 1974. Section 8.3.2 provides 
an overview of the use of Bry and Boschan-type algorithms in financial markets 
research. 
8.3.2 Studies using a Bry and Boschan Approach 
A number of studies have used a modified Bry and Boschan approach to 
examine trends in financial market prices. These studies typically take the 
standard Bry and Boschan algorithm as described in the previous section and 
amend the algorithm to allow for the identification of very short steep trends 
such as the market crash of 1987. Maxima and minima are identified using a 
short window and the censoring rules amended such that the minimum duration 
rules are not applied if the amplitude of a trend exceeds a given level over a 
specified period, say 20 percent in one month. Monthly data is typically used for 
ease of implementation of the algorithm. 
The use of monthly data in previous studies necessarily involves a lack of 
fineness in the results, since turning points in stock market trends can only be 
identified in terms of the month in which they occur. The Fink and Pratt (2004) 
algorithm on which this study is based, on the other hand, enables daily (or 
even intraday) data to be used without the need to reconfigure the algorithm. 
This enables a more detailed analysis of the statistical properties of daily price 
returns in stock market trends to be carried out in this study than has been 
possible in previous work using the Bry and Boschan approach. 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) conduct a descriptive analysis of stock market 
cycles in 28 emerging and mature economies over the period January 1973 to 
June 1999 and consider the extent to which financial liberalisation influences 
stock market trends. A simplified Bry and Boschan-type algorithm is used 
where trends are required to have a minimum duration of twelve months. No 
additional amplitude-based rules are applied. After identifying trends in the 
underlying data, qualitative information regarding periods of financial 
liberalisation in individual countries is used to compare the duration and total 
amplitude of stock market trends both before and after liberalisation. 
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Kaminsky and Schmukler report that bull trends last on average for 26 months 
and bear trends for 18 months. The boom and bust cycle appears to be more 
pronounced in developing than in developed markets. In the short run, financial 
liberalization does tend to trigger more explosive financial cycles, although 
these become less pronounced within three years. Rather than intensifying 
stock market cycles, therefore, liberalisation appears to make cycles smoother 
over the medium to long term. 
Pagan and Sossounov (2003) examine trends in the US stock market using 
monthly data for the equivalent of the S&P500 index over the period January 
1835 to May 1997. The algorithm used to identify turning points in the data is 
based on Bry and Boschan with a window length of eight months used to 
identify local maxima and minima. Trends have a minimum length of four 
months, except where the market falls by more than 20 percent in a single 
month in which case the minimum duration rule is not applied. 
Bull trends have an average duration of 25 months, which is significantly longer 
than the average bear cycle duration of 17 months. Over time, bull trends are 
seen to grow longer and stronger whilst bear trends become shorter and 
weaker. In addition to the duration and amplitude of trends, Pagan and 
Sossounov also consider a measure of the deviation in the shape of trends 
from a straight line, finding that this deviation becomes stronger over time. That 
is to say, the asymmetric behaviour of stock market trends has become more 
pronounced in recent decades. Over the most recent section of the data, from 
January 1945 to May 1997, bull trends have an average duration of 27 months 
and amplitude of 46 percent, whilst bear trends have an average duration of 
just 12 months and amplitude of -23 percent. The average sum of squares 
deviation from a straight line is 0.03 for bull trends and 0.014 for bear trends. 
Pagan and Sossounov go on to generate simulated price series using a range 
of asset pricing models to see which best replicate the properties of stock 
market trends identified in the earlier analysis. A random walk without drift fails 
to replicate the durations, amplitudes or shapes of trends. A random walk with 
drift and a GARCH (1,1) process, each with parameters set based on the past 
history of returns, do capture the general characteristics of trends but are 
unable to fit the asymmetric durations or shape of trends in real data as the 
distribution of returns is symmetrical for each. An EGARCH (1,1) model fits the 
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shape of the data better than the other models, whilst a Hamilton switching 
methodology fails to improve on EGARCH. Overall, none of the models is able 
to closely replicate the characteristics of the trends observed in the original 
data. 
Gonzalez et al (2005, forthcoming) use a modified Bry and Boschan approach 
where bull and bear markets are defined as the periods between troughs and 
peaks subject to the requirement that these intervals contain sufficient 
"persistent gains". A5 month window is used to identify local maxima and 
minima. The highest peak and lowest trough are selected as turning points, 
with further turning points selected according to the criterion that trends must 
produce a cumulative return of at least 10 percent. Any local maxima and 
minima not meeting this requirement are discarded. 
The data used is monthly US stock price data from January 1800 through 
December 2001. The profitability of two basic trading rules based on the trends 
identified by the algorithm is calculated. A conservative strategy buys the 
market on identification of a market trough, sells on identification of a market 
peak, and holds short-term treasury bills otherwise. Over the period from 
January 1968 through December 2001, this strategy produces slightly higher 
returns than a simple buy-and-hold strategy (1.11 percent compared to 1.01 
percent per month) and lower standard deviation of monthly returns (3.03 
percent compared to 4.46 percent) leading to a higher Sharpe ratio (0.1783 
compared to 0.1001). An aggressive strategy which borrows in order to double 
up on long positions, holding short-term treasury bills otherwise, earns 1.55 
percent per month with a standard deviation of 6.07 percent and a Sharpe ratio 
of 0.1627. 
Gonzalez et at report that over the full data sample, bull markets have an 
average duration of 20 months with 73.74 percent of monthly returns during a 
bull trend proving positive. The average monthly return is 1.9427 percent with 
a standard deviation of 4.0939 percent, skewness of 2.0060 and kurtosis of 
15.6247. Bear markets have an average duration of 15 months with 63.02 
percent of monthly returns during a bear trend proving negative. The average 
monthly return is -1.8330 percent with a standard deviation of 4.3430 percent, 
skewness of -0.4461 percent and kurtosis of 5.9876. The authors note that bull 
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and bear phenomena seem to have become more important as the sample 
progresses with the spread between bull and bear returns widening sharply. 
8.3.3 Regime Switching Models of Financial Market Trends 
A number of authors have used parametric regime switching models to identify 
bull and bear trends in stock market data. These follow the Hamilton (1989) 
parametric approach in which a non-stationary time series is modelled using a 
stationary piecewise linear process. 
The returns process is constructed with two distinct states of mean returns, one 
reflecting a bull market state and the other a bear market state. Although the 
current state of the market cannot be known with certainty at any point in time, 
it can be inferred based on a hazard function which governs the switching 
process between states. The hazard function is estimated from the past data, 
and the identification of market trends carried out on the basis of probability. If 
at any point in time there is a greater than 50 percent chance of being in a bull 
state, a bull trend is recorded, otherwise a bear trend is recorded. Turning 
points occur when the hazard function passes through 50 percent and the most 
likely state of the market switches from bull to bear or vice versa. 
In later studies, the hazard function is commonly adapted to reflect duration 
dependence in market trends. In this way, the probability of a switch increases 
(or decreases) with the period of time the market has spent in its current state. 
Maheu & McCurdy (2000) use a regime-switching model in which the mean 
and variance of returns within bull and bear states is influenced by duration. 
Monthly total return data for the US stock market is used covering the period 
1802 though 1995. Returns are sorted into two states using the switching 
model: a high return, stable bull market state and a low return, volatile bear 
market state. An analysis of the results shows that bull and bear markets 
account for 90 percent and 10 percent of the data sample respectively. The 
highest returns are achieved at the start of bull markets, and returns decline 
with the duration of the bull market. The volatility of returns increases with 
duration in bear markets. Both bull and bear market states display duration 
dependence, with the probability of a switch declining the longer the market has 
203 
spent in its current state. The authors conclude that duration is an important 
conditioning variable for both the mean and variance of returns. One possible 
reason given for the patterns identified is positive feedback trading into bull 
markets as optimism grows. 
Anas and Ferrara (2002, p30) demonstrate some of the limitations of regime- 
switching models. A regime-switching model 
"only separates regimes in accordance to the specification of the 
model" 
Using examples, the authors demonstrate how changes in the model 
specification in terms of number of regimes (typically two or three) and 
properties of regimes can lead to the identification of very different turning 
points. 
8.4 The Fink and Pratt Algorithm 
The Bry and Boschan algorithm, developed for use in dating the business 
cycle, has a number of limitations when used to date stock market trends. 
Firstly, the Bry and Boschan approach is a duration-based approach to 
identifying trends. Whilst this may be suitable for dating the business cycle, no 
rationale is proposed in the literature for the identification of stock market 
trends based on duration. Rather, as discussed in Section 8.2, most observers 
of stock market prices identify amplitude as the defining factor of a bull or bear 
trend. 
As described in Section 8.3.2, a number of studies using stock market data 
have attempted to get round this limitation by imposing additional rules to the 
algorithm such that the minimum duration rule is ignored if a trend has sufficient 
amplitude. Pagan and Sossounov (2003), for example, ignore the minimum 
duration imposed on their trends if the market falls by more than 20 percent in 
any one month. The choice of 20 percent as a trigger level and one month as 
the relevant time horizon is arbitrary, and different choices of these variables 
may lead to the identification of different turning points. 
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Secondly, the Bry and Boschan approach requires a sliding window of fixed 
length in order to identify local maxima and minima. Gonzalez et al (2005, 
forthcoming), for example, require a5 month window either side of a data point 
before it can be classified as a maximum or minimum. Whilst the Bry and 
Boschan algorithm will never generate a signal until five months after the 
relevant turning point, an amplitude-based algorithm may generate a signal 
much more quickly. An important distinction can be made between dating and 
detecting turning points. Anas and Ferrara (2002) liken the difference to that 
between estimating and predicting. Although Bry and Boschan-type algorithms 
may be useful for dating turning points in historical data, they are unlikely to 
identify turning points quickly enough in recent data to be useful for predictive 
purposes. 
For these reasons, an amplitude-based algorithm is preferred over the Bry and 
Boschan approach. To the author's knowledge, no previous study has 
employed an amplitude-based algorithm of the type used in this study to 
identify and analyse the statistical properties of trends in financial market 
prices79. 
The algorithm used in this study to identify market trends based on their 
amplitude is taken from the data compression literature in information 
technology. Data compression involves the representation of a time series by a 
smaller number of points whilst retaining the key features of the time series. 
Algorithms have been developed to address the problem of storing and 
manipulating large complex data sets in a range of fields, including computer 
science, cartography, and image processing. More recently, data compression 
has been applied to time series data mining problems80. 
Fink and Pratt (2004) propose an algorithm for the generation of a piecewise 
linear approximation of time series data based on the identification of 
"important points". An important point in this context is a local maximum / 
79 Fink and Pratt (2004) employ time series data from a range of fields, including the 
S&P 100 index, to demonstrate the broad applicability of their algorithm. The aim of 
their paper, however, is not to examine the properties of trends in time series data. 
8° Keogh et al (2004) provide an overview of the various approaches proposed in this 
literature for the piecewise linear representation of financial time series. 
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minimum which is at least x percent higher/lower than the surrounding minima / 
maxima respectively. The applicability of the algorithm to identifying turning 
points in time series data is demonstrated for a range of data sets including 
stock prices (S&P100 stocks from January 1998 to April 2000), air and sea 
temperatures, wind speeds, and electroencephalograms. 
The Fink and Pratt algorithm has four important advantages over Bry and 
Boschan: 
1. it identifies trends based on amplitude rather than duration. This 
provides a much closer fit with the generally accepted definition of a 
stock market trend. 
2. it can compress a time series as it arrives, resulting in a potentially 
much faster identification of turning points than under Bry and Boschan 
where the size of the window used to determine the initial local maxima 
and minima to be considered places a lower bound on the time taken to 
identify turning points. 
3. changing the frequency of the data used does not require the 
specification of the algorithm to be amended as would be the case for 
Bry and Boschan-type algorithms. The algorithm is relatively simple to 
implement using daily data, enabling a much finer analysis of the 
statistical properties of daily returns within financial market trends than 
has been possible in previous studies. 
4. it uses a parameter R to control the rate of compression and thus, in 
terms of the identification of stock market trends, the size of the trends 
identified. The higher the level of R selected, the more extreme the 
turning points found. In the context of stock market trends, a high R will 
identify a small number of long-term trends, whilst a smaller R will result 
in the identification of a greater number of short-term trends. The Bry 
and Boschan algorithm cannot be easily adjusted in this way to consider 
trends of differing magnitudes. 
Figure 8.2 reproduces the definition of turning points (important minima and 
important maxima) within the Fink and Pratt algorithm. 
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Figure 8.2 Definition of Turning Points in the Fink and Pratt 
Algorithm 
In the Fink and Pratt algorithm, 
a point am of a series a,, ...., an is an important minimum 
if there are indices i 
and j, where i<m<j, such that 
" am is a minimum among a;,..., aj, and 
" ajam >=R and a; /a,,, >=R 
a point am of a series a,, ...., an is an important maximum if there are indices i 
and j, where i<m<j, such that 
" a, is a maximum among a1,..., a1, and 
" am/ai >=R and aRJaj>=R 
Source: Fink and Pratt (2004) 
In simple terms, the Fink and Pratt algorithm searches for points which are the 
maximum values within a given segment and where the endpoints of the 
segment are much smaller. These are classified as important maxima. 
Similarly, important minima are local minima within segments where the 
endpoints are much larger. Segments do not have fixed length. The algorithm 
ensures that important maxima and minima alternate, and that all trends have a 
given minimum amplitude as measured by R. 
The Fink and Pratt algorithm is implemented in Microsoft ExcelTM for each of 
the 14 stock market price index series described in Chapter 5. In each case, 
the first data point is 31 December 1993 and the final data point is 31 
December 2002. 
Figure 8.3 reproduces the steps involved in the algorithm in the form of a 
flowchart. Whilst the process is more complex in terms of implementation than 
the Bry and Boschan approach, the underlying concepts are straightforward. 
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Figure 8.3 Flowchart: Fink and Pratt Algorithm 
START 
SET VARIABLES min-to-date = first data point 
max-to-date = first data point 
current = first data point 
nextooint = first point 
First Point 
currentl 
min-to- 
date <R? 
yes 
Important Minimum Found 
Record Important Point 
SET max-to-date = current 
Important Point Not Found 
UPDATE min-to-date and max-to-date: 
min-to-date = minimum (min-to-date, 
current) 
max-to-date = maximum (max-to-date, 
current) 
SET current = current +1J 
Point to Search For? 
Important 
Ma)dmum 
max-to-date 
/current<R? 
no 
yes 
no Important Maximum Found 
Record Important Point 
SET min-to-date = current 
Important Minimum 
current/ 
min-to- 
date <R? 
yes no 
current = last no 
data point? 
STOP 
yes 
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The algorithm scrolls through the data day by day, starting with the first data 
point in the sample. Three main processes are involved: the identification of the 
first turning point (which can be a peak or a trough), the identification of an 
important maximum, and the identification of an important minimum. 
8.4.1 Identification of the First Turning Point 
Until the first turning point in the data sample is found, the algorithm does not 
know whether that point will be an important maximum or an important 
minimum. Since the previous point is unknown, the criteria that the first 
important point in the data sample be higher / lower than the previous point by 
a factor of R cannot be enforced. 
To identify the first turning point, the algorithm therefore scrolls through the 
data, searching for a local maximum or minimum that is above / below the next 
local minimum / maximum by at least a factor of R. To do this, variables min-to- 
date and max-to-date are defined. Initially, both max-to-date and min-to-date 
are set to equal the first data point. As the algorithm scrolls through the data, 
these variables are updated at each step as appropriate. 
If, at any step, the current value is higher than the minimum-to-date by a factor 
of at least R then the data point corresponding to min-to-date is identified as 
the first turning point (an important minimum) and the algorithm looks for a local 
maximum as the next turning point. Similarly, if at any step, the current value is 
lower than the variable max-to-date by a factor of at least R then the point 
represented by max-to-date is identified as the first turning point (an important 
maximum) and the algorithm looks for a local minimum as the next turning 
point. 
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8.4.2 Identification of Remaining Turning Points 
Once the first turning point has been found and classified as a maximum or a 
minimum, the algorithm knows that the next point to be found is a minimum or 
maximum respectively. 
The algorithm specifies that each turning point must be higher / lower than both 
the preceding point and the next point by a factor of R. Consider the example 
where R is 1.2 and the first turning point is a maximum. The first and third 
points must be at least 1.2 times the second point. In identifying the first point, 
however, the algorithm has already ensured that the first point will be at least 
1.2 times the second. To identify the second point, therefore, it is only 
necessary to ensure that a third point will be found that is at least 1.2 times the 
level of the second point. 
If the algorithm is searching for an important maximum, it updates the variable 
max-to-date (as appropriate) as it scrolls through the data and considers at 
each point whether max-to-date exceeds the current market level by a factor of 
at least R. If it does, then the data point corresponding to max-to-date is 
classified as an important maximum. The next point to be found is a minimum, 
and min-to-date is reset to the current price81. 
If the algorithm is searching for an important minimum, it updates the variable 
min-to-date (as appropriate) as it scrolls through the data and considers at 
81 At the time the important maximum is found, the market is in a down trend (since by 
definition the maximum cannot be identified until after it occurs). The current level is by 
definition the minimum price recorded in that bear trend to date, since if a lower price 
had been recorded, the previous turning point would already have been identified. The 
next turning point, an important minimum, will be identified after its occurrence by 
finding a point that is greater than min-to-date by a factor of R. In this context, the 
minimum recorded in this trend is the relevant variable, not the minimum recorded 
since the start of the data set. For this reason, when an important maximum is found, 
min-to-date is reset to the current level at the time the maximum is identified. 
A similar argument applies for important minima; when an important minimum is 
identified, max-to-date is reset to the current price. 
Min-to-date or max-to-date is similarly reset to the current market level on identification 
of the first turning point in the data. 
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each point whether the current market level exceeds min-to-date by a factor of 
at least R. If it does, then the data point corresponding to min-to-date is 
classified as an important minimum. The next point to be found is a maximum, 
and the variable max-to-date is reset to the current price. 
8.4.3 Choice of Compression Rate R 
R is constant in the Fink & Pratt algorithm. One reason for this is that their 
paper is concerned with data compression in a variety of settings and does not 
specifically relate to financial data. 
The choice of R determines the number of turning points found. A high value of 
R will identify a small number of typically long-term trends, whilst a small R 
identifies a larger number of typically short-term trends. 
One important aim of this study is to carry out a comparative analysis of trend 
behaviour in the stock markets of fourteen developed countries. The volatility of 
daily price returns is likely to vary across the fourteen time series and also over 
time for any individual time series. This is illustrated in Table 8.1, which shows 
the standard deviation of daily price returns for each of the fourteen stock 
markets over each calendar year from 1987 to 2002 inclusive82. A turning point 
which might be considered significant in a low volatility series may not be as 
significant in a high volatility series. 
For this reason the Fink and Pratt algorithm is amended in this study such that 
R is time-varying based on the past volatility of returns. A higher R is therefore 
82 Table 8.1 shows the annualised standard deviations of daily price changes for each 
data series for the calendar years 1987 to 2002 inclusive (1st January 1987 is the base 
date for each index). Although the price index series are available from January 1987, 
the analysis described in this chapter is restricted to the period 1993 to 2002 inclusive 
to ensure comparability of the results with those of the first section of the research. 
Consistent with the analysis of momentum strategy profitability described in Chapters 6 
and 7, the data for 1993 is used as an estimation period with results reported for the 
period 1994 to 2002 inclusive. 
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used for more volatile markets and more volatile periods of time within each 
time series, and a lower R for less volatile markets and periods of time. This 
provides a "level playing field" for each stock market considered and would also 
enable the same methodology to be easily applied without adjustment to 
different types of financial time series such as foreign exchange rates and 
interest rates. For each trading day, the value of R to be used by the algorithm 
is defined as two-thirds of the annualised standard deviation of percentage 
price returns over the previous 252 trading days83. As discussed in Section 5.6, 
the use of the square root of time as a scaling rule when returns are not normal 
may be a limitation, although it is not considered material in this instance since 
the aim of the time-varying R is simply to enable the definition of a trend to vary 
based on some measure of the volatility of the underlying time series. 
The choice of 252 trading days as the calculation period for R is somewhat 
arbitrary. The time period should not be too long, in order that the changing 
volatility of the data sets over time is captured. On the other hand, the time 
period chosen should not be too short or the nature of the algorithm may 
artificially influence the results. If the length over which R is calculated is too 
short relative to the average length of the trends identified, then the volatility of 
price changes within a trend may have undue influence on the level of R used 
to identify the end of the trend. Volatile trends may be prolonged (by inducing a 
higher R) and less volatile trends shortened. The definition of R used in this 
study reflects the medium-term nature of the continuation effects identified in 
previous research. The average length of the trends identified by the algorithm 
is less than the 252 day period over which the standard deviation of returns is 
calculated. 
83 By experimentation, a level of R equal to two thirds of the standard deviation of price 
returns over the previous 252 trading days was seen to identify trends with a mean 
duration of between 6 and 12 months. This was considered desirable in order to ensure 
the potential relevance of the results to the (limited) findings of positive medium-term 
excess returns to momentum strategies in the first part of the research. A similar 
analysis with R defined as one third of the standard deviation of price returns over the 
previous 252 trading days yields a very similar pattern of results. These are reproduced 
in Appendix G. 
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The data set is the same as that used in Chapters 6 and 7 to investigate the 
issue of momentum strategy profitability. In this case, trends are identified in 
the price return series rather than the funded returns series used previously, as 
discussed in Section 8.2. 
For 1994, the first year of data to be considered, the appropriate level of R is 
calculated using price index data for the 1993 calendar year. That is to say, the 
level of R remains constant for each time series for the first 252 trading days 
considered. After the first 252 trading days, R is calculated for each trading day 
based on the standard deviation of daily price changes over the previous 252 
trading days. 
The algorithm is run through the data with R= 2/3 to create a list of turning 
points for each market. Appendix F shows the turning points identified for each 
market together with the date on which these are identified by the algorithm. 
8.4.4 Identification of Trends and Phases within Trends 
Once implemented, the algorithm generates a series of turning points for each 
data set based on the raw price index data. The first trend starts with the first 
turning point found in the data, and the last trend ends with the last point found. 
Once the turning points have been identified in the raw price series, the next 
step is to isolate the series of daily price returns occurring within each trend. 
Again, this is carried out using Microsoft ExcelTM 
Since the data used to generate these turning points comprises closing price 
data, each turning point is deemed to have occurred at the close on the date 
identified by the algorithm. When sorting the daily price returns into trends, 
therefore, the price return occurring on a day identified as a turning point is the 
final daily price return in the preceding trend, and the next trend begins with the 
following day's return. So for turning points identified on 2"d February 1994,24th 
June 1994, and 20`h July 1995, for example, the daily price returns would be 
sorted into two trends running from the 3ro February 1994 to the 24"' June 1994 
inclusive and from the 25th June 1994 to the 20"' July 1995 inclusive. 
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Once the daily price return data has been sorted into trends, each trend is 
further segmented into quarters based on the total number of observations 
(trading days) within each trend. This enables a descriptive analysis of the 
features of stock market trends as they develop. 
A simple rule is used to ensure that each trend is segmented in a consistent 
manner. The number of daily returns in the trend is first divided into two, with 
the extra day (if the total is not divisible by two) allocated to the second half of 
the trend. The daily returns allocated to the first half of the trend are split into 
two, with the extra day (if applicable) allocated to quarter 2. The daily returns 
allocated to the second half of the trend are split into two, with the extra day (if 
applicable) allocated to quarter 3. Table 8.2 illustrates this process, showing 
the number of daily returns allocated to each quarter for trends of differing 
lengths. 
Table 8.2 Allocation of Trading Days to Trends 
Trend Length 
(Trading Days) 
Days Allocated to 
Quarter 1 
Days Allocated to 
Quarter 2 
Days Allocated to 
Quarter 3 
Days Allocated to 
Quarter 4 
96 24 24 24 24 
97 24 24 25 24 
98 24 25 25 24 
99 24 25 25 25 
100 25 25 25 25 
101 25 25 26 25 
102 25 26 26 25 
and so on 
The segmentation of the price return series for each of the 14 stock markets 
into trends and quarters of trends forms the basis for the analysis described in 
the following sections. 
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8.5 Analysis of Trends 
The objective of this part of the research is to examine the statistical properties 
of stock market returns in bull and bear trends and to consider the ways in 
which stock market trends differ from random trends based on the same 
empirical distribution of daily returns. As discussed in Section 8.1, the concept 
of continuation in medium-term stock market returns as a result of investor 
underreaction implies that stock market trends are more extreme in some way 
than random trends. 
Most previous studies of bull and bear stock market trends have restricted 
themselves to considering the mean duration and total amplitude of stock 
market trends. As discussed in Section 8.4, one advantage of the methodology 
used in this study is that it can be used with daily data without the need for 
modification. Whereas previous studies have identified turning points in market 
trends in terms of the month in which they occur, the daily data used in this 
study enables turning points to be identified to the day. This permits a finer 
analysis to be carried out of the statistical properties of returns within bull and 
bear trends. The statistics reported are in themselves simple; the main 
methodological difficulties lie in the implementation of the algorithm to identify 
turning points and the manipulation of the data to identify the daily returns to be 
included in each calculation. 
The average duration of trends is measured in terms of trading days. This 
enables a consideration of the first potential source of excessive trend 
behaviour highlighted in Section 8.2, that stock market trends simply continue 
for longer than random trends. The average total amplitude of trends 
(measured in percent of the trend's starting value) answers the question of 
whether trends continue "further" (amplitude) and well as going for "longer" 
(duration) than random trends. 
The daily average price return in bull and in bear trends is calculated for bull 
and bear trends as a whole and also in terms of the four quarters of each trend 
considered in Section 8.4.4. This addresses the issue of whether stock market 
trends are steeper in overall terms than random trends, and whether patterns 
occur in the steepness of bull and bear trends as they develop. 
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From here, the analysis moves on to consider the possible sources of patterns 
in the steepness of trends: patterns in the proportion of positive and negative 
daily returns and patterns in the relative absolute magnitude of positive and 
negative daily returns. In each case, statistics are reported for bull and bear 
trends both as a whole and individually for the four quarters of each. 
This analysis of the average duration and total amplitude of bull and bear 
trends, together with patterns in the steepness, clustering of positive and 
negative daily returns and relative size of positive and negative returns within 
trends, enables the three potential sources of excessive stock market trend 
behaviour identified in Section 8.2 to be specifically addressed. 
In addition, further statistics relating to the distributions of daily price returns in 
bull and bear trends are reported. The mean daily price return calculated earlier 
in the analysis is supplemented by the standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis of daily price returns both within bull and bear trends and also within 
the quarters of each trend. This enables a consideration of the way in which the 
distribution of daily price returns changes as stock markets move through bull 
and bear cycles. 
8.6 Statistical Inference 
The objective of this part of the research is to consider the extent to which 
trends in stock market data differ from random trends based on the same 
distribution of daily returns. 
To achieve this, a bootstrap methodology is employed in much the same way 
as described in Chapter 7. Trends in the original data sets are identified using 
the Fink and Pratt algorithm and the statistics described in Section 8.5 are 
calculated. For each data set, 4999 bootstrap price return series are generated 
by sampling with replacement from the original data, and these price return 
series are used to calculate 4999 simulated price index series for each of the 
14 stock markets which are the focus of this study. By applying the Fink and 
Pratt algorithm to each simulated price series and calculating the statistics of 
interest in exactly the same way as for the original data, an empirical sampling 
distribution is built up for each statistic. Bootstrap P-values are taken from 
these empirical sampling distributions using the percentile method as described 
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in Chapter 78` and used to test for significant deviations between the properties 
of trends in the original data and the mean of the empirical sampling distribution 
estimated from the bootstrap simulations. 
8.7 Summary 
Very little research has been published to date which specifically examines the 
properties of trends in financial market prices. Of the work that has been 
conducted, the use of a duration-based algorithm with monthly data has 
typically restricted the analysis to a simple examination of the most basic 
features of trends in stock market prices, namely their duration and total 
amplitude. 
This chapter describes the methodology employed in the current study to carry 
out a more detailed analysis of the statistical properties of returns in stock 
market trends. An amplitude-based algorithm from the information technology 
literature for identifying turning points in time series data is introduced and 
refined for use in identifying turning points in stock market data. This enables a 
finer analysis of the properties of stock market trends to be carried out than has 
been possible for previous research using monthly data, and also enables the 
calculation of the relevant test statistics for each of the phases of bull and bear 
trends. In addition, this study extends previous work on identifying the 
properties of stock market trends, introducing a bootstrap technique to consider 
the extent to which trends in stock market data are different from random 
trends. Trends are not specific to stock market prices and indeed can be 
observed in purely random data. As this chapter explains, it is the differences 
between stock market trends and random trends which are likely to shed light 
on the potential sources of predictability in stock market returns rather than the 
overall properties of stock market trends. 
Chapter 9 presents the results of the analysis conducted using the 
methodology described in this chapter. 
84 The relevant P-values for a two-tailed test at the 1% significance level are simply the 
25`h and 4974th ranked values from the bootstrap simulations. For a two-tailed test at 
the 5% significance level, the 125th and 4874th values are taken. MacKinnon (2002) 
provides an In-depth discussion of this approach. 
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Chapter 9 
Trend Analysis Results 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the statistical properties of 
stock market trends described in Chapter 8. 
Section 8.2 discusses three ways in which stock market trends may differ from 
random trends. These can be summarised as follows: 
" stock market trends may have longer duration and / or greater total 
amplitude than random trends 
" patterns in the steepness of stock market trends may occur as a result 
of bull and bear trends having, either overall or in particular stages of 
their development, different proportions of positive and negative daily 
price returns than random trends with the same empirical distribution of 
daily returns 
" patterns in the steepness of stock market trends may occur as a result 
of bull and bear trends having, either overall or in particular stages of 
their development, positive and negative daily price changes of higher 
or lower average magnitude than random trends with the same 
empirical distribution of daily returns 
The results discussed in Sections 9.2 through 9.8 investigate these issues in 
further depth. Section 9.2 discusses the duration and total amplitude of stock 
market trends. Section 9.3 considers the steepness of stock market trends. 
Sections 9.4 and 9.5 develop the analysis in Section 9.3 to consider the two 
individual sources of excessive steepness described above; Section 9.4 
examines the proportion of positive and negative daily price returns in bull and 
bear trends, whilst Section 9.5 compares the relative magnitude of positive and 
negative daily price returns in each. Sections 9.6 and 9.7 investigate further the 
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distribution of daily price changes through the different phases of bull and bear 
trends, building on the analysis in the earlier sections to consider the standard 
deviation and coefficients of skewness and kurtosis of daily price returns. 
Section 9.8 summarises. 
9.2 Duration and Total Amplitude of Stock Market Trends 
This section considers the mean duration (length) and amplitude (height) of 
trends identified in the price index series of each of the fourteen stock markets 
considered in this study. 
Table 9.1 shows the number of bull and bear trends found for each market, the 
average duration of these trends in trading days and their average amplitude 
expressed in percent of their starting level. 
The algorithm forces bull and bear trends to alternate, with the result that it is 
impossible to obtain a difference of more than one in the number of bull and 
bear trends in the original data or in any individual bootstrap run. 
The number of trends in the original data is similar to the number found on 
average in the bootstrap runs, with a slightly higher number of trends in the 
original data than the bootstrap in some countries (for example Canada and 
Switzerland) and slightly less in others (for example France and Spain). Only 
one observation, that for bear trends in the Hong Kong stock market, is 
significantly different from the bootstrap at the 5% significance level. 
Table 9.1 also shows the average duration of each trend, measured in terms of 
trading days. The original data shows a longer duration for bull trends than bear 
trends in all countries except Japan. A similar pattern emerges in the bootstrap, 
with bull trends longer than bear trends in all countries except Hong Kong and 
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Table 9.1 Duration and Amplitude of Stock Market Trends 
Number of Trends Duration (trading days) Total Amplitude (%) 
Bull Bear Bull Bear Bull Bear 
Australia 8.00 7.00 189.00 78.43 20.25% -14.34% 
8.39 8.42 152.25 107.30 21.35% -15.57% 
Belgium 13.00 14.00 103.54 60.93 22.53% -18.64% 
9.93 9.96 123.25 96.55 22.71% -17.95% 
Canada 12.00 12.00 112.67 71.50 22.44% -17,82% 
10.11 10.15 128.72 86.49 24.15% -17.15% 
Denmark 11.00 10.00 115.45 69.80 24.81% -18.03% 
8.89 8.91 143.47 102.35 25.77% -19.10% 
France 8.00 9.00 164.63 95.89 34.55% -26.19% 
9.85 9.87 121.13 99.90 29.41% -23.70% 
Germany 9.00 10.00 151.67 84.80 32.79% -26.98% 
10.52 10.52 108.13 99.58 29.29% -25.94% 
Hong Kong 13.00 14.00 85.23 80.64 31.56% -31.93% 
9.15 9.15 105.59 136.29 34.65% -3782% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 11.00 11.00 102.00 100.18 33.75% -27.22% 
9.15 9.15 136.91 104.27 36.53% -27.379,6 
Japan 7.00 6.00 133.14 190.00 27.19% -31.85% 
8.42 8.44 109.13 144.27 25.26% -28.69% 
Netherlands 9.00 9.00 172.78 58.44 31.24% -19.02% 
11.36 11.40 109.13 84.59 27.79% -21.61% 
Spain 8.00 8.00 158.88 117.25 37.02% -27.89% 
9.60 9.63 131.01 96.22 33.26% -24.60% 
Switzerland 12.00 11.00 125.83 59.91 25.58% -20.35% 
9.85 9.87 126.46 93.99 27.21% -20.68% 
UK 10.00 10.00 136.00 80.20 22.06% -18.67% 
10.18 10.17 111.53 103.10 21.88% -19.60% 
USA 10.00 11.00 136.00 75.36 25.93% -17.90% 
10.48 10.53 120.42 86.52 24.68% -17.98% 
Bootstrap average values are shown in Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown In the table as "SIG 1%", 
is based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5`" and 99.5' percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
Significance at the 5% level, shown In the table as "SIG 5%", is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.51' and 
97.5'" percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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Japan, reflecting the generally rising markets which are a characteristic of the 
time period in question. 
Previous studies have found a similar pattern in the relative length of bull and 
bear trends in stock market data. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) obtain an 
average duration for bull trends of 26 months and for bear trends of 18 months 
using data from 28 emerging and mature economies. Pagan and Sossounov 
(2003) find average durations for bull and bear trends of 25 and 17 months 
respectively using US stock market data. The actual durations found by these 
studies are very different to those reported here as a result of the different 
methodologies employed. The use of an unmodified Bry and Boschan 
algorithm identifies much longer-term trends than are the focus of this study. 
Nevertheless, the ratio of the lengths of bull and bear trends are comparable. 
The relative duration of bull to bear trends found by Kaminsky and Schmukler is 
1.44, with a similar ratio of 1.47 found by Pagan and Sossounov. In this study, 
the average ratio is 1.68, with values ranging from 0.70 (Japan) to 2.96 (the 
Netherlands). 
Whilst the difference between the average duration of trends in the original data 
and the bootstrap may appear large, none of the values from the original data 
is significantly different from the bootstrap average at the 5% significance level. 
This simply reflects a high degree of variance in the bootstrap runs. Given the 
lack of statistical significance of the trend duration statistics reported in Table 
9.1, the difference between the average duration of bull and bear trends in the 
original data is interpreted as being a simple function of generally rising stock 
market prices over the period covered by the data samples. 
The final two columns of Table 9.1 show the average total trough-to-peak 
amplitude of bull trends and peak-to-trough amplitude of bear trends, 
expressed as a percentage of the starting value. The values from the original 
data are very similar to the bootstrap average in all cases, with no significant 
differences at the 5% level. The average total amplitude of bull trends is greater 
than that of bear trends in absolute terms for most countries; again, this reflects 
the period of generally rising stock markets over the first five years of the data 
samples. 
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The stock market trends identified using the Fink and Pratt algorithm show no 
significant deviations from random trends in terms of their average duration or 
total amplitude. This suggests that stock market trends are not systematically 
longer or higher than random trends. 
The first possible source of predictability in stock market returns, that trends in 
stock market data continue for longer than implied by randomness (as a result 
of underreaction or betting on trends, for example) is therefore not supported 
by the data. Trends in the 14 stock market data sets considered in this study 
have mean durations and amplitudes which are consistent with random trends 
based on the same distribution of daily returns. Nevertheless, important 
patterns in the steepness of returns may exist within stock market trends in 
such a way as to produce continuation effects. Section 9.3 considers the 
existence of such patterns in the steepness of stock market trends. 
9.3 Steepness of Stock Market Trends 
The previous section shows that, on average, stock market trends do not 
appear to be longer or higher than random trends. This section goes on to 
consider the extent to which patterns may occur in the steepness of stock 
market trends. 
Table 9.2 shows the average price return for each trading day in bull and bear 
trends, together with the average for each phase within the trends. As 
discussed in Section 8.4.4, this simply involves splitting each trend identified 
into four quarters with equal duration. 
As one would expect, the overall average daily returns presented in the first two 
columns of the table are all positive for bull trends and all negative for bear 
trends. This is the case by definition as the algorithm is picking out periods of 
rising and falling prices respectively. 
For bull trends, the average daily return is lower than the bootstrap average for 
9 of 14 countries and significantly so at the 5% level in the case of the 
Netherlands. For bear trends, the average daily price return is more negative 
than the bootstrap average for all counties except Japan and Spain, and 
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Table 9.2 Mean Daily Price Returns in Stock Market Trends 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 Q1 02 03 04 
Australia 0.11% -0.18% 0.19% 0.09% 0.05% 0.11% -0.25% -0.02% -0.04% -0.43% 
0.14% -0.15% 0.19% 0.10% 0.10% 0.19% -0.21% -0.09% -0.09% -0.21% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Belgium 0.22% -0.31% 0.34% 0.10% 0.13% 0.29% -0.27% -0.17% -0.15% -0.64% 
0.19% -0.19% 0.25% 0.13% 0.13% 0.25% -0.27% -0.12% -0.12% -0.27% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 0.20% -0.25% 0.30% 0.18% 0.09% 0.23% -0.29% -0.19% -0.17% -0.34% 
0.19% -0.21% 0.25% 0.14% 0.14% 0.25% -0.29% -0.13% -0.13% -0.29% 
Denmark 0.21% -0.26% 0.27% 0.14% 0.15% 0.30% -0.25% -0.19% -0.22% -0.38% 
0.19% -0.20% 0.24% 0.13% 0.13% 0.24% -0.28% -0.12% -0.12% -0.27% 
France 0.21% -0.27% 0.32% 0.18% 0.17% 0.18% -0.29% -0.13% -0.08% -0.60% 
0.25% -0.25% 0.33% 0.18% 0.17% 0.33% -0.34% -0.15% -0.15% -0.34% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Germany 0.22% -0.32% 0.33% 0.13% 0.12% 0.29% -0.27% -0.19% -0.17% -0.65% 
0.28% -0.27% 0.37% 0.19% 0.20% 0.37% -0.37"/% -0.18% -0.17% -0.37% 
SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 0.37% -0.40% 0.63% 0.21% 0.22% 0.43% -0.39% -0.18% -0.20% -0.82% 
0.34% -0.29% 0.47% 0.22% 0.22% 0.46% -0.39% -0.19% -0.19% -0.38% 
SIG 1% 
Italy 0.33% -0.27% 0.51% 0.18% 0.10% 0.54% -0.32% -0.07% -0.17% -0.52% 
0.28% -0.27% 0.36% 0.19% 0.19% 0.36% -0.38% -0.16% -0.18% -0.38% 
SIG 5% 
Japan 0.20% -0.17% 0.36% 0.17% 0.11% 0.19% -0.16% -0.14% -0.11% -0.26% 
0.24% -0.21% 0.33% 0.15% 0.16% 0.33% -0.27% -0.14% -0.14% -0.28% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Netherlands 0.18% -0.33% 0.27% 0.12% 0.14% 0.20% -0.33% -0.15% -0.13% -0.71% 
0.26% -0.26% 0.34% 0.18% 0.19% 0.34% -0.37% -0.16% -0.17% -0.37% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% S101% 
Spain 0.23% -0.24% 0.36% 0.12% 0.15% 0.29% -0.24% -0.08% -0.22% -0.41% 
0.26% -0.27% 0.34% 0.18% 0.19% 0.34% -0.37% -0.16% -0.17% -0.37% 
Switzerland 0.20% -0.34% 0.36% 0.08% 0.14% 0.23% -0.35% -0.13% -0.07% -0.83% 
0.22% -0.23% 0.29% 0.16% 0.15% 0.29% -0.32% -0.14% -0.14% -0.31% 
S105% SIG 1% 
UK 0.16% -0.23% 0.29% 0.13% 0.11% 0.12% -0.28% -0.05% -0.10% -0.51% 
0.20% -0.20% 0.27% 0.14% 0.14% 0.27% -0.27% -0.13% -0.13% -0.27% 
SIG1% SIG1% 
USA 0.19% -0.24% 0.33% 0.14% 0.11% 0.18% -0.27% -0.02% -0.16% -0.50% 
0.21% -0.22% 0.27% 0.15% 0.15% 0.27% -0.30% -0.13% -0.14% -0.30% 
SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown in italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown in the table as "SIG 1 %", 
is based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5th and 99.5'h percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
Significance at the 5% level, shown in the table as "SIG 5W, is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5' and 
97.5th percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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significantly so for Switzerland at the 5% level and Belgium at the 1% level. 
Whilst these features suggest that overall, bull trends may be slightly more 
shallow than implied by randomness and bear trends slightly steeper, very few 
results are statistically significant based on the bootstrap test. 
An analysis of the mean daily price returns across the four quarters of bull and 
bear trends shows that for bull trends, there are few significant differences 
between the original data and the bootstrap values. If anything, the trends 
identified in the original data appear to be steeper than the bootstrap at the 
start of a bull trend but generally less steep over the third and fourth quarters of 
the trend. In the fourth quarter of bull trends, significant differences between the 
steepness of trends in the original and the bootstrap data are noted for 6 
countries. Of these, 5 have significantly shallower trends than the bootstrap (2 
at the 1% significance level and 3 at the 5% significance level). For Italy, 
conversely, the steepness in the original data is significantly higher than the 
bootstrap at the 5% level. 
Bear trends, on the other hand, do display significant deviations from 
randomness. In the fourth quarter, bear trends are significantly steeper than the 
bootstrap at the 1% level for 9 of the 14 countries considered. No clear 
differences between the original data and the bootstrap are apparent over the 
first three quarters of bear trends. 
Similar features have been identified by research into the properties of the 
business cycle. Lupi and Ordine (2001) note that economists have long 
recognised that economic variables display asymmetric behaviour over the 
cycle. Both Sichel (1994) and Harding and Pagan (2002) document rapid 
recovery in the early stages of business cycle expansions. Artis et al (1997) 
find that contractions are steeper than expansions. Such insights are not new. 
Indeed, Mitchell (1927, p290) states 
"Business contractions appear to be a briefer and more violent 
process than business expansions" 
An important feature of the mean daily returns in Table 9.2 is the symmetry in 
the bootstrap averages across the four quarters of bull and bear trends. The 
values for quarters 1 and 4 appear to converge to the same value, with the 
values for quarters 2 and 3 converging to a different (less extreme) value. 
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Further investigation reveals this to be a result of the algorithm used to identify 
turning points in the data. 
Consider the example of a turning point identified by the algorithm as an 
important minimum. In order for that particular point to have been identified as 
a turning point, the market must fall to that level without having reached a lower 
level, and then rise afterwards, again without reaching a lower level. This is 
most likely to occur immediately following sections in the data of steeply falling 
prices and/or immediately before sections of steeply rising prices. This 
likelihood is reflected in the bootstrap values, with trends slightly steeper 
around turning points than in their second and third quarters. 
The bootstrap values are consistent, with similar values for quarter 1 and 
quarter 4 in both bull and bear trends. This is as one would expect given that in 
random trends, although it is likely that turning points will occur at the beginning 
or end of steep sections of data, there is no reason why one should occur more 
frequently than the other. Similarly, there is no reason for any one source of 
steepness to outweigh another in the bootstrap data. This is reflected in Tables 
9.3 through 9.5, where similar patterns are seen in the proportion of positive 
daily price returns, the magnitude of positive daily price returns, and the 
magnitude of negative daily price returns. 
Bull and bear stock market trends do appear to differ significantly from random 
trends in terms of their steepness. This is particularly true of the final quarter of 
bear trends, which are significantly steeper than the trends found in a bootstrap 
analysis based on the same data sample. There is also some evidence to 
suggest that bull trends are significantly shallower than random trends in their 
final quarter. 
The following two sections go on to examine the potential sources of these 
differences in the steepness of stock market trends and random trends based 
on the same empirical distribution of daily price returns. Section 9.4 considers 
the proportion of positive and negative daily price returns within trends, whilst 
Section 9.5 compares the relative magnitudes of positive and negative daily 
price returns within trends. 
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9.4 Proportion of Positive and Negative Daily Price 
Returns 
One possible cause of the patterns in the steepness of stock market trends 
identified in the previous section is a greater degree of clustering of positive 
and negative daily changes than would be implied by randomness. For 
example, the very steep final quarter of bear market trends could be a result of 
a much higher proportion of negative daily returns (relative to positive daily 
returns) than is present in random trends based on the same empirical 
distribution of returns. This section explores that possibility, with Section 9.5 
going on to consider the second possibility that patterns in the steepness of 
stock market trends are caused instead by differences in the relative 
magnitudes of positive and negative daily price returns within trends. 
Table 9.2 shows the percentage of trading days within bull and bear trends, 
and within the four quarters of each, on which a positive price return is 
recorded. 
The percentage of negative daily price returns very closely reflects 100 per cent 
minus the percentage of positive daily returns (with the difference simply 
reflecting a very small number of zero daily returns'), and the proportion of 
negative daily price returns is therefore not separately reproduced for reasons 
of brevity. In all cases, where the percentage of positive changes is significant 
based on the bootstrap test, the percentage of negative changes is significant 
at the same level (1 % or 5%). 
The first two columns in Table 9.3 show the overall percentage of positive and 
negative daily price returns in bull and bear trends respectively. The proportion 
of positive price returns is always greater than 50 per cent for bull trends and 
less than 50 per cent or bear trends for both the original data and the bootstrap 
- this is as one would expect given that the algorithm identifies periods of 
generally rising prices as bull trends and periods of generally falling prices as 
bear trends. By definition, either the proportion of positive moves is above 50 
per cent in bull trends or the absolute magnitude of positive returns is greater 
85 The number of zero observations ranges from 0.0435% (Hong Kong) to 0.0500% 
(Japan) of the total number of observations for each data sample. 
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Table 9.3 Proportion of Positive Daily Price Returns 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 01 02 03 04 
Australia 55.36% 43.17% 54.79% 55.15% 55.12% 56.38% 38.52% 48.91% 46.81% 38.24% 
57.19% 43.21% 59.31% 54.94% 55.05% 59.55% 40.21% 46.19% 46.20% 40.13% 
Belgium 59.88% 38.92% 62.46% 56.51% 55.75% 64.88% 38.16% 40.74% 45.66% 30.81% 
57.76% 44.03% 60.14% 55.47% 55.39% 60.15% 41.29% 46.80% 46.82% 41.08% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Canada 60.36% 41.49% 62.76% 59.29% 54.81% 64.69% 40.48% 37.67% 46.36% 41.31% 
58.84% 44.61% 61.27% 56.48% 56.56% 61.12% 41.39% 47.67% 47.82% 41.40% 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 58.98% 40.40% 60.38% 56.43% 57.14% 62.03% 34.12% 39.77% 46.37% 41.04% 
56.91% 43.09% 59.18% 54.75% 54.64% 59.16% 40.08% 45.94% 46.03% 40.18% 
France 57.40% 42.41% 59-51% 55.59% 57.10% 57.45% 41.04% 46.54% 47.49% 34.42% 
57.92% 43.61% 60.54% 55.39% 55.39% 60.46% 40.58% 46.65% 46.49% 40.58% 
Germany 59.19% 40.92% 59.76% 56.27% 55.65% 65.19% 35.10% 41.59% 48.61% 38.10% 
59.10% 44.78% 61.59% 56.36% 56.72% 61.84% 41.93% 47.67% 47.66% 41.73% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Hong Kong 57.04% 41.10% 58.24% 50.90% 55.16% 64.00% 39.71% 44.56% 44.10% 35.84% 
56.40% 43.21% 59.09% 53.60% 53.70% 59.34% 40.96% 45.58% 45.37% 40.88% 
Italy 58.11% 41.74% 58.91% 53.19% 54.04% 66.43% 38.01% 46.76% 44.09% 37.96% 
56.19% 41.89% 58.64% 53.72% 53.79% 58.69% 38.82% 45.03% 44.62% 38.93% 
SIG 5% 
Japan 54.29% 41.84% 53.68% 55.36% 50.21% 58.01% 41.34% 41-61% 41.61% 42.81% 
55.00% 41.32% 58.05% 52.08% 52.12% 57.87% 39.07% 43.67% 43.48% 38.98% 
Netherlands 57.11% 40.87% 60.36% 55.27% 54.71% 58.14% 36.43% 49.25% 44.78% 32.56% 
58.23% 43.96% 60.77% 55.75% 55.81% 60.73% 40.93% 47.00% 46.83% 40.95% 
SIG 5% 
Spain 58.38% 43.07% 64.24% 56.74% 50.94% 61.71% 38.53% 49.36% 47.48% 36.75% 
57.87016 43.61% 60.26% 55.32% 55.66% 60.32% 40.64% 46.43% 46.56% 40.67% 
Switzerland 58.74% 40.82% 61.23% 53.58% 57.70% 62.50% 34.38% 46.67% 48.54% 33.13% 
58.71% 44.77% 61.05% 56.44% 56.43% 61.03% 42.02% 47.65% 47.57% 41.70% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK 57.79% 43.64% 58.63% 57.18% 56.40% 59.00% 40.10% 50.99% 46.08% 37.19% 
59.03% 44.54% 61.64% 56.60% 56.49% 61.49% 41.67% 47.25% 47.39% 41.75% 
USA 58.90% 41.38% 60.65% 59.24% 56.14% 59.59% 35.96% 47.85% 45.07% 38.27% 
58.26% 43.78% 60.56% 55.99% 55.99% 60.59% 40.72% 46.93% 46.74% 40.59% 
Bootstrap average values are shown In Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown In the table as "SIG 1 %", 
is based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5 h and 99.5' percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
Significance at the 5% level, shown in the table as "SIG 5%", Is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5'h and 
97.5"" percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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than that of negative returns, or (more likely) both. A similar argument applies 
for bear trends. 
There are no significant differences between the proportion of positive daily 
price returns in the original data and the bootstrap for bull trends. For bear 
trends, the original data has a significantly lower proportion of positive returns 
(that is to say a higher proportion of negative returns) than the bootstrap for 
only three countries at the 5% level (Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland). 
The results for the individual quarters of bull and bear trends show no clear 
patterns. Very few significant results are reported, and no clear pattern is 
observed in the significant results obtained. 
Differences in the proportion of positive and negative daily price returns 
between stock market and random trends are not, therefore, able to explain the 
patterns in the steepness of trends identified in Section 9.3, most notably the 
extreme steepness of the fourth quarter of stock market bear trends relative to 
random trends. 
9.5 Magnitude of Positive and Negative Daily Price 
Returns 
The second possible source of patterns in the steepness of stock market trends 
relative to random trends relates to the relative absolute magnitudes of positive 
and negative daily price returns. If bull trends are characterised by positive 
daily returns that are larger than implied those in random trends based on the 
same empirical distribution of daily returns and/or negative daily price returns 
that are smaller (more negative), for example, then the resulting trends will tend 
to be steeper than random trends. This will be the case even if the duration of 
the trend and the proportion of positive and negative daily returns are not 
significantly different to those of random trends. 
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 show the average positive and negative daily price returns 
respectively for bull and bear trends and the four quarters of each. 
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Table 9.4 Mean Positive Price Returns In Stock Market Trends 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 at 02 03 04 
Australia 0.66% 0.61% 0.84% 0.63% 0.55% 0.61% 0.48% 0.66% 0.65% 0.62% 
0.68% 0.57% 0.70% 0.67% 0.67% 0.70% 0.55% 0.59% 0.59% 0.56% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Belgium 0.74% 0.69% 1.02% 0.60% 0.61% 0.70% 0.67% 0.67% 0.71% 0.69% 
0.80% 0.64% 0.83% 0.78% 0.78% 0.83% 0.61% 0.66% 0.66% 0.61% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 0.73% 0.77% 0.87% 0.68% 0.68% 0.70% 0.78% 0.79% 0.77% 0.73% 
0.81% 0.66% 0.83% 0.79% 0.78% 0.83% 0.63% 0.68% 0.67% 0.63% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Denmark 0.78% 0.67% 0.87% 0.68% 0.68% 0.88% 0.75% 0.66% 0.61% 0.69% 
0.84% 0.70% 0.86% 0.82% 0.82% 0.86% 0.67% 0.73% a71% 0.67% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
France 0.97% 0.97% 1.13% 0.89% 0.96% 0.91% 0.68% 0.96% 1.09% 1.14% 
1.07% 0.88% 1.10% 1.05% 1.04% 1.10% 0.85% 0.90% 0.90% 0.85% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Germany 0.96% 1.13% 1.19% 0.86% 0.85% 0.92% 0.99% 1.01% 1.26% 1.23% 
1.13% 0.93% 1.17% 1.10% 1.10% 1.16% 0.89% 0.95% 0.96% 0.89% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 1.33% 1.11% 1.72% 1.31% 1.14% 1.15% 0.97% 1.16% 1.28% 0.99% 
1.40% 1.07% 1.46% 1.33% 1.33% 1.45% 1.04% 1.11% 1.11% 1.03% 
SIG 1% 
Italy 1.29% 1.05% 1.60% 1.13% 1.19% 1.22% 1.04% 1.12% 1.03% 1.00% 
1.28% 1.06% 1.31% 1.25% 1.24% 1.31% 1.03% 1.09% 1.10% 1.03% 
SIG 1% 
Japan 1.01% 0.94% 1.37% 0.97% 0.92% 0.80% 0.85% 0.77% 1.12% 1.03% 
1.09% 0.89% 1.13% 1.05% 1.05% 1.12% 0.86% 0.91% 0.91% 0.86% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Netherlands 0.90% 0.84% 1.09% 0.80% 0.90% 0.79% 0.73% 0.78% 0.85% 1.05% 
1.06% 0.83% 1.10% 1.02% 1.02% 1.09% 0.80% 0.86% 0.85% 0.79% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 1.00% 1.18% 1.13% 0.79% 1.05% 1.01% 1.04% 1.04% 1.21% 1.46% 
1.15% 0.94% 1.18% 1.12% 1.12% 1.17% 0.91% 0.97% 0.97% 0.91% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% S101% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 0.81% 0.88% 1.04% 0.71% 0.74% 0.73% 0.65% 0.90% 0.98% 0.95% 
0.92% 0.73% 0.95% 0.90% 0.89% 0.94% 0.70% 0.76% 0.75% 0.71% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
UK 0.75% 0.74% 0.95% 0.73% 0.67% 0.65% 0.61% 0.74% 0.72% 0.92% 
0.84% 0.68% 0.87% 0.82% 0.81% 0.86% 0.66% 0.71% 0.71% 0.66% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
USA 0.76% 0.91% 0.90% 0.68% 0.71% 0.75% 0.94% 0.74% 0.99% 1.01% 
0.88% 0.70% 0.91% 0.85% 0.85% 0.90% 0.67% 0.72% 0.72% 0.67% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown In Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown In the table as "SIG 1 %", 
is based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5'" and 99.5' percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
Significance at the 5% level, shown In the table as "SIG W. Is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5' and 
97.5th percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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Table 9.5 Mean Negative Price Returns in Stock Market Trends 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 01 02 03 04 
Australia -0.58% -0.79% -0.60% -0.59% -0.58% -0.55% -0.71% -0.66% -0.65% -1.08% 
-0.58% -0.71% -0.57% -0.60% -0.60% -0.57% -0.73% -0.68% -0.68% -0.73% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Belgium -0.58% -0.95% -0.81% -0.58% -0.48% -0.46% -0.88% -0.76% -0.89% -1.24% 
-0.66% -0.86% -0.64% -0.69% -0.69% -0.63% -0.90% -0.82% -0.82% -0.90% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada -0.62% -0.98% -0.66% -0.54% -0.63% -0.65% -1.03% -0.79% -0.98% -1.11% 
-0.69% -0.91 % -0.67% -0-71% -0.71% -0.67% -0.95% -0.87% -0.86% -0.94% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Denmark -0.62% . 0.89% -0.68% -0.57% -0.56% -0.67% -0.77% -0.75% -0.93% -1.13% 
-0.70% -0.89% -0.68% -0.72% -0.72% -0.67% -0.93% -0.85% -0.85% -0.92% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
France -0.82% -1.19% -0.88% -0.72% -0.88% -0.80% -0.96% -1.09% -1.15% -1.51% 
-0.88% -1.11% -0.85% -0.91% -0.91% -0.85% -1.15% -1.07% -1.07% -1.15% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Germany -0.87% -1.33% -0.95% -0.82% -0.80% -0.91% -0.96% -1.05% -1.52% -1.83% 
-0.96% -1.25% -0.93% -1.00% -0.99% -0.93% -1.29% -1.21% -1.19% -1.29% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong -0.91% -1.45% -0.89% -0.94% -0.92% -0.86% -1.29% -1.26% -1.38% -1.84% 
-1.03% -1.33% -0.98% -1.07% -1.08% -0.97% -1.38% -1.28% -1.28% -1.37016 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Italy -1.02% -1.23% -1.07% -0.94% -1.18% -0.85% -1.17% -1.12% -1.15% -1.46% 
-1.03% -1.26% -1.01% -1.06% -1.06% -1.00% -1.30% -1.21% -1.22% -1.29% 
SIG 5% 
Japan -0.77% -0.98% -0.83% -0.83% -0.72% -0.68% -0.87% -0.81% -1.00% -1.27% 
-0.81% -0.99% -0.78% -0.84% -0.84% -0.78% -1.02% -0.96% -0.96% -1.01% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Netherlands -0.79% -1.14% -0.99% -0.76% -0.80% -0.63% -0.95% -1.07% -0.93% -1.56% 
-0.87% -1.14% -0.84% -0.90% -0.89% -0.83% -1.19% -1.08% -1.09% -1.19% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain -0.85% -1.32% -1.02% -0.75% -0.79% -0.87% -1.06% -1.18% -1.52% -1.52% 
-0.97% -1.22% -0.94% -1.01% -1.00% -0.94% -1.26% -1.17% -1.17"x° -1.26% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% S105% 
Switzerland -0.66% -1.19% -0.72% -0.65% -0.69% -0.59% -0.88% -1.06% -1.07% -1.70% 
-0.78% -1.01% -0.75% -0.80% -0.81% -0.75% -1.06% -0.97"/ -0.96% -1.05% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
UK -0.64% -0.99% -0.66% -0.68% -0.61% -0.63% -0.87% -0.88% -0.80% -1.36% 
-0.72% -0.91% -0.69% -0.75% -0.74% -0.69% -0.94% -0.88% -0.88% -0.94% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
USA -0.63% -1.05% -0.55% -0.64% -0.66% -0.66% -0.95% -0.73% -1.11% -1.37% 
-0.72% -0.93% -0.70% -0.75% -0.75% -0.70% -0.97% -0.89% -0.89% -0.96% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown in italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown in the table as "SIG 1%", 
is based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5'h and 99.5'" percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
Significance at the 5% level, shown in the table as "SIG 5%", is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5th and 
97.5th percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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The first two columns of Table 9.4 show the average positive daily price return 
in bull and bear trends overall. For bull trends, the average positive return is 
significantly lower than the bootstrap at the 1% level for 8 countries (Canada, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA) 
and the 5% level for 2 countries (Belgium and Denmark). For bear trends, the 
average positive daily price return is significantly higher than the bootstrap at 
the 1% level for 5 countries (Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the 
USA) and at the 5% level for 2 countries (France and the UK). 
Table 9.4 also shows the average positive daily price return for each of the 
quarters of bull and bear trends. 
For bull trends, there is limited evidence to suggest that in the first quarter of 
the trend, the average positive daily return is high, with the values obtained 
significantly in excess of the bootstrap values for 3 countries at the 1% level 
(Australia, Belgium and Italy) and one at the 5% level (Japan). The average 
positive return is smaller than the bootstrap throughout the remainder of the 
trend for all countries with the single exception of Denmark in the fourth 
quarter, with the difference significant for 9 countries in the second quarter (7 at 
the 1% level and 2 at the 5% level), 8 countries in the third quarter (5 at the 1% 
level and 3 at the 5% level) and 12 countries in the fourth quarter (8 at the 1% 
level and 4 at the 5% level). 
For bear trends, the pattern is less clear. A consideration of the significant 
deviations from the bootstrap reveals that whilst the pattern is mixed for quarter 
1 (2 countries significantly larger than the bootstrap, one at the 1% level and 
one at the 5% level, and one significantly smaller than the bootstrap at the 5% 
level) and quarter 2 (one country significantly smaller than the bootstrap at the 
5% level), the results are consistent for quarters 3 and 4. For the third quarter 
of bear trends, the average positive daily price return is significantly high for 6 
countries (5 at the 1% level and 1 at the 5% level). For the fourth quarter, the 
average positive daily price return is significantly high for 8 countries (7 at the 
1% level and 1 at the 5% level). 
Patterns in the magnitude of positive price returns in bull trends do appear to 
contribute to the differences in the steepness of stock market trends relative to 
random trends identified in Section 9.4. Large positive daily returns in the 
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second half of bear trends, however, run contrary to the evidence in Section 
9.4, where bear trends are seen to become excessively steep in the fourth 
quarter. In order to reconcile these two results, negative price returns in the 
fourth quarter of bear trends must exceed the bootstrap by a sufficient amount 
to more than offset the impact of large positive daily returns. 
Table 9.5 shows the average daily negative price returns in bull and bear 
trends. 
For bull trends, the pattern in the first quarter is again somewhat different from 
that observed in the remainder of the trend. In the first quarter, no clear picture 
emerges. In the second, third, and fourth quarters, the average daily negative 
daily price return is less extreme than the bootstrap with the sole exceptions of 
Italy in the third quarter and Denmark in the fourth. The difference between the 
original data and the bootstrap is significant for 7 countries in the second 
quarter (3 at the 1% level and 4 at the 5% level), 5 countries in the third quarter 
(3 at the I% level and 2 at the 5% level) and 4 countries in the fourth quarter (2 
at the 1% level and 2 at the 5% level). 
For bear trends, a clear pattern emerges. Overall, the average negative daily 
price return is larger than the bootstrap for most countries. An analysis of the 
pattern across the four quarters of bear trends reveals that negative returns are 
typically less extreme than the bootstrap in quarters 1 and 2 (with significant 
differences for 2 countries at the 1% level and 5 countries at the 5% level in 
quarter 1, and 2 countries at the 5% level in quarter 2), and more extreme in 
quarters 3 and 4. Significant differences between the average negative daily 
price return and the bootstrap value are found for only 3 countries in quarter 3 
(all at the 1% level), but for 12 of the 14 stock markets considered in quarter 4 
(10 at the 1% level and 2 at the 5% level). 
Section 8.2 introduced three possible explanations for the profitability of 
momentum strategies based on the characteristics of stock market trends. 
Sections 9.2 and 9.3 identified that extreme trend behaviour is based on 
patterns in the steepness of trends rather than their overall duration or 
amplitude. Section 9.4 ruled out patterns in the proportions of positive and 
negative daily price returns as the source of these patterns in trend steepness. 
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This section has identified the relative magnitude of positive and negative daily 
price returns in bull and bear trends as a potential source of the patterns 
identified in Section 9.3 in the overall steepness of the trends, particularly as 
regards the extreme steepness observed in the fourth quarter of bear trends. 
9.6 Standard Deviation of Daily Price Returns 
Table 9.6 shows the mean standard deviation of daily price returns in bull and 
bear trends and the four quarters of each. 
The average values from the bootstrap runs are consistent across the four 
quarters of each trend for all countries. This is as one would expect given that 
trends in the bootstrap data are generated by random sampling from the 
original data. For most countries, the bootstrapped standard deviation of daily 
price returns is slightly higher for bear trends than bull, reflecting the positive 
mean and median daily returns present in most of the data samples and 
presented in Table 5.1. For countries such as Japan, with negative mean and 
median returns, a slightly higher standard deviation of daily returns is observed 
in bull trends than in bear trends. 
For bull trends, the overall standard deviation of daily price returns is lower than 
the average value from the bootstrap runs for all fourteen stock markets, with 
the difference significant at the 1% level for ten countries. 
In quarter 1 of bull trends, the standard deviation of daily price returns is higher 
than the bootstrap average for all countries except Denmark and the USA, with 
the difference significant at the 5% level for 4 countries. 
For quarters 2 through 4, the standard deviation of daily price returns from the 
original data is lower than the bootstrap average in all cases except Australia in 
quarter 2 and Italy in quarter 3. The differences are significant for ten countries 
in quarter 2 (9 at the 1% level and one at the 5% level), eleven countries in 
quarter 3 (8 at the 1% level and 3 at the 5% level), and ten countries in quarter 
4 (8 at the 1% level and 2 at the 5% level). 
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Table 9.6 Standard Deviation of Daily Price Returns 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 01 02 03 04 
Australia 0.81% 0.93% 0.95% 0.83% 
0.72% 0.74% 0.76% 0.83% 0.81% 1.21% 
0.83% 0.86% 0.82% 0.83% 0.82% 0.82% 0.87% 0.85% 0.84% 0.86% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Belgium 0.93% 1.16% 1.29% 0.77% 0.76% 0.77% 0.99% 1.01% 1.18% 1.35% 
1.05% 1.05% 1.06% 1.04% 1.04% 1.05% 1.07% 1.04% 1.04% 1.06% 
SIG 1% S105% SIG 5% S1G 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
91% 0 1 25% 1.04% 0.81% 0.83% 0.92% 1.33% 1.13% 1.26% 1.27% Canada . . 
1.03% 1.12% 1.03% 1.03% 1.02% 1.02% 1.14% 1.09% 1.07% 1.13% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% S1G 1% SIG 1% 
Denmark 0.92% 1.07% 1.01% 0.84% 0.81% 1.01% 0.92% 0.96% 1.03% 1.31% 
1.03% 1.09% 1.03% 1.03% 1.03% 1.03% 1.10% 1.07% 1.07% 1.09% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
18% 1 1 48% 1.38% 1.04% 1.17% 1.10% 0.99% 1.36% 1.65% 1.76% France . . 
1.32% 1.36% 1.32% 1.32% 1.32% 1.31% 1.36% 1.34% 1.34% 1.36% 
SIG 1% S101% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
21% 1 1.69% 1.46% 1.13% 1.06% 1.16% 1.18% 1.35% 1.95% 2.06% Germany . 
1.44% 1.51% 1.44% 1.44% 1.43% 1.43% 1.52% 1.50% 1.48% 1.52% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
72% 1 1.82% 2.12% 1.74% 1.55% 1.36% 1.53% 1.72% 1.80% 2.10% Hong Kong . 
1.82% 1.74% 1.86% 1.77% 1.77% 1.83% 1.76% 1.72% 1.71% 1.74% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Italy 1.49% 1.51% 1.73% 
1.26% 1.54% 1.37% 1.39% 1.41% 1.47% 1.73% 
1.51% 1.52% 1.51% 1.51% 1.50% 1.50% 1.52% 1.51% 1.52% 1.52% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
20% 1 1.29% 1.52% 1.16% 1.08% 0.98% 1.14% 1.07% 1.44% 1.46% Japan . 
1.28% 1.24% 1.29% 1.27% 1.27% 1.28% 1.24% 1.24% 1.24% 1.23% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
14% 1 40% 1 1.46% 1.00% 1.13% 0,91% 1.15% 1.23% 1.19% 1.85% Netherlands . . 
1.36% 1.40% 1.37% 1.36% 1.35% 1.36% 1.42% 1.37% 1.37% 1.41% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
23% 1 1.64% 1.52% 1.00% 1.19% 1.15% 1.25% 1.42% 1.82% 1.97% Spain . 
1.42% 1.45% 1.42% 1.42% 1.41% 1.41% 1.46% 1.43% 1.43% 1.45% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% S101% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 1.04% 1.44% 1.30% 
0.93% 0.91% 0.94% 1.06% 1.28% 1.37% 1.81% 
1.20% 1.24% 1.21% 1.20% 1.19% 1.20% 1.26% 1.22% 1.20% 1.26% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
UK 0.95% 1.15% 1.10% 0.99% 
0.84% 0.83% 0.91% 1.02% 1.00% 1.53% 
1.05% 1.09% 1.05% 1.05% 1.05% 1.05% 1.10% 1.08% 1.08% 1.09% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
USA 0.97% 1.33% 1.06% 0.94% 0.92% 0.94% 1.24% 0.94% 1.45% 1.58% 
1.11% 1.14% 1.12% 1.11% 1.11% 1.11% 1.15% 1.12% 1.12% 1.14% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown In Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown In the table as "SIG 1 %", 
is based on a two-tailed test using the 0.51h and 99.5'" percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
Significance at the 5% level, shown In the table as "SIG 5%", is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5'" and 
97.51h percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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Overall, therefore, bull trends are characterised by a significantly high standard 
deviation of returns in the initial stages of the trend, followed by a significantly 
low standard deviation of returns through the remainder of the trend. 
For bear trends, the overall standard deviation of daily price returns is higher 
than the bootstrap average for all countries except Denmark, Italy, and the 
Netherlands, with the difference significant at the 1% level for 5 countries and 
at the 5% level for a further 2 countries. 
In quarter 1 of bear trends, the standard deviation of daily price returns from the 
original data is lower than the bootstrap average for all countries except 
Canada and the USA, with the difference significant at the 1% level for 4 
countries and the 5% level for a further 3 countries. In quarter 2, the standard 
deviation of daily price returns is lower than the bootstrap average for all 
countries with the exception of Canada, France, and Switzerland, although the 
difference is only significant for 2 countries at the 5% significance level. 
In quarter 3 of bear trends, the standard deviation of daily price returns from the 
original data is higher than the bootstrap average in 9 of the 14 stock markets 
considered, with the difference significant at the 1% level in 5 cases. 
The most salient feature of the standard deviation of daily price returns in bear 
trends occurs in quarter 4, where the standard deviation from the original data 
exceeds the bootstrap value for all fourteen countries considered, and the 
differences are significant for 10 countries at the 1% level and a further 3 at the 
5% level. 
Overall, therefore, bear trends are characterised by a generally low standard 
deviation of returns in the initial stages of the trend, increasing in the third 
quarter with a particularly high standard deviation of daily price returns 
observed in quarter 4. 
The results presented in Table 9.6 demonstrate an asymmetric pattern of 
volatility present in different stages of bull and bear trends. Previous research 
has identified a relationship between volatility and market returns, although the 
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empirical results are somewhat conflicting86. In general, studies tend to find that 
lower volatility is associated with high market returns rather than low market 
returns. Wu (2001), for example, notes that the phenomenon of asymmetric 
volatility is most apparent during market crashes when significant increases in 
volatility tend to occur. The results presented in this section indicate that 
increases in market volatility may not be confined to market crashes but may 
be a general feature of the latter stages of market downturns. 
Two main explanations have been put forward in the literature for asymmetric 
volatility in stock market returns: 
" Leverage Effects (Christie, 1982) 
If the price of a stock drops, its financial leverage increases. This 
increases the risk associated with the stock, hence its price volatility 
also increases. In other words, negative return shocks increase 
volatility. 
A related argument is that of time-varying risk premia. If the risk 
premium of a stock increases (this might occur as a result of an 
expected increase in volatility), prices must fall to increase the expected 
return to investors in line with the increased risk premium. In other 
words, positive shocks to volatility result in negative shocks to returns. 
" Volatility Feedback Effects (French et al, 1987) 
News entering the market in relation to a given stock, whether good or 
bad, increases uncertainty in relation to that stock and thus its price 
volatility. Volatility is persistent, hence news has an impact on both 
current and future expected volatility. The rate of return required by 
investors increases as a result of higher volatility (risk), and prices 
therefore fall. 
In the case of good news, the effect of the news is to raise prices, and 
the effect of volatility feedback is to lower them. Volatility feedback 
dampens the positive impact of news on prices and lowers volatility. 
86 Bekaert and Wu (2000) provide a review of this literature. 
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In the case of bad news, the effect of volatility feedback is to accentuate 
the fall in price caused by the bad news, thus increasing volatility. 
The analysis presented in this section indicates that the volatility of daily returns 
follows a clear pattern through the bull and bear trend cycle. Volatility is high in 
the initial stages of bull trends, and low throughout the rest of the trend. In the 
initial stages of bear trends, volatility is low but increases dramatically in the 
final stages of the trend. 
These results are not consistent with the leverage theory of asymmetry in stock 
market volatility. Volatility does not fall steadily as bull markets progress and 
rise steadily in bear markets as might be expected if leverage effects alone 
were the driving force behind asymmetries. 
The results presented in this section may, however, be considered to be 
broadly supportive of volatility feedback theories of asymmetric volatility. Low 
volatility in bull markets and correspondingly high volatility in bear markets is 
observed. In addition, volatility feedback may explain the apparent spill-over of 
low volatility into the first quarter of bear trends and high volatility into the first 
quarter of bull trends. Volatility feedback alone, however, may not be sufficient 
to explain the large increases in volatility observed during the final stages of 
bear trends. 
9.7 Skewness and Kurtosis 
Table 9.7 shows the coefficient of skewness for daily price returns in bull and 
bear trends and the four quarters of each. The calculation of these coefficients 
is described in Chapter 5. 
The first two columns in Table 9.7 show the average coefficient of skewness for 
bull and bear trends overall. Not surprisingly given that bull trends are periods 
of rising prices and bear trends periods of falling prices, returns are positively 
skewed in bull trends and negatively skewed in bear trends (with the exception 
of Spain where very slightly positive overall skewness is reported for bear 
markets). 
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Table 9.7 Skewness of Price Returns In Stock Market Trends 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear Q1 02 03 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Australia 0.12 -0.86 0.60 -0.30 -0.25 -0.31 0.35 0.24 0.27 -0.68 
0.14 -0.68 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.09 -0.53 -0.47 -0.49 -0.45 
Belgium 0.86 -0.41 0.85 -0.04 0.23 0.20 0.05 -0.18 -0.12 0.45 
0.64 -0.60 0.66 0.42 0.42 0.65 -0.53 -0.46 -0.45 -0.54 
SIG 5% 
Canada 0.27 -0.63 0.45 -0.08 -0.15 0.08 -0.90 -0.43 -0.47 -0.28 
0.22 -1.10 0.22 0.09 0.11 0.22 -0.93 -0.84 -0.83 -0.90 
Denmark 0.01 -0.47 -0.04 0.02 -0.21 -0.28 0.12 0.04 -0.18 -0.47 
0.10 -0.63 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.51 -0.48 -0.53 -0.49 
France 0.04 -0.09 0.22 0.14 -0.37 -0.27 0.22 -0.02 -0.07 0.33 
0.31 -0.49 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.26 -0.40 -0.39 -0.38 -0.40 
SIG 5% 
Germany 0.18 -0.32 0.26 0.43 -0.25 -0.32 0.41 -0.21 0.29 -0.48 
0.31 -0.65 0.28 0.17 0.16 0.23 -0.60 -0.55 -0.50 -0.58 
SIG 5% 
Hong Kong 1.78 -0.67 1.78 2.08 1.25 0.16 0.02 -0.49 0.32 -1.04 
1.50 -0.69 1.43 0.95 0.92 1.33 -0.73 -0.49 -0.48 -0.71 
Italy 0.31 -0.33 0.31 0.09 0.15 -0.18 0.08 -0.01 -0.17 -0.44 
0.24 -0.26 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.16 -0.11 -0.17 -0.17 -0.13 
Japan 0.59 0.06 0.94 -0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.23 -0.54 0.30 0.29 
0.58 -0.10 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.43 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 
Netherlands 0.08 -0.35 0.09 0.17 -0.32 0.16 -0.04 0.47 -0.52 0.75 
0.47 -0.73 0.47 0.31 0.33 0.46 -0.63 -0.57 -0.58 -0.65 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.16 -0.35 0.29 -0.10 -0.06 0.27 
0.26 -0.43 0.22 0.15 0.19 0.20 -0.29 -0.30 -0.34 -0.30 
SIG 5% 
Switzerland 1.04 -0.77 1.17 0.19 -0.11 1.65 -1.21 -0.40 0.05 0.45 
0.59 -0.85 0.61 0.39 0.37 0.58 -0.79 -0.67 -0.65 -0.73 
SIG 5% 
UK 0.21 -0.39 0.54 -0.29 0.08 -0.12 0.20 -0.23 0.10 0.06 
0.21 -0.53 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.15 -0.44 -0.40 -0.43 -0.45 
USA 0.46 -0.15 1.18 -0.27 0.02 0.16 -0.13 -0.29 0.14 0.28 
0.40 -0.59 0.38 0.28 0.28 0.34 -0.45 -0.43 -0.41 -0.45 
SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown In Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown In the table as "SIG 1%", 
is based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5"' and 99.5th percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
Significance at the 5% level, shown In the table as "SIG 5%", is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5" and 
97.5'" percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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The coefficients of skewness reported reflect the properties of returns within 
trends identified throughout this chapter. In bull trends, for example, Sections 
9.2 and 9.4 identify a higher proportion of positive price returns than negative 
price returns, and that the average absolute size of positive returns is greater 
than that of negative returns. This is reflected in a positive coefficient of 
skewness in Table 9.7. 
For bull trends, a number of countries show levels of skewness which, although 
positive, are much lower than the bootstrap values (Australia, France and 
Germany for example). The differences, however, are not statistically 
significant. For bear trends, daily price returns for most countries are less 
negatively skewed than the bootstrap, but are significant in only two cases, 
both at the 5% level (France and Spain). 
Lower absolute levels of skewness than the bootstrap values may indicate that 
extreme events in the direction of the underlying trend play a less important 
role in the formation of stock market trends than is the case for random trends. 
This might be the case, for example, if market participants underreact to news 
which confirms the current trend, for example. 
Table 9.7 also shows the coefficients of skewness calculated for each of the 
four quarters of bull and bear trends respectively. 
For bull trends, the only significant difference between the skewness of trends 
in the original data and the bootstrap lies in the first phase of bull trends for the 
US stock market, where the skewness coefficient from the original data is 
significantly in excess of the bootstrap average at the 1% level. It is interesting 
to note that daily price returns in each market display negative skewness for at 
least one of the four quarters. Of the fourteen markets considered, 1 has 
negative skewness in the first quarter, 6 in the second, 7 in the third, and 7 in 
the fourth. 
For bear trends, the coefficient of skewness is significantly higher (less 
negative) than the bootstrap average (and is in fact positive) for Germany in the 
first quarter (at the 5% level), the Netherlands in the second (at the 1% level), 
and Belgium and Switzerland (at the 5% level) together with the Netherlands 
(at the 1% level) in the fourth quarter. The daily price returns in each market 
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display positive skewness for at least one of the four quarters. Of the fourteen 
markets considered, 9 have positive skewness in the first quarter, 3 in the 
second, 7 in the third, and 8 in the fourth. 
Table 9.8 shows the coefficient of kurtosis for daily price returns in bull and 
bear trends and the four quarters of each. The calculation of these coefficients 
is described in Chapter 5. The coefficients of kurtosis calculated from the 
original data are typically smaller than the bootstrap values, although few of the 
differences are statistically significant. Few significant results are reported other 
than for the first quarter of bear trends, where the kurtosis of daily price returns 
is significant for 7 of the 14 countries considered. 
Bai and Ng (2001) consider the sampling distributions for the coefficients of 
skewness and kurtosis in serially correlated data. Using Monte Carlo analysis, 
they demonstrate that the test statistic for skewness is accurate for large 
sample sizes (where 200 observations is considered to be large). The test 
statistic for kurtosis, on the other hand, is heavily biased for finite sample sizes. 
The true value of kurtosis is generally underestimated and very large sample 
sizes are required to generate reasonable results. On the basis of the Monte 
Carlo analysis, the authors conclude that even with 5000 observations, kurtosis 
cannot be accurately estimated from serially correlated data. 
This study uses between 2222 and 2296 observations for each data sample. 
On the basis of Bai and Ng's research, one would expect the coefficients of 
skewness calculated using the bootstrap methodology to have acceptable 
power, although the bootstrapped kurtosis values should be treated with 
caution. 
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Table 9.8 Kurtosis of Price Returns in Stock Market Trends 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 01 02 03 04 
Australia 5.42 7.94 5.82 5.25 3.59 4.11 3.16 2.85 2.55 8.57 
5.25 7.18 5.17 4.95 4.99 4.85 7.11 6.08 6.14 6.59 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Belgium 9.19 5.19 7.62 4.71 6.27 5.40 4.12 5.43 5.64 4.73 
7.98 5.93 8.01 7.37 7.35 7.95 5.57 5.98 6.11 5.65 
Canada 5.79 7.64 5.85 5.42 3.77 6.36 9.81 9.26 6.55 5.26 
6.26 8.63 6.15 6.28 6.08 5.96 8.27 7.77 7.74 8.06 
SIG 5% 
Denmark 4.40 5.56 4.05 4.89 4.12 4.35 3.70 5.26 3.99 5.85 
5.35 5.62 5.30 5.21 5.26 5.25 5.65 5.34 5.56 5.39 
France 4.53 5.88 5.11 3.70 3.74 3.46 2.60 3.95 6.27 5.37 
5.65 5.29 5.64 5.50 5.50 5.61 5.16 5.33 5.21 5.22 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Germany 5.30 5.75 5.41 5.24 3.79 4.58 3.07 4.33 5.47 4.31 
6.28 5.90 6.32 6.10 6.05 6.18 5.70 5.85 5.85 5.82 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 17.28 7.45 16.12 22.13 10.73 4.82 4.13 8.63 4.32 9.11 
14.24 8.55 13.30 10.89 10.65 12.65 8.07 7.96 7.84 8.05 
SIG 5% 
Italy 4.59 4.57 4.51 2.70 4.13 5.72 3.00 3.14 4.74 5.29 
4.51 4.66 4.59 4.49 4.38 4.39 4.68 4.50 4.53 4.71 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Japan 6.09 5.53 5.85 3.88 4.41 5.72 4.85 6.59 6.24 4.03 
5.62 5.01 5.66 5.29 5.30 5.56 4.91 5.00 4.93 4.88 
Netherlands 5.98 6.47 5.58 3.85 5.75 3.96 6.02 5.31 5.35 5.84 
6.71 6.53 6.68 6.61 6.60 6.56 6.42 6.50 6.49 6.32 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 5.74 4.75 6.97 3.94 3.48 3.14 2.69 4.01 4.55 4.53 
5.10 5.21 5.07 5.08 5.02 5.04 5.15 5.12 5.09 5.15 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 10.08 5.87 8.41 7.65 4.15 16.30 14.22 4.17 4.19 4.67 
8.25 7.11 8.21 7.70 7.61 8.17 6.92 6.88 6.78 6.76 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
UK 5.53 4.86 5.38 5.62 4.32 4.40 3.20 3.31 3.94 4.27 
5.31 5.48 5.33 5.21 5.22 5.19 5.43 5.40 5.45 5.36 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
USA 6.40 5.58 7.75 5.72 4.64 5.36 5.55 4.01 5.55 4.86 
5.84 6.43 5.70 5.77 5.81 5.72 6.30 6.12 6.08 6.18 
Bootstrap average values are shown in Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown In the table as "SIG 1 
is based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5"' and 99.5"' percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
Significance at the 5% level, shown In the table as "SIG 5%", Is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5" and 
97.5th percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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9.8 Summary 
The analysis described in this chapter reveals a number of features which 
clearly differentiate trends in stock market data from trends in random data with 
the same distribution of daily returns. A clear understanding of the ways in 
which stock market trends differ from random trends may shed some light on 
which, if any, of the theories of stock market continuation and reversal effects 
proposed in the literature are important factors in the predictability of stock 
market returns 
Stock market trends are not significantly different from random trends in terms 
of their duration or total amplitude. Overall, bull trends appear to be slightly 
shallower and bear trends slightly steeper than random trends, although the 
differences are typically not statistically significant. 
Clear patterns are, however, observed in the steepness of different phases of 
bull and bear trends. The fourth quarter of bull trends is somewhat shallow, 
whilst the fourth quarter of bear trends is particularly steep relative to random 
trends based on the same distribution of daily returns. These patterns are not 
accounted for by the proportion of positive and negative daily price returns 
present in bull and bear trends and the four quarters of each. Rather, patterns 
in the absolute size of positive and negative daily returns through the bull-bear 
stock market cycle appear to drive the observed differences in the steepness of 
trends. 
Positive daily price returns are relatively high in the first quarter of bull trends 
but low throughout the remainder of the trend, whilst negative daily price 
returns are significantly smaller in quarters 2 through 4 than is the case for 
random trends. The resulting standard deviation of daily price returns is high, 
relative to that found in random trends, in quarter 1 but low in quarters 2 
through 4. 
Positive daily price returns are relatively large in the second half of bear trends, 
whilst negative daily price returns are relatively small in the first half but large 
(more negative) in the second half of bear trends. The standard deviation of 
daily price returns is low in the first half but high in the second half, and 
particularly so in the final quarter, of bear trends. 
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Overall, therefore, bull trends are steep and volatile in their initial phase largely 
as a result of large positive daily price returns. Later, both positive and negative 
daily returns become smaller (that is to say, negative returns become less 
negative) than is the case for random trends, and volatility falls. The first half of 
bear trends is characterised by small negative daily changes resulting in low 
steepness and volatility. As the trend progresses, both positive and negative 
daily price returns increase in size (that is to say, negative returns become 
more negative) and volatility increases markedly. 
Patterns in the steepness of bull and bear trends may help to explain some of 
the excess returns to short-term momentum trading strategies documented by 
previous research. Bull trends are steepest in their first quarter for 12 of the 14 
stock markets considered in this study. It is therefore possible that cross- 
sectional studies using standard methodologies similar to that of Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) identify winner portfolios that are biased towards stocks at 
the beginning of a bull trend. Bear trends, on the other hand, are generally 
steepest in their final quarter, hence it may be the case that studies identify 
loser portfolios which are biased towards identifying stocks at the end of a bear 
trend. The length of formation and test periods used, together with the trend 
behaviour of the underlying market, may influence the observed returns to 
winner and loser portfolios. 
Chapter 10 builds on this analysis by considering which, if any, of the 
behavioural biases and alternative theories proposed in the literature and 
examined in Chapters 2 and 3 is capable of explaining the patterns in the 
profitability of momentum trading strategies documented in Chapter 7 and the 
particular features of stock market trends described in this chapter. 
244 
Chapter 10 
Main Findings and Interpretation 
10.1 Introduction 
The research documented in this thesis has two main objectives. Firstly, a time 
series approach is implemented to consider the empirical evidence of 
continuation and reversal effects in the returns of 14 major stock markets. This 
first part of the research examines to what extent anomalies, in the words of 
Fama (1998, p283), "tend to disappear with reasonable changes in technique". 
The second main objective of the research documented in this thesis is to 
examine the potential causes of continuation and reversal effects in financial 
market returns. One of the main limitations of the existing literature is that, 
although an extensive menu of possible behavioural and non-behavioural 
causes of continuation and reversal effects has been identified, the empirical 
methodologies used to identify such effects in returns often do not allow the 
researcher to differentiate clearly between these possible causes. As Chapter 8 
discusses, findings of continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns 
imply that stock market trends have properties which differ systematically from 
those of random trends based on the same empirical distribution of daily 
returns. The current study therefore aims to draw some broad conclusions 
regarding the possible causes of continuation and reversal effects in stock 
market returns by examining the statistical properties of stock market trends. 
This chapter revisits the empirical results presented in Chapters 7 and 9, and 
considers the implications of these results in the light of the possible 
behavioural and alternative explanations proposed in the literature and 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Section 10.2 discusses the findings of the study of momentum strategy 
profitability described in Chapters 7 and 8. A review is provided of the main 
findings of this part of the research, and the consistency of these findings with 
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those of previous research is considered. Finally, the implications of the results 
of this part of the research for market efficiency are discussed. 
Section 10.3 goes on to consider the results of the study of the properties of 
stock market trends documented in Chapters 8 and 9. Again, the main findings 
are summarised and their consistency with the results of previous research is 
discussed. 
Section 10.4 brings together the results of the two parts of the research and 
discusses ways in which empirical findings of continuation and reversal effects 
in stock market returns may be linked to the properties of stock market trends. 
Sections 10.5 and 10.6 consider, in turn, the possible contribution to the 
empirical results of the current study of the behavioural and alternative 
explanations proposed in the literature and reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Section 10.7 then considers in more detail the possible role of loss aversion in 
driving the observed patterns in stock market trends. Section 10.8 discusses 
suggestions for further research, and Section 10.9 summarises. 
10.2 Study of Momentum Strategy Profitability 
10.2.1 Main Findings 
The research documented in Chapters 6 and 7 examines the extent to which 
continuation and reversal effects are present in the 14 stock market indices 
which are the focus of the current study. Momentum trading strategies are 
constructed which buy the relevant stock market index following a market rise 
and sell following a market fall. For each momentum strategy, a corresponding 
contrarian strategy can be defined which buys the index following a market fall 
and sells following a rise in the market. Significant momentum profits are 
therefore evidence of continuation effects in returns, whilst significant 
momentum losses (significant profits to the corresponding contrarian strategy) 
are interpreted as evidence of reversal effects in returns. This section 
summarises the main results of this part of the research. 
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Evidence of continuation effects in returns is found over periods of one trading 
day, with positive cumulative returns generated by the one day momentum 
trading strategies for thirteen of the fourteen countries considered (the 
exception being Germany). In many cases, these returns are economically 
substantive (the one trading day strategy for Belgium, for example, generates a 
cumulative return of 128.36% over the eight year data sample), and returns are 
statistically significant based on the bootstrap test in four cases (Belgium and 
Canada at the 1% level, and Hong Kong and Switzerland at the 5% level). 
Although at first sight, the returns to the one trading day strategies may appear 
attractive, an examination of returns by calendar year reveals that returns are 
not consistent over time. On average, the one trading day strategies generate 
positive returns for between 3 and 8 of the 8 years in the data sample, with a 
mean of 5.71 years of positive returns and a median of 6 years. 
One important feature of the returns to the one day momentum strategies 
examined in the current study is that the returns to long positions appear to 
make a greater contribution to overall returns than do the returns to short 
positions. Long positions generate a positive contribution to overall cumulative 
returns for all 14 countries and the long-only returns are significant in 8 cases 
(5 at the 1% level and 3 at the 5% level). Short positions generate positive 
cumulative returns for 10 of the 14 countries considered, although these returns 
are significant in only two cases. 
The standard deviation of daily returns to the one trading day strategies is 
significantly high based on the bootstrap test for all 14 countries considered, 
and the Sharpe ratio is significant in only two cases (Belgium and Canada). 
Overall, therefore, the one trading day strategies tend to produce high returns, 
although the standard deviation of returns is high and returns may therefore 
simply reflect compensation for the increased risk of the momentum strategy 
over a passive investment in the relevant index. 
Over 2 through 5 trading days, no clear patterns emerge in the returns to 
momentum strategies and strategies appear to be profitable as often as they 
are unprofitable. For the 2 trading day strategy, for example, positive returns 
are achieved for 6 of the 14 countries considered, with cumulative returns 
ranging from -74.61 % (the Netherlands) to 80.72% (Belgium). Only 2 strategies 
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of the 56 considered (2,3,4, and 5 trading day strategies for each of the 14 
countries) produce significant cumulative returns based on the bootstrap test 
(1 at the 1% level and I at the 5% level). This is approximately the number of 
significant results one would expect to occur by chance alone from 56 
observations. 
An examination of returns by calendar year shows that returns to the 2 through 
5 trading day strategies vary considerably from year to year in much the same 
way as for the one trading day strategies. Long-only returns are generally 
positive and short-only returns negative, although as in the case of the overall 
cumulative returns for these strategies, few of these returns are statistically 
significant. 
The standard deviations of daily returns to the 2 through 5 trading day 
strategies are significantly high in the same way as for the one trading day 
strategies, and the Sharpe ratio is significant for only one of the 56 strategies 
(the 2 day strategy for Belgium, whose Sharpe Ratio of 0.73 is significantly 
greater than the bootstrap value of 0.01 at the 5% significance level). 
In summary, therefore, the 2 through 5 trading day strategies do not appear to 
generate significant cumulative returns over the period covered by the data 
samples and no particular features of the returns stand out for further analysis. 
Over 10 through 252 trading days, the momentum strategies considered tend 
to produce positive cumulative returns, although these are not generally 
statistically significant based on the bootstrap test. Of the 84 strategies 
considered in this section (6 strategies for 14 countries), 64 produce positive 
cumulative returns. The principal exception to the rule is Australia, where the 
cumulative return to each of the 10,21,42,63,126 and 252 trading day 
strategies is negative. Fifteen strategies generate significant cumulative returns 
(6 at the 1% level and 9 at the 5% level). 
In common with the shorter strategies, the returns to the 10 through 252 trading 
day strategies are inconsistent from year to year, and the positive overall 
returns tend to be driven exclusively by high long-only returns, with the short- 
only returns often negative. Nevertheless, although the standard deviations of 
returns to the 10 through 252 trading day strategies tend to be significantly high 
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and only 10 of the 84 strategies have Sharpe ratios which are significantly in 
excess of the bootstrap values (3 at the 11% level and 7 at the 5% level). 
The main features of the results of this part of the research which are revisited 
later in this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
" Evidence of continuation over one trading day, possibly as a result of 
nonsynchronous trading 
" no significant continuation or reversal effects over 2 through 5 trading 
days 
9 limited evidence of continuation over periods ranging from 10 through 
252 trading days driven by returns to long positions. 
Section 10.2.2 considers the extent to which these findings are consistent with 
the results of previous research into continuation and reversal effects in stock 
market returns. 
10.2.2 Consistency with the Results of Prior Research 
Chapter 4 provides a review of studies of continuation and reversal effects in 
stock market returns. 
In the short-term, the current study finds evidence of continuation over periods 
of one trading day, with a lack of any significant effects over periods ranging 
from 2 through 5 trading days. 
For single stock data, most studies of short-term continuation and reversal 
effects in stock market returns have tended to find evidence of reversal for 
losers (see, for example, Bremer and Sweeney, 1991 and Akhigbe et al, 
1998). For winners, the picture is less clear. Howe (1986), for example, reports 
evidence of continuation for winners over periods of one week. Atkins and Dyl 
(1990), on the other hand, find that winners generate small negative returns 
over 1 though 7 days following the initial price event. 
The evidence from studies which consider stock market index data is mixed. 
Lasfer et al (2003), for example, find evidence of continuation for both winners 
and losers, with returns to winners increasing (and returns to losers 
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correspondingly decreasing) monotonically over 1 through 10 days following 
the initial price event. Schnusenberg and Madura (1998) find similar evidence 
of continuation for winners, but mixed results for losers. Ratner and Leal (1999) 
report no significant findings for winners whilst for losers, continuation is 
reported for some indices and reversal for others. 
The lack of consistency in the results of previous studies of short-term 
continuation and reversal effects makes a direct comparison with the results of 
the current study difficult. The pattern of results reported in this study is not fully 
consistent with any of the previous studies in isolation, although it should be 
noted that neither are the results of any of the previous studies fully consistent 
with one another. 
In the medium-term, the current study finds very limited evidence of significant 
continuation effects over periods of 10 through 252 trading days. Positive 
overall returns are driven by very high returns to long positions, with negative 
positions typically contributing negative returns. This could be considered 
analogous to findings of continuation for winners and reversal for losers within 
a traditional cross-sectional research approach. 
Most previous studies of medium-term effects in stock market returns use a 
standard cross-sectional methodology together with stock-level data, and find 
evidence of significant continuation effects (see, for example, Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993, and Rouwenhorst, 1998). Findings of medium-term continuation 
effects in the current study appear at first sight to be consistent with the results 
of prior research, although a question mark remains over the role of long and 
short positions in generating these returns. Whilst previous research has 
tended to suggest that both long (winner) and short (loser) positions make a 
positive contribution to overall returns, the results of the current study suggest 
that overall returns are driven by the returns to long positions, with short 
positions contributing negative (although non-significant) returns. 
In the long-term, studies tend to find evidence of significant reversals in returns 
over periods ranging from 2 years to 5 years (see, for example, De Bondt and 
Thaler, 1985). The results of these studies are generally consistent, although 
some authors find that reversal effects disappear when risk is controlled for. 
Allen and Prince (1995), for example, find evidence of reversals in returns in 
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line with those identified by previous studies, but note that continuation effects 
are instead identified when time varying risk is accounted for by re-estimating 
market model betas using the approach suggested by Chan (1988). Similarly, 
Forner and Marhuenda (2000) find that reversals disappear when risk is 
controlled for. The issue of time-varying risk is revisited later in this chapter. 
Section 10.2.3 goes on to consider the implications for market efficiency and 
market rationality of the results of the current study in terms of momentum 
strategy profitability. 
10.2.3 Implications for Market Efficiency and Market 
Rationality 
The returns to momentum trading strategies described in Chapter 7 and 
summarised in Sections 10.2.1 through 10.2.3 do not appear to contradict the 
concepts of weak-form market efficiency and market rationality for the 14 stock 
market indices considered. 
Weak-form market efficiency requires that investors cannot make money by 
trading on past prices alone. Whilst a number of the trading strategies 
considered generate returns which appear to be economically substantive (the 
1 trading day strategy for Belgium, for example, generates a return of 128.36% 
over the 8 year data sample), not all of the strategies produce such attractive 
returns (the 2 trading day strategy for France, for example, produces a 
cumulative loss of 68.61%). 
For momentum strategies of this type to be appealing to investors, they must 
offer the expectation of consistent profit. This might be the case if a range of 
momentum strategies were shown to work particularly well on a particular 
market, for example. Alternatively, a particular strategy specification might work 
well across a range of stock markets. This does not appear to be the case for 
the strategies considered in the current study. 
Figure 10.1 shows the number of strategies, of a total of eleven, which 
generate significant positive cumulative returns for each country. For four 
countries, no strategy produces significant returns based on the bootstrap test. 
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For a further three countries, only one strategy produces statistically positive 
returns. Four countries enjoy statistically positive returns for 2 strategies, two 
for 3 strategies, and one for 4 strategies. No data set generates positive returns 
for more than 4 of the 11 momentum trading strategies considered. 
Figure 10.2 examines the returns to momentum trading strategies of specific 
length across stock markets. The most consistently profitable strategies are the 
1 trading day strategy, which generates significant positive cumulative returns 
based on the bootstrap test for 4 of the 14 countries considered, and the 252 
trading day strategy, which produces a significantly positive cumulative return 
for 5 countries. For the remaining strategy specifications, no more than 3 of the 
14 data sets produce significant cumulative returns based on the bootstrap test. 
In particular, an analysis of the risk-return characteristics of the momentum 
strategies considered reveals that very few have Sharpe ratios significantly in 
excess of the bootstrap values. That is to say, even those strategies which do 
generate significant excess returns may not do so on a risk-adjusted basis. In 
addition, as shown in Appendix C, the returns to individual strategies vary 
considerably from year to year and even strategies which appear attractive 
based on the cumulative returns or Sharpe ratios over the 8-year data sample 
may not prove attractive when considered over shorter investment horizons. 
These initial results suggest that investors are not leaving a free lunch on the 
table. That is to say, they are not failing to exploit significant and consistent 
excess returns. Although individual anomalies may occur, such as a tendency 
towards momentum profits over horizons between 10 and 252 trading days, 
these effects are not sufficiently consistent to imply that the market behaves 
irrationally in failing to exploit them. 
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Figure 10.1 Momentum Strategy Results by Country 
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10.3 Analysis of the Properties of Price Trends 
10.3.1 Main Findings 
The second part of the research documented in this thesis uses an algorithm 
from the information technology literature (Fink and Pratt, 2004) to date turning 
points in price trends in the 14 stock market index data sets which form the 
basis of this study. The statistical properties of returns within bull and bear 
trends and four phases of each are then considered. A number of features are 
identified which clearly differentiate trends in stock market data from trends in 
random data based on the same distribution of daily returns. 
Whilst stock market trends are not significantly different from random trends in 
terms of their duration or total amplitude, patterns are observed in the 
steepness of different phases of bull and bear trends, in the magnitude of 
positive and negative price returns through bull and bear trends, and in the 
standard deviation of those price returns. Table 10.1 provides a summary of 
these patterns. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 9, although trends in the 14 stock market 
indices which are the focus of the current study do not appear to have longer 
duration or total amplitude that random trends based on the same empirical 
distribution of daily returns, patterns are observed in both the steepness of 
trends as they develop and also in the standard deviation of daily price 
changes within trends. 
Bull trends tend to be shallow in their final quarter. The steepness of bear 
trends does not differ significantly from the bootstrap over the first three 
quarters of the trend. The final quarter of bear trends, however, is steeper than 
the bootstrap value for all countries except Japan, and significantly so for 9 
countries at the 1% level. 
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Table 10.1 Summary of Patterns Identified in Stock Market Trends 
011 02 
Bull 
03 04 01 
Bear 
02 03 04 
Steepness Low High 
Standard Deviation 
High? Low Low Low Low High? High 
of Returns 
Positive Returns High? Low Low Low High? High 
Negative Returns Low Low? Low? Low High 
Note: The table shows the main pauern ui reswrs iUerrunieu across rnd i' swcr' 
market indices which are considered in this study, identified by a significant 
result at the 5% level for more than 6 of the 14 countries considered. A 
question mark denotes that only between 4 and 6 significant results were 
recorded. Blank cells in the table indicate that no clear pattern is identified in 
the results (three or less significant results). 
Patterns are also observed in the standard deviation of daily price returns 
through the bull-bear cycle, with a significantly high standard deviation of 
returns in the second half of bear trends and first quarter of bull trends. Again, 
the fourth quarter of bear trends appears to be particularly extreme, with the 
standard deviation of daily price returns significantly high based on the 
bootstrap test for 9 of the 14 countries considered at the 1% level and a further 
4 countries at the 5% level. 
Patterns in the magnitude of positive and negative price changes through the 
bull-bear cycle appear to drive these observed patterns in the steepness of 
trends and in the volatility of price returns. This can be observed with reference 
to the examples provided in Table 10.2 for the UK data sample87. 
87 No one data sample fully reflects all of the general features identified across the 14 
data sets and summarised in Table 10.1. The UK results, for example, do not exhibit 
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Table 10.2 Summary Results for the UK Data Sample 
01 
Bull 
02 03 04 01 
Bear 
02 03 04 
Steepness 0.29% 0.13% 0.11% 0.12% -0.28% -0.05% -0.10% -0.51 % 
(mean daily price 0.27% 0.14% 0.14% 0.27% -0.27% -0.13% -0.13% -0.27% 
return) SIG 1% SIG 1% 
1.10% 0.99% 0.84% 0.83% 0.91% 1.02% 1.00% 1.53% Standard Deviation 
1.05% 1.05% 1.05% 1.05% 1.10% 1.08% 1.08% 1.09% 
of Returns SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
0.95% 0.73% 0.67% 0.65% 0.61% 0.74% 0.72% 0.92% 
Positive Returns 0.87% 0.82% 0.81% 0.86% 0.66% 0.71% 0.71% 0.66% 
SIG 5% S101% SIG 1% 
-0.66% -0.68% -0.61 % -0.63% -0.87% -0.88% -0.80% -1.36% 
Negative Returns -0.69% -0.74% -0.74 % -0.69% -0.94 % -0.88 % -0.88 % -0.94% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Note: Figures in italics are the mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs. "SIG 
1 %" and "SIG 5%" denote significance at the 1% level and 5% levels 
respectively based on the bootstrap test. 
There is some evidence to suggest that in the first quarter of bull trends, 
positive price returns are significantly higher than those found in random trends 
with the same empirical distribution of daily returns. Throughout the remainder 
of the bull trend, positive price returns tend to be significantly lower than the 
bootstrap values. Negative price changes tend to be significantly low through 
quarters 2,3, and 4 of the bull trend. The combination of these patterns in the 
magnitude of positive and negative price returns results in bull trends may be 
responsible for the observation that bull trends tend to be significantly shallow 
in their fourth quarter. 
the same steepness in quarter 1 of bull trends seen for other countries such as Hong 
Kong or Italy. In addition, quarter 3 of bear trends is not as steep for the UK data as, for 
example, Denmark or Spain. 
256 
For bear trends, no clear patterns in the magnitude of positive daily returns are 
observed in the first half of the trend, although positive returns are significantly 
larger than the bootstrap in quarter 4 for most countries. Negative daily returns 
are typically less extreme than the bootstrap in quarter 1 and more extreme in 
quarter 4. These patterns result in bear trends which are significantly steeper 
than the bootstrap average in their fourth quarter. Whilst the standard 
deviations of daily returns is low in the first quarter of bear trends, it is 
significantly high in quarter 4. 
The main features of the results of this part of the research which are revisited 
later in this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
" Stock market trends are not significantly long (duration) or high 
(amplitude) 
" Patterns occur in the steepness of trends through the bull-bear cycle. 
o Bull trends are steepest at the beginning, becoming more 
shallow thereafter 
o Bear trends become extremely steep in their final stages 
" Patterns occur in the volatility of price returns within trends 
o High volatility of returns in steep sections of trends, combined 
with low volatility of returns in shallow sections 
" These effects appear to be driven by the changing distribution of daily 
price returns, reflected in the mean positive and negative daily returns, 
through the bull-bear cycle. 
One of the major challenges for the different explanations of continuation and 
reversal effects proposed in the literature and described in Chapters 2 and 3 is 
therefore to explain the ways in which stock market trends appear to differ 
significantly from random trends based on the same distribution of daily returns. 
In particular, any successful explanation of continuation and reversal effects in 
financial market returns should be consistent with the observed patterns in the 
magnitude of positive and negative price returns through the bull-bear cycle. 
257 
Section 10.3.2 considers the extent to which the findings of the current study, 
summarised in this section, are consistent with the findings of previous 
research. 
10.3.2 Consistency with the Results of Prior Research 
Previous studies have examined the features of stock market trends using 
algorithms based on the approach of Bry and Boschan (1971) and regime- 
switching models based on the work of Hamilton (1989). 
As Chapter 8 discusses, only a very limited amount of work has been published 
in this field, and the use of monthly data by most of these studies means that 
they have been unable to carry out an analysis of the basic properties of stock 
market trends to the same level of detail as that reported in the current study. 
One feature of the results of most previous studies is that bull trends last for 
longer than bear trends. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001), for example, report 
that bull trends last for 26 months on average whilst bear trends last for only 18 
months. Similarly, Pagan and Sossounov (2003) report average durations of 25 
months for bull trends and 17 months for bear trends respectively. 
One of the main findings of the current study is that, although bull trends do last 
for longer than bear trends, this does not appear to be one of the features that 
differentiates stock market trends from random trends. Bull trends are also 
longer than bear trends on average across 4999 bootstrap runs generated by 
sampling with replacement from the original daily price returns of the 14 data 
sets which are the focus of the current study. 
The current study concludes that the excess duration of bull trends over bear 
trends observed in most prior research is simply a result of data samples 
characterised by rising stock prices. When considering the possible causes of 
continuation and reversal effects in returns, however, the important features are 
likely to be those which systematically differentiate trends in actual stock 
market data from trends in random data with the same overall distribution of 
daily returns. 
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The current study considers data samples covering the years 1993 to 2002. 
This is in contrast to many of the previous studies, which use much longer data 
samples. Gonzalez et al (2005, forthcoming), for example, consider trends in 
the US stock market over the period 1800 through 2001. 
Although the results of previous studies may not provide the same depth of 
analysis as the current study as a result of their use of monthly rather than daily 
data, potentially important observations can be drawn by considering 
subsections of the long periods of data on which they are commonly based. 
Pagan and Sossounov (2003) consider a data sample covering the US market 
from 1835 to 1997. Over time, Pagan and Sossounov observe that bull trends 
become longer and stronger whilst bear trends become shorter and weaker. In 
addition, the deviation of trends from a straight line increases through the data 
sample. These results tend to indicate that the specific features of stock market 
trends may have been increasing, rather than decreasing, over the very long- 
term. 
This provides an immediate contrast to many of the market microstructure 
theories of continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns, such as 
bid-ask bounce and non-synchronous trading, whose effects are postulated to 
reduce over time as market liquidity increases. In addition, the findings of 
Pagan and Sossounov may relate in some way to those of studies of 
momentum strategy profitability using very long data samples. Chen and Sauer 
(1997), for example, report patterns in the long-term profitability of the 5-year 
contrarian strategy of buying past losers and selling past winners with the 
strategy generating negative returns in the mid to late 1930s, very high returns 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and very low returns from the mid 1940s to 
the mid 1950s. 
An important challenge for any successful theory of stock market continuation 
and reversal effects is therefore to explain not only how patterns in the 
magnitude of positive and negative daily returns occur through the bull-bear 
cycle, but also to explain how it could be, as suggested by previous research, 
that such effects appear to be non-stationary over time. 
Sections 10.2 and 10.3 have summarised the findings of each of the main 
sections of the research documented in this thesis, and discussed the 
consistency of these findings with those of the existing literature. Section 10.4 
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considers how the results of the two parts of the research may be related, that 
is to say, how the properties of stock market trends may contribute to the 
profitability of momentum trading strategies. 
10.4 Stock Market Trends and Momentum Strategy 
Profitability 
Chapter 8 describes how the existence of continuation and reversal effects in 
stock market returns implies that stock market trend behaviour is systematically 
different from that of random time series based on the same distribution of daily 
returns. 
This section considers the relationship between stock market trends and 
continuation and reversal effects in returns in the light of the results presented 
in Chapter 9. It is possible that stock market trend behaviour may be at least 
partly responsible for findings of continuation and reversal effects in the existing 
literature. 
Patterns in stock market trend behaviour may influence both the results of the 
existing literature and also the results of the study of momentum strategy 
profitability described in Chapters 6 and 7. That is not to say that the results of 
any of these studies are necessarily invalid. Rather, this section attempts to 
reconcile, in simple terms, the properties of returns that such studies may in 
fact be measuring. Figure 10.3 illustrates the typical pattern of the stock market 
bull-bear cycle. 
As illustrated in Figure 10.3, the part of the bull/bear cycle with the highest 
mean returns is the first phase of the bull trend, whilst that with the lowest 
mean returns is the final phase of the bear trend. Studies based on a cross- 
sectional methodology and single stock data typically form winner portfolios 
based on the best-performing decile of stocks over a specified formation 
period. Given the stock market trend behaviour shown in Figure 10.3, it is likely 
that these studies will be biased towards identifying winner stocks that are in 
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the initial phases of a bull trend. If this is the case, then these stocks will 
continue to perform well over the test period, and studies are likely, therefore, 
to find evidence of continuation for winners. Similarly, loser portfolios are likely 
to be biased towards identifying stocks that are in the final stages of a bear 
trend, and studies might therefore be expected to find evidence of reversal 
among losers. 
Previous cross-sectional studies of medium-term continuation and reversal 
effects have tended to find evidence of continuation for both winners and losers 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, and Rouwenhorst, 1998, for example). Whilst 
the above analysis may help to explain findings of continuation for winners, 
therefore, it is not at first sight able to explain similar findings of continuation for 
losers. 
The analysis does, however, provide a close fit to the results of the study of 
momentum strategy profitability described in Chapters 6 and 7. The 
methodology adopted in the current study identifies periods of high and low 
returns in time series data rather than portfolios of winning and losing stocks in 
a cross-sectional approach. As previously discussed, the properties of stock 
market trends may bias the results of the first part of the research towards 
findings of continuation for winners (long positions) and reversal for losers 
(short positions) in the medium-term. This is indeed the pattern identified in the 
first part of the research for the 10 through 252 trading day strategies. 
The properties of medium-term stock market trends considered in the current 
study do not explain the findings of continuation over one trading day or the 
lack of significant continuation or reversal effects over 2 through 5 trading days, 
however. It is possible that very short term effects are driven by separate 
factors to those driving stock market trend behaviour. Market microstructure 
arguments, for example, could explain findings of momentum returns (or lack of 
returns) in the very short-term which do not appear to be reflected in the 
properties of medium-term stock market trends. Alternatively, very short-term 
trends (which combine to make up medium-term trends) might have different 
properties to the medium-term trends considered in the current study. 
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The next two sections go on to consider which, if any, of the possible 
behavioural and non-behavioural alternative arguments proposed in the 
literature and discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 might be responsible for the 
empirical findings of the current study. 
10.5 Consistency with Behavioural Explanations 
The main features of the empirical results of the current study can be 
summarised as follows: 
" Very limited evidence of one-day and 10 through 252 day continuation 
effects is identified by the study of momentum strategy profitability, and 
" There is evidence of patterns in the steepness and volatility of stock 
market trends. As discussed in the previous section, these are 
hypothesised to be responsible for the findings of medium-term 
momentum strategy profitability in the current study. 
This section considers the extent to which these empirical findings are 
consistent with the principal behavioural explanations proposed in the literature 
and reviewed in Chapter 2. Specifically, this section discusses the potential 
impact of mental accounting, representativeness, availability, anchoring, 
overconfidence, aversion to loss, and aversion to ambiguity on market returns 
and considers the extent to which the results of this study are consistent with 
each. 
10.5.1 Mental Accounting 
Mental accounting describes the way in which investors view different portions 
of wealth independently. A portfolio of stocks designed as an investment for 
retirement provision is likely to be treated very differently to a day trading 
account held for the purposes of entertainment and short-term gain, for 
example. 
Mental accounting does not in itself provide an explanation for empirical 
findings of continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns. It does, 
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however, help to explain why such effects might differ across markets. For 
example, a blue-chip stock which is widely held by large institutions such as 
pension funds can be expected to behave differently to a small stock traded 
speculatively. Differences in the trend behaviour of individual stocks may 
therefore shed further light on the factors driving patterns in stock market 
trends. Mental accounting is revisited in Section 10.8 where suggestions are 
given for further research based on the findings of the current study. 
10.5.2 Representativeness, Availability and Anchoring 
The representativeness, availability, and anchoring heuristics are rules of 
thumb used by individuals to simplify decision-making situations. As described 
in this section, all three heuristics can be expected to have the same effect on 
stock market trend behaviour, and as such they are considered together. 
Under representativeness, investors simplify decision-making or prediction 
scenarios by considering the extent to which they are stereotypical of known 
situations. A period of rising prices, for example, might be considered to be 
representative of a bull (rising) trend, in which case investors will expect similar 
price changes in the future. The use of the representativeness heuristic can be 
expected to result in a tendency to "chase the trend" with expectations of future 
price changes formed on the basis of past returns. 
The availability heuristic describes how individuals may estimate the probability 
of events according to their salience, that is to say, the ease with which similar 
events can be brought to mind. In an investment scenario, recent price 
changes and extreme price changes are particularly salient and may lead 
investors to overestimate both the probability of a continuation of the recent 
trend and the probability of extreme price changes. If investors overestimate 
the probability of reoccurrence of recent price changes, then this will result in 
trend-chasing behaviour in the same way as one would expect from the use of 
the representativeness heuristic. 
When forming expectations of future price changes, investors may also use the 
anchoring heuristic. Under the anchoring heuristic, an anchor is chosen as a 
starting point and adjusted up or down to reach a predicted value. The choice 
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of anchor is likely to depend on the investment situation. When forming long- 
term investment views, for example, an investor may choose the long-run 
average price level as the anchor, whilst recent returns may be considered a 
more appropriate anchor for short-term investments (De Bondt, 1998). The use 
of the anchoring heuristic can therefore be expected to result in a tendency to 
chase trends in much the same way as for the representativeness and 
availability heuristics. 
The findings of the study of momentum strategy profitability contained in 
Chapters 6 and 7 indicate evidence of continuation effects over 1 trading day, 
although no clear effects are evident over 2 through 5 trading day horizons. 
This does not appear to be consistent with the use of the representativeness, 
availability or anchoring heuristics by investors. Whilst arguments might be 
constructed that decision-making heuristics might lead investors to extrapolate 
trends occurring over a period of just one day, there is no reason to expect this 
not to continue over 2 through 5 days. 
Specific patterns in stock market price behaviour would be expected as a result 
of investors making decisions based on the representativeness, availability, 
and/or anchoring heuristics. Bull and bear trends should accelerate as the 
market rises / falls respectively, becoming steeper over time as more and more 
investors "recognise" the trend and make investment decisions accordingly. 
When fundamental information dictates a reversal in trend, this will not be 
immediately recognised by investors using the representativeness, availability 
and anchoring heuristics, resulting in a continuation of the trend and prices 
overshooting fundamental values. 
If investors made decisions in this way, therefore, stock market trends would be 
expected to have higher amplitude than random trends based on the same 
distribution of daily returns, and trends should become steeper as they develop. 
Trends need not necessarily have longer duration than random trends (with 
trends both starting and finishing later than the turning points suggested by 
fundamental values). The representativeness, availability and anchoring 
heuristics do not in themselves suggest any asymmetry in the characteristics of 
bull and bear trends. That is to say, the properties of bull and bear trends would 
be expected to be mirror images of one another if trends in stock market 
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returns were driven solely by decision-making heuristics such as 
representativeness, availability and anchoring. 
The features of stock market trends which would be associated with the 
representativeness, availability and anchoring heuristics are not reflected in the 
results of the current study. Trends in the 14 stock market indices considered 
do not have significantly greater amplitude than random trends based on the 
same distribution of daily returns. The steepness of trends does not generally 
increase through the four quarters of the trend (although the market decline in 
the fourth quarter of bear trends is significantly steep). Finally, the results of this 
study exhibit clear asymmetry in the characteristics of bull and bear trends. The 
fourth quarter of bear trends is significantly steep and volatile, whilst no similar 
patterns are observed at the end of bull trends, for example. 
Overall, therefore, the representativeness, availability and anchoring heuristics 
do not seem to provide, in isolation, an adequate explanation of the results of 
either part of the current study. Although prior research (see Barberis and 
Thaler, 2002, for a review) shows that these heuristics are used by individuals 
in investment scenarios, they do not appear to be the sole driving force behind 
the momentum strategy profits or properties of stock market trends which are 
documented in this thesis. 
10.5.3 Overconfidence 
Overconfidence causes individuals to overestimate the expected returns to the 
investment strategies they select (De Bondt, 1998), and may therefore 
exaggerate the impact of other factors (such as the representativeness, 
availability and anchoring heuristics) on investment behaviour. If the recent 
path of prices is upwards, for example, then representativeness, availability and 
anchoring will all tend to lead investors to expect further short-term price 
increases. An overconfident investor would exaggerate the expected size of 
these increases. 
Overconfidence among investors cannot on its own, therefore, be expected to 
generate continuation effects in stock market returns or patterns in the 
steepness and volatility of stock market trends of the type evidenced in this 
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study. If other behavioural factors cause these patterns, however, then 
overconfidence may have a role to play in exaggerating their impact on market 
prices. 
10.5.4 Aversion to Loss 
Investors have been shown to be highly averse to realising losses (see Odean, 
1998, for example). The degree of loss aversion is lower following gains than it 
is following losses (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). The frequency with which 
outcomes are evaluated is also important (Benartzi and Thaler, 1985), with 
investors generally displaying a higher degree of loss aversion when outcomes 
are evaluated more frequently. 
In the stock market, investors gain on aggregate when the market rises and 
lose when the market falls. The degree of market loss aversion can therefore 
be expected to fall through bull trends and rise through bear trends. 
Importantly, therefore, loss aversion may be capable of generating asymmetry 
in the properties of stock market returns between bull markets and bear 
markets. In particular, loss aversion may help to explain the asymmetric pattern 
of returns through the bull/bear stock market cycle shown in Figure 10.3. The 
possible relationship between loss aversion and the properties of stock market 
trends is discussed more fully later in this chapter. 
10.5.5 Aversion to Ambiguity 
Aversion to ambiguity describes the tendency among individuals to prefer 
gambles where the probability of outcomes is known. Aversion to ambiguity is 
inversely linked to overconfidence (Heath and Tversky, 1991). Increasing 
ambiguity has the same effect as reducing confidence. As discussed above, 
overconfidence cannot in itself generate the observed pattern of returns 
through the bull/bear cycle but may be responsible for exaggerating the impact 
of other factors. Similarly, aversion to ambiguity cannot in itself generate 
patterns in returns of the type observed, but may be responsible for reducing 
the impact of whichever factors do drive these returns. 
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This section has considered the main behavioural factors discussed in Chapter 
2. None of these factors appears able to explain findings of momentum strategy 
profits over one trading day combined with a lack of significant returns over 2 
through 5 trading days. Loss aversion is the only one of the behavioural 
theories considered which would produce asymmetries across bull and bear 
markets and therefore may have a role to play in generating the patterns 
observed in stock market returns through the bull/bear cycle. Section 10.6 goes 
on to consider the alternative theories of continuation and reversal effects in 
stock market returns discussed in Chapter 3. 
10.6 Consistency with Alternative Explanations 
Chapter 3 describes a range of non-behavioural alternative explanations 
proposed in the literature for continuation and reversal effects in financial 
market returns. 
This section considers the extent to which the empirical findings of the current 
study are consistent with the explanations reviewed in Chapter 3. Specifically, 
this section discusses the impact of market microstructure issues such as bid- 
ask bounce and nonsynchronous trading, methodological issues, and risk on 
market returns and considers the extent to which the results of this study are 
consistent with each. 
10.6.1 Bid-Ask Bounce 
Bid-ask bounce implies negative autocorrelation in stock returns in the very 
short-term. The results of the study of momentum strategy profitability 
described in Chapters 6 and 7, on the other hand, are consistent with positive 
short-term autocorrelation in returns leading to positive returns to one-day 
momentum trading strategies. The results of the current study do not, therefore, 
appear to be consistent with bid-ask bounce affecting returns. 
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10.6.2 Nonsynchronous Trading 
Nonsynchronous trading implies negative autocorrelation in individual stock 
returns in the very short-term but positive autocorrelation in stock index returns 
over the same horizon. 
The current study finds evidence of positive momentum strategy returns for 13 
of the 14 stock market indices considered (the exception being Germany). No 
significant effects are found over horizons of 2 to 5 trading days, on the other 
hand. This does appear to be consistent with nonsynchronous trading, the 
effects of which can be expected to dissipate over very short horizons such as 
1 trading day. 
Nonsynchronous trading may also explain why many previous studies of short- 
term continuation and reversal effects in the returns of individual stocks using a 
cross-sectional methodology find evidence of reversal over periods of one 
trading day, in contrast to the results of the current study. 
Nonsynchronous trading does, therefore, appear to provide a plausible 
explanation for findings of the continuation effects in the 14 stock market 
indices considered over periods of one trading day. In addition, this explanation 
is consistent with the lack of significant effects over periods of 2 through 5 
trading days, and is also consistent with the results of the existing literature. 
10.6.3 Methodological Issues 
A range of methodological issues have been identified in the literature as being 
capable of introducing bias to the results of previous studies of continuation 
and reversal effects in stock market returns. In particular, the choice of an 
appropriate measure of expected returns and the method used to cumulate 
returns can have an important influence on the results of individual studies. 
Furthermore, simplistic comparisons of formation and test period returns may 
result in unwarranted findings of asymmetries between the winner and loser 
portfolios. The study of momentum strategy profitability described in Chapters 6 
and 7 aims to mitigate any methodological bias by ensuring as far as possible 
that the returns measured match those which would have been available to a 
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real-world data (without taking into account transaction costs or taxation 
issues). 
In the study of the properties of stock market trends, described in Chapters 8 
and 9 the same methodology is used to identify turning points in the original 
and bootstrapped time series, with the same analysis then applied to the 
resulting trends. Any methodological issues would therefore be expected to 
have an impact on the bootstrap results as well as the results from the original 
data sets. As such, it is highly unlikely that methodological issues cause the 
observed differences between the properties of trends in the 14 stock market 
data sets and those in random data generated from the same empirical 
distribution of daily returns. Nevertheless, the choice of algorithm used to 
identify the trends to be examined (The amplitude-based Fink and Pratt 
algorithm rather than the duration-based approach used by previous research) 
may influence the results obtained. 
10.6.4 Cross-Sectional Dispersion in Risk and Expected 
Returns 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggest that positive returns to momentum strategies 
may occur simply as a result of buying high return high risk stocks (past 
winners) and selling low return low risk stocks (past losers). This might explain 
the positive returns to both long (winner) and short (loser) positions in cross- 
sectional momentum strategies of the type considered by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) and Rouwenhorst (1998), among others. 
In isolation, Conrad and Kaul's argument does not appear to explain the results 
of the current study. The momentum strategies considered in the current study 
are based on stock market indices. Although the FTSE All-World Indices 
considered in this study are not tradeable in their own right (the only way to 
trade them being to transact in the underlying constituents of the indices), other 
well-known indices (such as the F>-SE 100 index in the UK) can be traded as 
an asset in their own right. If the results of the current study were shown to 
extend to traded indiceS88, then cross-sectional dispersion in risk would not 
88 Indices which have liquid futures contracts, for example. 
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explain the medium-term returns to momentum strategies based on those 
indices. 
10.6.5 Time-Varying Risk and Expected Returns 
Time-varying risk may have a role to play in driving continuation and reversal 
effects in stock market returns. Chan (1988) argues that leverage effects may 
be responsible for changing risk levels over time. As the price of a stock falls, 
its financial leverage increases and the risk of the stock increases. Investors 
will therefore increase the discount rate used to value the stock, and its price 
will fall further. The converse argument can be applied to stocks whose price 
rises, and findings of continuation for winners and losers will result. 
Time-varying risk of the type described by Chan (1988) does not explain the 
asymmetries observed by the current study in the properties of stock market 
trends. If increases in leverage cause stock prices to fall so quickly in the final 
stages of a bear trend, for example, then why is the initial stage of the bull trend 
not correspondingly steep as leverage falls again? 
This section has discussed the possible non-behavioural causes of 
continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns proposed in the 
literature and reviewed in Chapter 3. Nonsynchronous trading appears to 
provide a highly plausible explanation for the findings reported in the current 
study of positive returns to one-day momentum trading strategies. 
Whilst risk does clearly vary across stocks and over time, it is difficult to see 
how changing risk levels alone might explain the asymmetric features of stock 
market trends identified in the current study. Loss aversion therefore stands out 
as the only one of the potential causes of continuation and reversal effects put 
forward in the literature and briefly reviewed earlier in this chapter which is 
clearly capable of generating asymmetric returns in bull and bear markets. The 
following section goes on to consider how this might occur. 
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10.7 Loss Aversion and the Properties of Stock Market 
Trends 
This section proposes one way in which loss aversion among investors might 
result in the patterns in the steepness of stock market trends and the volatility 
of returns within trends identified in the current study. 
Prospect theory describes decision-making under loss aversion. Under 
prospect theory, investors will value stocks by multiplying the subjective values 
of all possible outcomes (measured relative to a reference point reflecting 
current wealth) by decision weights which overestimate the probability of very 
unlikely events and correspondingly underestimate the probability of all other 
events. The value function is concave for gains and convex for losses, 
reflecting a reducing marginal pleasure from higher gains and an increasing 
marginal discomfort to higher losses. 
It is unlikely that the value function used by investors will be stationary over 
time. Under the house money effect of Thaler and Johnson (1990), for 
example, loss aversion increases following losses and falls following gains. The 
shape of the value function to be used at any point in time will therefore depend 
on returns in the recent past. 
During a market downturn, investors are losing money on a net basis, and the 
degree of loss aversion will therefore be increasing. As the value function 
steepens in the region of losses, investors' valuations will be reduced and stock 
prices will fall. As prices fall, the house money effect will tend to further steepen 
the value curve, resulting in accelerating bear trends of the type observed in 
the current study. 
Once a turning point is reached and the market begins to rise again, the initial 
steepness of the value curve means that prices will tend to rise quickly. The 
house money effect will result in a tendency for the value curve to begin to 
flatten, resulting in decelerating bull trends of the type observed in the current 
study. 
Changes in the steepness of the value function may also help to explain 
patterns in the volatility of returns through the bull/bear stock market cycle. 
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During phases where the value function is steep, investors' valuations will react 
in an extreme manner to any new information entering the market. This implies 
a positive relationship between the steepness of the value curve, the 
steepness of trends, and the volatility of returns within trends. 
The analysis in this section provides one possible explanation for the pattern. 
As discussed in previous sections, the analysis of patterns within stock market 
trends presented in the current study is, to the author's knowledge, new to the 
literature and as a result, no studies have explicitly addressed the possible 
contribution of the behavioural and alternative explanations of continuation and 
reversal effects in stock market returns proposed in the literature to the 
formation of these patterns. 
The following section offers a number of suggestions for further research. 
10.8 Suggestions for Further Research 
The analysis presented in this chapter offers a number of avenues for further 
research. These are considered in turn in this section. 
10.8.1 Trends within Trends 
As discussed in Chapter 8, the medium-term stock market trends which are 
considered in the current study are themselves made up of shorter trends. The 
statistical properties of medium-term trends, identified in the current study, are 
not able to explain the empirical findings of the current study of positive 
cumulative returns to one-day momentum trading strategies but no significant 
returns to the equivalent 2 through 5 day strategies. 
One plausible explanation for the short-term returns to momentum trading 
strategies identified in the current study is nonsynchronous trading. It is, 
however, possible that very short-term stock market trends may have different 
properties to those of medium-term trends and that an analysis of the 
properties of very short-term trends in the 14 data sets may shed further light 
on the sources of returns to the short-term momentum trading strategies 
considered. 
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The first suggestion for further research based on the findings of the current 
study is therefore to examine the properties of stock market trends of different 
magnitudes. This can be easily achieved by changing the parameter R used to 
identify trends and running the same analysis used in the current study89. An R 
of 1.00 will identify runs in stock market data90. As R is increased, the degree of 
allowable movement in the opposite direction to the trend is increased, and 
longer trends will therefore be identified91. 
An analysis of the properties of trends over a range of different levels of R 
would therefore address the question of whether very short-term trends in 
returns may be able to explain the findings of the current study of one-day 
continuation but no significant continuation or reversal effects over periods 
ranging from 2 through 5 trading days. 
10.8.2 Cross-Sectional Dispersion in the Trend Behaviour of 
Stocks 
One important avenue for further research is to consider whether the trend 
behaviour of individual stocks differs. The current study examines the 
properties of trends in stock market indices. Section 10.5.1 discusses mental 
accounting and hypothesises that if the features of stock market trends 
identified in the current study are caused by behavioural factors, then mental 
89 In the Fink and Pratt (2004) algorithm, R controls the minimum amplitude of the 
trends identified. With an R of 1.20, for example, the algorithm will identify bull/bear 
trends with a minimum amplitude of 20 percent from trough-to-peak / peak-to-trough 
respectively. In the current study, R is variable and is calculated as 2/3 of the standard 
deviation of price returns over the previous 252 trading days. 
90 A run is a series of exclusively positive or negative price returns in stock market data. 
91 Previous research has considered runs in stock market returns. Yao et al (2003), for 
example, use a proportional hazards model to examine duration dependence in runs In 
Australian stock market returns. One disadvantage of the use of runs is that they can 
be misleading in certain circumstances. A series of 10 days of positive returns followed 
by one very small negative return and then 10 further days of positive returns would be 
segmented into three individual runs. The use of the Fink and Pratt (2004) methodology 
with R slightly in excess of one enables such patterns to be treated for the purposes of 
analysis as a single upwards trend. 
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accounting should result in different trend behaviour for different types of 
stocks. 
If patterns in the steepness and volatility of stock market trends are caused by 
loss aversion, for example, then stocks which are more actively traded might 
exhibit more extreme trend behaviour as a result of more frequent reviewing of 
outcomes92 than stocks which are less actively traded (forming part of long- 
term investment portfolios). 
The methodology employed in the current study can be easily applied to price 
data for individual stocks in order to measure cross-sectional dispersion in 
trend behaviour across stocks. This in turn may enable further conclusions to 
be drawn regarding the possible role of loss aversion in driving patterns in the 
steepness of trends in stock market prices and the volatility of returns within 
trends. 
10.8.3 Returns to Momentum Trading Strategies across 
Markets 
Section 10.6.4 notes that cross-sectional dispersion in risk and return across 
stocks cannot explain excess returns to momentum trading strategies applied 
to stock market indices which can be separately traded as an asset in their own 
right. An analysis of the returns to the momentum trading strategies developed 
in the current study and applied to the returns of traded indices such as the 
FTSE 100 index in the UK and the S&P 500 index in the USA is therefore of 
interest in assessing the role of cross-sectional differences in the risk and 
expected returns of individual stocks in driving the empirical results of studies 
using a cross-sectional research methodology. 
92 Benartzi and Thaler (1985) note a negative relationship between loss aversion and 
the frequency of evaluating outcomes. 
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10.8.4 Cross-Sectional Momentum Returns and Stock Market 
Trends 
Section 10.4 argues that the medium-term continuation effects identified in the 
current study are consistent with the observed properties of stock market 
trends. Winners are likely to be identified in the early stages of bull trends, 
resulting in findings of continuation, whilst losers are more likely to be identified 
in the final stages of bear trends, resulting in findings of reversal. 
In order to assess the validity of this argument, one important avenue for 
further research would be to carry out a decomposition of the returns to the 
momentum trading strategies considered in, for example, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). An analysis of trends in the winner and loser stocks identified by 
the strategy would enable the hypothesis to be tested that winner and loser 
portfolios are biased towards identifying stocks in the initial stages of bull trends 
and final stages of bear trends respectively. 
10.8.5 Loss Aversion and Stock Market Trends 
Section 10.7 describes one way in which loss aversion might be responsible for 
generating the particular features of stock market trends identified in the current 
study. Whilst outside the scope of the current study, one avenue for further 
research in this direction would be the construction of a model of loss aversion 
and the stock price formation process in order to verify whether such a model is 
capable of generating trends in simulated data sets which are consistent with 
those observed empirically in the current study. 
The list of possible avenues for further research discussed in this section is 
brief and by no means exhaustive. The research documented in this thesis has 
identified a wide range of questions which might be addressed by further 
research. The aim of the suggestions provided in this section is merely to 
provide a starting point for further investigation into momentum and 
continuation effects in stock market returns and the properties of stock market 
trends. 
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10.9 Summary 
The aim of this chapter is to summarise the main research results documented 
in Chapters 7 and 9 and to compare these results to those of the existing 
literature. A possible link is identified between the findings of the two parts of 
the empirical research documented in the current study. Momentum strategies 
buy following periods of high returns and sell following low returns. The 
patterns in the steepness of stock market trends in the current study suggests 
that high returns are likely to be identified near the beginning of bull trends, with 
low returns tending to occur towards the end of bear trends. Winners will 
therefore tend to exhibit continuation, whilst losers reverse. 
The potential behavioural and alternative explanations proposed in the 
literature for continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns are then 
discussed in turn. Of these, nonsynchronous trading appears to be the most 
plausible explanation of short-term momentum strategy profitability although 
further research is recommended into the properties of short-term stock market 
trends in order to ascertain whether these provide a suitable alternative 
explanation. Similarly, loss aversion among investors is identified as the most 
likely cause of the observed patterns in the steepness and volatility of stock 
market trends. 
This chapter then goes on to discuss in further depth one way in which loss 
aversion among investors might generate the features of stock market trends 
identified in the current study. Finally, a number of suggestions for further 
research are provided. 
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Chapter 11 
Summary and Conclusions 
11.1 Introduction 
The research documented in this thesis examines the existence of, and 
possible causes of, continuation and reversal effects in the returns of 14 major 
world stock markets. The background to this research was discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
Chapters 2 and 3 introduced the main behavioural and non-behavioural 
alternative explanations proposed in the literature as possible causes of 
continuation and reversal effects in returns, whilst Chapter 4 went on to 
consider the results of previous empirical studies which aim to identify such 
effects in stock market returns. 
The first main part of the research aimed to identify continuation and reversal 
effects in the 14 data sets using a time-series approach which closely reflects 
the experiences of real-world investors93. The second part of the research then 
considered the implications of continuation and reversal for stock market trend 
behaviour before going on to consider the statistical properties of stock market 
trends using an algorithm from the information technology literature (Fink and 
Pratt, 2004) to identify the turning points of trends in the 14 data sets. This 
research is described in detail in Chapters 6 through 9. A summary and 
interpretation of the main findings of the research was provided in Chapter 10. 
This Chapter discusses the motivations of the research and provides a brief 
summary of its main findings and conclusions. The limitations of the research 
are considered and a framework for further research is discussed. 
93 The measure of returns used in the current study is the return to investors (from 
capital gains and dividends) after taking into account the cost of funding at the short 
term interest rate (in the relevant currency for each stock market). 
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11.2 Motivation for the Current Study 
The motivation for the current study was provided by two fundamental 
limitations of the existing literature on the existence of, and possible causes of, 
medium-term continuation and reversal effects in financial market returns. 
Firstly, the results of previous empirical work which aims to identify such effects 
have been inconsistent94. A number of widely-quoted studies, such as those of 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 and 2001) and Rouwenhorst (1998) find 
evidence of significant continuation and reversal effects for both winners and 
losers using a cross-sectional methodology with formation and test periods 
ranging from 3 to 12 months in length. Other studies, such as that of Hameed 
and Kusnadi (2002), find no such evidence of continuation or reversal effects 
within their data samples. In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that 
methodological issues may be responsible for some of the results of previous 
studies. Pan and Hsueh (2001), for example, find that momentum profits within 
their data sample disappear when non-overlapping time periods are used. 
The fist aim of the current study is therefore to consider the issue of the 
existence of continuation and reversal effects using a different methodology to 
the cross-sectional approach employed by the majority of previous studies. A 
time-series approach is used to examine the profitability of momentum and 
contrarian trading strategies based on fourteen major world stock market 
indices. This approach aims to match as closely as possible the returns 
available to real-world investors in order to consider whether significant 
continuation and/or reversal effects are present within the data samples over 
the short-term and medium-term95. In addition, the extent to which any such 
effects are consistent across markets and/or across time is considered. Many 
of the possible explanations proposed in the literature96 for the existence of 
continuation and reversal effects in financial market returns would be expected 
to operate consistently across time and across a range of markets. The extent 
94 This body of research is reviewed in Chapter 4. 
95 The profitability of short-term strategies is also considered in this part of the research 
since medium-term effects are likely to represent an amalgamation of shorter-term 
effects. 
96 These are reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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to which continuation and reversal effects are consistent within and across the 
data samples is therefore an important factor in interpreting which, if any, of the 
proposed explanations fits the empirical evidence. Finally, the use of a 
methodology which closely reflects the experiences of real-world investors 
enables the risk and return inherent to momentum and contrarian trading 
strategies to be explicitly considered and conclusions drawn as to whether the 
market acts irrationally in failing to exploit significant profit opportunities. 
The second main aim of the current study is to address the question of which, if 
any, of the possible explanations proposed in the literature might cause 
continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns. Whilst the existing 
literature has identified anomalies of continuation and reversal in stock market 
returns and a range of behavioural and non-behavioural proposed 
explanations, research has not generally been able to identify a direct link 
between individual causes and their effects. As Chapter 2 demonstrates, for 
example, a number of different behavioural biases would all be expected to 
have the same impact on financial market returns. 
The second part of the research documented in this thesis therefore takes a 
different approach to the issue of continuation and reversal effects in returns in 
an attempt to differentiate between some of the potential causes identified in 
the wider literature. More specifically, Chapter 8 discusses how the presence of 
continuation and reversal effects in stock market returns would imply 
systematic features of trends in stock market trends which differentiate them 
from trends found in random data. The manner in which stock market trends 
differ from random trends may therefore enable some insight to be drawn into 
the potential causes of such effects. 
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11.3 Main Results and Conclusions 
The first part of the research examines whether continuation and reversal 
effects are present in the 14 data sets by considering the profitability of 
momentum trading strategies which buy the stock market index following a 
market rise and sell following a market fall. Significant profits to momentum 
strategies are indicative of continuation effects in returns, whilst significant 
losses to momentum strategies imply profits to the equivalent contrarian 
strategy and hence reversal effects in returns. 
Positive returns to momentum strategies are found for 1 trading day strategies 
and for longer-term strategies with holding periods from 10 to 252 trading days. 
Mixed results are obtained for strategies based on 2 through 5 day returns. 
Overall, however, few results are statistically significant. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, the positive returns to the longer-term strategies in particular are 
driven by the returns to long positions, with short positions typically generating 
negative returns. Chapter 8 argues that evidence of continuation will be found 
where data sets are significantly skewed, either overall or in subsections of the 
data, and it may be the case that the momentum profits found in this part of the 
research are simply a result of generally rising market prices during the period 
of the data considered. 
Certainly, an analysis of the profitability of each strategy by calendar year 
suggests that returns are highly inconsistent over time. The standard deviation 
of daily returns is significantly high for almost all of the strategies considered, 
and the Sharpe ratios are not significantly different from zero. Although a 
simplistic approach may draw the conclusion that momentum effects are 
present in the data samples, there is no evidence to suggest that the returns to 
momentum strategies offer significant risk-adjusted returns. 
The second part of the research documented in this thesis uses an algorithm 
from the information technology literature to date price trends in the 14 stock 
market index data sets which form the basis of this study. The statistical 
properties of returns within bull and bear trends and four phases of each are 
then considered. 
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A number of features are identified in the research which clearly differentiate 
trends in stock market data from trends in random data with the same 
distribution of daily returns. Whilst stock market trends are not significantly 
different from random trends in terms of their duration or total amplitude, clear 
patterns are observed in the steepness of different phases of bull and bear 
trends. The fourth quarter of bull trends is somewhat shallow, whilst the fourth 
quarter of bear trends is particularly steep. Patterns are also observed in the 
volatility of daily price changes within stock market trends, with returns 
particularly volatile in the final stages of bear trends. 
An analysis of the relative frequency and size of positive and negative daily 
returns within price trends reveals the source of these patterns in the steepness 
of trends. Patterns in the absolute size of positive and negative daily returns 
through the bull-bear stock market cycle rather than patterns in the proportion 
of positive and negative daily price returns within trends appear to be the 
driving force behind systematic patterns in the steepness of trends and the 
volatility of returns within trends. These patterns, which have not been analysed 
in depth by the existing literature97, may have an important role to play in 
driving previous empirical findings of momentum and reversal effects in stock 
market returns. 
Chapter 10 analyses the results of the two parts of the current study with 
reference to the potential causes of continuation and reversal effects proposed 
in the literature and discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The consistency of the 
results of each part of the research with those of the existing literature is also 
considered. Nonsynchronous trading appears to provide the best explanation of 
the returns to the short-term momentum trading strategies considered in the 
first part of the research, whilst the properties of stock market trends are 
consistent with explanations of continuation and reversal effects based on loss 
aversion among investors. The proposals for further research presented in 
Section 10.8 focus on exploring further the properties of stock market trends 
and the possible relationship between investor loss aversion and continuation 
and reversal effects in returns. Section 11.4 provides a summary of the 
limitations of the current study and the suggested framework for further 
research. 
97 Partly as a result of the use of monthly rather than daily returns in most studies. 
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11.4 Limitations and Framework for Further Research 
The main limitation of the current study is its exclusive use of index-level data. 
Whilst this was necessary as a result of the broad scope of the research 
documented in this thesis, the use of individual stock data in addition to index- 
level data may enable further insight to be drawn into the relationship between 
the behavioural and non-behavioural factors discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 and 
the existence of continuation and reversal effects in returns. 
The proposals for further research contained in Section 10.8 therefore aim to 
address this limitation by proposing firstly that the current study be extended to 
consider the statistical properties of trends in the prices of individual stocks. A 
decomposition of the results of one of the most commonly quoted studies of 
medium-term continuation and reversal effects (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 
for example) is then proposed to address the hypothesis raised in Chapter 10 
that systematic trend behaviour in stock prices may be an important driving 
factor behind the results of previous empirical studies based on a cross- 
sectional methodology. 
A further limitation of the current study is that, whilst the properties of medium- 
term trends are considered, no analysis is presented of the way in which short- 
term trends in stock market prices (positive and negative runs in prices being 
the extreme example) combine to form the medium-term trends which are the 
focus of the current study. Again, Section 10.8 proposes to address this 
deficiency by considering initially the way in which short-term trends combine to 
form longer-term trends in the 14 data sets which are the focus of the current 
study. 
The final major limitation of the current study is that, whilst it raises important 
questions regarding the role of loss aversion in driving the observed patterns in 
stock market trend behaviour, a further analysis of this mechanism falls outside 
the scope of the current work. Modelling the price formation process in a 
market characterised by loss-averse investors is the next logical step in 
answering some of the questions raised by the study. In particular, do trends in 
the simulated price series generated by such a model share the empirical 
characteristics of trends in the real-world data which is the focus of this study? 
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Similarly, are simulated time series characterised by significant momentum or 
contrarian profits similar to those identified in the current study? 
11.5 Summary 
The current study aims to make a significant contribution to knowledge by 
examining from a new angle the issue of continuation and reversal effects in 
stock market returns. 
The existence of such effects in the fourteen stock market indices which are the 
focus of the study is first analysed using a time series approach which closely 
reflects the returns available to real-life investors. Continuation effects are 
observed over periods of 1 trading day and 10 through 252 trading days, with 
no significant continuation or reversal effects identified over periods of 2 
through 5 trading days. 
Continuation and reversal effects in returns imply that stock market trends are 
systematically different to trends in random data. The second part of the current 
study therefore adapts an algorithm from the information technology literature 
to examine in detail the statistical properties of trends in each of the fourteen 
data sets. Important patterns are identified in the steepness of trends as they 
develop as well as in the volatility of returns within trends. 
The possible causes of continuation and reversal effects proposed in the 
literature are considered in the light of the continuation effects identified in the 
first part of the research and the patterns in stock market trends identified in the 
second part. Whilst nonsynchronous trading stands out as the most probable 
cause of short-term effects in the data samples, loss aversion among investors 
most closely fits the empirical features of stock market trends. 
As in any study of this nature, the research documented in this thesis raises as 
many questions as it answers. The scope of the current study does not permit 
each of these questions to be addressed in full; instead, the most important 
outstanding issues are highlighted in the suggestions for further research. 
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Appendix A: Datastream Codes 
The table shows, for each country, the Datastream codes for each data item 
used. For the FTSE all-world index series, the data type (PI or TR) determines 
the price index / total return index for stock market data. 
Stock Market Currency Interest Rate 
Australia WIAUSTL A$ AUSIBCL 
Belgium WIBELGL E ECBFRST 
Canada WICNDAL C$ ECCD$ST 
Denmark WIDNMKL DK ECDKNST 
France WIFRNCL E ECFFRST 
Germany WIWGRML E ECWGMST 
Hong Kong WIHGKGL K$ HKDEPCL 
Italy W IITALL E ECITLST 
Japan WIJPANL Y ECJAPST 
Netherlands WINETHL E ECNLGST 
Spain WISPANL E ESMIBON 
Switzerland WISWITL SF ECSWFST 
UK WIUTDKL £ ECUK£ST 
USA WIUSAML U$ ECUS$ST 
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Appendix B: Data Samples 
Australia 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
500- 
400- 
300- 
200- 
100 
mt U') (0 rl- CO 0) 0 r- C\1 
rn rn CD 0) 
rn C) 0öö 
T_ TTTTNNN 
- Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
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Belgium 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
In Cp Co OOr N 
rrTTTrNNN 
Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
8.00%- 
6.00%- 
4.00%- 
2.00% 
0.00% 
-2.00% 
-4.00% 
-6.00% 
-8.00% 
287 
Canada 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
It U) C. 0 Cý 0 1- N 0)0) Ö 0) 0) O3) O3) O3) 00 
.-rT 7- T- T_ NNN 
- Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
8.00% 
6.00% 
4.00% 
2.00% 
0.00% 
-2.00% 
-4.00% 
-6.00% 
-8.00% 
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Denmark 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
rn LO CO C) CO 0) 0ö0 a) 0) 0) a) 0) 
NNN 1-1 T- 
- Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
8.00%- 
6.00%- 
4.00%- 
2.00 % 
0.00% 
-2.00% IvprofifTir mimlii 
-4.00%- 
-6.00%- 
-8.00%- 
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France 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
It LO Co rn rn rn ööö rn rn rn CD rn rn o0 
rrrrrrNNN 
Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
8.00% 
6.00% 
4.00%- 
2.00% 
0.00% 
-2.00% 
-4.00%- 
-6.00%- 
-8.00% 
290 
Germany 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
400 
300 
200 
100 
N 
0) 
O3) 0) 0) Q 
mm 
)0000 
rrrrrrNNN 
Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
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Hong Kong 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
It LO (0 fý- 00 m0 CM 
T- Ir- 
0) 0) NNN 
Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
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Italy 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
400 
300 
200 
100 
Irt LO CO r- 00 0) 0 7- N 
C)) 
0) 0) 0) 
0)) 
Q) 000 
rrrrrrNNN 
Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
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Japan 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
150- 
125- 
100-00, 
75 
50 
rn LO rn rn Co rn ööö 
0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) NNN 
-Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
8.00% 
6.00%- 
4.00%- 
2.00%- 
0.00% 
-2.00% 
-4.00% 
-6.00% 
-8.00% 
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Netherlands 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
1000 
900 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
14t LO (0 r- CO (7) 0 T_ C14 
0) 0) 0) 
0) 0) 0) CY) ö00ö0 
TTTTTNN CV 
-Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
8.00% 
6.00%- 
4.00%- 
2.00% 
0.00% 
-2.00% 
-4.00% 
-6.00% 
-8.00% 
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Spain 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
900 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
rn rn rn rn 0) 0) 000 0) 0) (3) 0) 0) 0) 0NN 
TTTTT 
Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
8.00%- 
6.00%- 
4.00%- 
2.00% 
0.00% 
-2.00% 
-4.00% 
-6.00% 
-8.00% 
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Switzerland 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
CD CD 
T 
LO CC) r- OD a) 
CY) a) o) CY) CD S S 
TT .- r- NNN 
- Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
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UK 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
It LO (D r- CO 0) 0 
0 0) r) rNNN 
Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
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USA 
Price Index and Total Return Index Data 
900 
800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
rn CF) rn rn rn 0) ööö rn rn rn rn rn o00 rrrr T- NNN 
- Price Index Total Return Index 
Funded Returns 
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Appendix C: Momentum Strategy Returns by Year 
Australia 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
300 
V GIIVlG" UVVa. 7u191F . 71t, j11111VQ11I OL LI 119 1 /U IGV I 
o denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
Belgium 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
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  aenotes wUwuap siynnicdrR e at the 170 ievei 
Q denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
Canada 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
o denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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  aenotes bootstrap signricance at the i w/o ievel 
Denmark 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
o denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
303 
  aenotes oooisirap significance at the 1 Mio ievel 
France 
I to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
50% 
D 
40% 
30% "" 
20% ", 
" 
". 
10% 
-10,1 
1996 199 `" 1998 " 1999 200' 2 
-20%- 
-30%- 
-401% 
-50%01 
21 42 63 --- 126 ....... 252 
  denotes bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
Q denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Germany 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
i 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
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  UCnvteS UUUt Il d .J b1gl IMLanLC aL tilt: 170 IUVCl 
Q denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
Hong Kong 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
Q denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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- uniIv«a uvuwuaJ aIyiiuR. dIIc, C dl tIJ 170 16V@I 
Italy 
I to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
Q denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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  denotes bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
Japan 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
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  aenoies bootstrap signmcance at the iw ievei 
Q denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
Netherlands 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
50% 
. p" 
40% . "ýo". 
30% "" '" 
20% . "'' ' 
10% 
0% 
-10°/a 5 1996 1997 `1998 "' 
1999 0", 2001"t 02 
-20% 
". " 
-30% "' 
-40% 
21 42 63 --- . 126 ....... 252 
  denotes bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
Q denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Spain 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
Q denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
310 
  aenvtes AUULbU * siynii uii e at ine -1 0 level 
Switzerland 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
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  aenotes bootstrap sigrnricance at ine i , /o ievei 
Q denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
UK 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
01 .... _ . 1996 ". ".. 1997,1998,19 2000. "', ' 2001. . 
: Z101c 
......... ý.. 
" ' 
-30% 
123--" .4....... 5.... 10 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
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V CIIVLGJ UVVIJU ü'. J JIyl III wQuIL. C1L UI 1 70 ICVCI 
o denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
USA 
1 to 10 Trading Day Strategies 
21 to 252 Trading Day Strategies 
Q denotes bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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  aenotes oooisirap signrncance at the 1% level 
Appendix D: Returns to Momentum Strategies 
(Signals based on Price Returns) 
This Appendix presents the returns to momentum strategies where trading 
signals are generated based on past price returns (rather than on past funded 
returns as in the original analysis). 
The calculation of the returns to each strategy is then carried out based on 
funded returns as described in detail in Chapter 6. 
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Table D-1 Cumulative Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 9.66% -15.91% -19.81% -42.17% -28.44% -41.99% 
0.93% 0.22% 1.61% 0.74% 1.76% 1.43% 
Belgium 123.98% 80.65% 32.31% 6.50% -13.75% 18.02% 
-0.33% 0.58% 1.16% -0.79% -1.32% -2.97% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 75.64% 18.02% 13.35% -9.49% 18.22% 38.57% 
-0.42% -0.59% -0.10% -1.11% -0.99% 1.77% 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 38.78% 1.23% 5.44% 34.15% 38.13% 36.12% 
-0.11% 0.01% 0.30% 1.44% -0.02% -0.02% 
SIG 5% 
France 20.48% -71.12% -47.72% -56.25% -75.17% -0.02% 
-1.36% -1.27% 0.48% -0.44% 1.87% 2.02% 
Germany -5.73% -50.18% -68.26% 0.99% -4.96% -16.84% 
15.20% -2.18% -1.06% -1.33% -4.68% 0.31% 
Hong Kong 71.43% 66.59% 47.43% 9.18% 15.18% 35.92% 
-1.78% -1.34% -4.09% -2.30% -2.01% -1.70% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 14.05% -26.60% -20.17% 65.22% -5.69% 95.52% 
0.68% 2.17% 0.81% 1.29% 1.31% 4.83% 
SIG 5% 
Japan 22.45% 8.17% -51.33% -124.53% -107.59% -21.99% 
-0.54% -2.00% -3.25% -2.72% -3.24% -2.49% 
Netherlands 23.39% -75.67% -70.83% -95.06% -57.05% 65.18% 
0.06% 0.79% -1.16% -1.26% 1.11% 2.46% 
Spain 38.78% -31.48% -32.01% -11.58% 25.23% 75.23% 
-1.38% 2.85% -1.39% 1.41% -0.40% 2.77"/ 
Switzerland 41.93% 3.90% -27.45% -10.29% -28.18% 72.31% 
0.97% 0.57% 0.99% 0.98% 1.94% 3.80% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK 36.70% -52.88% -79.16% -56.63% -73.52% -7.07% 
0.76% 0.17% 0.10% -0.55% 0.26% 0.33% 
USA 20.40% -38.94% -79.52% -48.22% -76.48% -6.77% 
-1.05% -0.48% 2.08% 1.80% 2.28% 3.43% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-1 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -27.37% -38.68% -18.44% -1.17% 1.05% 
2.98% 2.91% 5.16% 6.95% 10.18% 
Belgium 8.45% 65.76% 42.28% 33.20% 64.96% 
0.08% 1.65% 2.83% 5.10% 8.18% 
Canada 34.14% 57.48% 16.13% -7.07% 79.52% 
4.29% 6.07% 7.89% 12.05% 16.80% 
SIG 5% 
Denmark 8.30% 10.92% 85.50% 100.17% 83.29% 
1.30% -0.99% 4.93% 8.11% 10.82% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% S105% 
France 54.49% 80.23% 75.08% -13.07% 65.53% 
2.67% 3.13% 4.65% 6.03% 28.33% 
Germany 41.42% 64.68% 68.03% -19.83% 57.58% 
-0.45% -2.44% 1.28% 1.90% 3.60% 
Hong Kong 86.63% 40.74% -46.86% 32.72% -79.55% 
-3.89% -4.61% 0.35% -4.00% 0.15% 
Italy 11.25% -15.14% 30.22% 50.03% 114.19% 
5.38% 8.01% 5.84% 6.06% 9.49% 
SIG 5% 
Japan -34.89% 21.60% 35.77% 4.79% -15.60% 
1.38% 5.66% 1.44% 2.22% 1.26% 
Netherlands 6.32% 115.28% 111.82% 18.22% 132.80% 
1.91% 4.30% 8.48% 10.44% 16.54% 
S1G 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Spain 95.57% 43.45% 64.34% 68.37% 125.78% 
2.20% 7.79% 9.80% 14.93% 18.31% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Switzerland 36.87% 44.66% 92.13% 36.33% 96.32% 
4.72% 5.87°/ 9.47% 11.56% 16.58% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK -32.43% -13.45% 29.04% -41.27% 72.63% 
1.51% 2.39% 1.24% -0.26% -2.38% 
USA 6.64% -17.14% 32.83% 64.44% 113.55% 
3.63% 8.75% 9.93% 10.42% 10.49% 
SIG 1% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-2 Cumulative Long-Only Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 20.72% 14.23% -4.03% -18.07% -5.34% 1.50% 
3.07% 4.91% 5.12% 5.01% 6.48% 7.41% 
SIG 5% 
Belgium 71.88% 39.58% 37.51% 28.76% 24.68% 30.50% 
2.42% 5.00% 6.91% 5.61% 5.32% 5.96% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 47.35% 28.13% 19.48% 12.47% 32.41% 40.61% 
3.31% 3.83% 5.87% 6.62% 6.99% 10.41% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Denmark 35.30% 21.02% 41.84% 56.71% 65.13% 38.07% 
3.37% 4.20% 5.80% 6.71% 6.44% 7.23% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
France 19.48% -22.94% 4.10% -5.16% -14.66% 22.94% 
2.25% 3.36% 5.50% 6.44% 8.79% 10.00% 
Germany 5.46% -15.28% -24.25% -8.07% 11.46% -6.09% 
5.28% -0.31% 1.39% 1.64% 1.02% 4.18% 
Hong Kong 56.54% 41.69% 14.79% -6.05% 31.01% 33.08% 
-2.68% -4.99% -5.37% -6.11% -6.79% -6.61% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 3.54% -9.30% 14.06% 65.90% 39.36% 87.44% 
3.85% 6.85% 7.45% 7.89% 7.99% 9.78% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Japan 5.91% 27.87% 5.53% -36.35% -17.01% 0.88% 
-2.39% -4.81% -5.17% -5.55% -7.28% -7.03% 
Netherlands 35.32% -29.90% -29.33% -58.09% -8.30% 51.09% 
4.26% 5.73% 6.65% 7.50% 11.01% 13.54% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Spain 20.02% -24.94% -16.56% 17.98% 54.34% 62.73% 
3.45% 8.10% 7.74% 10.40% 10.87% 14.70% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Switzerland 27.58% 28.58% -6.67% 13.66% 14.54% 58.93% 
3.93% 5.79% 8.10% 9.43% 10.68% 13.19% 
SIG5% SIG 1% 
UK 16.53% -18.99% -24.28% -9.06% -26.01% 19.07% 
0.95% 0.74% 0.83% 0.32% 0.53% 0.99% 
USA 40.42% -1.07% -14.06% 15.38% 12.63% 46.74% 
3.23% 4.17% 7.19% 6.98% 8.23% 10.05% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-2 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia 2.54% 0.89% 9.60% -0.63% 18.82% 
8.40% 8.93% 10.26% 12.14% 14.55% 
Belgium 43.46% 67.76% 51.24% 66.47% 83.31% 
9.56% 10.96% 10.78% 13.30% 14.51% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 57.37% 75.01% 31.81% 5.82% 66.46% 
12.26% 14.16% 16.64% 19.72% 22.53% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% S101% 
Denmark 15.95% 19.13% 78.24% 89.22% 74.36% 
7.34% 6.34% 11.30% 13.35% 16.44% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
France 36.91% 58.55% 88.98% 29.96% 69.41% 
12.26% 12.76% 13.65% 14.63% 25.47% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Germany 34.01% 61.42% 75.92% -3.09% 57.58% 
4.84% 3.79% 6.29% 6.87% 8.32% 
SIG 5% 
Hong Kong 94.56% 19.75% -19.04% -7.65% 11.21% 
-10.17% -10.38% -8.77% -11.00% -9.36% 
SIG 1% 
Italy 34.43% -0.90% 41.73% 41.44% 92.68% 
12.66% 12.84% 11.68% 12.59% 16.50% 
SIG 1% 
Japan 9.92% 8.18% 0.01% 14.71% -10.44% 
-5.52% -3.85% -5.76% -6.00% -6.04% 
Netherlands 15.27% 69.23% 108.22% 47.76% 107.07% 
14.19% 17.11% 19.47% 22.02% 23.92% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Spain 102.06% 57.78% 91.35% 78.95% 111.62% 
14.12% 17.35% 20.21% 23.51% 25.46% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 34.66% 36.58% 102.33% 64.14% 96.32% 
15.47% 17.57% 19.41% 21.01% 25.35% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
UK -10.36% 9.00% 25.25% -4.64% 60.47% 
1.89% 1.60% 1.43% 0.82% -0.48% 
SIG 5% 
USA 21.69% 26.16% 57.64% 48.79% 97.07% 
11.58% 15.60% 16.75% 17.30% 18.29% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the I% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-3 Cumulative Short-Only Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia -11.06% -30.14% -15.79% -24.09% -23.10% -43.50% 
-2.14% -4.69% -3.50% -4.27% -4.73% -5.98% 
Belgium 52.10% 41.06% -5.20% -22.26% -38.42% -12.48% 
-2.76% -4.42% -5.75% -6.40% -6.63% -8.93% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 28.29% -10.11% -6.14% -21.96% -14.19% -2.04% 
-3.73% -4.42% -5.96% -7.74% -7.98% -8.64% 
SIG 5% 
Denmark 3.48% -19.79% -36.41% -22.56% -27.00% -1.95% 
-3.48% -4.19% -5.49% -5.27% -6.46% -7.25% 
France 1.01% -48.18% -51.83% -51.09% -60.51% -22.97% 
461% -4.62% -5.02% -6.88% -6.91% -7.98% 
Germany -11.19% -34.90% -44.01% 9.05% -16.42% -10.75% 
9.92% -1.86% -2.45% -2.98% 5.70% -3.88% 
Hong Kong 14.88% 24.90% 32.64% 15.23% -15.82% 2.84% 
0.90% 3.65% 1.28% 3.81% 4.78% 4.92% 
Italy 10.51% -17.30% -34.23% -0.68% -45.05% 8.08% 
-3.17% -4.68% -6.64% -6.59% -6.68% -4.95% 
Japan 16.54% -19.69% -56.86% -88.18% -90.58% -22.88% 
1.85% 2.81% 1.92% 2.82% 4.05% 4.54% 
Netherlands -11.93% -45.78% -41.50% -36.96% -48.74% 14.09% 
-4.20% -4.94% -7.81% -8.76% -9.90% -11.08% 
Spain 18.75% -6.54% -15.44% -29.55% -29.10% 12.50% 
-4.84% -5.25% -9.13% -9.00% -11.27% -11.93% 
Switzerland 14.36% -24.68% -20.78% -23.95% -42.72% 13.38% 
-2.96% -5.21% -7.12% -8.45% -8.74% -9.40% 
UK 20.17% -33.89% -54.88% -47.58% -47.50% -26.13% 
-0.19% -0.57% -0.73% -0.86% -0.27% -0.66% 
USA -20.02% -37.87% -65.46% -63.60% -89.11% -53.51% 
-4.29% -4.65% -5.11% -5.18% -5.95% -6.62% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-3 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -29.91% -39.57% -28.04% -0.54% -17.77% 
-5.42% -6.03% -5.11% -5.19% -4.37% 
Belgium -35.01% -2.00% -8.96% -33.27% -18.35% 
-9.49% -9.31% -7.96% -8.20% -6.33% 
Canada -23.23% -17.53% -15.67% -12.90% 13.06% 
-7.97% -8.09% -8.75% -7.67% -5.73% 
Denmark -7.65% -8.20% 7.26% 10.94% 8.93% 
-6.04% -7.33% -6.37% -5.24% -5.62% 
France 17.58% 21.68% -13.90% -43.03% -3.88% 
-9.60% -9.63% -9.00% -8.61% 2.86% 
Germany 7.41% 3.26% -7.89% -16.74% 0.00% 
-5.29% -6.23% -5.01% -4.97% -4.72% 
Hong Kong -7.94% 20.99% -27.82% 40.37% -90.76% 
6.27% 5.78% 9.13% 7.00% 9.51% 
Italy -23.17% -14.24% -11.51% 8.59% 21.51% 
-7.28% -4.84% -5.84% -6.54% -701% 
Japan -44.80% 13.42% 35.77% -9.92% -5.16% 
6.90% 9.51% 7.20% 8.21% 7.30% 
Netherlands -8.95% 46.04% 3.60% -29.54% 25.72% 
-12.28% -12.81% -10.99% -11.58% -7.38% 
SIG 5% 
Spain -6.50% -14.33% -27.01% -10.58% 14.16% 
-11.92% -9.56% -10.40% -8.58% -7.15% 
Switzerland 2.21% 8.08% -10.20% -27.80% 0.00% 
-10.74% -11.70% -9.94% -9.45% -8.77'/ 
UK -22.07% -22.45% 3.79% -36.63% 12.16% 
-0.39% 0.79% -0.19% -1.08% -1.90% 
USA -15.05% -43.30% -24.82% 15.65% 16.48% 
-7.95% -6.85% -6.82% -6.88% -7.80% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-4 Mean Transaction Profits 
PANEL A. - 
1-10 Trading 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Day Strategies 
Australia 0.0276% -0.0621% -0.0976% -0.2396% -0.1961% -0.4772% 
0.0027% 0.0010% 0.0077% 0.0044% 0.0118% 0.0154% 
Belgium 0.2938% 0.2466% 0.1330% 0.0312% -0.0768% 0.1749% 
-0.0010% 0.0026% 0.0064% -0.0048% -0.0092% -0.0350% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 0.2107% 0.0583% 0.0556% -0.0479% 0.1091% 0.3745% 
-0.0015% -0.0027% -0.0007% -0.0069% -0.0073% 0.0204% 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 0.0887% 0.0040% 0.0222% 0.1751% 0.2297% 0.3762% 
-0.0003% 0.0000% 0.0012% 0.0079% -0.0004% -0.0018% 
France 0.0481% -0.2244% -0.1917% -0.2827% -0.4396% -0.0003% 
-0.0042% -0.0053% 0.0024% -0.0029% 0.0121% 0.0231% 
Germany -0.0139% -0.1701% -0.2821% 0.0051% -0.0299% -0.1792% 
0.0477%0 -0.0090% -0.0054% -0.0087% -0.0329% 0.0046% 
Hong Kong 0.2113% 0.2581% 0.2445% 0.0540% 0.0999% 0.3991% 
-0.0060% -0.0056% -0.0215% -0.0142% -0.0132% -0.0212% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 0.0372% -0.0967% -0.0994% 0.3706% -0.0360% 1.0497% 
0.0018% 0.0080% 0.0041% 0.0078% 0.0095% 0.0520% 
SIG 5% 
Japan 0.0592% 0.0292% -0.2261% -0.6520% -0.6601% -0.2499% 
-0.0015% -0.0079% -0.0163% -0.0159% -0.0220% -0.0307% 
Netherlands 0.0538% -0.2402% -0.3093% -0.4850% -0.3500% 0.7492% 
0.0002% 0.0039% -0.0059% -0.0080% 0.0080% 0.0288% 
Spain 0.0912% -0.1029% -0.1404% -0.0636% 0.1529% 0.7448% 
-0.0039% 0.0111% -0.0070% 0.0084% -0.0028% 0.0314% 
Switzerland 0.1095% 0.0143% -0.1283% -0.0562% -0.1830% 0.8311% 
0.0032% 0.0023% 0.0056% 0.0065% 0.0146% 0.0440% 
SIG 5% 
UK 0.0866% -0.1663% -0.3298% -0.3029% -0.4595% -0.0803% 
0.0024% 0.0007% 0.0000% -0.0033% 0.0020% 0.0048% 
USA 0.0492% -0.1281% -0.3259% -0.2399% -0.4446% -0.0728% 
-0.0032% -0.0025% 0.0104% 0.0109% 0.0158% 0.0387% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-4 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -0.6083% -1.6118% -1.0846% -0.1169% 0.2107% 
0.0607% 0.1090% 0.2842% 0.6949% 1.8724% 
Belgium 0.1537% 2.1211% 1.9218% 2.2134% 9.2798% 
-0.0006% 0.0740% 0.1528% 0.5524% 1.5498% 
Canada 0.6566% 1.9820% 0.7683% -0.5442% 11.3594% 
0.0883% 0.2349% 0.4205% 1.2097% 3.0124% 
Denmark 0.1482% 0.3310% 4.0716% 7.1548% 10.4114% 
0.0294% -0.0337% 0.2765% 0.8150% 1.9330% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
France 1.0898% 3.2093% 3.5752% -1.0892% 10.9221% 
0.0598% 0.1252% 0.2591% 0.6120% 4.9140% 
Germany 0.7966% 2.3101% 3.5808% -1.8025% 11.5156% 
-0.0097% -0.1041% 0.0438% 0.1243% 0.7120% 
Hong Kong 1.7679% 1.6297% -2.4662% 3.2721% -13.2583% 
-0.0899% -0.1689% 0.0391% -0.4146% -0.0822% 
Italy 0.2084% -0.5607% 1.6790% 4.5480% 22.8378% 
0.1112% 0.3037°/ 0.3229% 0.6539% 1.7148% 
SIG 5% 
Japan -0.7423% 0.8308% 2.1044% 0.5324% -3.9002% 
0.0330% 0.2282% 0.0747% 0.2481% 0.3921% 
Netherlands 0.1239% 4.6110% 5.8855% 1.4014% 18.9708% 
0.0391% 0.1708% 0.4500% 1.0601% 3.0704% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Spain 1.8378% 1.4981% 3.0640% 6.8368% 20.9638% 
0.0461% 0.3025% 0.5420% 1.5284% 3.2657% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Switzerland 0.6827% 1.8610% 4.8490% 2.7949% 16.0529% 
0.1001% 0.2357% 0.5418% 1.2058% 3.2176% 
SIG 5% 
UK -0.7049% -0.5605% 1.6136% -3.7521% 12.1049% 
0.0342% 0.0810% 0.0795% -0.0018% -0.5383% 
USA 0.1328% -0.5910% 1.7277% 5.8578% 18.9245% 
0.0698% 0.3290% 0.5498% 1.0673% 1.6824% 
SIG 5% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-5 Mean Transaction and Daily Profit by Strategy Length 
Strategy Length (Trading Days) Mean Transaction Profit Mean Daily Profit 
1 0.0966% 0.0966% 
2 -0.0414% -0.0207% 
3 -0.1197% -0.0399% 
4 -0.1238% -0.0310% 
5 -0.1631% -0.0326% 
10 0.2600% 0.0260% 
21 0.3959% 0.0189% 
42 1.2186% 0.0290% 
63 2.2350% 0.0355% 
126 1.9505% 0.0155% 
252 10.4568% 0.0415% 
Table shows the mean transaction profit across all 14 data sets for each strategy length together with the 
mean daily profit for days on which each strategy holds a market position. 
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Table D-6 Standard Deviation of Daily Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 6.62% 7.79% 8.37% 8.75% 8.79% 9.63% 
5.62% 6.91% 7.56% 7.96% 8.21% 8.94% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Belgium 10.47% 12.25% 12.72% 13.08% 13.94% 14.59% 
6.57% 8.09% 8.94% 9.53% 9.91% 10.99% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% S101% 
Canada 8.46% 10.88% 12.10% 12.71% 12.18% 13.14% 
6.59% 8.23% 9.13% 9.69% 10.10% 11.19% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Denmark 10.27% 11.70% 12.03% 12.29% 12.52% 13.29% 
6.93% 8.49% 9.34% 9.85% 10.25% 11.22% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
France 11.59% 14.88% 15.11% 15.62% 16.35% 16.51% 
8.61% 10.63% 11.76% 12.46% 12.93% 14.22% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Germany 13.05% 16.31% 16.94% 17.45% 18.08% 19.29% 
9.21% 11.51% 12.72% 13.53% 14.10% 16.27% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% S1G 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 14.78% 16.79% 17.71% 18.57% 19.46% 21.22% 
10.89% 13.32% 14.76% 15.58% 16.27% 18.07% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Italy 12.83% 16.05% 16.36% 16.72% 17.69% 18.44% 
10.30% 12.55% 13.70% 14.45% 14.96% 16.27% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Japan 10.29% 13.10% 13.86% 14.24% 14.68% 15.71% 
8.38% 10.17% 11.15% 11.82% 12.21% 13.32% 
SIG1% SIG1% SIG1% SIG1% SIG1% SIG1% 
Netherlands 12.97% 15.74% 15.96% 17.07% 17.84% 17.76% 
8.22% 10.49% 11.67% 12.46% 13.02% 14.48% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 12.63% 15.43% 15.84% 16.10% 17.20% 18.10% 
9.33% 11.53% 12.68% 13.45% 13.93% 15.27% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 11.65% 13.36% 14.23% 15.54% 15.08% 15.73% 
7.35% 9.18% 10.17°/ 10.80% 11.27% 12.50% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
UK 9.46% 11.30% 12.34% 12.41% 12.18% 13.38% 
6.85% 8.54% 9.43% 9.98% 10.39% 11.40% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
USA 10.00% 12.11% 12.55% 13.38% 13.24% 13.76% 
7.479,61 8.92% 9.80% 10.37% 10.76% 11.88% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% S101% SIG 1% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-6 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia 9.78% 9.89% 10.05% 10.31% 10.79% 
9.52% 9.88% 10.02% 10.38% 10.65% 
Belgium 15.07% 15.61% 15.70% 16.55% 17.06% 
11.76% 12.25% 12.46% 13.01% 13.29% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 13.26% 13.72% 14.49% 16.46% 17.33% 
11.97% 12.58% 12.88% 13.28% 13.78% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Denmark 14.23% 14.68% 14.66% 16.35% 17.79% 
11.87% 12.48% 12.69% 13.09% 13.42% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
France 17.66% 17.39% 19.37% 20.48% 19.04% 
15.15% 15.79% 16.04% 16.47% 17.43% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Germany 19.45% 20.25% 19.92% 21.45% 19.62% 
16.61% 17.26% 17.45% 17.90% 18.07% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Hong Kong 22.63% 21.30% 22.86% 18.96% 25.54% 
19.38% 20.28% 20.60% 20.81% 20.60% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 19.63% 19.95% 20.25% 20.65% 21.20% 
17.29% 17.97% 18.27% 18.78% 19.30% 
SIG 1% 
Japan 15.56% 15.58% 15.78% 15.91% 14.50% 
14.10% 14.58% 14.87% 15.01% 14.97% 
SIG 5% 
Netherlands 18.89% 18.14% 19.84% 21.15% 19.82% 
15.56% 16.25% 16.49% 17.07% 17.52% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Spain 19.11% 19.82% 19.60% 20.10% 22.48% 
16.25% 16.97% 17.21% 17.73% 18.56% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 16.42% 15.72% 16.47% 18.32% 15.70% 
13.50% 14.17% 14.47% 15.00% 15.55% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
UK 14.12% 13.75% 14.42% 14.87% 15.03% 
12.16% 12.56% 12.78% 12.97% 13.12% 
SIG 1% 
USA 14.69% 14.70% 14.74% 15.14% 16.12% 
12.75% 13.27% 13.60% 14.10% 14.69% 
SIG 5% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the I% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-7 Sharpe Ratios 
PANEL A. 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 0.16 -0.23 -0.26 -0.53 -0.36 -0.48 
0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Belgium 1.31 0.73 0.28 0.05 -0.11 0.14 
-0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 0.99 0.18 0.12 -0.08 0.17 0.33 
-0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 0.42 0.01 0.05 0.31 0.34 0.30 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
France 0.20 -0.53 -0.35 -0.40 -0.51 0.00 
-0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Germany -0.05 -0.34 -0.45 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 
0.18 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 
Hong Kong 0.53 0.44 0.29 0.05 0.09 0.19 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 
Italy 0.12 -0.18 -0.14 0.43 -0.04 0.57 
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
SIG 5% 
Japan 0.25 0.07 -0.42 -0.99 -0.83 -0.16 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
Netherlands 0.20 -0.53 -0.49 -0.61 -0.35 0.40 
0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
Spain 0.34 -0.23 -0.22 -0.08 0.16 0.46 
-0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Switzerland 0.40 0.03 -0.22 -0.07 -0.21 0.51 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
UK 0.43 -0.52 -0.71 -0.51 -0.67 -0.06 
0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
USA 0.23 -0.36 -0.70 -0.40 -0.64 -0.05 
-0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table D-7 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -0.31 -0.43 -0.20 -0.01 0.01 
0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Belgium 0.06 0.47 0.30 0.22 0.42 
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 
Canada 0.29 0.47 0.12 -0.05 0.51 
0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.12 
Denmark 0.06 0.08 0.64 0.68 0.52 
0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
France 0.34 0.51 0.43 -0.07 0.38 
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.16 
Germany 0.24 0.35 0.38 -0.10 0.33 
0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Hong Kong 0.42 0.21 -0.23 0.19 -0.34 
-0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
Italy 0.06 -0.08 0.16 0.27 0.59 
0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 
SIG 5% 
Japan -0.25 0.16 0.26 0.03 -0.12 
0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Netherlands 0.04 0.70 0.62 0.09 0.74 
0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.09 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Spain 0.56 0.24 0.37 0.38 0.62 
0.01 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.09 
SIG 5% 
Switzerland 0.25 0.32 0.62 0.22 0.68 
0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.11 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK -0.25 -0.11 0.22 -0.31 0.54 
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
USA 0.05 -0.13 0.25 0.47 0.78 
0.03 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 
SIG 5% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Appendix E: Returns to Momentum Strategies 
(Signals based on Total Returns) 
This Appendix presents the returns to momentum strategies where trading 
signals are generated based on past total returns (rather than on past funded 
returns as in the original analysis). 
The calculation of the returns to each strategy is then carried out based on 
funded returns as described in detail in Chapter 6. 
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Table E-1 Cumulative Returns 
PANEL A. - 
1 -10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 8.49% -12.35% -16.19% -38.42% -28.95% -34.52% 
-0.23% 0.55% 0.62% 1.67% 2.01% -1.28% 
Belgium 131.44% 84.16% 40.47% 22.94% -16.07% 22.98% 
-0.41% 0.84% -0.97% -0.91% -1.63% -1.86% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 73.97% 23.17% 9.86% -11.47% 29.73% 32.40% 
1.36% -0.33% 0.06% -0.50% 0.39% 2.07% 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 37.14% -1.79% 4.15% 35.11% 46.30% 34.70% 
-0.67% 1.65% 1.65% 1.93% 0.83% 0.41% 
France 22.80% -67.72% -48.13% -52.06% -76.72% -3.34% 
0.99% -0.18% -1.09% 0.88% 0.70% -0.55% 
Germany -2.54% -49.62% -63.95% -3.37% -22.51% -25.05% 
-1.58% -1.77% -1.05% -0.67% -4.11% -0.65% 
Hong Kong 71.20% 70.56% 51.26% 2.16% 26.81% 32.91% 
0.47% 3.33% 1.96% -1.28% -1.79% -2.55% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 15.84% -21.64% -16.56% 69.81% -5.40% 94.74% 
1.26% 2.30% 0.91% 1.52% 1.71% 5.58% 
SIG 5% 
Japan 23.29% 4.53% -47.56% -126.79% -110.63% -19.67% 
-0.89% -1.94% -0.98% 0.03% -2.27% -2.83% 
Netherlands 24.52% -74.16% -69.10% -90.95% -58.88% 80.37% 
1.47% -1.32% -1.94% 0.19% 2.78% 2.10% 
SIG 5% 
Spain 42.62% -48.13% -22.15% -1.26% 29.88% 79.84% 
-0.93% 2.62% -1.30% 1.90% 0.81% 2.75% 
Switzerland 47.26% 4.89% -39.84% -20.90% -31.41% 75.60% 
1.17% 0.88% 1.21% 1.84% 2.38% 4.43% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK 36.81% -50.25% -63.75% -53.72% -72.07% 37.93% 
0.36% 0.33% 0.03% -0.66% 0.36% -0.16% 
USA 21.71% -38.53% -81.44% -50.66% -68.85% -15.88% 
-1.00% -0.18% 2.07% 2.41% 2.31% -1.27% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table E-1 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -21.90% -36.52% -30.19% -14.38% 25.36% 
2.67% 5.05% 7.08% 10.15% 14.22% 
Belgium -3.99% 61.68% 40.41% 1.87% 90.83% 
1.36% 3.73% 4.17% 8.67% 11.47 
SIG 5% 
Canada 35.36% 58.90% 44.97% 4.01% 86.89% 
4.05% 7.13% 9.62% 15.68% 21.12% 
SIG 5% 
Denmark -5.54% 11.41% 63.13% 93.45% 84.41% 
2.61% 4.73% 5.55% 10.34% 12.13% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
France 54.37% 87.54% 79.06% -17.94% 114.44% 
4.38% 4.95% 6.29% 8.22% 11.16% 
SIG 5% S105% 
Germany 48.68% 72.12% 83.00% -12.94% 77.52% 
-2.10% -2.21% 0.88% 2.90% 2.66% 
Hong Kong 84.17% 22.42% -29.57% 12.16% -106.84% 
-4.58% -6.51% -0.76% -6.06% -1.71% 
Italy 25.47% -18.04% 24.28% 56.92% 115.84% 
4.87% 8.68% 7.06% 6.55% 11.62% 
SIG 5% 
Japan -21.66% 26.79% 28.29% -0.68% -13.65% 
0.70% 4.56% 1.14% 2.07% 1.15% 
Netherlands 36.54% 99.07% 120.99% 28.44% 136.32% 
2.81% 7.02% 10.17% 14.05% 20.81% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 87.17% 7.32% 76.39% 49.26% 135.41% 
3.22% 9.94% 11.72% 17.65% 21.44% 
SIG 1% 
Switzerland 38.87% 22.09% 94.34% 35.87% 97.68% 
4.50% 6.33% 11.06% 13.59% 19.10% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK -4.57% -16.15% 31.63% -36.55% 69.90% 
1.52% 1.05% -6.94% -0.49% -37.66% 
SIG 1% 
USA 10.09% -1.61% 33.33% 65.81% 108.54% 
5.71% 9.60% 11.01% 14.47"/ 19.59% 
SIG 1% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table E-2 Cumulative Long-Only Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 21.29% 15.60% 0.37% -12.54% -6.11% 4.87% 
2.53% 3.68% 4.70% 5.51% 6.39% 4.07% 
SIG 5% 
Belgium 74.47% 43.38% 46.23% 42.04% 26.95% 29.45% 
2.19% 5.16% 4.17% 5.14% 5.14% 6.52% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 46.53% 32.28% 19.74% 12.90% 40.43% 42.22% 
4.12% 4.16% 5.99% 6.85% 7.50% 10.68% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Denmark 33.70% 19.37% 40.56% 58.33% 69.01% 41.68% 
2.45% 5.08% 5.44% 5.79% 5.59% 7.66% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
France 19.46% -19.87% 4.61% -4.42% -16.49% 17.36% 
3.27% 5.38% 5.70% 7.32% 7.19% 8.54% 
Germany 8.65% -15.28% -19.49% -8.00% 4.06% -10.34% 
1.02% 0.31% 1.37% 2.18% 1.17% 3.18% 
Hong Kong 56.31% 43.59% 18.62% -13.07% 33.86% 45.83% 
-2.63% -1.90% -2.53% -5.70% -7.19% -7.41% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 3.54% -6-91% 19.39% 68.34% 45.13% 87.44% 
3.98% 6.87% 7.12% 7.75% 8.05% 10.65% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Japan 6.74% 26.50% 9.30% -35.86% -17.69% 2.62% 
-2.73% -3.53% -3.95% -3.66% -6.03% -7.21% 
Netherlands 35.64% -29.22% -26.79% -54.31% -9.27% 54.37% 
4.75% 7.32% 8.57% 12.04% 11.95% 13.69% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Spain 23.57% -30.54% -8.10% 26.43% 58.99% 62.50% 
3.40% 7.95% 7.94% 10.37% 11.37% 14.33% 
SIG 5% S105% 
Switzerland 30.02% 25.90% -11.31% 4.31% 11.48% 63.46% 
4.48% 6.07% 8.44% 9.75% 11.13% 13.91% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
UK 16.20% -19.36% -15.45% -5.90% -25.49% 17.44% 
0.20% 0.74% 0.77% 0.03% 0.91% 0.50% 
USA 40.68% -0.47% -16.41% 15.07% 15.98% 37.34% 
3.33% 4.28% 7.44% 7.70% 8.50% 5.80% 
SIG 1% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
331 
Table E-2 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia 8.50% 9.85% 2.78% -11.82% 25.36% 
7.29% 10.05% 11.42% 14.03% 18.73% 
Belgium 36.19% 63.22% 55.51% 49.61% 88.59% 
10.13% 11.79% 11.39% 16.07% 17.45% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Canada 54.53% 76.18% 44.51% 12.36% 71.65% 
14.27% 15.62% 17.57% 21.75% 25.30% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Denmark 2.32% 24.88% 69.12% 89.08% 75.75% 
10.21% 11.41% 11.40% 14.88% 16.95% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
France 37.24% 68.08% 86.55% 32.86% 86.96% 
12.37% 13.29% 14.96% 16.35% 16.85% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Germany 37.81% 58.17% 75.92% 6.85% 49.89% 
2.73% 4.17% 6.14% 7.51% 7.70% 
SIG 5% 
Hong Kong 90.82% -1.76% -2.73% -22.83% -6.11% 
-10.42% -11.84% -10.00% -13.80% -10.92% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 38.28% -0.90% 41.73% 51.59% 92.68% 
11.91% 13.22% 11.85% 13.19% 17.38% 
SIG 1% 
Japan 13.81% 6.99% 0.01% 13.41% -8.50% 
-5.88% -4.33% -5.97%0 -6.31% -5.90% 
Netherlands 30.28% 64.97% 108.42% 52.56% 110.59% 
14.65% 18.26% 20.76% 23.39% 27.42% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Spain 91.48% 55.07% 98.20% 73.63% 121.61% 
15.00% 19.00% 21.19% 25.32% 28.29% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 32.14% 28.82% 99.76% 63.67% 97.68% 
15.66% 17.96% 21.03% 22.63% 26.99% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
UK -9.09% 1.98% 29.89% 4.31% 57.74% 
2.25% 1.15% -3.29% 1.24% -25.78% 
SIG 1% 
USA 31.34% 38.47% 61.58% 49.69% 9.07% 
13.44% 15.97%0 18.40% 21.78% 25.89% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table E-3 Cumulative Short-Only Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia -12.80% -27.95% -16.56% -25.87% -22.83% -39.39% 
-2.75% -4.23% -4.07'x6 -3.84% -4.37% -5.35% 
Belgium 56.97% 40.78% -5.76% -19.10% -43.01% -6.47% 
-2.61% -4.32% -5.14% -6.05% -6.77% -8.38% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 27.44% -9.12% -9.88% -24.38% -10.70% -9.82% 
-2.75% -4.49% -5.94% -7.36% -7.89% -8.61% 
SIG 5% 
Denmark 3.44% -21.16% -36.41% -23.33% -22.71% -6.98% 
-3.12% -3.42% -3.79% -3.86% -4.76% -7.25% 
France 3.34% -47.85% -52.74% -47.64% -60.24% -20.70% 
-2.28% -5.56% -6.79% -6.44% -6.49% -9.09% 
Germany -11.19% -34.35% -44.45% 4.63% -26.57% -14.71% 
-2.60% -2.08% -2.42% -2.85% -5.28% -3.83% 
Hong Kong 14.88% 26.97% 32.64% 15.23% -7.04% -12.92% 
3.10% 5.23% 4.49% 4.42% 5.40% 4.86% 
Italy 12.30% -14.73% -35.95% 1.47% -50.54% 7.30% 
-2.72% -4.57% -6.21% -6.23% -6.34% -5.07% 
Japan 16.54% -21.96% -56.86% -90.93% -92.93% -22.29% 
1.85% 1.59% 2.97% 3.69% 3.76% 4.37% 
Netherlands -11.12% -44.94% -42.31% -36.64% -49.60% 26.00% 
-3.28% -8.64% -10.51% -11.85% -9.17% -11.59% 
Spain 19.05% -17.60% -14.05% -27.69% -29.10% 17.34% 
-4.33% -5.32% -9.24% -8.47% -10.56% -11.58% 
Switzerland 17.24% -21.01% -28.53% -25.21% -42.89% 12.14% 
-3.31% -5.18% -7.24% -7.92% -8.74% -9.48% 
UK 20.61% -30.89% -48.30% -47.31% -46.57% -9.51% 
0.16% -0.41% -0.75% -0.69% -0.55% -0.66% 
USA -18.97% -38.07% -65.03% -65.73% -84.83% -53.22% 
-4.33% -4.45% -5.38% -5.30% -6.20% -7.07% 
Figures in italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table E-3 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -30.39% -46.37% -32.97% -2.55% 0.00% 
-4.62% -4.99% -4.34% -3.87% -2.51% 
Belgium -40.17% -1.54% -15.10% -47.74% 2.24% 
-8.77% -8.06% -7.22% -7.41% -5.98% 
Canada -19.17% -17.28% 0.46% -8.35% 15.24% 
-10.22% -8.50% -7.95% -6.07% -4.18% 
Denmark -7.87% -13.47% -6.00% 4.37% 8.6% 
-7.60% -6.68% -5.85% -4.55% -4.82% 
France 17.12% 19.46% -7.49% -50.80% 27.47% 
-7.99% -8.34% -8.67% -8.13% -5.69% 
Germany 10.87% 13.95% 7.08% -19.79% 27.63% 
-4.83% -6.38% -5.26% -4.61% -5.04% 
Hong Kong -6.65% 24.19% -26.84% 35.00% -112.95% 
5.84% 5.33% 9.23% 7.74% 9.21% 
Italy -12.81% -17.14% -17.45% 5.33% 23.15% 
-7.04% -4.54% -4.79% -6.64% -5.76% 
Japan -35.47% 19.80% 28.29% -14.09% -5.16% 
6.58% 8.88% 7.11% 8.38% 7.05% 
Netherlands 6.26% 34.10% 12.57% -24.12% 25.72% 
-11.84% -11.24% -10.59% -9.34% -6.61% 
Spain -4.30% -47.74% -21.81% -24.36% 13.80% 
-11.78% -9.06% -9.46% -7.67% -6.85% 
Switzerland 6.72% -6.73% -5.42% -27.80% -0.00% 
-11.16% -11.63% -9.97% -9.04% -7.89% 
UK 4.53% -18.13% 1.73% -40.86% 12.16% 
-0.73% -0.09% -3.66% -1.73% -11.88% 
USA -21.26% -40.09% -28.25% 16.12% 16.48% 
-7.73% -6.37% -7.39% -7.31% -6.30% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the I% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table E-4 Mean Transaction Profits 
PANEL A. - 
1 -10 Trading 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Day Strategies 
Australia 0.0246% -0.0482% -0.0774% -0.2123% -0.1969% -0.3923% 
-0.0006% -0.0022% 0.0028% 0.0094% 0.0132% -0.0150% 
Belgium 0.3078% 0.2543% 0.1619% 0.1087% -0.0893% 0.2231% 
-0.0014% 0.0035% -0.0052% -0.0055% -0.0114% -0.0221% 
SIG1% SIG1% 
Canada 0.2038% 0.0743% 0.0411% -0.0577% 0.1780% 0.3208% 
0.0045% -0.0015% 0.0000% -0.0033% -0.0030% 0.0217% 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 0.0856% -0.0058% 0.0166% 0.1800% 0.2806% 0.3614% 
-0.0020% 0.0064% 0.0078% 0.0108% 0.0055% 0.0031% 
France 0.0534% -0.2123% -0.1895% -0.2629% -0.4540% -0.0372% 
0.0032% -0.0006% -0.0054% 0.0054% 0.0051% -0.0089% 
Germany -0.0061% -0.1694% -0.2653% -0.0172% -0.1340% -0.2637% 
-0.0053% -0.0073% -0.0057% -0.0046% -0.0289% -0.0087% 
Hong Kong 0.2100% 0.2756% 0.2589% 0.0125% 0.1788% 0.3698% 
0.0023% 0.0148% 0.0108% -0.0078% -0.0117% -0.0319% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 0.0422% -0.0790% -0.0812% 0.3944% -0.0340% 1.0645% 
0.0035% 0.0084% 0.0046% 0.0089% 0.0117% 0.0605% 
SIG 5% 
Japan 0.0614% 0.0162% -0.2077% -0.6638% -0.6746% -0.2236% 
-0.0024% -0.0078% -0.0051% -0.0002% -0.0156% -0.0339% 
Netherlands 0.0561% -0.2339% -0.2966% -0.4664% -0.3547% 0.8930% 
0.0055% -0.0057% -0.0097% 0.0021% 0.0198% 0.0238% 
SIG 5% 
Spain 0.1000% -0.1583% -0.0959% -0.0069% 0.1789% 0.7905% 
-0.0028% 0.0102% -0.0065% 0.0109% 0.0056% 0.0309% 
Switzerland 0.1212% 0.0176% -0.1828% -0.1111% -0.1915% 0.8494% 
0.0041% 0.0033% 0.0064% 0.0113% 0.0172% 0.0516% 
SIG 5% 
UK 0.0868% -0.1585% -0.2645% -0.2812% -0.4476% 0.0911% 
0.0012% 0.0013% -0.0002% -0-0039% 0.0026% -0.0006% 
USA 0.0523% -0.1272% -0.3324% -0.2520% -0.4026% -0.1690% 
-0.0030% -0.0013% 0.0102% 0.0146% 0.0161% -0.0145% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table E-4 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -0.4866% -1.4609% -1.6771% -1.4376% 5.0716% 
-0.0126% -0.0252% -0.0378% -0.0756% -0.1512% 
Belgium -0.0725% 1.9897% 1.7571% 0.1440% 15.1383% 
0.0254% 0.1430% 0.2221% 0.8367% 1.9808% 
SIG 5% 
Canada 0.6672% 1.9634% 2.1414% 0.3087% 12.4129% 
0.0823% 0.2610% 0.5070% 1.5301% 3.6907% 
Denmark -0.0973% 0.3458% 2.8694% 6.6749% 12.0589% 
0.0530% 0.1781% 0.3019% 0.9992% 2.0908% 
France 1.0455% 3.2422% 4.1611% -1.4948% 19.0728% 
0.0926% 0.1909% 0.3367% 0.8318% 1.9055% 
SIG 5% 
Germany 0.9545% 2.6712% 4.3683% -1.1764% 12.9195% 
-0.0471% -0.0977'% 0.0241% 0.2385% 0.3884% 
Hong Kong 1.6835% 0.8008% -1.4079% 1.1058% -17.8062% 
-0.1014% -0.2448% -0.0241% -0.6786% -0.5133% 
Italy 0.4899% -0.6682% 1.3488% 5.1746% 23.1671% 
0.0974% 0.3155% 0.3802% 0.6719% 1.9244% 
SIG 5% 
Japan -0.4608% 1.0304% 1.7683% -0.0680% -3.4137% 
0.0176% 0.1836% 0.0565% 0.2259% 0.3793% 
Netherlands 0.7165% 3.5380% 6.3681% 2.1875% 19.4736% 
0.0571% 0.2707% 0.5296% 1.3623% 3.7214% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Spain 1.6143% 0.2525% 3.8195% 4.1053% 22.5684% 
0.0663% 0.3886% 0.6312% 1.7681% 3.6231% 
SIG 5% 
Switzerland 0.7475% 0.8181% 4.9652% 2.7592% 16.2801% 
0.0942% 0.2477% 0.6238% 1.4133% 3.6175% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK -0.0952% -0.5569% 1.7570% -3.3227% 11.6500% 
0.0328% 0.0322% -0.4123% -0.0821% -7.5886% 
SIG 1% 
USA 0.1940% -0.0557% 1.5871% 5.9830% 18.0908% 
0.1151% 0.3612% 0.5725% 1.3720% 3.3643% 
SIG 5% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table E-5 Mean Transaction and Daily Profit by Strategy 
Length 
Strategy Length (Trading Days) Mean Transaction Profit Mean Daily Profit 
1 0.0999% 0.0999% 
2 -0.0396% -0.0198% 
3 -0.1082% -0.0361% 
4 -0.1169% -0.0292% 
5 -0.1545% -0.0309% 
10 0.2770% 0.0277% 
21 0.4929% 0.0235% 
42 0.9936% 0.0237% 
63 2.4162% 0.0384% 
126 1.4960% 0.0119% 
252 11.9060% 0.0472% 
Table shows the mean transaction profit across all 14 data sets for each strategy length together with the 
mean daily profit for days on which each strategy holds a market position. 
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Table E-6 Standard Deviation of Daily Returns 
PANEL A: 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 6.60% 7.87% 8.47% 8.75% 8.76% 9.68% 
5.63% 6.92% 7.58% 7.98% 8.24% 8.96% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Belgium 10.38% 12.27% 12.75% 13.01% 13.97% 14.71% 
6.53% 8.12% 8.94% 9.51% 9.93% 11.01% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 8.48% 10.91% 12.12% 12.71% 12.24% 12.93% 
6.57% 8.24% 9.13% 9.70% 10.12% 11.19% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Denmark 10.28% 11.70% 12.05% 12.27% 12.47% 13.26% 
6.95% 8.50% 9.33% 9.86% 10.28% 11.24% 
SIG1% SIG1% SIG1% SIG1% SIG1% SIG1% 
France 11.57% 14.90% 15.12% 15.57% 16.33% 16.49% 
8.56% 10.67% 11.75% 12.45% 12.97% 14.27% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% S101% 
Germany 13.07% 16.30% 16.95% 17.48% 18.05% 19.38% 
9.25% 11.51% 12.72% 13.53% 14.10% 15.51% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 14.78% 16.59% 17.83% 18.62% 19.27% 21.75% 
11.07% 13.46% 14.77% 15.58% 16.28% 18.03% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Italy 12.82% 16.02% 16.42% 16.76% 17.71% 18.29% 
10.28% 12.55% 13.70% 14.45% 14.97% 16.29% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% S1G 1% 
Japan 10.29% 13.08% 13.89% 14.25% 14.69% 15.75% 
8.38% 10.18% 11.19% 11.79% 12.22% 13.32% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Netherlands 12.98% 15.74% 16.01% 17.07% 17.86% 17.94% 
8.27% 10.54% 11.70% 12.49% 13.03% 14.50% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 12.65% 15.60% 15.93% 16.17% 17.24% 18.10% 
9.34% 11.53% 12.69% 13.45% 13.95% 15.27% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 11.64% 13.40% 14.28% 15.59% 15.25% 15.84% 
7.45% 9.30% 10.29% 10.93% 11.39% 12.59% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
UK 9.34% 11.25% 12.41% 12.43% 12.19% 13.25% 
6.88% 8.55% 9.45% 10.00% 10.40% 11.42% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
USA 9.99% 12.10% 12.55% 13.39% 13.21% 13.81% 
7.49% 8.93% 9.81% 10.39% 10.81% 11.94% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Figures in Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table E-6 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia 9.85% 9.92% 10.27% 10.33% 10.78% 
9.58% 9.97% 10.20% 10.61% 11.14% 
Belgium 15.18% 15.52% 15.63% 15.10% 14.57% 
11.79% 12.34% 12.61% 13.08% 13.64% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 13.37% 13.88% 14.71% 16.62% 17.08% 
12.04% 12.63% 12.93% 13.40% 13.98% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Denmark 14.32% 14.74% 14.88% 16.37% 17.22% 
11.98% 12.49% 12.73% 13.19% 13.59% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
France 17.94% 17.92% 18.85% 20.62% 19.03% 
15.13% 15.83% 16.10% 16.58% 17.11% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Germany 19.44% 20.20% 19.93% 21.52% 23.63% 
16.53% 17.31% 17.51% 17.97/ 18.18% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 22.27% 21.54% 23.02% 19.64% 26.82% 
19.42% 20.31% 20.50% 20.78% 20.52% 
SIG 5% 
Italy 19.32% 19.96% 20.08% 21.16% 21.43% 
17.32% 18.01% 18.37% 18.88% 19.46% 
SIG 5% 
Japan 15.57% 15.58% 15.69% 16.29% 14.47% 
14.10% 14.59% 14.87% 14.99% 14.90% 
SIG 5% 
Netherlands 18.59% 18.78% 19.51% 21.30% 20.25% 
15.60% 16.28% 16.64% 17.22% 17.89% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Spain 19.58% 19.69% 19.37% 20.24% 23.38% 
16.26% 17.01 % 17.32% 17.91% 18.96% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 16.24% 16.28% 15.66% 18.35% 15.69% 
13.57% 14.27% 14.50% 15.10% 15.70% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK 13.96% 13.53% 14.52% 14.72% 14.58% 
12.18% 12.64% 12.84% 13.21% 13.12% 
SIG 1% 
USA 14.91% 14.72% 15.05% 15.03% 15.91% 
12.75% 13.32% 13.71% 14.21% 14.94% 
SIG 5% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
339 
Table E-7 Sharpe Ratios 
PANEL A. - 
1-10 Trading Day 1 2 3 4 5 10 
Strategies 
Australia 0.14 -0.17 -0.21 -0.49 -0.37 -0.39 
0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.02 
Belgium 1.40 0.76 0.35 0.20 -0.13 0.17 
-0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Canada 0.97 0.24 0.09 -0.10 0.27 0.28 
0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 0.40 -0.02 0.04 0.32 0.41 0.29 
-0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 
France 0.22 -0.51 -0.35 -0.37 -0.52 -0.02 
0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Germany -0.02 -0.34 -0.42 -0.02 -0.14 -0.14 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
Hong Kong 0.53 0.47 0.32 0.01 0.15 0.17 
0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Italy 0.14 -0.15 -0.11 0.46 -0.03 0.57 
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 
SIG 5% 
Japan 0.26 0.04 -0.39 -1.01 -0.85 -0.14 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
Netherlands 0.21 -0.52 -0.47 -0.58 -0.36 0.49 
0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Spain 0.37 -0.34 -0.15 -0.01 0.19 0.49 
-0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Switzerland 0.45 0.04 -0.31 -0.15 -0.23 0.53 
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 
UK 0.44 -0.50 -0.57 -0.48 -0.68 0.07 
0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
USA 0.24 -0.35 -0.72 -0.42 -0.58 -0.13 
-0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% Indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Table E-7 (continued) 
PANEL B: 
21-252 Trading 21 42 63 126 252 
Day Strategies 
Australia -0.25 -0.41 -0.33 -0.15 0.26 
0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.12 
Belgium -0.03 0.44 0.29 0.01 0.69 
0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06 
SIG 5% 
Canada 0.29 0.47 0.34 0.03 0.57 
0.02 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.15 
SIG 5% 
Denmark -0.04 0.09 0.47 0.63 0.54 
0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.08 
SIG 5% 
France 0.34 0.54 0.47 -0.10 0.67 
0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 
SIG 5% 
Germany 0.28 0.40 0.46 -0.07 0.36 
-0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Hong Kong 0.41 0.11 -0.14 0.07 -0.44 
-0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 
Italy 0.15 -0.10 0.13 0.30 0.60 
0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 
SIG 5% 
Japan -0.16 0.20 0.20 0.00 -0.11 
0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Netherlands 0.22 0.58 0.68 0.15 0.74 
0.02 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.11 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Spain 0.50 0.04 0.44 0.27 0.64 
0.02 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10 
SIG 5% 
Switzerland 0.27 0.15 0.67 0.22 0.69 
0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.12 
SIG 5% GIG 5% 
UK -0.04 -0.13 0.24 -0.28 0.53 
0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.31 
SIG 1% 
USA 0.08 -0.01 0.25 0.49 0.76 
0.05 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.13 
SIG 1% 
Figures In Italics are mean values from 4999 bootstrap runs 
SIG 1% indicates bootstrap significance at the 1% level 
SIG 5% indicates bootstrap significance at the 5% level 
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Appendix F: Trends in Stock Market Prices 
Australia 
Date Price Date Found 
13Jan94 163.14 25Feb94 
23Mar94 164.38 05May94 
11 Ju194 148.40 29Aug94 
31 Aug94 161.54 07Oct94 
08Feb95 141.08 11 Apr95 
26Apr96 177.56 11 Jul96 
17Jul96 158.87 19Aug96 
23Sep97 218.27 24Oct97 
Date Price Date Found 
28Oct97 180.69 04Nov97 
16Apr98 224.16 11Jun98 
01 Sep98 189.48 23Nov98 
27Apr99 240.44 21 Sep99 
19Oct99 211.84 18Nov99 
29Jun01 281.05 31Aug01 
24Sep01 230.97 05Oct01 
07Mar02 280.19 26Jun02 
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Belgium 
Date Price Date Found 
31Jan94 148.66 03Jun94 
13Ju194 132.77 02Aug94 
08Aug94 141.93 19Sep94 
070ct94 126.66 05Dec94 
05Dec94 134.98 06Mar95 
09Mar95 124.16 11 Apr95 
01Feb96 163.34 19Feb96 
20Feb96 150.44 07Mar96 
11 Mar97 209.61 20Mar97 
20Mar97 196.17 23Apr97 
28Jul97 239.98 13Aug97 
280ct97 206.89 01 Dec97 
20Jul98 360.48 28Aug98 
050ct98 268.42 150ct98 
Date Price Date Found 
06Jan99 377.88 24Mar99 
10Aug99 295.04 17Sep99 
17Sep99 334.30 180099 
18Oct99 299.50 05Nov99 
16Nov99 350.30 18Jan00 
13Mar00 262.37 16Mar00 
06Nov00 335.71 13Mar01 
22Mar01 273.25 30Mar01 
19Ju101 310.31 10Sep01 
21Sep01 243.89 28Sep01 
23Apr02 299.40 12Jun02 
24JuI02 205.64 27Aug02 
27Aug02 244.38 18Sep02 
09Oct02 181.03 21 Nov02 
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Canada 
Date Price Date Found 
31 Dec93 130.19 19Jan94 
01Feb94 138.14 21Feb94 
24Feb94 129.74 18Mar94 
23Mar94 139.16 30Mar94 
19Apr94 124.66 26May94 
26May94 131.70 21Jun94 
24Jun94 121.22 02Aug94 
19Sep94 137.24 09Nov94 
30Jan95 125.01 20Mar95 
17Ju195 147.89 27Sep95 
230ct95 132.91 06Nov95 
03J un 96 163.72 16J u l96 
24JuI96 153.11 22Aug96 
Date Price Date Found 
10Mar97 201.82 27Mar97 
11 Apr97 180.31 02May97 
07Oct97 232.31 27Oct97 
12Jan98 206.71 11Feb98 
25May98 260.54 29Jul98 
05Oct98 179.63 28Oct98 
27MarOO 358.39 14Apr00 
14Apr00 300.19 05May00 
01 Sep00 406.26 250ct00 
21Sep01 232.06 19Nov01 
07Mar02 282.15 13Jun02 
09Oct02 199.35 18Oct02 
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Denmark 
Date Price Date Found 
31 Dec93 228.45 19Jan94 
02Feb94 252.63 25Mar94 
29Mar95 189.75 09May95 
15Sep95 220.90 15Nov95 
15Nov95 207.15 03Jan96 
11 Mar97 333.45 03Apr97 
03Apr97 306.63 06May97 
17Jul97 391.13 18Aug97 
15Sep97 350.78 29Sep97 
15Jul98 498.97 05Aug98 
08Oct98 362.77 21 Dec98 
Date Price Date Found 
06Jan99 444.10 09Mar99 
15Mar99 375.36 09Ju199 
21 Mar00 564.86 11 Apr00 
17Apr00 498.06 02May00 
060ct00 671.16 22Nov00 
21 Dec00 564.47 24Jan01 
31 Jan01 655.93 13Mar01 
04Apr01 526.08 22May01 
31 May01 601.93 30Aug01 
21 Sep01 447.94 11 Oct01 
11 Oct01 522.34 19J un02 
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France 
Date Price Date Found 
02Feb94 171.21 02Mar94 
04JuI94 136.74 25Jul94 
02Aug94 153.21 20Sep94 
13Mar95 127.20 21 Apr95 
12May95 147.99 22Sep95 
23Oct95 128.58 03Jan96 
30Apr96 160.85 24Jul96 
24Jul96 147.76 30Sep96 
030ctl97 228.77 28Oct97 
Date Price Date Found 
28Oct97 197.29 30Dec97 
17Jul98 323.25 11 Aug98 
08Oct98 217.19 27Oct98 
04Sep00 505.52 11 Oct00 
22Mar01 368.91 27Apr01 
22 M ay01 433.03 1u l01 
21 Sep01 282.95 10Oct01 
28Mar02 363.79 13Jun02 
09Oct02 212.07 28Nov02 
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Germany 
Date Price Date Found 
03Jan94 126.93 24Jan94 
02Mar94 114.20 18Apr94 
02 M ay94 126.17 14J un 94 
20Jun94 109.77 02Aug94 
31Aug94 121.61 30Sep94 
28 M ar95 103.95 12 M ay95 
15Sep95 124.58 23Oct95 
27Oct95 113.35 12Dec95 
31Jul97 227.67 26Aug97 
15Sep97 196.63 07Oct97 
Date Price Date Found 
08Oct97 222.38 28Oct97 
28Oct97 183.73 08Dec97 
20Jul98 301.07 11Aug98 
08Oct98 189.27 27Oct98 
07Mar00 355.04 21 Sep00 
22Mar01 262.88 30Apr01 
24May01 304.24 10Aug01 
21 Sep01 184.20 04Oct01 
19Mar02 268.08 07Jun02 
09Oct02 129.93 21Oct02 
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Hong Kong 
Date Price Date Found 
04Jan94 502.33 12Jan94 
13Jan94 413.38 01Feb94 
04Feb94 488.89 21 Feb94 
04May94 338.55 20May94 
09Sep94 413.12 22Nov94 
23Jan95 275.47 24Feb95 
16Feb96 447.97 13Mar96 
13Mar96 399.61 27Sep96 
16Jan97 511.18 13Mar97 
03Apr97 437.59 06May97 
07Aug97 576.49 29Aug97 
28Oct97 312.46 03Nov97 
03Nov97 387.04 08Jan98 
Date Price Date Found 
12Jan98 261.53 02Feb98 
25Mar98 360.58 27May98 
13Aug98 195.65 12Oct98 
24Nov98 333.76 10Feb99 
10Feb99 266.65 07Apr99 
05Jul99 422.96 15Oct99 
19Oct99 350.66 16Nov99 
28MarOO 488.94 17Apr00 
26May00 370.45 05JulOO 
21Ju100 478.78 22Sep00 
21Sep01 251.61 09Nov01 
07Jan02 338.79 26Jun02 
10Oct02 241.21 25Nov02 
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Italy 
Date Price Date Found 
10Jan94 83.73 31Jan94 
10 Ma y94 116.44 15J un94 
12Dec94 82.10 16Jan95 
09Feb95 98.94 16Oct95 
05Dec95 80.18 19Jan96 
08Feb96 94.02 26Mar96 
26Mar96 82.75 22Apr96 
26Apr96 97.95 16Jul96 
05Sep96 82.67 19Nov96 
06Apr98 240.65 27Apr98 
27Apr98 19 8.58 16J u 198 
20Jul98 241.67 28Aug98 
Date Price Date Found 
09Oct98 155.36 04Nov98 
07Jan99 236.46 14Oct99 
18Oct99 197.35 01 Dec99 
06Mar00 306.48 03Apr00 
17Apr00 256.92 15Nov00 
15Nov00 295.76 16Feb01 
22Mar01 221.39 18Apr01 
30Apr01 255.22 18Jun01 
21Sep01 149.01 27Sep01 
16Apr02 207.40 14Jun02 
09Oct02 132.30 21 Nov02 
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Japan 
Date Price Date Found 
31Dec93 91.80 31Jan94 
13Jun94 108.46 21 Nov94 
29Jun95 76.33 17Jul95 
26Jun96 109.29 07Aug96 
27Jan97 84.66 30Apr97 
28M97 101.50 17Sep97 
12Jan98 74.47 10Feb98 
Date Price Date Found 
10Feb98 85.61 27Aug98 
09Oct98 64.31 24Nov98 
07Feb00 113.55 27JuI00 
14Mar01 78.79 26Mar01 
07May01 97.38 15Jun01 
06Feb02 62.74 04Mar02 
24May02 77.25 26Jun02 
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Netherlands 
Date Price Date Found 
31Jan94 184.54 02Mar94 
05Apr94 167.17 15Apr94 
15Apr94 177.77 27May94 
27Jun94 159.18 29Jul94 
29Aug94 175.68 22Sep94 
060ct94 162.51 01 May95 
15Sep95 192.04 270ct95 
270ct95 180.34 27Nov95 
12Jun96 235.15 16Jul96 
24Jul96 213.36 16Aug96 
Date Price Date Found 
07Aug97 415.86 15Aug97 
28Oct97 346.26 17Feb98 
20Jul98 514.59 11Aug98 
08Oct98 331.98 02Nov98 
04Sep00 607.11 07Feb01 
22Mar01 465.45 18Apr01 
22May01 541.02 18Ju101 
21Sep01 351.35 28Sep01 
28Mar02 473.16 13Jun02 
351 
Spain 
Date Price Date Found 
31 Dec93 150.88 31 Jan94 
31Jan94 166.15 02Mar94 
04Apr94 140.19 18May94 
20May94 154.56 17Jun94 
06Jul94 132.01 01 Aug94 
08Aug94 147.59 06Sep94 
23Mar95 121.45 08May95 
13Sep95 147.46 090ct95 
230ct95 133.17 23Nov95 
Date Price Date Found 
01Oct97 315.16 27Oct97 
28Oct97 261.23 27Nov97 
17Jul98 480.17 21Aug98 
01Oct98 311.93 27Oct98 
06Mar00 566.27 1 OMayOO 
21 Sep01 314.93 17Oct01 
05Dec01 423.57 06Jun02 
09Oct02 249.04 21 Nov02 
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Switzerland 
Date Price Date Found 
31Dec93 147.44 31Jan94 
31 Jan94 158.77 14Feb94 
09May94 131.48 08Jun94 
08Jun94 141.54 20Jun94 
13Jul94 125.75 02Sep94 
05Sep94 135.37 260ct94 
270ct94 125.09 22Dec94 
11Jul96 192.96 24Jul96 
24Jul96 175.82 020096 
08Jul97 299.31 18Aug97 
29Aug97 263.01 020ct97 
030ct97 295.48 280ct97 
Date Price Date Found 
28Oct97 262.56 05Dec97 
21 JuI98 409.67 24Aug98 
05Oct98 256.62 20Oct98 
07Sep99 388.04 13Mar00 
13Mar00 341.83 11 May00 
23Aug00 421.22 02Mar01 
22Mar01 336.95 12Apr01 
22May01 392.71 27Jun01 
21Sep01 262.11 28Sep01 
16May02 345.78 20Jun02 
24JuI02 240.56 19Aug02 
19Aug02 289.47 23Sep02 
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UK 
Date Price Date Found 
02Feb94 213.18 24Feb94 
24J un 94 174.10 15J ul 94 
26Aug94 197.29 16Sep94 
12Dec94 177.39 06Apr95 
19Apr96 231.93 16Jul96 
16Jui96 218.56 16Aug96 
030ct97 310.10 270ct97 
13Nov97 275.18 08Dec97 
20Jul98 358.17 06Aug98 
050ct98 270.11 270ct98 
06Jul99 384.65 150ct99 
Date Price Date Found 
18Oct99 340.57 25Nov99 
30Dec99 394.65 04Feb00 
15Feb00 337.78 21 Mar00 
04Sep00 396.84 20Feb01 
22Mar01 315.93 27Apr01 
22May01 355.56 24Jul01 
21 Sep01 263.97 10Oct01 
06 Dec01 321.24 14Jun02 
24JuI02 226.34 27Aug02 
27Aug02 265.70 23Sep02 
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USA 
Date Price Date Found 
02Feb94 196.04 29Mar94 
04Apr94 178.95 16Aug94 
30Aug94 194.32 01 Dec94 
08Dec94 182.33 03Feb95 
05Jun96 276.47 15Jul96 
24JuI96 254.79 13Sep96 
18Feb97 331.54 02Apr97 
11Apr97 299.79 02May97 
070ct97 399.82 270ct97 
270ct97 358.31 05Dec97 
17Jul98 485.88 14Aug98 
Date Price Date Found 
08Oct98 390.12 29Oct98 
16Jul99 584.07 15Oct99 
15Oct99 512.82 16Nov99 
24MarOO 632.32 120ct00 
04Apr01 452.23 01 May01 
21 May01 540.78 29Aug01 
21Sep01 396.41 06Nov01 
04Jan02 480.93 07May02 
23Jui02 326.98 15Aug02 
22Aug02 394.31 24Sep02 
09Oct02 317.20 04Nov02 
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Appendix G: Results of Trend Analysis with 
Adjusted R 
This Appendix presents the results of the analysis of the properties of trends in 
stock market prices described in Chapters 8 and 9 where R is set to 1/3 of the 
standard deviation of price returns over the previous 252 trading days (rather than 
2/3 the standard deviation as in the original analysis). This means that the 
algorithm will identify more, but shorter, trends for each market. 
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Table G-1 Duration and Amplitude of Stock Market Trends 
Number of Trends Duration (trading days) Total Amplitude (%) 
Bull Bear Bull Bear Bull Bear 
32 00 31.00 42.38 28.81 9.78% -8.45% Australia . 
27.09 27.10 46.12 36.77 10.78% -8.95% 
00 28 29.00 43.00 34.31 13.50% -11.93% Belgium . 
29.94 29.96 40.72 34.30 12.12% -10.48% 
00 30 30.00 42.37 31.30 12.69% -10.84% Canada . 
30.80 30.81 41.51 31.06 12.49% -10.11% 
00 32 32.00 39.81 29.66 12.55% -10.77% Denmark . 
28.02 28.05 44.63 35.58 13.22% -11.02% 
00 29 29.00 44.72 31.14 14.82% -13.23% France . 
29.95 29.95 40.21 34.35 15.62% -13.66% 
00 28 28.00 51.96 28.43 16.77% -14.89% Germany . 
31.15 31.16 37.50 34.37 16.12% -14.98% 
SIG 5% 
34 00 34.00 35.59 31.32 18.85% -19.52% Hong Kong . 
2Z62 27.61 38.07 43.93 19.44% -20.49% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
00 32 31.00 37.59 34.13 18.47% -16.09% Italy . 
28.47 28.46 42.24 37.09 18.77% -16.14% 
00 23 22.00 39.83 58.50 13.99% -15.69% Japan . 
26.48 26.46 37.66 45.09 14.09% -15.22% 
00 29 28.00 52.55 26.86 16.00% -13.57% Netherlands . 
32.68 32.68 37.70 31.60 15.19% -12.99% 
SIG 5% 
00 35 35.00 35.80 27.31 15.20% -13.11% Spain . 
29.96 29.97 40.88 33.72 17.15% -14.30% 
Switzerland 31.00 30.00 
43.32 29.93 14.22% -12.10% 
29.59 29.61 41.44 33.87 14.34% -12.12% 
00 28 27.00 48.36 32.93 11.57% -10.74% UK . 
30.73 30.73 37.88 35.09 11.91% -11.14% 
00 27 27.00 54.33 27.56 13.89% -11.45% USA . 
31.56 31.56 39.42 31.54 12.95% -10.64% 
SIG 5% 
Bootstrap average values are shown in Italics. Significance at the I% level, shown In the table as "SIG 1 °%", is 
based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5"' and 99.5"' percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. Significance at 
the 5% level, shown in the table as "SIG 5%", Is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5" and 97.50 percentile 
values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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Table G-2 Mean Daily Price Returns in Stock Market Trends 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear Q1 02 03 04 01 02 03 04 
Australia 0.23% -0.29% 0.37% 0.16% 0.14% 0.26% -0.34% -0.13% -0.17% -0.55% 
0.24% -0.25% 0.31% 0.17% 0.17% 0.30% -0.33% -0.17% -0.17% -0.33% 
SIG 1% 
Belgium 0.31% -0.35% 0.45% 0.19% 0.24% 0.38% -0.36% -0.22% -0.16% -0.67% 
0.30% -0.31% 0.39% 0.21% 0.22% 0.39% -0.42% -0.21% -0.21% -0.41% 
SIG 1% 
Canada 0.30% -0.35% 0.43% 0.23% 0.20% 0.34% -0.45% -0.14% -0.12% -0.70% 
0.30% -0.33% 0.39% 0.22% 0.23% 0.38% -0.46% -0.21% -0.22% -0.44% 
SIG 1% 
Denmark 0.32% -0.36% 0.45% 0.16% 0.24% 0.43% -0.30% -0.34% -0.22% -0.59% 
0.30% -0.31% 0.39% 0.22% 0.22% 0.38% -0.43% -0.21% -0.20% -0.42% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
33% 0 -0 43% 0.54% 0.19% 0.21% 0.40% -0.43% -0.20% -0.35% -0 73% France . . . 
0.39% -0.40% 0.51% 0.28% 0.28% 0.50% -0.54% -0.27% -0.27% -0.54% 
SIG 5% 
Germany 0.32% -0.52% 0.52% 0.23% 0.21% 0.35% -0.47% -0.39% -0.30% -0.95% 
0.43% -0.44% 0.57% 0.30% 0.31% 0.56% -0.60% -0.30% -0.30% -0.58% 
SIG 1% SIG 6% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 0.53% -0.62% 0.91% 0.28% 0.42% 0.53% -0.60% -0.37% -0.30% -1.25% 
0.52% -0.47% 0.69% 0.34% 0.36% 0.68% -0.63% -0.33% -0.33% -0.61% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Italy 0.49% -0.47% 0.73% 0.32% 0.35% 0.58% -0.56% -0.25% -0.20% -0.89% 
0.45% -0.44% 0.59% 0.31% 0.32% 0.58% -0.59% -0.30% -0.30% -0.58% 
S101% 
35% 0 -0.27% 0.70% 0.16% 0.20% 0.36% -0.30% -0.13% -0.24% -0 41% Japan . . 
0.38% -0.34% 0.51% 0.26% 0.25% 0.50% -0.45% -0.24% -0.24% -0.45% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Netherlands 0.30% -0.51% 0.46% 
0.19% 0.21% 0.36% -0.49% -0.28% -0.30% -0.97% 
0.41% -0.42% 0.53% 0.29% 0.29% 0.52% -0.56% -0.27% -0.29% -0.55% 
SIG 1% S1G 5% SIG 1% 510 1% 
Spain 0.42% -0.48% 0.65% 
0.25% 0.32% 0.50% -0.43% -0.34% -0.41% -0.75% 
0.42% -0.43% 0.55% 0.30% 0.31% 0.54% -0.59% -0.28% -0.29% -0.58% 
I- 
SIG 5% I S105% 
Switzerland 0.33% -0.40% 0.53% 0.17% 0.20% 0.42% -0.37% -0.25% -0.21% -0.81% 
0.35% -0.36% 0.45% 0.26% 0.25% 0.45% -0.49% -0.24% -0.24% -0.48% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
UK 0.24% -0.33% 0.38% 0.20% 0.17% 0.21% -0.36% -0.20% -0.19% -0.58% 
0.32% -0.32% 0.42% 0.22% 0.23% 0.41% -0.43% -0.22% -0.22% -0.43% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
USA 0.26% -0.42% 0.41% 0.17% 0.21% 0.23% -0.44% -0.17% -0.23% -0.86% 
0.33% -0.34% 0.43% 0.24% 0.24% 0.42% -0.46% -0.23% -0.23% -0.46% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown In Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown In the table as "SIG M", is 
based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5" and 99.5' percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. Significance at 
the 5% level, shown in the table as "SIG 5%", Is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5'" and 97.5' percentile 
values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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Table G-3 Proportion of Positive Daily Price Returns 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 01 02 03 04 
28% 61 36.51% 64.92% 58.26% 56.13% 66.27% 28.04% 43.11% 42.98% 31 05% Australia . . 
61.89% 38.24% 65.85% 58.12% 58.21% 65.80% 33.47% 42.68% 42.69% 33.70% 
Belgium 64.70% 36.08% 68.73% 
58.88% 60.58% 71.04% 32.35% 40.32% 44.62% 26.23% 
62.23% 39.30% 66.33% 58.56% 58.49% 66.37% 34.56% 43.75% 43.71% 34.90% 
SIG 1% 
Canada 66.01% 35.46% 68.93% 62.07% 64.02% 69.84% 28.57% 42.19% 40.89% 29.44% 
63.38% 39.40% 67.32% 59.93% 59.77"/ 6734% 34.14% 44.42% 44.09% 34.82% 
SIG 5% 
Denmark 63.42% 35.19% 
68.30% 58.20% 59.02% 68.55% 32.44% 33.61% 41.77% 32.48% 
61.50% 38.23% 65.36% 57.80% 57.79% 65.50% 33.38% 42.75% 42.80% 33.55% 
SIG 1% 
68% 61 37.21% 67.83% 59.69% 56.80% 62.81% 35.02% 42.98% 40.08% 30.32% France . 
62.54% 38.46% 66.95% 58.68% 58.61% 66.58% 33.53% 43.09% 42.94% 33.87% 
37% 61 35.80% 64.59% 59.67% 57.18% 64.35% 31.05% 39.11% 44.98% 29 23% Germany . . 
63.65% 39.73% 67.81% 59.78% 59.88% 67.99% 35.06% 44.32% 43.97% 35.37% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Hong Kong 61.98% 34.55% 
66.90% 56.35% 58.73% 66.44% 30.71% 41.79% 37.37% 27.86% 
60.84% 38.74% 65.24% 56.50% 56.86% 65.52% 34.84% 42.47% 42.50% 34.85% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Italy 62.43% 36.11% 
67.35% 58.22% 58.52% 66.67% 29.08% 42.75% 43.64% 28.14% 
61.04% 37.19% 65.40% 57.10% 57.14% 64.98% 32.67% 41.47% 41.46% 32.68% 
Japan 59.61% 38.54% 
63.64% 56.65% 52.94% 67.11% 33.54% 43.83% 40.85% 35.74% 
59.65% 36.74% 64.46% 55.56% 55.05% 64.20% 32.73% 40.57% 40.51% 32.80% 
Netherlands 60.24% 35.64% 
63.98% 57.85% 56.23% 64.19% 29.61% 41.88% 43.94% 26.09% 
62.83% 39.11% 67.01% 59.56% 58.97% 67.02% 34.22% 43.97% 43.60% 34.66% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Spain 64.49% 35.36% 69.21% 
60.63% 62.08% 67.31% 34.35% 36.25% 41.27% 29.91% 
62.72% 38.59% 66.79% 58.97% 58.84% 66.84% 33.69% 43.41% 43.06% 33.77% 
SIG 5% 
Switzerland 63.66% 37.08% 66.56% 57.57% 
63.04% 69.79% 31.02% 42.67% 44.12% 29.68% 
63.20% 39.94% 67.25% 59.68% 59.27% 67.35% 35.28% 44.46% 44.35% 35.42% 
UK 61.15% 38.92% 64.94% 58.19% 60.63% 61.81% 36.15% 43.95% 42.13% 33.03% 
63.63% 39.58% 68.01% 59.83% 59.65% 67.86% 34.94% 43.95% 43.97% 35.17% 
SIG 6% 
USA 60.40% 36.42% 62.25% 56.84% 58.24% 64.46% 30.51% 42.86% 46.43% 24.73% 
62.91% 38.84% 66.89% 59.55% 59.26% 66.98% 33.85% 43.79% 43.31% 34.26% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown in Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown in the table as "SIG 1 %, is 
based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5" and 99.5'h percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. Significance at 
the 5% level, shown in the table as "SIG 5%", is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5' and 97.5'h percentile 
values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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Table G-4 Mean Positive Price Returns in Stock Market Trends 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 01 02 03 04 
Australia 0.69% 0.53% 0.84% 0.67% 0.64% 0.62% 0.51% 0.57% 0.52% 0.50% 
0.71% 0.53% 0.73% 0.68% 0.68% 0.73% 0.50% 0.55% 0.54% 0.50% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Belgium 0.77% 0.62% 0.98% 0.69% 0.70% 0.71% 0.64% 0.60% 0.61% 0.62% 
0.83% 0.57% 0.86% 0.79% 0.79% 0.86% 0.55% 0.59% 0.59% 0.55% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Canada 0.74% 0.75% 0.90% 0.71% 0.64% 0.72% 0.73% 0.77% 0.82% 0.62% 
0.83% 0.60% 0.87% 0.80% 0.80% 0.86% 0.57% 0.62% 0.61% 0.57% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Denmark 0.81% 0.70% 0.89% 0.75% 0.77% 0.82% 0.73% 0.64% 0.74% 0.68% 
0.87% 0.64% 0.90% 0.84% 0.84% 0.89% 0.61% 0.66% 0.66% 0.61% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
France 1.01% 0.88% 1.19% 0.93% 0.91% 0.97% 0.72% 0.84% 0.89% 1.10% 
1.10% 0.80% 1.14% 1.07% 1.06% 1.14% 0.77% 0.82% 0.82% 0.77% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Germany 1.03% 1.10% 1.28% 0.96% 0.90% 0.95% 0.88% 1.01% 1.06% 1.51% 
1.17% 0.84% 1.22% 1.11% 1.12% 1.21% 0.81% 0.87% 0.87% 0.81% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 1.40% 0.90% 1.79% 1.27% 1.32% 1.22% 0.69% 0.88% 1.08% 0.89% 
1.44% 0.96% 1.52% 1.35% 1.36% 1.50% 0.92% 1.00% 1.00% 0.91% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Italy 1.32% 0.96% 1.61% 1.25% 1.28% 1.25% 0.78% 1.04% 1.01% 0.94% 
1.32% 0.97% 1.37% 1.27% 1.27% 1.37% 0.93% 1.01% 1.00% 0.92% 
Japan 1.10% 0.87% 1.45% 1.02% 1.06% 0.89% 0.77% 0.86% 0.85% 0.97% 
1.12% 0.80% 1.17% 1.07% 1.07% 1.17% 0.77% 0.83% 0.83% 0.76% 
SIG 1% S1G 1% SIG 1% 
Netherlands 1.00% 0.89% 1.27% 0.92% 0.90% 0.88% 0.81% 
0.75% 0.84% 1.29% 
1.09% 0.75% 1.15% 1.04% 1.04% 1.13% 0.72% 0.77% 0.77% 0.72% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 1.06% 1.07% 1.33% 0.96% 0.90% 1.03% 0.83% 0.99% 1.10% 1.39% 
1.19% 0.86% 1.23% 1.15% 1.14% 1.22% 0.82% 0.89% 0.88% 0.82% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 0.85% 0.85% 1.11% 0.78% 0.69% 0.83% 0.78% 0.87% 0.86% 0.85% 
0.95% 0.66% 0.99% 0.92% 0.91% 0.98% 0.64% 0.69% 0.68% 0.64% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
UK 0.80% 0.71% 0.98% 0.84% 0.70% 0.67% 0.63% 0.71% 0.67% 0.85% 
0.87% 0.62% 0.90% 0.83% 0.83% 0.90% 0.60% 0.64% 0.64% 0.59% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
USA 0.81% 0.77% 1.00% 0.82% 0.77% 0.66% 0.59% 0.80% 0.79% 0.91% 
0.91% 0.63% 0.95% 0.87% 0.87% 0.94% 0.60% 0.65% 0.65% 0.60% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown in italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown In the table as "SIG 1 %", is 
based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5'" and 99.5" percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. Significance at 
the 5% level, shown In the table as "SIG 5%", is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5' and 97.5"' percentile 
values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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Table G-5 Mean Negative Price Returns in Stock Market Trends 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 01 02 03 04 
Australia -0.51% -0.77% -0.50% -0.55% -0.50% -0.46% -0.68% -0.66% -0.70% -1.02% 
-0.53% -0.73% -0.51% -0.55% -0.55% -0.51% -0.76% -0.70% -0.70% -0.75% 
SIG 1% 
Belgium -0.54% -0.91% -0.72% -0.54% -0.50% -0.44% -0.85% -0.78% -0.80% -1.14% 
-0.59% -0.90% -0.56% -0.61% -0.61% -0.55% -0.95% -0.85% -0.85% -0.94% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Canada -0.57% -0.95% -0.61% -0.54% -0.60% -0.52% -0.93% -0.82% -0.76% -1.25% 
-0.62% -0.93% -0.59% -0.64% -0.64% -0.59% -0.99% -0.88% -0.88% -0.98% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Denmark -0.56% -0.95% -0.54% -0.66% -0.55% -0.47% -0.82% -0.85% -0.91% -1.21% 
-0.63% -0.92% -0.60% -0.65% -0.65% -0.59% -0.97% -0.87% -0.87% -0.96% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
75% -0 20% -1 -0.83% -0.92% -0.70% -0.58% -1.05% -0.99% -1.19% -1.53% France . . 
-0.79% -1.15% -0.76% -0.82% -0.82% -0.76% -1.21% -1.10% -1.10% -1.20% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
80% -0 -1.44% -0.88% -0.86% -0.73% -0.74% -1.11 
% -1.26% -1.39% -1.94% Germany . 
-0.86% -1.29% -0.81% -0.89% -0.89% -0.81 
% -1.37% -1.22% -1.22% -1.35% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
90% -0 -1.43% -0.88% -0.99% -0.86% -0.84% -1.17% -1.28% -1.13% -2.08% Hong Kong . 
-0.92% -1.38% -0.87% -0.96% -0.96% -0.87% -1.46% -1.31% -1.32% -1.43% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Italy -0.91% -1.30% -0.90% -0.97% -0.96% -0.78% -1.14% -1.22% -1.16% -1.61% 
-0.94% -1.29% -0.90% -0.98% -0.97% -0.91% -1.35% -1.24% -1.24% -1.33% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Japan -0.77% -1.00% -0.64% -0.93% -0.77% -0.68% -0.85% -0.90% -1.01% -1.23% 
-0.74% -1.02% -0.71% -0.77% -0.77% -0.71% -1.06% -0.98% -0.99% -1.05% 
SIG 5% S101% SIG 1% 
Netherlands -0.76% -1.29% -1.00% -0.78% -0.71% -0.57% -1.04% -1.04% -1.20% -1.77% 
-0.77% -1.18% -0.74% -0.80% -0.80% -0.73% -1.25% -1.10% -1.12% -1.23% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
74% -0 -1 34% 88% -0 -0.84% -0.63% -0.61% -1.11% -1.10% -1.49% -1.64% Spain . . . 
-0.88% -1.25% -0.84% -0.91% -0.91% -0.84% -1.32% -1.18% -1.19% -1.30% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% S101% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland -0.60% -1.15% -0.63% -0.61% -0.64% -0.51 % -0.89% -1.10% -1.06% -1.51 
% 
-0.69% -1.05% -0.66% -0.72% -0.72% -0.66% -1.12% -0.99% -0.99% -1.10% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
UK -0.65% -0.99% -0.72% -0.69% -0.64% -0.53% -0.91% -0.91% -0.82% -1.29% 
-0.65% -0.94% -0.62% -0.67% -0.67% -0.61% -0.99% -0.89% -0.90% -0.98% 
SIG1% 
USA -0.59% -1.10% -0.56% -0.68% -0.57% -0.55% -0.89% -0.89% -1.11% -1.44% 
-0.65% -0.96% -0.62% -0.68% -0.67% -0.61% -1-01% -0-91% -0-91% -1.00% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown in italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown in the table as "SIG 1%", Is 
based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5th and 99.5" percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. Significance at 
the 5% level, shown in the table as "SIG W. is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile 
values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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Table G-6 Standard Deviation of Daily Price Returns 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 01 02 03 04 
Australia 0.77% 0.87% 0.89% 0.77% 0.74% 0.66% 0.72% 0.80% 0.83% 1.04% 
0.80% 0.84% 0.80% 0.80% 0.80% 0.79% 0.85% 0.83% 0.83% 0.84% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Belgium 0.93% 1.08% 1.22% 0.83% 0.84% 0.75% 1.02% 0.95% 1.03% 1.24% 
1.02% 1.04% 1.03% 0.99% 1.00% 1.02% 1.06% 1.01% 1.01% 1.05% 
SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Canada 0.90% 1.18% 1.05% 0.85% 0.83% 0.83% 1.13% 1.05% 1.06% 1.35% 
0.99% 1.10% 0.99% 0.98% 0.98% 0.98% 1.14% 1.05% 1.05% 1.12% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Denmark 0.91% 1.12% 0.97% 0.93% 0.85% 0.84% 0.96% 1.01% 1.15% 1.29% 
0.99% 1.07% 1.00% 0.99% 0.99% 0.98% 1.09% 1.04% 1.04% 1.08% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% S105% SIG 1% 
France 1.18% 1.40% 1.36% 1.22% 1.09% 1.00% 1.10% 1.24% 1.37% 1.74% 
1.28% 1.33% 1.28% 1.27% 1.27% 1.27% 1.34% 1.30% 1.30% 1.34% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Germany 1.26% 1.69% 1.56% 1.21% 1.11% 1.11% 1.30% 1.42% 1.63% 2.20% 
1.38% 1.48% 1.39% 1.36% 1.37% 1.38% 1.52% 1.45% 1.44% 1.50% 
SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Hong Kong 1.74% 1.68% 2.14% 1.75% 1.56% 1.39% 1.28% 1.49% 1.46% 2.18% 
1.77% 1.70% 1.82% 1.69% 1.71% 1.80% 1.74% 1.65% 1.66% 1.71% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Italy 1.45% 1.49% 1.59% 1.39% 1.44% 1.32% 1.21% 1.39% 1.45% 1.74% 
1.47% 1.48% 1.47% 1.46% 1.46% 1.47% 1.48% 1.47% 1.47% 1.46% 
S105% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Japan 1.29% 1.21% 1.47% 1.33% 1.25% 1.02% 1.02% 1.13% 1.19% 1.45% 
1.26% 1.20% 1.28% 1.24% 1.24% 1.27% 1.19% 1.19% 1.20% 1.19% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Netherlands 1.24% 1.54% 1.57% 1.19% 1.15% 0.96% 1.26% 1.19% 1.41% 2.07% 
1.31% 1.38% 1.34% 1.29% 1.29% 1.31% 1.41% 1.33% 1.34% 1.39% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Spain 1.22% 1.54% 1.48% 1.20% 1.03% 1.10% 1.25% 1.27% 1.63% 1.89% 
1.37% 1.41% 1.38% 1.37% 1.36% 1.36% 1.43% 1.38% 1.38% 1.41% 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
Switzerland 1.06% 1.36% 1.32% 1.01% 0.86% 0.95% 1.07% 1.31% 1.35% 1.58% 
1.16% 1.22% 1.17% 1.14% 1.14% 1.15% 1.26% 1.18% 1.18% 1.24% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
UK 1.00% 1.13% 1.17% 1.07% 0.90% 0.80% 1.00% 1.06% 0.97% 1.41% 
1.02% 1.07% 1.02% 1.01% 1.01% 1.01% 1.09% 1.04% 1.05% 1.08% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 1% 
USA 0.99% 1.26% 1.12% 1.06% 0.92% 0.81% 0.97% 1.09% 1.25% 1.55% 
1.08% 1.11% 1.09% 1.07%o 1.07% 1.07% 1.12% 1.08% 1.09% 1.12% 
SIG 5% SIG 1% SIG 5% S101% SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown in Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown In the table as "SIG 1%, Is 
based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5'" and 99.5m percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. Significance at 
the 5% level, shown in the table as "SIG 5%, is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5"' and 97.5"h percentile 
values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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Table G-7 Skewness of Price Returns in Stock Market Trends 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 01 02 03 04 
40 0 75 -0 0.33 0.05 0.24 -0.34 1.00 0.14 -0.42 -0.03 Australia . . 
0.32 -0.79 -0.05 0.22 0.21 -0.08 -0.29 -0.56 -0.56 -0.23 
1 02 53 -0 0.75 0.41 0.90 -0.23 -0.25 0.07 -0.32 0.59 Belgium . . 
0.98 -0.83 0.73 0.70 0.68 0.72 -0.31 -0.72 -0.72 -0.35 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Canada 0.42 -0.69 0.30 -0.01 -0.15 0.05 -0.26 0.34 0.18 -0.17 
0.56 -1.26 0.24 0.38 0.42 0.25 -0.72 -0.97 -1.00 -0.66 
SIG 1% SIG 5% 
Denmark 0.37 -0.47 0.38 -0.25 0.06 -0.18 0.27 0.04 -0.71 0.38 
0.33 -0.77 0.01 0.18 0.20 0.01 -0.28 -0.60 -0.63 -0.26 
SIG 5% 
18 0 19 -0 0.14 -0.17 -0.13 -0.24 0.63 -0.34 0.50 0.38 France . . 
0.53 -0.66 0.15 0.36 0.36 0.18 -0.13 -0.54 -0.55 -0.14 
SIG 1% SIG 1% 
0 60 -0.30 0.93 -0.38 0.32 0.04 -0.21 0.15 -0.19 0.79 Germany . 
0.60 -0.83 0.24 0.37 0.40 0.22 -0.37 -0.71 -0.70 -0.39 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 5% SIG 5% 
65 1 -1.13 1.18 2.15 1.15 -0.12 0.12 -0.85 0.01 0.23 Hong Kong . 
1.78 -1.05 1.32 1.24 1.31 1.27 -0.79 -0.78 -0.82 -0.78 
SIG 5% 
37 0 -0.30 0.05 0.17 -0.12 -0.03 0.64 0.10 -0.26 0.62 Italy . 
0.35 -0.37 -0.06 0.25 0.25 -0.08 0.12 -0.26 -0.26 0.11 
Japan 0.51 -0.11 0.09 0.19 0.04 -0.14 0.27 0.00 0.17 -0.15 
0.71 -0.30 0.19 0.53 0.58 0.23 0.02 -0.20 -0.21 0.01 
62 0 41 -0 24 0 0.72 0.72 0.30 0.19 0.19 -0.32 1.08 Netherlands . . . 
0.80 -0.96 0.46 0.61 0.63 0.47 -0.43 -0.81 -0.83 -0.48 
SIG 1% SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Spain 0.63 -0.18 0.12 0.23 0.31 
0.23 -0.22 0.27 -0.16 0.59 
0.46 -0.58 0.09 0.31 
0.33 0.09 -0.01 -0.44 -0.46 -0.02 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
Switzerland 1.34 -0.65 1.23 0.80 -0.12 1.26 
0.00 -0.55 -0.63 0.62 
0.97 -1.07 0.67 0.69 0.75 0.66 -0.60 -0.91 -0.89 -0.57 
SIG 5% SIG 5% 
UK 0.25 -0.39 0.02 0.27 0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.14 0.01 0.31 
0.45 -0.69 0.03 0.29 0.30 0.03 -0.23 -0.54 -0.59 -0.23 
SIG 5% 
USA 0.73 -0.41 0.77 0.53 0.79 -0.13 1.00 0.07 -0.12 1.40 
0.64 -0.78 0.31 0.46 0.49 0.29 -0.19 -0.62 -0.60 -0.20 
SIG 5% SIG 1% 
Bootstrap average values are shown in Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown In the table as "SIG 1%", is 
based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5" and 99.5"' percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. Significance at 
the 5% level, shown In the table as "SIG 5%", Is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5'h and 97.5th percentile 
values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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Table G-8 Kurtosis of Price Returns in Stock Market Trends 
Overall Bull Bear 
Bull Bear 01 02 03 04 01 02 Q3 04 
Australia 2.02 4.41 3.35 0.46 1.38 0.08 1.03 0.20 
3.05 6.25 
1.88 4.42 2.05 1.54 1.58 1.82 4.72 3.37 3.38 4.19 
Belgium 6.23 2.53 5.03 2.46 8.20 2.96 2.64 1.71 
3.03 2.50 
5.32 2.41 5.53 4.66 4.64 5.41 2.34 2.58 2.60 2.37 
Canada 3.70 4.84 3.24 3.21 3.68 3.96 8.68 2.44 1.98 4.27 
2.70 5.64 2.85 2.58 2.62 2.88 5.69 4.76 4.85 5.21 
SIG 5% 
Denmark 2.21 2.12 3.95 1.21 0.79 2.11 0.97 1.88 3.34 1.66 
2.11 2.57 2.27 1.99 1.98 2.21 2.82 2.33 2.48 2.57 
France 2.67 2.56 3.22 2.26 2.06 0.38 1.34 1.37 3.10 2.06 
2.64 2.09 2.93 2.41 2.39 2.82 2.24 2.08 2.11 2.19 
SIG 1% 
Germany 3.85 2.22 3.85 2.36 2.57 1.71 2.18 0.92 0.72 2.12 
3.28 2.64 3.57 3.01 3.03 3.47 2.61 2.66 2.63 2.68 
SIG 5% 
94 11 5.56 11.26 16.79 5.78 1.74 2.46 3.95 1.58 5.19 Hong Kong . 
11.65 5.11 10.38 8.21 8.52 10.19 5.04 4.26 4.53 4.98 
Italy 1.52 1.70 2.51 0.07 1.02 1.92 0.90 -0.14 1.44 2.64 
1.40 1.60 1.66 1.29 1.32 1.52 1.85 1.49 1.48 1.85 
SIG 1% 
Japan 3.34 1.48 3.25 3.49 2.59 1.60 0.94 0.15 0.40 2.01 
2.66 1.71 2.93 2.39 2.44 2.79 1.87 1.64 1.65 1.84 
SIG 5% 
Netherlands 4.40 2.96 2.88 4.29 6.31 1.73 3.91 1.53 1.67 2.29 
3.61 3.30 3.75 3.52 3.57 3.61 3.22 3.52 3.39 3.28 
Spain 2.70 1.80 2.14 2.31 1.83 3.40 2.26 0.42 1.12 1.80 
1.98 2.12 2.18 1.90 1.90 2.16 2.37 1.98 2.04 2.30 
Switzerland 7.50 2.81 5.82 4.93 1.54 12.94 1.38 1.24 4.80 2.61 
5.39 3.77 5.54 4.61 4.84 5.47 3.79 3.75 3.53 3.64 
SIG 1% 
UK 3.24 1.84 2.81 3.17 2.78 1.98 2.24 1.64 1.02 1.35 
2.13 2.39 2.38 2.04 2.01 2.29 2.49 2.34 2.42 2.44 
SIG 5% 
USA 3.57 2.52 2.65 3.17 4.59 3.02 2.32 0.83 0.50 3.65 
2.71 3.32 2.91 2.58 2.64 2.80 3.41 2.96 3.09 3.29 
SIG 5% 
Bootstrap average values are shown in Italics. Significance at the 1% level, shown in the table as "SIG 1%", is 
based on a two-tailed test using the 0.5"' and 99.5" percentile values of the bootstrap distribution. Significance at 
the 5% level, shown In the table as "SIG 5%", is based on a two-tailed test using the 2.5" and 97.5' percentile 
values of the bootstrap distribution. 
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